IV.—RIEHL ON "PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM".¹

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THE rich Kantian literature of the last twenty years has produced no work of greater significance than Prof. A. Riehl's elaborate study of the Critical Method and application of it to questions of general philosophy. *Der philosophische Kriticismus*, mentioned but not before examined in MIND, is much more than a contribution to the better understanding of the Kantian philosophy. Though resting upon a careful and highly successful historical interpretation of the Kantian system, the work has importance for the most part as an attempt to apply the fundamental conception of the critical method, purified from all extraneous matter, to the general problems of the theory of knowledge in the first instance, and in the second instance to the concrete problems that have at all times formed the staple of metaphysical discussion. It would not be altogether inaccurate to say that the broad divisions into which this application of the critical method naturally falls correspond to the familiar rubrics of the Kantian *Kritik*. But the treatment is characterised by so much freshness and originality of conception, so comprehensive an insight into the relations of philosophical and scientific problems, and so close a reference to the general tenor of modern science, as to render it in no sense a mere re-presentation of the work already achieved by Kant.

In regard to the work generally, it is unnecessary to say more than that at all points the author exhibits completeness of knowledge and maturity of philosophical reflection. The work is that of a genuine thinker who has spared no effort to render it adequate to the far-reaching importance of the problems involved. But an expression of special thanks may be allowed for the great excellence of Prof. Riehl's style. He is everywhere lucid and intelligible, firm and precise in the use of terms, and a master in the art of condensed logical exposition. The matter he has to offer

¹ *Der philosophische Kriticismus und seine Bedeutung für die positive Wissenschaft*: Bd. i. "Geschichte u. Methode des philosophischen Kriticismus," 1876; Bd. ii. Th. 1, "Die sinnlichen u. logischen Grundlagen der Erkenntniss," 1879; Bd. ii. Th. 2, "Zur Wissenschaftstheorie u. Metaphysik," 1887. [For convenience, the last part shall be cited as vol. iii.] Leipzig: W. Engelmann.

may have its difficulties; the manner of presentation is invariably an aid rather than an obstacle to comprehension.

A work of so extensive a range as Prof. Riehl's, embracing in some form all the problems of theoretical philosophy, cannot in any critical survey be satisfactorily dealt with on all its sides. As its main significance may be thought to consist rather in the original treatment of general problems than in the historical review of pre-Kantian and Kantian philosophy on which the treatment is based, all that falls within vol. i. may meantime be dismissed with a general indication of its contents. The author, holding that philosophy is practically identical with theory of knowledge (a brief formula of which the work itself is the expanded interpretation and of which the full bearings will presently be noted), finds in Locke's *Essay* the first great contribution to the establishment of the critical method and its principles, in Hume an important though inadequate and one-sided development of the same, and in Kant, with much imperfection and some important defects, the matured consciousness of the nature and consequences of the method itself. Sufficient notice is at the same time extended to such minor preparations for the Critical Philosophy as may be thought to have influenced the final statement of it in Kant's work,—in Wolff, Lambert and Tetens. The interest of the historical review centres in Hume and Kant. Of the former, Prof. Riehl's account is one of the best and most thorough known to me. It is distinguished by its completeness and fairness, and, in particular, it devotes the attention and care the matter deserves to Hume's elaborate application of his fundamental principles to the criticism of mathematical science. The second part of the first book of the *Treatise* has experienced undeserved neglect at the hands of historians of philosophy, who have generally contented themselves with accepting as adequate representation of Hume's views on mathematics the brief, misleading and commonly misconceived expressions in the *Inquiry*. On some points in Prof. Riehl's interpretation of Hume on this matter there may be differences of opinion, not without importance in so fundamental a question; and it may be doubted whether, in the satisfaction of finding so much of the critical method in Hume, he has laid sufficient stress on the peculiar imperfections of the foundation on which Hume's doctrine rests; but such possible differences and doubts demand a longer historical statement than can here be accorded to them. In like manner, there must meantime be left aside any examination of the most important section of the historical

volume, that in which the essence of the critical method as conceived by Kant is formally expounded. What Prof. Riehl understands this essence to be will appear in the statement of his own views, which are developed from it: with what justice it is assigned to Kant, and what is the worth of the adverse criticism directed upon certain portions of the Kantian system, not in Prof. Riehl's judgment compatible with it, are questions deserving separate and detailed treatment. The rock of offence is found in Kant's mode of viewing things-in-themselves and noumena, a matter sufficiently fundamental not only for interpretation of Kant, but for philosophy at large; and, though it would be an inadequate representation of Prof. Riehl's view simply to class him with the many who have accepted the apparently negative results of the Kantian criticism of knowledge and rejected such positive addenda as Kant seemed to make in regard to these problematical entities, the reference may be allowed here as a provisional indication of the historical view taken by him. His view regarding the question itself will become sufficiently apparent in the statement of his theory of knowledge.

The proverbial danger that lurks in general statements perhaps nowhere more easily conceals itself than in those introductory expressions with which a philosophical investigator defines the point of view to be occupied by him and the problem he proposes to himself. Acute appreciation of the danger is no guarantee of success in avoidance of it; the historian of philosophy has to record the failure of many a well-intentioned effort to shake off all entanglements of pre-suppositions and to start from absolutely simple and unambiguous fact, failures due solely to the important yet readily ignored consideration that simple and unambiguous facts are not given with these desirable qualities, but have to be reached by the long and slippery path of reflective analysis. A standpoint, as the Germans phrase it, is not the beginning but the end of the journey; a problem well put is, in philosophy, much more than half the solution of it.

These precautionary remarks are by no means intended to convey any covert censure on the manner in which Prof. Riehl has performed the task of formally acquainting the reader with the general nature of the philosophic position occupied by him, with the conception he has formed of the nature and functions of philosophy, and with the relations in which his own method and aims stand to those of other thinkers, philosophic in the narrower sense or scientific. But they are intended to account in a general way

for the particular difficulty I experience in convincing myself that I thoroughly comprehend the author's drift in many of his introductory statements, and to form a general plea for exculpation if it should turn out that in some essential points I have failed to do justice to his meaning.

"Philosophy is the science and criticism of knowledge" (iii. 1). Its business is to unfold the essence of knowledge, to determine the significance of experience and science. Logic, which has also to do with knowledge, is for the most part descriptive, and is differentiated from philosophy by absence of that critical reference to the reality of knowledge which is fundamental and characteristic in philosophical analysis. Psychology is a branch of concrete or positive science, distinct from and related to philosophy in exactly the same general fashion as the positive sciences of nature.

Philosophy, then, is no new way of knowing objects; it increases in no respect the domain of ascertained facts which positive science, natural or mental, may bring before us. Philosophy is no *Weltanschauungslehre*; it has to follow science, and may be regarded as the self-consciousness of scientific thinking.¹

The notion of knowledge, then, is the foundation on which the whole rests: with a definition or description of knowledge, it is natural that the work should begin. Accordingly, in the introductory chapter of the second volume, Prof. Riehl lays out his formal statement of the characters essential to knowledge and of the ultimate assumptions involved in the fact or act of knowing. The author is well aware that great part of such preliminary matter must await its full justification from later, more developed investigations into the contents of what is known. He evidently does not share the view that a theory of knowledge can be constructed without the aid of assumptions, or that by dint of mere meditation on the idea of knowing satisfactory insight into the problem of knowledge is to be attained.

