III.—THE ORDER OF THE HEGELIAN CATEGORIES IN THE HEGELIAN ARGUMENT.

BY MARY WHITON CALKINS.

THE tendency of Hegel's immediate followers to regard the categories from the standpoint of Hegel himself has been followed by a sweeping reaction. Instead of teaching that each category is inevitable, and that it must occupy precisely its own position in the line, modern commentators usually hold that the order of the categories is arbitrary and artificial; that the choice of the categories proceeds on historical, and even in large measure on empirical grounds; and that the study of Hegel's Logic possesses therefore a chiefly antiquarian interest.

It seems probable that the truth lies somewhere between these two extremes. On the one hand, nobody can read either the larger Logic or the Logic of the *Encyclopædia*, without the conviction that what is regarded as progress is often mere repetition: in "Essence," for example, the categories of Force and Manifestation, Inner and Outer, Ground and Consequent, are merely co-ordinate names for the same pair of distinctions and do not in the least justify Hegel's claim by growing out of each other, as successive transcendences of opposition. More than this, identical categories, under different names, appear not merely in close succession, but at essentially different stages of the argument. Thus Identity and Difference, categories of "Essence," are barely distinguishable from Reality and Negation which belong to "Being"; and Mechanism, a category of "Notion," turns out to have the precise characteristics of the earlier categories, Cause and Effect and Reciprocity. But to admit the presence of needless steps and of puzzling iterations is not to deny all value to Hegel's argument. Not merely Hegel's result, but his method of attaining it is of permanent value; and in some modification or another, his argument must be retraced

by everybody who reaches his conclusion: the conception of Reality as an Absolute Self.

This paper proposes a new reading of Hegel's Logic. Neglecting artificial distinctions, it aims at a rearrangement which will exhibit the parallelism of many pairs of categories, and which will disentangle distinct lines of argument. At the same time, it proposes no addition whatever to the subject-matter of the Logic and only one important omission: the sections included under 'Quantity' and 'Measure'. The following outline summarises the argument of the Logic, and indicates the proposed changes of order.

A. (Introduction.) Metaphysics is possible, for

I. Ultimate Reality is not undetermined. (Book i., *Being and Naught*.)

II. Ultimate Reality is not unknowable. (Book ii., *Essence and Appearance and parallel categories*.)

B. I. Ultimate Reality is Absolute One, for

a. Ultimate reality is not a single reality, among others, for every such single reality is

1. (a) Same and other. (Book i., *Determined Being*; book ii., *Identity and Difference*.)

(b) Like and unlike. (Book ii., *Likeness and Unlikeness*; book iii., *Notion and Judgment*.)

2. Dependent on others. (Book ii., *Causality*.)

b. Ultimate Reality is not a composite of ultimate parts. (Book i., *Finitude and Infinity and Being-for-Self*; book ii., *Action and Reaction*; book iii., *Mechanism*.)

II. Ultimate Reality is Absolute Self, for

a. Ultimate Reality is not mere Life. (Book iii., *Life*.)

b. Ultimate Reality is not Finite Consciousness. (Book iii., *Cognition*.)

The remainder of this paper elaborates this argument and seeks to justify the re-organisation of material.

A. POSSIBILITY OF A DOCTRINE OF ULTIMATE REALITY.

The logical beginnings of Hegel's philosophy must be sought in his discussions of two related doctrines—alike in that they both make metaphysics impossible. The first of these is the conception of ultimate reality as undetermined—a doctrine whose most perfect exponents are the Vedantic

teaching about Brahma, the Eleatic doctrine of Pure Being, and Schelling's later conception of the Absolute as Pure Indifference. Such a theory makes metaphysics, the study of ultimate reality, impossible; for it is futile to study the nature of that which is, by hypothesis, without attributes or determinations.

It is unnecessary to consider in detail Hegel's treatment of this theory, in the first section of book i. of the *Logic*, for all commentators are agreed in their reading of his argument. He opposes the theory of an utterly undetermined Absolute, or Pure Being, by such an analysis of the concept as discloses its inner contradictions. For Pure Being, entire indeterminateness,—Hegel shows—would be utter absence of reality, Pure Nothing;¹ whereas ultimate, or complete, reality can never be truly described as bare nothing, since, at the very least, the reality of the present moment exists. Therefore, because it is not entirely indeterminate, ultimate reality is in some sense qualified or determined; and the effort of metaphysics to discover the nature of this determined, ultimate reality is justified.

Distinct from this theory of the Absolute as undetermined reality, yet also very closely allied to it, is another doctrine which would make a positive metaphysics impossible. This is the conception, emphasised and enforced by Kant, of the ultimate reality as unknowable. On this Kantian theory of the limitation of knowledge, all that we know is *ipso facto* bound by the forms and limitations of human consciousness; and attainment of the ultimate or absolute reality is utterly impossible. Such absolute reality becomes, therefore, unknowable. Hegel discusses this doctrine in many sections of the first two divisions, "Essence" and "Appearance," of book ii. of the *Logic*. He makes use of ontological and of cosmological, rather than of epistemological, terms to express the relation of Appearance to Essence, of Existence to Ground, of Form to Matter or of Manifestation to Force. But by these parallel sets of terms he means, fundamentally, what Kant had meant by knowable and unknowable;² and the main outlines of his argument against Kant are very clear. He shows first, that the knowable phenomenon—appearance or manifestation—implies of necessity the bare existence of

¹ *Werke*, iii., 78; *Encycl.*, § 87. (The references to the larger *Logic* are to the pages of the second edition of the complete works, vol. iii.-v., 1843. The references to the *Encyclopædia* are to the sections of the later editions; the translation is that of Wallace. Exponents refer to the paragraphs of page or section.)

² *Of. Werke*, iv., 127; *Encycl.*, § 124.

a more ultimate reality—the alleged Unknowable—Essence or Force. But this, as he points out, makes it clear that the Unknowable Essence stands in necessary relation to the known phenomenon and that it is therefore, to some degree, itself known. In other words: we know at least the relatedness of ultimate to phenomenal reality; and the knowledge of even this one fact (its relation) forbids our excluding ultimate reality from the universe of the knowable.¹

The conformity of Hegel's terminology, in the "Essence and Appearance" sections of book ii., to the current scientific conceptions of his times, sometimes obscures, but never obliterates, the essential outlines of the argument. He shows, by repeated illustration, that the alleged unknowable is invariably linked to the known phenomenon; that it is, indeed, described only in terms of the known. Thus 'magnetic force'—an example of alleged unknowable force—exists only in so far as it is expressed in actual magnetic phenomena. Out of relation to these phenomena, magnetic force is not merely unknowable but non-existent. So, Hegel insists, the philosophising natural science which explains every set of phenomena by some hypothesised force overlooks the truth that the force can itself be defined only as the reality of these particular phenomena. Such a theory, therefore, involves the thinker in a vicious circle—a "Hexenkreise," as Hegel somewhere calls it. Throughout these sections, Hegel's illustrations are chiefly borrowed from Schelling's nature-philosophy. The theory which he combats is, however, as has been pointed out, the characteristic teaching of Kant. Essence and Ground and Force are alike in that each is supposed to be unknowable reality; and what Hegel teaches is that every alleged unknowable reality is postulated merely in so far as it stands in inevitable relation to the known, and that thus the supposedly Unattainable Reality is unwittingly admitted (even by those who call it unknowable) to be known.