Knowledge in the special sense, *Erkenntniss*, is characterised as *mediate*, i.e., involving a movement of thought from one content apprehended to another—a movement even if the result be only a transformation of the initial content; as accompanied with consciousness of the process involved and with reflection; and as having the concomitant feeling

¹ Vol. iii., c. 1. I am not able to see the connexion between this view of theoretical philosophy and the brief account given (pp. 20-21) of practical philosophy. It appears to me that all the questions of practical philosophy there referred to belong to positive science, unless there be some ground of distinction in reserve which I do not apprehend.

of belief or conviction (ii. 1). It is in form a judgment (ii. 16).

It is evident that such a description of knowledge, though possibly useful for didactic purposes, involves notions so much more general than itself, and so far from being of settled and accepted significance, that it cannot be taken for the foundation of the superstructure. It is rather the expression of a final result which may be expected to emerge in the course of the discussion. Nor do the truly determining aspects of the problem of knowledge appear with sufficient explicitness in it. The notion of belief or conviction may be intended to cover the objective reference which is the peculiar mark of the content known ; it can do so only if there has been previously such research into the nature and meaning of objectivity in knowledge, and the relation thereto of the inner process called *conviction*, as shall entitle us to use the notion with complete insight into its significance. It is rather in the explanations offered of the more general terms appearing in the definition of knowledge, of *consciousness*, *experience* and the like, briefly, in the various elements constituting what the author calls the standpoint of Critical Realism, that we are to look for the true foundation of his theory of knowledge. The point of view of Critical Realism is that assumed by the author ; the main burden of his theory of knowledge is the explanation and justification of it. The barest statement of the point of view is surrounded with difficulties, and one can hardly hope to be quite successful in reproducing in words other than those of the author what seems to be its import.¹

Experience is, briefly, the sum of all the effects produced by things on our consciousness. The world of consciousness, which is the world of experience, contains only phenomena, the appearances of things. Within that world arises, and is developed under conditions which we can trace, the important distinction of subjective and objective. But this distinction is not equivalent to that between consciousness and the independent reality of things. To be an object and to be an existing real thing are notions wholly distinct from one another. The first is explicable, and is only explicable in terms of consciousness ; the second is explicable, and only explicable in terms implying independence of and difference from consciousness. It is impossible for us to work out consistently the hypothesis that the world of consciousness

¹ See ii. 2-22, iii. 28-39, 53-61, and generally the chapter on the reality of the external world, iii. 128-176.

is absolute, is the sum-total of reality. In the mass, and in all details, conscious experience exhibits itself as relative to and conditioned by the independent world of real existence.

Just by reason of this dependent, relative character of conscious experience does there arise the necessity for a theory of knowledge, for an attempt to determine systematically how far the connexions among the elements of consciousness can have assigned to them worth as means of apprehending the nature and relations of that which is. Conscious experience has its own general laws, a structure or form imposed upon it from its very nature, as always and throughout the experience of one thinking subject. The Kantian doctrine of the unity of experience, though perhaps susceptible of modifications in detail, and though certainly requiring a radical alteration as regards its interpretation, expresses, nevertheless, the deepest, most fundamental trait of consciousness. The notions by which we express in abstract fashion the ultimate conditions imposed on conscious experience by the unity and identity of the subject, need by no means have only that subjective validity allowed to them by Kant. They are more than ways in which the subjective activity organises its experience. Just as they express the ultimate forms of connexion among the elements which enter into knowledge, so they may be held at the same time to express the relations of real, extra-mental existence. For consciousness, with its ultimate nature, forms a part of the great whole of real existence, and it may be maintained that in its structure it exhibits the characteristics imposed upon it by its relation to the whole. Were there not an essential conformity between real relations and the ultimate forms of consciousness, the real could in no way enter into consciousness.¹

The statement of the general point of view enables us to form a clear idea of the special lines which the detailed investigation has to follow, and at the same time brings sharply before us the nature of the problem involved throughout the whole treatment. Knowledge as a whole is to be analysed, not psychologically or in regard to the natural conditions of its growth, but logically or epistemologically, in regard to its significance as disclosing the relations of the ultimate reality. With this analysis the second volume is occupied. The results of that analysis fall then to be considered in their general aspect as metaphysical propositions, declaratory of the nature of the real, and there-

¹ See for this last extremely important point, ii. 28-4, iii. 819-20.

fore raising the old familiar questions of speculation. The treatment of these questions in the light of the analysis of knowledge occupies the third volume. Throughout there appears the problem, how we are to interpret the reference to reality which plays so significant a part in the theory of knowledge. The problem is certainly no new one—it is as old as speculative philosophy—but it is always of interest to follow the way in which a thinker, with new lights, with improved methods, approaches it.

The first important step towards Prof. Riehl's solution of this question is to be discerned in the chapter on Sensation, for I suppose that by the ambiguous English term *sensation* one must translate the equally ambiguous German *Empfindung*. Were the term *apprehension* recognised as of general import, as indicating only the attitude of the subject in having a more or less definite content before it, as implying, therefore, nothing in regard to the psychically simple or complex character of the act of apprehending, and as embracing a variety of species under it constituted by the differing conditions under which it comes about, *sense-apprehension* would be the more correct and more intelligible rendering for *Empfindung*. Rejecting the views regarding sensation of Condillac and Herbart on the one hand, and of Kant on the other, Prof. Riehl marks out for inquiry (a) the nature of the process of sensation, (b) the relation of sense-qualities to the character of the stimuli by which they arise, (c) the significance of sensations in building up the peculiar form of conscious experience, the antithesis of object and subject. In respect to the first point, his answer is that the process of sensation is essentially complex—complex in no fewer than three ways: (1) as involving factors distinct in psychical character; (2) as arising only through change, difference; and (3) as containing in the form of a judgment the primitive assertion of existence, real, extra-mental being.

Every sensation is a combination, an intimate union of two factors, the quality apprehended and the mode of feeling with which it is apprehended, a mode "standing in relation to the Intensity of the sensation, and dependent partly on the strength of the stimulation, partly on the strength of the psychical activity of apprehension". Every type of sensation unites these constituents; the union and its peculiarity are realised with greatest distinctness in the sensations of Movement, by which, I take it, Prof. Riehl means what is sometimes designated Active Touch. There "we have the sensations of tension and resistance only in proportion to our feelings of striving; and, conversely,

we become aware of these feelings only in relation to the sensuously apprehended resistance". With the utmost distinctness is exhibited in this mode of sensation the all-important opposition of the two constituent factors. In sensation, then, consciousness is not merely receptive, it is at the same time spontaneously active (*selbstthätig*), for Feeling is the reaction of consciousness on the qualitative contents of sense-presentations.

With much of this account of sense-apprehension I am in entire agreement, and shall only note in passing wherein I think it requires a more explicit statement in order to make its character unmistakable. I cannot make clear to myself what exactly Prof. Riehl includes under the term *Feeling*. "All actual sensation," he writes, "is at the same time *felt*; it never forms a wholly indifferent state or content of consciousness. We have thus a *feeling* of seeing which marks that off from the mere idea of seeing." Now the word "indifferent" which appears in the first of these sentences does not seem to me at all appropriate to express what is implied in the second, if I understand the second rightly. "Indifferent" applies strictly to the familiar rubrics of the pleasurable and painful, which psychologists have been accustomed to use as the comprehensive categories of feeling. But neither with pleasurable nor painful has the *feeling* of seeing or the feelings of the activity of accommodating the ear for sounds (another of Prof. Riehl's examples) anything in common. If Prof. Riehl means that feeling has a range and significance extending beyond the pleasurable and painful, as seems to be implied in the description of pleasure and pain as stronger degrees of feeling (p. 63), if he is serious with his generalisation of it as the "reaction of consciousness," a process I do not pretend to understand, it would have been well, in view of the high importance attached to the function assigned to feeling, to have given a fuller account of it. Nor am I satisfied with what is briefly, almost casually, said of the "psychical activity of apprehending the stimulus". I quite agree in regarding the phase of mental life called sense-apprehension as a mode of activity, and in thinking that our primitive conceptions of activity are drawn from experiences of this inner life; but when the activity of sense-apprehension is separated from the other components of the complete fact, and is regarded as having an intensity or strength of its own which, apparently, may vary, I am of opinion that the fullest psychological analysis is needed in order to avoid misconception.

Sensation is not only complex as uniting feeling and

qualitative content : it further exhibits complexity as being in essence of the nature of a judgment. In order that a sensation should come about, there must be a previous stimulation, of which we are sensuously unaware, but through which, and in relation to which, the new stimulation is apprehended. "That of which we are conscious in sensation is the difference, the relation of two stimulations, which only by their co-operation yield the product, *sensation*" (p. 41). "Every sensation is a process of becoming aware (*das Bewusstwerden*) of the definite difference between two stimulations" (p. 71). The stimulation or sensation of which we are unaware is the indispensable condition for the consciousness of the sensation of which we are aware ; the first stands to the second in the same relation in which the apperceiving representation stands to that apperceived ; and as the mental movement in the case of apperception is admittedly a judgment, the form of the act of sensation is likewise to be called a judgment.

With most of this exposition I find myself in disagreement, and I am still more sceptical as to the consequences which Prof. Riehl proceeds to evolve from it. For he regards the facts just noted as clearing up the "characteristic and epistemologically weighty feature of sensation," that with every sensation there goes "the immediate consciousness of its relation to something which is not sensuously apprehended". This *something*, he insists, is not to be regarded as identical with or as explicable by the objective character which we come to assign to the qualitative content apprehended. Sense-contents are doubtless regarded as not-ourselves, but in addition they are referred to something not-themselves. An original *positing*, or recognition of existence, not of or in but other than the sense-content, is combined with every act of sense-apprehension. Sensation cannot be regarded as absolute ; from its mode of origination it can only have the significance of a property of something existing (*Eigenschaft von Etwas*). With this original positing of existence goes the peculiar mass of feeling constituting Belief, which feeling, again, appears to be identified with the feelings of innervation (p. 45). It appears to me that in the view thus taken of sense-apprehension certain knots are rather cut than fairly untied. Evidently much of any future discussion respecting the real worth of knowledge is determined by what is here said regarding sensation : indeed, without qualification, it may be said that the whole decision in regard to such real worth is contained in the decision regarding sense, for Riehl is perfectly definite in maintaining that

all the more elaborate processes of perceiving, thinking, reasoning, rest, so far as reference to reality is concerned, on sensation. In the development of knowledge we may make more distinct and adequate our conceptions of the real, but in so doing we only unfold what is implicitly contained in sense.

The resemblance of this acceptance of sense to certain cardinal doctrines of Leibniz leads naturally to a critical remark on the earlier thinker which enables Prof. Riehl to make more precise his own view (iii. 171). The Leibnizian doctrine, it is insisted, can offer no explanation in terms of its own assumptions of the objective reference taken to be involved in the *Vorstellungen* of the Monad. To start with the conception of the monad as a being whose whole activity is *presentation* (*das Vorstellen*) precludes any explanation of a *presented content*. At best such content can be no more than like presentative activity of other monads. It appears to me, however, that the objection so stated is too general. I doubt if Leibniz would have accepted the severance between *presenting* and *presented* on which it turns. I think he would have maintained the old view that no conception whatsoever can be formed of *presenting* or *apprehending*, in even its most obscure mode, which does not involve as correlate the *presented* or *apprehended*. Where there is difference, and difference doubtless there is, it concerns the most of existence to be ascribed to the contents presented or apprehended. With Leibniz the element of not-self, of external reality, is for each monad the limiting, passive, given character of those impressions which, though called perceptions, are held to exist either as wholly beyond consciousness, or, if within consciousness, yet not to involve the opposition of self or subject and not-self or object. With Leibniz, moreover, the passive element discharges a function entirely similar to that which Prof. Riehl has to assign to sensation. It is for Leibniz the expression of the real relation in which each monad stands to the whole: it is the bond of union among the monads whereby they form a system of compossible realities. With Prof. Riehl sensation is a result of the actions and reactions of the real (for though the expressions used often lend themselves all too easily to the naturalist or biological view, which takes the organic body and its extra-organic stimuli as the agents involved, Prof. Riehl interprets both body and extra-organic things as only phenomenal of the ultimate reality); and, as from sensation so conceived there develops the distinction of subjective and objective, sensation in its primitive character is the general

correlate of reality. The difference which remains can be put succinctly enough. With Leibniz, the given, passive, limiting nature of sense-affection is regarded as containing in itself and as warranting the reference to reality other than the sentient monad; with Prof. Riehl, the same characteristics are regarded as containing in themselves and as warranting a reference to reality which is *other than sensation itself*.

I trust I am not misapprehending Prof. Riehl in taking the last expression as being the feature of his doctrine both of sense and of consciousness generally. He seems to me to say that in every act of sense-apprehension there is contained a judgment that something is which is other than, distinct from, antithetic to the sense-content apprehended. Such a view deserves closest scrutiny and closest examination on its own ground. Psychological analysis of the various components making up the act of sense can do no more than bring out more clearly the essential peculiarity of this all-important feature. No explanation of it, in terms of the phenomenal experiences within consciousness, is possible. Accordingly, one must insist that all appeal to the given, compulsory character of the content apprehended is beside the question. These marks can serve only to distinguish, in phenomenal experience, what is sensation from what simulates sense, and I observe, with some surprise, that Prof. Riehl maintains no one can imagine that he is sensuously affected. There must be dismissed also, as not touching the heart of the question, all appeal to active movement as an ingredient in sense-apprehension. For movement is itself phenomenal, and, however important as giving a clue to what we are to understand by the real, can hardly be regarded as itself the act of positing a real distinct from itself.

In order to obtain further light on so important a matter, I turn to certain distinctions on which Prof. Riehl lays stress, and which in themselves are of much general interest. In the first place, throughout the discussion of the grounds for allowing reality to the external world, the notion of *being* (*Sein*) is carefully distinguished from the notion of *being an object* (*Object sein*), and their relation is so explained as to leave no doubt that it corresponds exactly to the familiar scholastic and Cartesian distinction between formal and objective existence, a distinction which more modern theories of knowledge have done ill to drop. *Being* is the real, absolute existence of the thing, absolute in the sense of being apart from, other than, and independent of consciousness. *Being*

an object is the form which apprehension of Being takes in consciousness under the two-fold sets of conditions—those of consciousness in general, those of special affection of sense in particular. *Being an object* is invariably relative: relative not only to subject-being, since it is developed in strictest correlation with that, but also to the real independent existence which is referred to in it. Thus *Object sein* and Phenomenon come to mean much the same in Prof. Riehl's terminology, and it is possible for him to distinguish phenomenon from *Vorstellung*, which ambiguous term, so far as I can gather, he would confine to *re-presentations* resting on and formed from sense-affections. It is true, his language here is not more accurate than that of the majority of writers on psychology and theory of knowledge, and one might feel inclined to insist that such a phrase as occurs on iii., p. 182—"natural phenomena are only known to us in the form of *Vorstellungen*, consequently as psychical processes"—indicates a deeper confusion than that of language.