The difficulty of these sections is due, in large part, to the arbitrary assignment of certain pairs of the categories to the division headed "Essence" and of others to the class named "Appearance". This division is doubly untrue to the underlying conception of Hegel, since it assigns to "Essence" categories—such as Consequence and Form—which rightly belong to "Appearance"; and, on the other hand, includes under "Appearance" categories, such as Content and Inward, which have to do exclusively with "Essence".

An even more serious difficulty is the arrangement of these categories on the model of book i., in triad form, as if they grew out of each other by antithesis and synthesis, whereas most of these categories of book ii. are, in the main, re-statements of the fundamental opposition, that between Essence and Appearance, the really real and the apparently real. The true movement in the two books may thus be symbolised:—

¹ Those portions of this paper which appear in the larger type contain a statement of its main teaching. They may be read consecutively, neglecting the sections in small type. These latter undertake to substantiate this reading of Hegel by an examination of the text of the *Logic*.

Ground and Consequence, Matter and Form, Force and Expression, Inward and Outward, and even Substance and Accidents, are virtually variants of the expression Essence and Appearance, though each set of terms is meant to show more clearly than the last the actual relatedness of the Inner and the Outer, and the consequent impossibility of defining ultimate reality in the terms of the Inner only.¹

B. THE NATURE OF ULTIMATE REALITY.

I. ULTIMATE REALITY IS AN ABSOLUTE ONE.

Hegel vindicates the possibility of metaphysics, by showing the inner contradictions of the two doctrines which would invalidate it. As against the theory of an Utterly Undetermined Absolute, he shows that such an Absolute would be positive unreality and that it is therefore inconsistent with the certainties of immediate experience. It follows, that the supposed Undetermined Reality must always, and of necessity, be conceived as in some way determined. Similarly, Hegel shows that the so-called Unknowable Ultimate does, in fact, stand in essential relation to the known phenomenon. Hegel thus establishes his right to enter upon the metaphysical quest: in other words, to investigate the nature of an absolute reality which is both determined and knowable.

Hegel's conception of this absolute reality is well known: he teaches that ultimate reality is One and is Self (Idea). He lays equal stress on these predicates of reality; but his argument to the absolute one-ness of ultimate reality is more acute, more elaborate and, as it stands, more convincing than his proof that the Absolute One is Self. The doctrine of the unity of reality occupies all the first two books—excepting those introductory sections already dis-

¹ Cf. *Encycl.*, § 136; *Phänomenologie*, A. iii., "Kraft und Verstand". Compare also Hutchinson Stirling's criticism: "'The manifestation,' he says, 'depends on the essence and yet, no less, the essence depends on the manifestation.' This is a simple idea, but with this, and this only, Hegel contrives to wash over page after page" (*Secret of Hegel*, ch. 2, C. 3).

cussed—and two divisions of the third book of the *Logic*. It has two parts: first, the demonstration that the Ultimate Real is no single, isolated reality, one among others even if pre-eminent among them; and second, the proof that this Ultimate Real is not the sum of such isolated realities. Hegel's treatment of the first of these hypotheses must next, therefore, be considered.

a. Ultimate Reality is not one-among-others.

Hegel's method here as everywhere is one of elimination and of self-refutation. Assuming the truth of the conclusion which he does not hold, he makes it disclose its own contradictions and show the insufficiency of its own claim to be final reality. Thus the examination of every possible case of a single, independent reality results in the discovery that this supposedly isolated reality inevitably implies the existence of more than itself, and that it therefore is not truly isolated. Once more, Hegel's argument has two distinct parts, of which the first receives incomparably the stronger emphasis. He shows that:—

1. *Ultimate Reality is no single reality beside others, because every such reality is at least 'same' or 'like,' and thus implies other realities.*—It is of utmost importance for the student of Hegel to seize the full significance of this most characteristic teaching. Hegel is analysing the doctrine of pluralism in its most general form. Every pluralistic philosophy teaches that some one limited reality—spirit or matter, for example,—is ultimate, albeit not all-inclusive. Hegel aims to prove it impossible that any limited reality, whatever its nature, should be ultimate. To this end, he selects for analysis precisely those attributes of the limited reality which seem to speak most loudly for its isolation, its pre-eminent position and its ultimacy. These attributes are self-identity and distinctness: every limited reality is the same with itself and distinct from any other, as—for example—spirit is spirit and is entirely distinct from matter. Without this self-sufficiency and this differentiation it would indeed be impossible to conceive of a limited reality as ultimate. What Hegel, however, teaches, is this: These very qualities of self-identity and distinctness testify to the relation of the single reality to others. To be different from others clearly implies the existence of these others; and to be identical with oneself implies as certainly, though less directly, an opposition to others. The 'same' is in fact the 'not-other': that is to say, relation to others is not a mere external

appendage, but is itself an inherent part, an inevitable attribute of every supposedly limited reality. Evidently, no such limited reality can be ultimate or final, since by its most intimate and essential attribute—its self-identity—it implies the validity of other realities.

The greater part of the *Logic* is occupied with the consideration, under every possible form, of the argument just outlined. It appears in each book of the *Logic*; it involves categories of the most varying names; it is discussed on different levels of philosophical thought; yet it is always, in the last analysis, the same invincible argument which it is Hegel's great merit to have expounded and illustrated until it had become inwrought with the common fibre of philosophical doctrine. The argument first appears in book i., following upon the conclusion that Pure Being—an undetermined Absolute—is impossible. In the section on Determined Being,¹ it is pointed out that every single, isolated reality has a 'character' of its own, and that this, its determination, is also a 'negation' of some other quality and thus a 'limit'—as, for instance, "White is white" implies "White is not-black". So arise the categories of Reality and Negation,² followed by several pairs of perfectly equivalent categories.³ Under varying names, the supposedly single unrelated Something is shown to imply the existence of another, and to be what it is in reference to that Other: "Being if kept distinct and apart . . . would be only the vacant abstraction of Being. . . . Hence the other-ness is not something indifferent and outside it but a function proper to it." It may be added that both the reduction in the number and the change in the order of the categories of Determined Being, in the *Logic* of the *Encyclopedia*, as compared with the larger *Logic*, clearly suggest Hegel's own conviction of the unimportance and the unessential character of some of these categories.

The argument, just outlined, is repeated in more usual terminology, under the discussion—in book ii.—of the categories of Identity and Difference. The analysis of these categories follows, to be sure, upon the discussion of Essence, or Unknowable Reality, but the categories themselves apply very clearly only to the knowable world of determined realities,—the world of Appearance, regarded as itself a world of reality, not of illusion.⁴ There can, indeed, be little doubt that these categories, Identity and Difference, are precisely equivalent to the earlier categories, Reality and Negation. The reality of anything—that which gives it its character—is simply its identity with itself and its difference from everything else; and, similarly, negation means other-ness or non-identity (difference, in a loose sense of the term). Hegel's illustrations of reality, negation, and parallel categories clearly substantiate this interpretation. For example, he names⁵ the fact that "the ground is a meadow not a pond" the qualitative limit of the meadow.