As the point is one of very great significance, a further remark may be permitted on it. When it is said that objects perceived are complexes of sensation arranged in space- and time-relations, the plain man is much perplexed, and his perplexity is not removed by the reason advanced for the statement, that whatsoever he knows lies within consciousness, that perceptions, sensations and the like are facts of consciousness, and that consciousness cannot be transcended. I do not ascribe all these reasons to Prof. Riehl, though the definition of Perception is his, for he has very emphatically expressed his disapproval of them, and has most excellently commented on the wholly metaphorical sense of such expressions as *in* or *out of* consciousness. But I think he has not gone far enough, and that there is more to be said for the plain man and his perplexity. There runs a double sense through all the favourite shibboleths of subjective idealism. On the one hand, consciousness is spoken of as the way of knowing; on the other hand, it is spoken of as a *fact*, or series of facts. In the second sense, it may be appropriate to use of it those objective terms by which we are in the habit of describing things or events; in the first sense, all use of such terms is inappropriate and hopelessly misleading. It is unquestionably difficult to find and to remain faithful to forms of expression which shall only indicate the first of these senses. The tendency to drift into objective phraseology is almost inevitable, and yet one would be inclined to go the length of saying that just in so far as a phase of consciousness is conceived of as a fact, an occur-

rence, in so far it ceases to have significance as an item of knowing, as a way in which knowledge is had. Its existence, in other words, plays no part in the apprehension which, one may perhaps legitimately say, is had through means of it. I may illustrate the distinction adverted to by referring to Mr. H. Spencer's interesting discussion of Realism. When Mr. Spencer tells us that the subject consists of faint states of consciousness, the object of vivid states, he is describing both in objective terms and noting such characteristics as might be observed by a mind apprehending both. But, when he tells us that "the thing primarily known is not that a sensation has been experienced, but that there exists an outer object," he is dealing with what can never be exhibited or conceived in the fashion of a fact, and in which the existence of a sensation as a fact plays no part. So far, then, from admitting that apprehension cannot transcend consciousness, one might say that if consciousness be conceived in objective terms as a series of facts, all apprehension transcends it. Consciousness so regarded is a part—an extremely complicated and involved part—of what we know. I will add that its complexity seems to me too frequently overlooked, and that inconceivable harm to philosophy generally, and to psychology in particular, has attended the familiar correlation of outer and inner phenomena, objects of outer sense and objects of inner sense. With fatal facility, sensations, presentations and the like are treated as objects to which the subject may attend, which have objective relations to one another, and which are viewed as separate entities.

It appears to me only a form of the same confusion of thought when a quasi-existence is assigned to what are called phenomena. Riehl distinguishes in a manner I do not quite understand *Phenomenon* and *Vorstellung* (iii. 152). Both subject and object he says are phenomena, and that in the only intelligible sense of the term, as including in their significance the reference to that which appears. If he only means to oppose the secondary and derivate experience given in representations to the direct and vivid experience of sensation, feeling and perception, there is not much to object to, though I do not in the least understand what the real is that manifests itself in the subject. For, after all, the special significance assigned by us to *Vorstellungen*, in the sense of representations, is acquired, not original; given to it by experience, not contained as an integral part of the content represented. But, allowing this to pass, one may fairly ask what is the exact nature

of the addition made to complexes of sensation, called objects perceived, when these are designated phenomena. It seems to me as if a two-fold answer to this was given by Prof. Riehl. On the one hand, he is constant in insisting that sensation as such involves position of the real other than sensation, that *being* is no predicate of thought but is only *felt, experienced*, and that thus there comes about the phenomenal aspect of the percept. Phenomenality is, so to speak, given in and with the act of sensation. On the other hand, developing his view of the immediate, not secondary or inferential apprehension of a real external world, he advances as grounds "two incontestable facts of consciousness, the dependent character of consciousness in sensation and perception and the real existence of social or altruistic feelings" (iii. 172). I cannot attach much weight to the latter of these facts, and, generally speaking, the stress laid on the social factor seems to me unnecessary. There can be no doubt that, in the formation of that highly articulated representation or, better, conception of the outer world to which the matured consciousness attains, what may roughly be called the social factor plays an important part, but its function seems to me secondary and derivative, capable of having its history traced and so explained. The reduction of the "transcendental" consciousness to notions, or empirical conceptions, may certainly be largely facilitated by the operation of the conditions called social, but it seems to me an error to trace its origin to these conditions (iii. 165 n.).

I cannot determine whether or not Prof. Riehl identifies the "dependent" character of consciousness in sense and perception with the original and simple positing of the real. The identification would seem to me an error; for the characteristics which compose it are themselves somewhat complicated data of consciousness, and yield their result only through reflective interpretation. Probably, then, the whole stress of the contention respecting the external world rests on this original position of extra-sensational reality, which is, at the same time, recognition of the character of the sense-content apprehended as phenomenal. But if so, then there are two questions that press for answer. First, is the position explicable by reference to the psychological characteristics of sensation; in other words, is the character of sensation as such the determining element? Secondly, are we entitled to describe complexes of sensation as phenomena? As regards the first, I take the view briefly expressed by Kant: "that it is an affection of sense in me

constitutes in no way a reference of the presentation to any object," and would carry it further. All that concerns the sensation as an affection in me becomes matter of knowledge only in the course of that development of mind whereby the subjective individual life of the self is severed from the total complex of experience, and only contributes indirectly to enable us to determine further the general marks of the object apprehended. The *position* involved in the sense-affection is due not, it seems to me, to the peculiarities of that affection as produced, dependent, constrained or what not, but to the thought of which the true whole concerned, the act of sense-apprehension, is a specially conditioned form. I can form no conception of an act of apprehension which is not the apprehension of a "somewhat," an object therefore, but it seems to me evident that the said "somewhat" is neither the "sense-affection" nor a "real other than the sense-affection". Not the former, for that only becomes an object when apprehended as one phase in the temporal sequence of the inner life; not the latter, for the data by which the discrimination of real from sense-affection is effected are not there given.

What do we mean by describing complexes of sensation as phenomena? I have already objected to the phraseology which describes complexes of sensations as the objects apprehended in sense-perception, but at present I am only concerned to draw attention to the quasi-existence which is implied in the term phenomenon. It is an implication that runs in a perplexing fashion through the whole of Kant's *Kritik*, and the wonderful difficulties of exposition to which it leads can be most clearly discovered in the curious speculations contained in his posthumous work. Nor is the perplexity confined to modern and more psychological philosophising. It is at bottom the difficulty that the Platonic theory encounters in dealing with the particulars of sense-perception. The complication seems to me false. There is no predication of existence involved in the term phenomenon. I put aside as wholly irrelevant the consideration that our states of consciousness or acts of apprehension are produced, are dependent in their origin and relation to one another. The produced character of the act of apprehension, even if we had a clearer idea of the process than we possess, forms no part of the content apprehended. That content apprehended is certainly to be distinguished from the real, but not as though it were one fact set alongside another. The act of apprehension is only to be understood as involving this two-fold aspect—appre-

hending and the content apprehended, and these are not two distinct existences. I should even go so far as to think that recognition of the act of apprehending *as an act* is a secondary and derivative feature. That our apprehension, then, is phenomenal means no more than that it is apprehension of reality, and that it is as such distinct from reality. Phenomena do not intervene as a *tertium quid*, and when we speak of phenomena, contrasting them with the real, we mean, I think, only to lay stress on the exceedingly partial, fragmentary character of the picture which we gradually form of the inter-connected whole we style the real. There are many expressions in Prof. Riehl's treatment which lead me to think that in substance we are not far from agreement, but in the mode of exposition I find much to which I take exception, and there are some special doctrines which I cannot reconcile with the view here taken.

The fundamental position being granted, that in consciousness, and pre-eminently in the phase of consciousness called sense-apprehension, there is direct reference to a real other than consciousness,—much follows with comparative ease in regard to the limiting, objectively valid notions of experience. The qualitative differences of sensations point to ultimate differences in the characteristics of the real stimuli that give rise to sensation. The prevailing tendency to interpret all difference as quantitative merely, has its universal scope assigned to it through the easy confusion between conditions of existence and conditions of intelligibility. We only understand when we have reduced the manifold presented to a unity of conception, and the uniting conception by which we express to ourselves the ultimate relations of the real is naturally based on the formal and most general aspects which we apprehend in phenomena. But it is impossible to regard the mechanical form of the real as exhausting its nature. The qualitative differences we discover in our apprehension of the real must correspond to qualitative variations in the real itself.

Moreover, just as we find ourselves in sense-apprehension constrained to accept sense-contents as given by and corresponding to the real, so we are constrained to accept and to interpret, as in like manner indicative of the real, the numerical multiplicity, the coexistences and the sequences of the contents of sense. It is true the representation of these relations is dependent on the unity of consciousness, and is possible only for a consciousness aware of its own continuous identity, but the relations themselves are emphatically *given*, not constructed, belong to sense, not to

representation. "The relations of sensations, their definite coexistence and sequence, impress consciousness just as sensations themselves do; we feel this impression in the constraint which the definiteness of empirical multiplicities imposes on our perceptive consciousness" (ii. 104). In these relations, too, consists the empirical element of the representations Time and Space.

The analysis of Time and Space is carried out with great care and minuteness, and it forms, in some respects, the most original and valuable portion of Prof. Riehl's work. A brief *résumé*, such as can here be given, will convey but an inadequate conception of the care and circumspection with which the work is done. Selecting Time for first treatment, as being the fundamental idea of the two, Riehl signals the two-fold element implied in it, permanence and sequence; points to the real conditions of these in the uniformity and continuity of consciousness on the one hand, and the actual, empirically given sequence of sensations on the other hand; and traces the formal qualities of our Time-representation, its unity, homogeneity, continuity, to the recognition of unity of consciousness in the apperception of successive sensations. In a most interesting fashion he draws attention to the psychological variations in the clearness with which consciousness of self comes about and connects with these the changes in our Time-representation from its first crude stage as little more than Time-perception up to the abstract notion of mathematical Time. Time, then, though conditioned by the unity of consciousness, and therefore having an aspect only to be interpreted in terms of consciousness, contains likewise an empirical side, and so has objective significance. It is neither pure form of consciousness nor merely subjective. The empirically definite relations of Time point clearly to relations of the real which are manifested in Time. Real things, what affect consciousness, must be at least simultaneous with their phenomenal appearance in consciousness, and it may, therefore, be reasonably assumed that phenomenal sequence points to real sequence. Time, moreover, is a real agent; "it changes the matter of perception, and, therefore, can be no mere form of representation". The familiar facts of *Zeit-verschiebung* are directly, easily, perhaps only, explicable by assigning to Time an objective character.

With many portions of this account of the Time-representation I cannot bring myself to agree. The phenomena of *Zeit-verschiebung* appear to me to point only to the easily made confusion between the perceptive and the

imaginative portions of our experience, and to furnish the most conclusive reply to Prof. Riehl's hypothesis that the subject cannot *imagine* that he is sensuously affected. That he should be capable of such imagination appears to me most intelligible. For, after all, the distinction between real and imaginary in sensuous experience is empirical only. The subject who dates an impression before it has actually occurred has no more than the vivid representation of an unimpressed content which he locates without hesitation in the empirical series of sensations co-existing with it. Again, that the real should be simultaneous with its phenomenal appearance in consciousness is only capable of interpretation if it be assumed that real and phenomenon are alike objects of consciousness. So to designate them is to fall into the error above noted, of erecting the content of perception into an object with a quasi-existence. There are not, as it seems to me, three distinct facts—real, phenomenon, act of apprehending—but two only. The phenomenon has no more than a fictitious existence conferred upon it by an act of our own abstraction. Further, I can attach no precise meaning to the view that Time is a real agent, concerned in altering the contents of perception. The "summation of effects" which Prof. Riehl adduces as the characteristic feature of development, and as proof of the real efficacy of Time, is perfectly explicable without such a curious hypothesis. That the real changes one would readily allow, and one would further insist that such change is by no means to be conceived of after the fashion of our Time-image; but to allow efficacy in production of change to Time is a position which has neither reasons in its favour nor coherence with the general doctrine of the apprehension of Time. I would observe, lastly, that I do not think there is so much difference between the account of Time here given and the Kantian doctrine so sharply criticised by Prof. Riehl. I do not think Kant overlooked, or needed to overlook, the empirically given nature of sequence, but I imagine he was justified in asserting that representation of these empirical facts, recognition of sequence *as* sequence, was not to be explained by simply pointing to the empirical facts. These, after all, however familiar to us, have a nature only assigned to them by abstraction from the more concrete and complicated acts of our perception. The whole exposition given by Prof. Riehl tends to accentuate unduly the mechanical interpretation of the connexion between reality and consciousness into which, indeed, the theory seems more than once to fall.

I have no objection to the distinction drawn between association and apperception, but I would press that the nature of apperception, which is left in great obscurity, might well have been more thoroughly investigated; that the significance of unity of apperception is insufficiently determined; that the relation between the unity of consciousness and the empirical contents of the permanent self is by no means clear; and finally, that the notion of *permanence* cannot be regarded as legitimately based on the mere fact that some contents of the inner life remain unchanged, while others fluctuate. To describe this relatively greater duration of some mental facts as permanence, and in any way to correlate it with the constancy of matter, seems to me a hasty analysis.

The same distinction between formal and empirical elements as has been used in respect to Time is applied to Space. What is formal and, so to speak, *a priori* in our space-notions is the result of the unity of consciousness in the varied experiences of coexisting sensations. All that characterises space can be explained by reference to the functional activity of our uniting consciousness taken in conjunction with the peculiarities of sensuous experiences in which coexistence is apprehended. The senses of space are pre-eminently touch and sight, for in them only is there fully developed the distinction between "motor-feelings" and sensuously appreciated qualities. It would be more correct, however, to say that sight only is the space-sense; the distinctive features of Prof. Riehl's analysis being the total severance of tactual space from visual, the explicit declaration that tactual experience of space, so called, is entirely *temporal* in nature, and the identification of the fundamental mark of visual sensations with the ultimate quality of perceived space. Tactual space is the sum-total of the ideas of coexistence obtained by means of the sense of touch, and the formation of it rests on the power of distinguishing simultaneously received touch-sensations, on a difference in value of the "feelings of innervation" accompanying these, and on the "mobility" of the interdependent system of such feelings and sensations. Not in any one of these three elements do we find the mark we habitually assign to space; the sense of touch, by itself, cannot yield space-perception in the narrower acceptation of the term—"the perception that sensations not only coexist in definite relations and in definite temporal extents of such relations, but in addition are external to us and external to one another (*ausser uns und aussereinander*)" (ii. 147). It is this latter feature, the

simultaneous externality to one another of perceived facts, that constitutes the characteristic of space as subjectively apprehended, and it is only sensations of sight that furnish at once and by themselves the perception of spatial extension. Space is the specific form—not of external sense but—only of the sense of sight. All other sensations, taken by themselves, must be represented by us as intensities of definite quality, "but we must think the sensations of brightness (*Helligkeit*) as extended" (ii. 149). "The sensation of brightness, without further experience, is the perception of extendedness, and this perception seems to be directly bound up with none of the other sensations" (ii. 150).