The demonstration that every reality demands, by its very self-identity, the existence of other realities is applicable to abstract qualities as well as to concrete things: for example 'round,' to be round, must be 'not-

¹ *Werke*, iii., S. 106 seq.; *Encycl.*, § 89 seq.

² *Werke*, iii., S. 109 seq.; *Encycl.*, § 91.

³ *Werke*, iii., S. 113 seq.; *Encycl.*, *ib.*

⁴ *Encycl.*, § 24. Cf. J. McT. E. McTaggart, *MIND*, N.S., vi., 1897, 173^a.

⁵ *Encycl.*, § 92^a.

rectangular,' and the 'good' is of necessity the 'not-bad'. A parallel set of categories, discussed only in book ii., is applicable, however, only to the concrete thing and never to the single quality. These are the categories of Likeness and Unlikeness. A thing, Hegel teaches, implies other things not only because its identity with itself is a difference from others, but also because it is always 'like' some other things and 'unlike' others. The definition of a thing is always, in truth, an enumeration of the ways in which it resembles some other things and differs from others still. The crab-apple, for instance, is like the cherry in form, like the pear in surface, like the peach in colour, and thus unlike pear and peach in form, unlike cherry and peach in surface, and unlike cherry and pear in colour. Hegel shows in detail how the categories of Likeness and Unlikeness proceed from those of Identity and Difference. Each of them, it is made clear, involves partial identity and partial difference: "Difference as an identity of the objects related is Likeness; as non-identity of them is Unlikeness".¹ For example a rose which is like another has perhaps identity of colour but difference in form, and indeed could never be called 'like' unless in some sort distinct. Thus, likeness and unlikeness, as well as identity and difference, are seen to imply the existence of related others; and it is therefore plain that ultimate reality can never be stated in terms of any one quality or thing.

The argument from identity and likeness is repeated in book iii., but in terms which greatly lessen its force. Hegel expressly admits the equivalence of those categories of book iii. with those of book ii: "Universal, particular and individual,"² he says, "are, taken in the abstract, the same as identity, difference and ground". Universality thus means the likeness of one thing to another by virtue of the fact, that they share each other's qualities: particularity is the unlikeness of one thing to another, that is, its failure to share certain qualities; and the individual, like the thing, is the complex of qualities.

This parallelism is, it must be confessed, much obscured by the title of the first division of book iii., "The Subjective Notion". For this term applies most naturally to realities of consciousness and not to mere qualities and things. But no attentive student can escape the force of Hegel's reiterated teaching that 'subjective' does not mean 'conscious' and that the terms 'notion' and 'judgment' apply to external as well as to internal facts.³ "All things," he says, "are a judgment:"⁴ and his discussion of judgments is closely parallel to his consideration, in book ii., of things.

In brief, the argument of this part of book iii. runs as follows: An individual is necessarily described in terms of its resemblance to other individuals. This likeness to others is of various degrees and forms, but the fewer and the less essential the resemblances—that is, shared qualities—the more incomplete and inadequate the description of the individual. In other words, the individual consists of its shared qualities: in its very nature, it implies the existence of others. The single, unrelated individual is, therefore, impossible.

In detail, these different sections consider the nature of the resemblances of one individual to others. These likenesses may be sensational (in the Qualitative Judgment), relational (in the Judgments of Reflexion

¹ *Encycl.*, § 117; *Werke*, iv., S. 41. *seq.*

² *Encycl.*, § 164²; *cf.* *Werke*, v., S. 35.

³ *Cf.* McTaggart, *MIND*, N.S., vi., 1897, 166.

⁴ *Encycl.*, § 167¹; *cf.* *Encycl.*, § 181; *Werke*, v., 115²; *cf.* also Kant, *Kritik d. reinen Vernunft*, *Transc. Analytik*, § 19.

and of Necessity), or notional (in the Judgment of the Notion). A bronze, for example, is brown, is useful as a lamp-holder and is also beautiful. But however unessential or essential the resemblances, and however few or many, they inevitably connect the one individual with others.

It should be added, that these sections on the judgment are greatly confused by Hegel's Homeric tendency to lose the thread of his argument while following out the labyrinthine turns of a figure of speech. His effort is to complete the analogy of the individual, as complex of shared qualities, with the judgment, as composed of universal and particular, by referring to every form of proposition and syllogism. His procedure leads to petty distinctions, to meaningless refinements, and to actual inconsistencies. The term 'particular,' for example, readily applicable to the distinguishing or 'unlike' feature of an individual, has no meaning as the name of a minor proposition. Similarly, the term 'universal,' after doing duty as synonym for 'like,' ought not—to a sudden—to gain the meaning 'absolute'.

The study of this first division of Hegel's argument, in all three books of the *Logic*, suggests, finally, the questions: Is the theory which he opposes ever seriously applied? Has anybody ever believed or thought that ultimate reality is identical with any single quality or composite of qualities? It may readily be admitted that Hegel's illustrations are, indeed, extreme examples of the single and isolated reality. But though nobody claims for any single quality of a concrete thing, or for the complex thing itself, the position of final reality, it is clear that dualistic materialism regards matter as co-existing with spirit and yet as possessing ultimate reality; and that dualistic spiritualism assigns to spirit this same anomalous and impossible position of an ultimate reality which has some other reality external to it.

In opposition to the doctrine of ultimate reality as limited, Hegel has now a second argument. It may be stated thus:—

2. *Ultimate Reality is not one limited reality among others, for every such reality is dependent on others.*—In the sections already outlined, Hegel has shown that because every limited reality is itself and not another, and because every complex is like and unlike others, therefore no such limited quality or thing can be looked on as final reality. He now goes on to show, that the limited reality, besides implying others, is dependent on them, that is, of necessity connected with them. In other words, no supposedly independent reality can make good its claim to independence. Not only does every quality or thing imply the existence of others, but it is actually connected with these others, inextricably bound up with them and dependent on them. For every thing or individual is acknowledged to be either a cause or an effect: as such, however, it simply is not independent, since—by virtue of its being cause or effect—it is 'connected.' In Hegel's own words:¹ "Cause and effect are conceived

¹ *Encycl.*, § 153²; cf. *Werke*, iv., 218².

as two separate existences . . . only when we leave the causal relation out of sight".

Important as it is, this argument never receives detailed consideration, doubtless because it substantially repeats Kant's causal theory, which was common property of metaphysicians when Hegel wrote the *Logic*. Hegel therefore devotes his main effort to the demonstration of the seeming paradox: self-identity implies the existence of others. The argument from causal connexion is barely suggested in book i., in the treatment of infinity as an indefinite series of temporally connected finites,¹ and in book iii., under the section on "Mechanism". It is distinctly, but very briefly, considered in book ii., in the discussion of Cause and Effect. These categories and their parallels—Condition and Conditioned, and Possibility and Actuality (in one use of these last two terms)²—are categories of connexion. Like Identity, Difference and the others they do not characterise either Essence—Unknowable Reality—or Appearance regarded as illusory manifestation of Essence, but are applicable, rather, to things in their relation to each other. No single, exclusive entity or reality—this is Hegel's teaching—can be in itself ultimate or absolute reality, because it is in necessary connexion with other realities, and thus is dependent upon them instead of being self-sufficient.

The force of this argument is weakened, in Hegel's statement of it, in several ways. In the first place, he sometimes seems to use the expression 'cause and effect' as mere synonym for 'substance and accident,' that is, for 'essence and appearance'.³ In the second place, Hegel, like Kant, does not realise the partial identity of the conceptions of time and causality.⁴ Finally, because of this incomplete analysis, he confuses mutual causality with reciprocity (in the narrower sense). Both Kant and Hegel, it is true, make use of the term 'reciprocity,' but mean by it merely a reciprocal causality—in which, as Hegel says, "there is only one and the same thing, *viz.*, one cause and another and their connexion with one another".⁵ Kant illustrates this mutual relation from the influence of heavenly bodies on each other;⁶ Hegel exemplifies it by the reciprocal relation of the "character and manners of a nation" and its "nature and laws,"⁷ observing that either side may be regarded either as cause or as effect, that is, that the manners affect the laws but are also affected by them. This reciprocal influence is, however, a mere involved and doubled form of causality. Neither Kant nor Hegel discusses the necessary but non-temporal form of dependence—Schopenhauer's *Grund des Seins*—which is best named reciprocity. The relation, for example, of mathematical quantities to each other is reciprocity, in this more definite sense. Like causality (the temporal form of necessary

¹ *Werke*, iii., S. 146 seq.; *Encycl.*, § 92 seq.

² *Encycl.*, § 146, note; *Werke*, iv., 221¹. Hegel sometimes, however, uses 'possibility' and 'actuality' as mere equivalents for 'essence' and 'appearance' (cf. *Encycl.*, § 146, note; *Werke*, iv., 202⁴). In other contexts, the opposition seems to be that of the purely imaginary to the real (cf. *Encycl.*, § 143, note).

³ Cf. *Encycl.*, § 152; *Werke*, iv., 216².

⁴ Cf. an article, by the writer, on "Time as Related to Causality and to Space," in *MIND*, N.S., April, 1899.

⁵ *Encycl.*, § 154³.

⁶ *Critique of Pure Reason*, Third Analogy.

⁷ *Encycl.*, § 156, note.

connexion), the relation of reciprocity involves the dependence of all exclusive realities on each other.

Hegel has shown that the single, exclusive reality, however significant, is not the ultimate, or final reality. For it is self-identical and thus implies others; and it is furthermore necessarily linked to others and is thus dependent on them. In its most intimate nature, therefore, it contains the implication of others and the connexion with them. The demonstration of the fundamental doctrine of Hegel's system is thus completed, and he enters upon the discussion of his second important teaching. It may be formulated thus:—

b. Ultimate Reality is not a composite of all individual realities : it is neither an aggregate nor a system.

The argument on which Hegel lays most stress is simply the following: Ultimate, or final, reality must be complete; if it fail to include every scrap and shred of actuality, there is something outside and beyond it: it is then no longer ultimate. But if ultimate, or—as we now see—complete, reality be simply a composite, it must be made up of an infinite number of parts; it must include, in other words, every single aspect of reality which exists now in every corner of every world; it must, indeed, include every reality which is, which has been or which is to come. Such an infinity would be, however, unknowable and incalculable; whereas ultimate reality has been shown to be knowable. It follows that no knowable composite could be complete, and therefore that no composite could fulfil the conditions of ultimate reality. The reasoning is, of course, that which Kant had introduced, in his doctrine of the Antinomies, though the method is Hegel's. The conception of a composite of an infinite number of parts is developed until it discloses its own contradictions and shows itself as in truth inconceivable and unknowable. But besides showing that a Complete, or Ultimate, Reality, if composite, would be unknowable, Hegel furthermore insists that it would be impossible. Two forms of this doctrine of the Ultimate, as mere composite, are logically conceivable. The first of these theories holds that ultimate reality is a bare, but complete, plurality—that is, a composite of individuals which are distinct and unconnected. The argument which Hegel opposes to this view is precisely that by which he has proved that ultimate reality is not any one unconnected individual: A plurality of unconnected individuals, however complete, is even more obviously impossible than a single unconnected reality, for every one of

these so-called single and independent realities is not only self-identical and like others, but is also either cause and effect or in reciprocal relation: in other words, the bare plurality turns out to be a system of related reals.

The second form of the composite reality theory is incomparably more important than the first, for it wears the specious semblance of a theory of unity. It is the conception of ultimate reality, not as an aggregate of unconnected individuals, but as a Whole—a unity of inter-related parts. Fichte's Absolute Ego, which turns out to be the system of inter-related egos, and, indeed, every conception of the universe as the organic unity of independent but related selves is an illustration of this theory. Such doctrines of an apparent unity—really, as he affirms, a plurality—Hegel invariably opposes by the explicit teaching that ultimate reality is not a whole of parts, but logically prior to the parts and itself the relating principle. But, incredible as it seems, Hegel never carefully considers this significant and historically important theory of ultimate reality as a system of co-ordinate parts. Instead of assuming its validity, analysing its implications and making it disclose its own weakness, he rarely, if ever, frames a serious argument against it. To the writer, this neglect is, beyond doubt, the greatest and the most inexplicable defect of Hegel's Logic.

There is not lacking, however, though Hegel never made adequate use of it, a demonstration, quite in the spirit of Hegel, of the fallacy of this theory of reality as an inclusive whole of co-ordinate, inter-related individuals. For what, it may be asked, is the whole? It may be defined, perhaps, as a sum of the relations of the distinct, yet connected parts. What, then, is the relation? It cannot, in the first place, be external to the parts which it relates, else it would be itself another form of reality and would need to be related with all the rest; and the new relation would again need relating, and so on *ad infinitum*.¹ And yet, though relation cannot, thus, be other than the related individuals, it cannot, on the other hand, be merely an attribute of one or more of these individuals, else the whole of connected realities would be merely that plurality of distinct and unrelated individuals. There is no escape from this difficulty except in the conception of a whole which is also a singular; and this

¹ Cf. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 82. "How the relation can stand to the qualities is . . . unintelligible. If it is nothing to the qualities then they are not related at all. . . . But if it is to be something to them then clearly we now shall require a new connecting relation."

is the conception of an Absolute whose nature is manifested in the parts so that their relation is just the fact of its oneness.

It must be borne in mind that though Hegel does not employ this argument, he does most unequivocally and repeatedly affirm its conclusion. No assertion of Hegelian metaphysics seems to the writer more neglected and more significant than precisely this affirmation of the individuality of the Absolute Whole of Reality. If Hegel's Absolute be interpreted, as it so often is, as a mere system or whole, then Hegel's idealism advances upon Fichte's only in one particular, the complete expulsion of the *Ding-an-sich*, and Hegel's Absolute is essentially no other than Fichte's Ego. But only an artificial interpretation of Hegel's unequivocal statements can—in the opinion of the writer—leave one in doubt of his own conviction that Ultimate Reality is no whole, or aggregate, or system, but a One.¹

The outline which follows groups together the arguments for this conception of ultimate reality, including—for the sake of completeness—arguments which Hegel merely suggested but never explicitly used:—

Ultimate Reality is not a complete composite, but a One, for

A complete composite is unknowable.