The very startling character of these positions is due mainly to the language in which they are expressed—language for which Prof. Riehl, perhaps, is not more to be blamed than the majority of psychologists. But, after we have had difference between simultaneous sensations distinguished from "*aussereinandersein*," in that the latter involves the representation of being in different portions of space (ii. 79, cp. 99), it is satisfactory, though a little perplexing, to find it after all stated "that *aussereinandersein* is a sensation like every other, brought about by real processes in our consciousness" (ii. 198). For if this is interpreted strictly, it would signify only that the conditions of visual sensation were such as to enable its contents, with great readiness, to assume the form of Space. The immediacy of space-relatedness which appears to be assigned to the content of visual apprehension seems to me illusory, though I am quite prepared to allow that, in our concrete or pictorial way of envisaging space, we tend habitually to employ only data of vision. The highly objective character which we accord to the contents of visual apprehension seems to me not more dependent on the peculiar ease with which distinguishable parts in the visual content are simultaneously apprehended than on the relatively great amount of "*objectifying*" data which accompany vision, and of which, indeed, Prof. Riehl is no ways oblivious. I should, therefore, go the length of doubting the worth of the sharp distinction drawn between tactual and visual space-perception. For, if we must recognise, as Prof. Riehl does, that the peculiarities of the visual space-perception, in the picture it affords us of a world of objects immediately outside of one another, are strictly subjective, and that only the "logical and arithmetical portion of the space-intuition" has real significance, we may reasonably doubt whether the distinction has any other than psychological importance. I find it quite

impossible to attach any meaning to the expressions that sensations have or have not the space-quality in themselves. Sensations taken in themselves are mere abstractions. Sensations, as acts or states of the apprehending subject, are necessarily devoid of space-relations, because only as in contrast to a space-extended world of objects does the subject arrive at increasingly clear consciousness of himself and of his varying inner experience. Nothing can be better than the exposition of this correlated development of subject- and object-consciousness given in Prof. Riehl's chapter on Perception (ii. 187-218). The only remark I shall offer on it is, that it makes abundantly clear how large is the share in sense-apprehension that is played by elements not capable of being described as sensuous, how imperfect are the psychological classifications which separate perceiving from thinking, and how impossible it is to connect the reference to reality with the mere abstract nature of sensation.

Unity of consciousness, which plays so important a part even in Perception, comes forward in more explicit fashion in the various processes and products of Thought, and by Thought Prof. Riehl understands *discursive* thought, manifested in the familiar types of Notion, Judgment and Reasoning. There is much excellent matter, both of psychological and epistemological kind, in the treatment of the various ways in which, within the sphere commonly designated perceptive, the uniting function of consciousness makes itself apparent, but to this a mere reference must suffice. More interest attaches to the manner in which Prof. Riehl reproduces and interprets the familiar distinction between matter and form. The function of the unity of consciousness is in itself formal; the distinguishing peculiarities of the various products of thought come from the general nature of the matter within which unity of consciousness is realised. As the result of the combination between purely formal unity of consciousness and general characteristics of the matter of experience, we have the fundamental outlines or principles of the systematic conception of completed knowledge. Such principles may be described rightly as *a priori*; they can only be specialised through particular experience; but they furnish a norm and guide to all empirical research, and in default of them empirical research would not only be aimless but would fail to yield foundation for those universal maxims on which in detail it confidently proceeds. Such maxims, *e.g.*, as the law of causality, the law of the permanence of substance and force, exhibit on closer analysis empirical and *a priori* features. Empirically, *e.g.*, the law of

causation requires in its two aspects, as indicating a connexion between two events and as a generalisation, on the one hand special evidence of the quantitative equality of the facts designated cause and effect, and on the other hand special evidence that similar or identical cases are found in nature. But all such special evidence would fall short of the mark if there were not conjoined with it the perfectly general rule of all experience, that experience as a whole is only intelligible in so far as its variations are conceived as no other than modes in which the one permanently identical whole is manifested, and this again is but the correlate in experience of the unity of consciousness. The unity of the world of experience is bound up with the unity of consciousness; that this unity should, for understanding, exhibit itself as a quantitative unity depends on the general character of the matter furnished, which exhibits no other than qualitative and quantitative aspects.¹

According to our author—

"The logical conditions of experience, the categories of the permanence of substance, of causality, or the sufficient ground of change, of the interconnexion of phenomena in one all-embracing reality or nature, are not, as Kant thought, a manifold of different notions, given as merely the actual structure of our understanding. They spring from a single supreme principle, that of the unity and permanence (*Erhaltung*) of consciousness in general, and differ only through the various application of this principle to the general relations of Intuition. The Ego . . . becomes conscious of its own unity and identity as the conditions of all knowledge, now in the discrimination of a simultaneous manifold of impressions, the form of whose intuition is space, now in the combination of a series of impressions, now in the conjoint acts of discriminating and combining, whence arises the notion of a connected whole of phenomena. We can thus distinguish an analytical, a synthetical and an analytico-synthetical function of consciousness. Through the one we distinguish the permanent from the changeable, through the second we connect a change with its grounds, and through the third, finally, we conceive of all the real, whether things or processes, as belonging to one and the same world, each particular as part of the whole of Nature" (iii. 67-8).

It is hardly worth raising the question, whether the remark on Kant made here and in the note appended to the passage quoted is fully justified. I do not imagine that Kant would have found much to object to in the statement that category and schema are one and the same thing; there is a sense in which that is true, another in

¹ The same line of thought leads Prof. Riehl to the view that judgments in a logical aspect are equations of notions, that the one principle of logical consequence is the law of identity, and that logic therefore has only to lay down the conditions under which notions can be combined without contradiction.

which it is false, both for Kant and for the author's somewhat similar theory. Nor is it, perhaps, a fair statement of the Kantian categories to describe them as merely the actual structure of the understanding, and so to sever them on the one hand from the unity of consciousness, and on the other hand from the general character of intuited material for understanding. It is, however, a thoroughly justifiable comment on the Kantian theory, that it fails precisely where it was most emphatic on the need of success, *viz.*, in showing that the categories are the abstract forms of the connecting thoughts whereby objective knowledge is possible. That unity of consciousness, the mind's realisation of itself, is possible only in and through apprehension of objective fact, is the simple maxim which Kant applies in the analysis of experience, and it is a principle from which, so far, assent cannot be withheld. But it does not enable Kant to show either that the thoughts involved in such apprehension of objective fact are in intimate relation to identity of consciousness, or that in system they exhaust the abstract significance of objectivity. It is a slippery notion, that of the unity of consciousness, and all too easily interpreted in a semi-psychological fashion, into which fashion, indeed, the over-formal interpretation of it likewise tends to fall. I feel no great satisfaction with the separation which Prof. Riehl seems to make between the apparently given character of intuition (in its general characteristics) and the uniting function of consciousness, a separation involving as consequence the assignment to those given characteristics of all the concrete significance of the thoughts which emerge from their conjunction. Nothing is gained by giving to a result of our reflection the quasi-objective meaning of a distinction among facts. So far as the analysis of knowledge in and for itself is concerned, it matters not at all that we may seem to ourselves in the history of individual experience to be able to trace successive stages of clearness of conception in the process of unifying the matter of intuition, and that the process may seem to be one involving given material, and the active function of discriminating and combining it. No light is thrown upon the "function" of unity of consciousness as a condition of knowledge by assimilating it in any way to the active exercise of an energy by the subject, an exercise which we shall in vain attempt to express in terms of objective fact, and which must, therefore, from that point of view, present itself as a merely blank form of conjunction.

It is possible that I may here be misinterpreting Prof.