A composite can not be ultimate, since it is

either: A bare, un-related plurality (impossible, because every single is like and dependent),

or: A system (impossible, because the sum of likenesses is an Absolute One

„ „ dependences „ „ „).

From this summary of Hegel's argument, we must turn to a closer study of Hegel's text. This text-commentary will indicate that the argument, as just presented, does not at every point follow Hegel's order.

THE GENERAL ARGUMENT IN BOOKS I. AND III., AGAINST THE THEORY OF ULTIMATE REALITY AS COMPOSITE.

Hegel argues, in every Book of the Logic, for the absolute unity of reality. The most general discussion is found in book i., in the sections on "The One" and "Being for Self". In these sections, the emphasis falls on the demonstration that an ultimate reality must be utterly

¹The best interpretation known to the writer, of Hegel's Absolute as an organic system of selves, is that of McTaggart. It is dangerous to differ from so close a student of the Hegelian text; but where the question is of Hegel's meaning, there is no choice save to follow Hegel's words rather than those of the critic. Cf. a review, by the writer, of McTaggart's "Studies in Hegelian Cosmology," in the *Philosophical Review*, March, 1908.

complete and entire, and that a complete, composite reality is inconceivable. The One is defined as reconciliation of the opposition between Finite and Infinite. By the Finite, is meant the Somewhat, the single reality, and by Infinity, Hegel means to indicate that whatever the number of actual realities, any particular Somewhat is other to each of the other realities and so related to each of them. 'White,' for instance, is not-black, not-coloured, not-sour, not-square, not-just and so on. Its nature is the negation of an indefinite number of other qualities; it is not itself ultimate reality because it implies all these others and requires an endless enumeration of them all in order to its own definition. But the very endlessness of this infinite plurality, Hegel teaches, is a bar to its ultimateness; and the only reconciliation of the two is by the conception of an underlying One. This Absolute One is not made up of the specious Infinity (*schlechte Unendlichkeit*), or Many, but includes the Many, and differentiates itself into them, so that it is a Being-for-Self as well as a One—that is to say, a True Infinite. Or, in Hegel's words: "The One forms the pre-supposition of the Many; and in the thought of the One is implied that it explicitly makes itself Many".¹ The fact of there being many, Hegel names Repulsion;² the fact, that these many are nevertheless alike, in that they are parts of the One, he names Attraction. This physical metaphor is greatly overworked, especially in the larger Logic—never, however, so much as entirely to obscure its real meaning. The significant feature of the doctrine is the conception of complete reality as more than bare aggregate and more even than mere whole of co-ordinate parts—as, in truth, a One which manifests itself in its parts.

The most important criticism of these closing sections of book i. concerns Hegel's varying use of the categories Finite and Infinite. He makes (1) the opposition, fundamental to his argument, of the Finite—that is, the single unit—to the Specious Infinite whether temporally³ or non-temporally regarded. He furthermore (2) contrasts the Specious Infinite with the True Infinite—equivalent to Being-for-Self, or One.⁴ But he utterly obscures the force of his argument when (3) he lays stress on a third opposition, the contrast between the Finite, conceived as the Here-and-Now, and the Specious Infinite, regarded as the Beyond (the Jenseits).⁵ This contrast is certainly significant, but is out of place at this point in the argument, since Finite and Infinite, in this meaning, are, once more, no other than the constantly reappearing categories of Appearance and Essence.

The argument just outlined, reappears in book iii., under the heading Syllogism. There is, however, this difference, that Hegel passes at once, in book iii., from the theory of ultimate reality as a single individual, to the conception of ultimate reality as a system of related parts, ignoring the hypothesis—refuted in book i.—that final reality is a plurality of distinct and unrelated parts. Moreover, in book iii., Hegel lays special stress on the likeness of the parts which make up the supposedly complete composite of reality. In the sections on 'Judgment' which immediately precede, Hegel has shown that ultimate reality can never be identical with any one individual, since the fact that the individual is simply a bundle of likenesses and unlikenesses implies always the exist-

¹ *Encycl.*, § 97, note; cf. *Werke*, iii., S. 182², 175¹.

² *Werke*, iii., 189², *Dass viele Eins seien, ist die Repulsion selbst*; cf. *Encycl.*, § 98.

³ *Werke*, iii., 140¹; cf. *Encycl.*, § 92 seq.

⁴ *Encycl.*, § 95².

⁵ *Werke*, iii., 148 seq.; *Encycl.*, § 95³.

ence of other individuals. At this point, the new conception emerges: ultimate reality is a syllogism, namely, a system of related individuals, bound together by ties of universality, that is, of likeness.¹ Or, in Hegel's own words: "Everything is"—turns into, is seen to imply—"a syllogism".²

The system of like realities, however, as Hegel proceeds to show with great elaboration, that is, this system of individuals connected through universals, must be a complete system, if it is to be indeed ultimate reality. Upon this point, here as in book i., Hegel lays great stress. Under the misleading title, "Qualitative Syllogism," he shows clearly that one group, among several, of resembling individuals can no more constitute fundamental reality than any one of the individuals. For the common quality on which this system is based will be, in the first place empirically observed³ and very likely unessential; and it will, of course, be one quality only among the many qualities of each one of the individuals in the system, so that the system will not adequately represent the individuals composing it. Thus, the rose, because red, is a coloured object; but if ultimate reality be defined as the totality of coloured objects, such a system does not even truly represent the rose, for a flower has other qualities than colour.⁴

It is quite evident, therefore, that the system, or universality, of like objects, so long as it remains incomplete, implies the existence of still another incomplete system, and that these incomplete systems have to be linked together in a complete totality, or, as Hegel calls it, a Syllogism of Allness. This complete system of distinct individuals bound together by all conceivable resemblances, however complex and intricate the combinations, is, thus, the only sort of whole-of-resembling-parts which meets the requirements of ultimate reality.

We have before us, therefore, in obscure terminology but in unmistakable outline, the theory of ultimate reality as the complete whole of all realities in perfect relation of likeness. But the conception involves an inherent contradiction. The very completeness which is its distinctive feature is impossible unless the unity be more than that of a mere sum or whole. For, as Hegel proceeds to show—under the heading "Syllogism of Reflexion"—such a complete sum, or syllogism of allness, is contingent and unknowable, because it is an affair of mere induction or of analogy.⁵ Clearly, therefore, if ultimate reality were a mere All, it

¹ Hegel sometimes uses the term 'syllogism' of any whole of parts, and not merely of the whole of like parts (*cf. Werke*, v., 191²; *Encycl.*, § 197). But the latter is the usual meaning of the term.

² *Encycl.*, § 181²; *cf. Werke*, v., 122¹.

³ *Encycl.*, § 184; *cf. Werke*, v., 118 A., *seq.*

⁴ *Encycl.*, § 184: "The Middle Term being an abstract particularity is nothing but any quality whatever of the subject; but the subject being immediate and thus empirically concrete, has several others and could, therefore, be coupled with exactly as many other universalities as it possesses single qualities" (*cf. Werke*, v., 123).

⁵ *Werke*, v., 150 *seq.*; *Encycl.*, § 190, note: "The syllogism of Allness hands us over to the syllogism of Induction . . . that presupposes that over a certain region observation and experiment are complete. But the things in question here are individuals; and so again we are landed in the progression *ad infinitum*. In other words, in no induction can we ever exhaust the individuals. Every induction is consequently imperfect." In the still more imperfect "Syllogism of Analogy," we conclude from the

would be definitely unknowable. No one can completely enumerate every individual reality, and without such enumeration, no All can be conceived. But ultimate reality has already been shown to be knowable, to be within experience and not beyond it. Its completeness, therefore, must be of a sort which needs no impossible enumeration, and the absolute whole of like parts—the Syllogism of Necessity, as Hegel calls it—must be an Absolute Individual, not a system.

This is the only reasoning by which Hegel opposes the theory that ultimate reality is a complete whole of co-ordinate like parts. He fails, as we have already indicated, to make use of a far subtler and more fundamental form of argument,¹ by which he might have established the truth that the Absolute One is an Individual. But however incomplete his argument, Hegel never falters in his affirmation of the doctrine. In book i., he defines ultimate reality as Being-for-Self, a One which is "just self-exclusion and explicit putting of itself as Many".² Even more clearly, in book iii., he substitutes for the false conception of the complete whole of co-ordinate parts the conception of ultimate reality as Absolute Individual, "a totality of its particular members and . . . a single particular or exclusive individuality".³

THE ARGUMENTS, IN BOOKS II. AND III., AGAINST THE THEORY OF ULTIMATE REALITY AS A COMPOSITE OF INTERDEPENDENT PARTS.

We turn now to Hegel's discussion of ultimate reality as a composite of parts, whose interdependence is emphasised. The consideration of ultimate reality as composite of interdependent parts, though suggested in book i., is first definitely brought forward by the sections on Action and Reaction, Necessity and Freedom, at the end of book ii. In this discussion, Hegel no longer lays stress on the impossibility of conceiving a composite as complete.⁴ Instead, he insists on the more fundamental doctrine that no mere composite, however complete, can be ultimate. To appreciate both the rigor and the defect of his argument, we must once again distinguish the two forms of composite reality: (1) the plurality of distinct and independent parts, and (2) the system of inter-related and mutually dependent parts. Hegel's argument directs itself against the first of these conceptions, the hypothesis of the bare and unrelated plurality of absolutely independent individuals. He has virtually already refuted this theory by showing that each term in the plurality is closely related to each of the others.⁵ Now he points out, with specific application to the plurality, that causality is a universal relation; that every limited reality is itself both cause and effect; and that this interconnexion annihilates the independence of all, as well as of each, of the parts.⁶

This unimpeachable argument, however, proves only what almost every pluralist would admit: the impossibility that ultimate reality is a mere aggregate of unrelated units. The argument does not, on the other hand, affect at all the deeper pluralist conception, of ultimate reality as the unity of all limited realities in a complete and closely articulated

fact that some things of a certain kind possess a certain quality that the same quality is possessed by other things of the same kind. Cf. the similar teaching, under the heading 'Judgment of Reflection,' *Encycl.*, 175¹.

¹ Cf. p. 328. ² *Encycl.*, § 97²; cf. *Werke*, iii., 179², 187².

³ *Encycl.*, § 191; italics mine.

⁴ For mere suggestion of this argument cf. *Encycl.*, § 156².

⁵ Cf. B, I., a., p. 822 seq.

⁶ *Encycl.*, § 153².

system of related parts. But though he directs no specific argument against it, Hegel certainly rejects this conception of ultimate reality as a system of connected parts, and definitely adopts the hypothesis of ultimate reality as an Absolute One, or Individual—the Notion manifesting itself in the parts and itself constituting their relation. “To understand,” he says, “the relation of action and re-action, we must not let the two sides rest in their state of mere given facts, but must recognise them . . . for factors of a third and higher, which is the Notion and nothing else.”

The second section of book iii., miscalled “The Object,” repeats the discussion of ultimate reality as composite of interdependent parts. The discussion in book iii. is, however, more convincing than that of the preceding book. Ultimate reality as plurality of independent parts, is described under the heading “Formal Mechanism”¹ as a “unity of differentia, . . . a composite, an aggregate,” in which the relation is conceived as external and foreign to the individuals related, so that “[they] remain independent and . . . external to each other.”² The inner contradiction of this conception is shown by the old argument: such independence is impossible, since all facts are causally related. That is to say, ultimate reality is not a Formal Mechanism, or plurality of independent parts, but rather a related composite—in Hegel’s terms, Mechanism with Affinity; and this composite, to be ultimate, must be a Complete or Absolute Mechanism—an ultimate unity or system of inter-related parts. Moreover, even this hypothesis, of ultimate reality as complete system, or mechanism, is rejected by Hegel. His arguments, however, affect only the old, discredited theory of Formal Mechanism, the plurality of unrelated parts. He might readily, as we have seen, disprove the Absolute Mechanism theory, the hypothesis of a complete unity of inter-related parts, by closely analysing the conception. How, he might ask, can realities which are many be, at the same time, connected—that is one? It is impossible to reply that the causal or reciprocal relation makes the many into one, for—conceived as an independent reality—the relation is itself one of the many and in need of unification.³ The unity of the many is, therefore, possible only as they participate in a deeper reality, in a One which underlies and includes them, instead of being made up by them. The interdependence of the many, thus, is not ultimate reality, but is, rather, a relatively superficial aspect of the fundamental unity of the Absolute Individual.

II. ULTIMATE REALITY IS SELF.

The conception of ultimate reality as Absolute One, leaves unanswered the question: What is the nature of this absolute individuality, this self-determining, self-differentiating One; what is it really, actually, concretely? Hegel answers this question by the assertion: The Absolute is Idea—that is Self. This conception is, indeed, inevitable, given the earlier conclusions of Hegel’s argument. It is evident, first of all, that the Absolute One is consciousness; for consciousness is the only reality immediately experienced—a reality to which

¹ This exposition follows the order of categories in the *Encyclopædia*, and does not take into account the sections on “Chemism” and “Teleology”—mere illustration of the domain of chemistry and of organic life of the inadequacy of the aggregation-theory of ultimate reality.

² *Encycl.*, § 195; cf. *Werke*, v., 175.

³ Cf. p. 323, above.

even so-called material phenomena reduce. Therefore, consciousness is at least one form of reality, so that if, as Hegel has proved, ultimate reality is an absolute One, the nature of that Absolute must be consciousness. But an Absolute Consciousness is an Absolute Self. For the only alternative conception of the Absolute Consciousness is that of an organic unity of inter-related selves, and this theory is untenable because Hegel has shown that the Absolute is a One, an Individual, not a system. Thus, the absolute, self-centred, self-differentiating One, which is also consciousness, can be none other than Absolute Self, Absolute Personality—in Hegel's term, Absolute Idea or Spirit.