Riehl's meaning. I have in view, however, not only what is said in the passage above quoted, but also what has been before commented on, the apparent tendency to regard the "transcendental consciousness" as a derivative fact, a product of social relations. To these must be added the general interpretation given of unity of experience, which seems to me to be taken in too quantitative and mechanical a fashion, and the special treatment (iii. 214 ff.) of psychical synthesis. I confess to a feeling of doubt when I find much deduced from the notion of unity—when, *e.g.*, the whole principle of ground and consequent is interpreted as no more than the expression of the unity of things, and the equivalence of ground and consequent merely the statement of what is involved in the thought of reality as one. Such principles seem rather to me to be the ways in which the unity of things comes to have a meaning at all, and the unity of things to have a far more concrete and complicated significance than that of a quantitative sum.

I have some difficulty also in understanding the full scope of the discussions, most interesting and valuable in themselves, of the two great scientific principles, the universality of the causal relation, the permanence of substance and force. The general character of the treatment is plain enough. The ultimate principle, unity of consciousness, prescribes unity in the sequence of events and in the sum-total of coexistent, space-related facts. Connectedness of ground and consequent in the temporal sequence of experience, permanence of the extended amid change, are but the other side of unity of consciousness. These generalities, the conditions of the intelligibility of experience, become scientific principles, if and in so far as the actual data of intuition can be shown to conform to them, and such conformity is exhibited in the quantitative relations of conditions and the events conditioned by them, of real substance and its changing forms. So far is clear. Experience, the world of phenomena, is to be regarded as a connected series of interdependent changes, constant in sum amid all its variety. Nature is a mechanism. How far, then, do these characteristics apply to the ultimate real, that which is manifested in phenomena? How far do they enable us further to determine the nature of the real, which up to this point has only had asserted of it, first, a general structure enabling its phenomenal manifestation to conform to the conditions of unity of consciousness; secondly, a particular structure explanatory of the empirically cognised qualitative differences and quantitative relations of phenomena? To this final

question the whole inquiry has been tending. It is, indeed, the ultimate metaphysical problem, the answer to which is based upon, and perhaps even determined by, the analysis of experience. Prof. Riehl's answer, I think, is to be gathered from the tenor of the detailed consideration which in his final volume is given to the special problems, Reality of the Outer World, the Relation of Psychical and Material, Determinism, the Infinity of the World, Necessity and Teleology. It is impossible to follow in detail these special discussions, any one of which furnishes matter for prolonged debate. I shall here note only certain results which seem to me to bear on the ultimate question. On the whole, as was before said, the discussions resemble those occupying a similar place in the Kantian system, though cast in a more modern, more scientific form, and the results in many ways are identical with the Kantian.

The treatment of the question of external reality seems to me beset throughout with the ambiguity attaching to the term *real*, which now signifies the peculiarity of immediate sensuous affection as opposed to *Vorstellung*, now the character of that which, being other than the sensuous content apprehended, manifests itself therein. When the first is prominent, there is the greatest danger that the terms employed will drift into the fatally attractive puzzle of psychological idealism, which offers its interpretation of things as mere facts of consciousness. I cannot accommodate my ideas to such phrases as "Natural phenomena are only known to us in the form of *Vorstellungen*, consequently as psychical processes," or "the general properties which we assign to the objects of external perception are at the same time qualities of the process of perception itself" (iii. 182, 189). There seems to me no ground for identifying the meaning of consciousness with the subjective processes which in a dim and obscure way we gradually come to sever off from the rest of experience and regard as constituting the individual mind. The hard problem, What characteristics do we assign to those facts, as they may be called, that enter into the inner life? Prof. Riehl, so far as I can see, does not touch. He has traced excellently the manner in which the opposition of subjective and objective grows up and acquires clearness and articulation, but the effect of the general maxim that experience, consciousness, is the natural product of the action of things, a maxim that one might not quarrel with provided its interpretation were agreed upon, is to induce the idealistic phraseology from which one would most gladly escape. Subjective and objective are alike treated as facts, the latter,

however, having the additional function of being "indicative" of the real, a function which I cannot reconcile with the notion of a fact at all.

The most important contribution to the ultimate problem is given, however, in the excellent discussion of the relation between psychical phenomena and material processes, of which the following passage is a summary:—

"Psychical states and activities are not dependent on the external phenomena of things; on the contrary, such phenomena are themselves, as known (*als Vorstellung*), the result of psychical activity. The will stands in no contradiction to the mechanism of outer fact. The same conformity to law, which in its external manifestation we apprehend as mechanism, is exhibited in the connexion of the Will on the one hand with its effects, on the other with its causes; and the mechanical liberating force of Innervation, which we in the inner life experience as an Impulse of the Will, is distinct only phenomenally, not in ultimate nature, from the impulse itself. An innervation without the impulse of will is therefore not the same real process as an innervation with this impulse. Consciousness and will spring from the qualitative activity of things, the abstract and quantitative expression of which is mechanism. The mechanism of outer nature is no precondition of things themselves, is no law imposed upon things from without; it is but the expression of their own activity, the consequence of their unchanging properties" (iii. 211-2).

In other words, the mechanism which forms the objective element in our experience is not the ultimate reality, but phenomenal of it. The one system of real things, qualitatively distinct, gives rise by its interactions to the world of consciousness, within which, and only within which, mechanism finds a place. We must say then that the effects of the ultimate reality are one, just as the reality is one. The difference between the inner psychical experiences and the objectified phenomena we commonly call external is a difference resting on the ways of apprehending the one real. It is the same real interaction of things that is now apprehended as a change in the particles of the brain and then as a psychical experience. The subject cannot be simultaneously apprehensive in both ways, but what is for him inner experience is for an outer observer change of a mechanical kind, objective event.

Can we follow out completely this conception? There is, Prof. Riehl admits, one significant exception—what he calls "psychical association," the connexion of contents in consciousness on the ground of their apprehended likeness. This is only "in and for self-consciousness, and, even if external observation of the processes in the nervous substance were complete, must for ever lie beyond its scope" (iii. 214). That psychical association is not to be called

just one fact of mind among others, but that it is the very essence of the whole, Prof. Riehl fully recognises, and he finds explanation of its apparently anomalous position in the very ultimateness of its character. "It concerns no phenomenon, but the ground of all phenomena, the uniting function of consciousness. Of this function, psychical association is the effect." It depends on no one organ or part of the nervous system; its substrate is "the organic individual as a whole and in the interdependence of its parts". The unity of self-consciousness is the psychical expression of the organic equilibrium that is maintained in life amid all its quantitative changes. This unity can be intuited neither in inner nor in outer experience. Only its effects, psychical associations, are part of the subjective side of experience (iii. 215-6). Moreover, only in external experience is there involved the note of mechanism, the equivalence or identity of causes and effects (iii. 201, 322). Inner experience gives a "supplement to the mechanism of external phenomena: it shows us processes not simply brought about, but themselves active" (iii. 195).