This is the underlying argument of the last division of Hegel's Logic. He neglects, as already discredited, the hypothesis of ultimate reality as identical with inorganic matter and proceeds at once, in the section on "Life," to show that ultimate reality cannot be conceived as organic nature. This conclusion leads, therefore, to the theory that reality is (or includes) consciousness. Hegel, therefore, considers, under the heading "Cognition in General,"¹ the conception of ultimate reality as finite consciousness. He shows that the finite self is always confronted by a world external to it, so that ultimate reality, if the finite self were an ultimate part of it, would be a world of co-ordinate and related realities, whereas it has been found to be an absolute One. It follows, Hegel indicates, that ultimate reality, though of the nature of consciousness, lies deeper than the finite selves. Evidently it can be none other than the Absolute Idea or Self.

Even from this bare outline of the closing section of the Logic, it appears that Hegel has virtually omitted certain essential portions of his argument. A careful reading of the text, especially in the less adequate version of the *Encyclopædia*, discloses wide digressions and frequent over-elaboration of unimportant details. As it stands, the closing division of book iii. has indeed almost the force of an independent argument, rather awkwardly combined with what precedes; and its essential teaching, that ultimate reality is a Self, certainly is not as logically developed or as rigorously treated as the doctrine that ultimate reality is an Absolute One, that is an Absolute Individual. From a historical standpoint, however, the disproportion may be readily understood.

¹ *Encycl.*, § 323. The heading in the larger Logic is "Die Idee des Erkennens" (*Werke*, v., 255).

Fichte and even Schelling (in some periods of his thought) assert unequivocally that all reality is of the nature of consciousness. But because they failed, lavishly as they used the word 'absolute,' to realise the self-centred unity which makes up the conception of absoluteness, therefore they did not attain the culminating doctrine of the Absolute Consciousness as an Absolute Personality. Fichte is therefore correctly represented as teaching that God, or the Absolute, "exists only in the consciousness of thinking men".¹ It is Hegel's great achievement to substitute for this theory of reality as a connected system of finite selves, the doctrine of an Absolute Self, whose and who is all reality. This Absolute Spirit, he teaches, is self-differentiated into the rich variety of the world of nature and of finite spirit, yet is always conscious of itself as distinct, not separate, from these lesser selves and these natural phenomena. In enforcing this conclusion, Hegel had, however, little need to argue for the conception of ultimate reality as consciousness, since this had been abundantly demonstrated by his predecessors. This part of his doctrine, therefore, is more broadly treated and less severely argued. On the other hand, only by the close logic and the constant repetitions of his argument for an Absolute which is neither aggregate nor system, but in the strictest sense a unity, could Hegel transmute the unsatisfactory ambiguity of Fichte's teaching that the Absolute which explains the world of finite selves is itself simply the sum of these finite selves, into the doctrine of a personality which yet is Absolute. "The highest, extremest Summit," he says, "is pure Personality, which alone, through that absolute dialectic which is its nature, encloses and holds all within itself."²

A closer study of the text will emphasise Hegel's conclusion.

a. The nature of Ultimate Reality is not adequately conceived as life.

As has been noticed, this section should logically have been preceded by a discussion of the hypothesis: ultimate reality is mere inorganic matter. The omission is accounted for, historically, by the fact that materialism of the mechanical form had long been superseded, whereas organic nature was often tacitly excepted, even by idealists, from the spiritualistic conception of reality. Kant's *Kritik der Urtheilskraft* had suggested the theory, which was firmly imbedded in Schelling's nature-

¹ A. B. Thompson, *Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge*, p. 128; cf. the "Anweisung zum seeligen Leben," *Werke*, v., 450.

² *Werke*, v., 339^a; cf. 317^a, 59^a.

philosophy, that the secret of reality is one with the secret of organic nature and there was thus an immediate need for Hegel's critical discussion of this theory. He considers it in the first section of the last division of book iii., and enumerates—by way of introduction—the points in which the conception of life conforms with the conditions, already formulated, of absolute reality. The living organism, he points out¹ is not an aggregate of independent parts, but a one manifesting itself in different members which are related to each other and to the one. In so far, it conforms to the type of the Absolute One; and its special functions, sensibility, irritability and reproduction furnish ready analogies to the various forms of self-differentiation and self-relation of the Absolute.²

The initial difficulty which confronts this theory is the necessity for indicating a precise distinction between organic and inorganic, between life and matter.³ Neither science nor philosophy has ever succeeded in the attempt to define life except by enumerating its material constituents. Evidently, therefore, there is no definable reason for distinguishing between life and inert matter. Therefore, since no one claims that ultimate reality can be stated in terms of inorganic matter, and since life is not known to be other than a form of the inorganic, the attempt to define ultimate reality as life must be abandoned.

Waiving this objection, however, Hegel proceeds to a closer analysis of the conception of ultimate reality as life. It is capable of two interpretations: ultimate reality is either some one living organism or is the succession of such organisms—not the individual, but the race, or type. The first of these hypotheses is obviously inconsistent with the conclusion, already justified, that ultimate reality is no single individual, limited by the existence of other individuals. There is, at first sight, more likelihood that the second form of the theory is adequate. Admitting that the single organism can never be identical with ultimate reality, is it not possible that the life perpetuated through generations—the life, not of the individual, but of the race, the type—may be indeed, the fundamental reality?⁴ Hegel puts the question, but, with his cool and penetrating logic, he does not fail to analyse the conception of the life of the race, which Schelling, in his ardour, had uncritically assumed to be ultimate. This race, or type—he asks—what is it? Simply, he answers, a plurality, an indefinitely prolonged procession of living beings.⁵ And, since it has been shown already that an organic unity of related individuals is not ultimate reality, the conception of ultimate reality as life of the race must be abandoned.

b. Ultimate Reality cannot be adequately conceived as finite self.

From the untenable hypothesis that ultimate reality is life, Hegel turns to the conception of fundamental reality as finite consciousness.⁶ This is of course a dualistic conception, for every finite self is confronted with the opposition of the external world, "the immediate world found ready to hand"⁷—a world of opinions and purposes contrary to its own and a world of things which it has not made.

¹ *Werke*, v., 248³ seq.; *Encycl.*, § 216¹.

² *Werke*, v., 246 seq.; *Encycl.*, § 218².

³ *Werke*, v., 252 seq.; *Encycl.*, § 221.

⁴ *Werke*, v., 255³; *Encycl.*, § 222.

⁵ *Encycl.*, § 224; cf. *Werke*, v., 265².

⁶ *Encycl.*, § 219.

⁷ *Werke*, v., 254.

There are, to be sure, two ways in which the finite self instinctively contradicts this independence of the world, thereby asserting its own self-sufficiency. The first is the way of thought, or cognition, in which it "receives the existing world into itself, into subjective conception,"¹ that is, analyses and classifies it. In other words: the fact that the external object can be thought about² shows that it is itself the stuff of which consciousness is made. Yet this fact cannot obscure the truth that the activity of finite understanding assumes, always, the existence of something outside itself to be analysed and classified. In truth "the finitude of consciousness lies in the presupposition of a world already in existence".³

The second attitude of the finite self to the external world seems at first sight more successful in reducing its externality. For, in Volition, the finite self changes the world and converts it to the ends of the self.⁴ Herein, volition is clearly distinguished from cognition, for "while Intelligence merely proposes to take the world as it is, Will takes steps to make it what it ought to be". Yet, even, in volition, the finite self fails to attain ultimate reality, for "as finite it presupposes the purposed end of the Good to be a mere subjective idea and the object to be independent,"⁵ that is, it is limited by reality external to it.

So long, therefore, as we define reality in terms of the purely human consciousness, we conceive of reality as a system of which the finite consciousness forms merely one of the related parts. Even—Hegel might well have added—if the external world be a world not of material realities but of other finite selves, ultimate reality, thus conceived, is composite not individual. But it has been shown that ultimate reality, whatever its concrete nature, is Absolute One, not organic unity of parts. The finite self and the reality external to it must then be conceived as parts of a more ultimate reality.⁶ And this "identity of the two sides which supersedes them both" can be none other than Will—but no longer merely finite will. The Will, which includes within itself both the finite self and the world external to it, the Will "which knows the world to be its own" is none other than the Absolute Idea or Self—"the absolute and all truth, the Idea which thinks itself . . . and . . . is completely self-identical in its otherness".⁷

It will be well in conclusion to comment on the re-orderings of the categories, required by the preceding interpretation of Hegel's argument. The categories in book i. are unchanged in order, and have been merely interrupted by including parallel or related groups of categories from other books. But certain important omissions from book i. must be briefly justified. The category of Becoming is not, as it claims to be, a synthesis of the first two categories,—Being and Naught—but is rather the universal category of the Logic, the common method by which every category is shown to

¹ *Encycl.*, § 225. ² *Werke*, v., 270-810; *Encycl.*, §§ 227-232.

³ *Encycl.*, § 226²; cf. *Werke*, v., 267².

⁴ *Werke*, v., 814²; *Encycl.*, § 234².

⁵ *Encycl.*, § 233; cf. *Werke*, v., 312².

⁶ *Encycl.*, § 234; *Werke*, v., 816².

⁷ *Encycl.*, §§ 236, 238¹; cf. *Werke*, v., 317¹.

involve its opposite and thus to imply a reality deeper than that of itself or of its other. Becoming, which is merely, thus, a name for the dialectic process, might as well be called the synthesis of Somewhat and Other, of Finite and Infinite, or of Essence and Appearance, as of Being and Naught. The true synthesis of Being and Naught, on the other hand, is Determined Being; for since Pure Being and Pure Nothing are shown to be mere fictions the reality implied by each is that of Determined Being. Hegel admits this by the statement "Being Determinate is the Union of Being and Nothing".¹ He virtually admits, also, that Becoming is a universal category, by giving the name to the transition from Somewhat to Other.² Indeed, every page of the *Logic* shows the futility of trying to confine Becoming to any one stage—least of all to an early stage—of the thought development.

The entire neglect, in this reading of Hegel, of the sections on Quantity and Measure is a more serious matter. The attempt to explain it in detail would involve a complicated discussion, but the reasons for the omission are in general the following: the categories of Quantity are substantially parallel with those of the later sections of book i.—the categories of Finitude and Infinity, of One and Being-for-Self. For example: (1) The attributes of Quantity, Continuity and Discreteness are explicitly identified with the Attraction and Repulsion (meaning likeness and difference) within the One.³ (2) The discussion of Infinite Quantitative Progression differs in no essential respect from the treatment of the subject in the consideration of the Quality-categories, Finitude and Infinity. Finally (3) the discussion of Quantitative Ratio⁴ is a close anticipation of the teaching, in book iii., about the inter-relation of syllogisms; and the sections in book iii., as we have seen, are really a continuation of the concluding sections under Quality.

This virtual parallel of the categories of Quantity with those of Quality does away with the alleged necessity of 'reconciling' Quality with Quantity in Measure. The section on Measure, therefore,—in all its confusion of empirical illustration with metaphysical analysis—simply falls away, to the great advantage of Hegel's argument.

The discussion, in book ii. of the *Logic*, of Reality as Unknowable Essence has been transposed in the present

¹ *Encycl.*, § 89.

² *Werke*, iii., 115².

³ *Werke*, iii., 204; *Encycl.*, § 100.

⁴ *Werke*, iii., 387²; *Encycl.*, § 105¹.

arrangement to follow on the consideration in book i. of Undetermined Being. It may be freely admitted that this change of order is not positively required. For the hypothesis, here discussed, that Reality is unknowable might be made at any point of Hegel's argument, and not merely at its beginning. But though the transposition is not strictly necessary, it is, on the other hand, both natural and logical. The destructive analysis of the doctrine of ultimate reality as unknowable Essence is more closely connected with the proof that Ultimate Reality is no Undetermined Being, than with any other section of the Logic,¹ in that both theories would make a positive metaphysics impossible. For this reason, the Essence hypothesis, like the Pure Being theory, appropriately precedes the positive discussions of the Logic.

The transposition of the sections on Identity and Difference, Likeness and Unlikeness would still, however, be imperatively needed, even if the discussion of Essence were left in its present place. As they stand, these categories—Identity and the others—come midway between the categories of Essence and Appearance and the entirely parallel categories of Ground and Consequence. But, as our summary of these sections has shown,² Identity, Difference, Likeness and Unlikeness are not relations of unknowable essence to the world of appearance, but rather categories of the connexion of determined realities within the world of appearance. Since, then, it is necessary to dislodge these categories—Identity and the others—from their present position, there can be no doubt that they follow most naturally on the parallel categories, in book i., of Reality and Negation, Somewhat and Other and the rest.

The remaining changes of order suggested in this summary of Hegel's teaching will be readily allowed, when once the need of some change in the present order has been clearly apprehended. Some transposition of the categories is, in truth, demanded by the fact that Hegel's argument, in its present form, has the wholly fictitious and misleading appearance of progress and steady advance from the earliest categories of Being to the final category of Absolute Idea. The truth is, however, that both book ii. and book iii. are largely composed of repetitions, in varied form and terminology, of the categories already discussed. Just because it doubles on itself, without proper warning, the Hegelian argument needs to be disentangled. The changes required consist merely in the juxtaposition of groups of equivalent

¹ Cf. *Werke*, iv., 127.

² Cf. p. 322, above.

categories; and the justification for each change is found—as has been shown—in Hegel's own admission. He himself asserts the equivalence of Identity and Difference not only with the categories of Determined Being, in book i., but with the categories of the Judgment in book iii.¹ He clearly implies the parallelism of the categories of Syllogism with the categories, in book i., of Being-for-Self, or One,² and he distinctly affirms the substantial identity of Mechanism, in book iii., with Reciprocity in book ii.³

The reconstruction attempted in this paper will, however, fail of its object if it in any wise detract from the value of Hegel's argument. It should, rather, reveal the strength of a system which has triumphed over such difficulties of expression. The idealistic critic may, therefore, re-shape but he never may reject Hegel's proof that ultimate reality is an Absolute Self.

¹ Cf. p. 324, above. ² Cf. p. 330, above. ³ Cf. p. 333, above.