Some points in this exposition seem to me to involve grave difficulties. If I follow it rightly, the peculiarity of the phenomena of the inner life is explained by reference to the qualitative character of the real, a character only known to us in and through its phenomenal manifestations, but of whose nature these phenomena entitle us to form at least a partial conception. This conception, as based on the phenomena of the inner life, involves the thoughts of self-activity and of a mode of inter-connexion other than that familiar to us in the sphere of mechanism. In what relation can the real so conceived be placed to conscious experience? Not merely in that of cause to effect. Apart altogether from the reflection that in such a relation something would be involved alien to the same relation as holding in the sphere of phenomena, it seems to me hard, if not impossible, to identify the thoughts of *effect* and *phenomenal manifestation*. Further, to put in the briefest fashion a second perplexity that I find, I cannot form a coherent conception of the inner experience as a number of states each of which might be contemplated as arising from or being the manifestation in consciousness of the underlying reality. The very consideration to which Prof. Riehl draws attention under the term "psychical association" seems to me decisive in this respect. Psychical association, we have seen, is not one phenomenon of inner experience, but is that which gives to mind its character; and I do not

suppose that it is intended to identify the unity of consciousness on which the possibility and the form of knowledge rest with the empirical unity of the self-conscious individual. Finally, I note that if, as Prof. Riehl is most cautious in pointing out, every external phenomenon has its psychical correlate, he can hardly avoid the perplexities arising from the want of an exact statement as to what characterises inner experience or psychical phenomena as such. For there are not external phenomena and internal. *External* and *internal* are merely relative terms qualifying the several states of consciousness, and are absolutely inseparable. If there be no internal state which has not its external correlate, the object of sense-apprehension to another, just as little is there an external which has not its correlative internal; a difficulty which appears to me entirely to arise from the identification of 'consciousness' as our apprehension of the real with 'consciousness' as a peculiar set of phenomena, those of inner experience. The negative side, then, of this Critical Monism seems to be just and sound; the positive, I cannot follow out in any coherent fashion.

The discussion of the perennially interesting problem of Determinism is, in my judgment, one of the richest and most valuable sections of the work. To some portions of the introductory statements formulating the problem one might take exception; the general character of the solution offered leaves little to be desired. The ultimate ground for mechanical determinism Prof. Riehl rightly finds in the tendency to hypostasise the mechanical in experience. The true explanation of practical freedom, which is, in fact, the kind of action possible for a self-conscious agent, he finds in the comprehensive view of experience as exhibiting both mechanical connexion and conscious process,—not as disparate realities, possibly indifferent to one another, but as distinct only through the difference in ways of apprehending; a difference which otherwise would be expressed by saying that the subject can never obtain at once the apprehension of his own character and actions as among the facts of external experience and as inner life. There is a necessity in things, but a necessity that equally applies to the mechanism of external nature and to the existence of self-conscious agents acting with purpose and intelligence. The future may be pre-established through the past and the present, but "what has fore-ordained it is a power necessarily akin to human understanding, since it has produced that understanding" (iii. 245). Practical freedom

is no other than action from self-conscious motives. It implies, then, negatively, that the will is not constrained by immediate sensuous impulses, and, positively, that it depends on abstract self-conscious motives (iii. 259). And just as it is through action at all that the subject becomes aware of himself, so it is in the development of action that there becomes clear the consciousness of a general will, or spirit, or rule of action, and that the individual becomes morally free. On the circumstances through which this development takes place, Prof. Riehl has much that is valuable. I am under the impression, however, that here, as in the correlative case of belief in the external reality of things, he allows himself to be too much influenced by a desire to conform to current scientific ideas. For the 'intelligible character' of the Critical Philosophy he would substitute the character as moulded by social forces into conformity with, and recognition of, a generally constraining rule of conduct. The influence of these social forces is no more to be doubted than the comparative jejuneness and fruitlessness of the Kantian notion; but it requires much careful statement to avoid the error of tracing the moral law in an abstractly mechanical fashion to the natural forces of society. Were there not, in even the individual's consciousness, the elements that are conditions for recognition of a universal rule of conduct, it does not seem to me that such recognition would come about through social relations. The ethical side of the problem, however, is not discussed with formal fulness.

I take in the briefest fashion what forms the matter of the concluding chapters in the work—the cosmological problems, infinity of the world, the relation of natural law to teleology. As regards the first, the conclusion reached is that "the phenomenal world, the only object of knowledge, is in mass of unchangeable and consequently finite magnitude, in spatial extendedness not necessarily limited, in time unlimited as regards the past and boundless as regards the future"; but that, so far as the question applies to the ground of the phenomenal world, no notions of magnitude have any significance. The world in this sense does not exist in itself as mass or corporeal nature. The ground of phenomena in space is not itself in space or time (iii. 316, 314, 313).

The necessity of mechanical law is no more objectively real than the necessity which is implied in the relation of means and end. But that latter relation can find no place in the mechanism of nature, neither as explanatory of a part nor as a possible explanation of the whole. Only in the field of conscious striving, in the region of practical conduct, has

it a place, but there its place is as assured as that of mechanical law in the realm of nature. "A final end has objective reality, since purposive action is a process that takes place by reason of the unity of that which is the substrate of material and mental phenomena in the context of our experience. Voluntary action is the subjective expression of the very same activity which is objectively exhibited as spontaneity of the cerebrum" (iii. 354).

How closely these final determinations approximate to the cautiously expressed results of the Critical Philosophy does not need to be pointed out. Their form of expression is different, and, so far in particular as regards the central notion of Kant's practical philosophy, strong opposition is implied,—an opposition which, however, seems to me to involve no matter of great philosophical significance. I am not able to attach much weight to Prof. Riehl's strongly expressed opinion that in the Kantian system a distinction of importance is drawn between Things-in-themselves and *Noûmena*, and that in the Kantian ethics an unduly positive content is assigned to *Noûmena*. When we investigate more closely this positive content, there is only one interpretation, that of the self, which is not in thorough harmony with the more modern, more scientifically expressed views on the real here reached. But that point undoubtedly raises a difficulty in regard to the ultimate conception of reality both in the Kantian doctrine and as here expounded. From that difficulty as it concerned the Kantian system, seem to me to have originated those more metaphysical teachings of German philosophy for which Prof. Riehl has, I think, little or no sympathy. As it concerns his own views, it may be put in a very general fashion, and the statement of it will convey briefly the ground of objection which I take to "Critical Realism," so far as I understand Riehl's exposition of it. Are the results reached compatible with the root-idea of critical realism? or do they and the process by which they have been reached render necessary a restatement of that idea? The idea itself I take in the form frequently given to it in the work before me, that experience is the result of the action of the real upon consciousness. Every thinker must feel the difficulty of expressing himself otherwise than through ordinary familiar terms, the secret metaphors involved in which he may deliberately purpose to exclude from influence on his thought. Now the metaphor concealed in such an expression is that of a quasi-mechanical operation, and we are all too ready to picture to ourselves the world of conscious experiences as the result of the inter-

play of the real. But such a conception strikes at the root of all explanation of knowledge and gives fixity to a distinction which in the course of the development of thought proves itself to be a mere result of abstraction. No one would propose to treat consciousness as 'unnatural' or 'supernatural,' but one need not on that account identify the notion of knowing with the notion of a produced *Vorstellung*. Nor can we evade the consequence that naturally follows from the strict adherence to this mechanical conception. The realm of real existence and the world of ordered phenomena, that is to say, of produced *Vorstellungen*, which by their empirical nature and connexion in the unity of consciousness assume an order, lie apart from one another. A certain puzzling mode of existence, as perplexing as the mode of existence of the Platonic particulars, is necessarily assigned to the phenomenal world, and if we, at the same time, insist that existence is all of a piece, that there is but one variegated real, our principles only conflict in our minds. It is not that I object to those final determinations which Prof. Riehl offers of the nature of existence—with most of them I find myself in entire agreement; but I cannot help feeling that they constrain us to just such a more metaphysical way of attempting to express the relation of the real to thought as is here most strenuously refused. That we can find no expression for the nature of the real in terms of scientific knowledge, I take to signify—not that its nature is exhausted by what we can scientifically determine regarding it, but—that the notions of scientific knowledge have their own limits, limits that call for, and are capable of, explanation. With their aid, then, we can in no way attain a philosophically satisfactory statement of the way in which the real and consciousness are related.

This general difference of view would, doubtless, entail differences in regard to many important points of detail, some of which have been touched on in the course of this review. It does not prevent the most cordial recognition of the great value of Prof. Riehl's work—work equally distinguished for width of knowledge and for sustained power of philosophical thinking.