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religious teacher of the age would have said, 'The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is strong.' Heathenism regarded the flesh as an obstacle to being good; Christianity regarded it as material for being good with.'

There are a number of points, not of great importance for the argument of the book as a whole, about which we are constrained to dissent from the views of the author. A few examples may be given. The "judgment-seat" in Acts xviii. 17 is explained (p. 13) as the judgment-seat of the Jewish synagogue at Corinth. It is, of course, true that the judgment-seat is not said in this verse to have been Gallio's, but in the preceding verses the judgment-seat has been twice mentioned, and is obviously that of the proconsul.

Again, on p. 56 the state of religion in Israel in the time of Elijah is thus described:

"It was to a crowd of fetish-worshippers, dancing madly round the altars of Baal or the hangings of the maypole (sic), dedicating their children by fire to Moloch, building houses in the sacrifice of their first-born, credulous of taboo, trustful in their war-god Jehovah, whom they carried into battle in a wooden box, that Elijah came. Civilisation, such as it was, was against him; yet to Elijah, child of the desert, and cousin to the wandering Arabs, the great secret was given that Jehovah was not in the earthquake, but in the whispering of a small voice. And this conviction and unshakable faith grew till the whole nation was impregnated with it."

This passage appears to us full of petitiones principii, and to be a caricature of the religion of the Hebrews in Elijah's time, if even one of the Psalms be from David, or if the Song in Judges v. be (as it is admitted to be) contemporary with the events it celebrates. Even monolatry is not fetish-worship. We had thought, too, that the modern idea was that ethical monotheism was the special product of the age of Hosea and Amos; here it is brought back to Elijah. Perhaps it begins with Abraham.

We must also demur to the sentences on p. 86 suggesting a parallelism between Mithraism and Freemasonry. Mr. Carrington probably knows more about the former than about the latter. He does not seem to be aware that the atheistic Freemasonry of some parts of the Continent, which is no doubt "a definite antagonist of Christianity," has no relations whatsoever with the theistic Freemasonry of England and elsewhere. No English Freemason would accept his definition of Freemasonry as being merely "a society for mutual benefit." It is a religious society. The epithet makes all the difference. Again, why should the mysteries of birth be described (p. 90) as "the most holy and horrible of human secrets"? Some of the results of the abuses connected with them are no doubt horrible, but the sentence seems to us to imply more than that.

On the whole, we have to thank the author for a book which will stimulate thought, and develop interest in the Christian writings of a period not so well known as it should be.

J. M. HARDEN.


The fame of Benedetto Croce, and the naturalization of his thought in our own philosophy of art and history to-day, have brought home to us
the existence of a very active idealistic school in Italy. But little has
been known hitherto of the actual work of such writers as Giovanni
Gentile and Guido de Ruggiero. In the present volume we have a careful
translation of a work of Ruggiero's which saw the light in 1912, and is a
survey of European philosophy from 1850 onwards.

But we have here no unprejudiced description of the rise and fall of
metaphysical speculation, but rather a polemic of the most trenchant
character; it is phrased throughout as the proclamation of the one and
only truth from the point of view of one who has attained the goal; it
presents just one criterion of judgment on the various schools of thought
in Germany, France, England, America, and Italy, by the standard of
which all metaphysics are tried and found wanting; and that criterion
is the philosophy of absolute Immanence itself—in short, the position
of Gentile. Philosophers from Kant downwards are ranged as valuable
or worthless just in so far as their systems prepare the way for the great
illumination to come, or, on the other hand, admit elements which obstruct
its advance.

And what is this philosophy, apart from its aesthetic teaching? It
claims to be the inevitable completion of the criticism of the Kantian
movement which culminated in Hegel. It banishes the concept of
transcendence altogether, which Kant in the noumenon left outside his
critique; Hegel, it is true, professed to suppress it, but in fact dualism
dwells in the heart of his logic. The absolute Immanentist can afford
to be gentle with Naturalism and Positivism, though it can hardly be
said that Ruggiero is, for, absurd and crude as they are, yet they battered
obsolete ideologies and all theories which depreciate facts and attempt
to anticipate facts by thoughts. At least, they expressed a form of
Immanence, empirical in Mill, phenomenal in the Neo-Kantians, intu­
tional in Bergson, though they were all alike doomed to break out
ultimately into transcendence, now positing a "nature,"  now a religious
object, now a social ideal. All alike fail to solve the problems of nature
and history, without the introduction of anything outside the flow of the
human spirit, and by their very failure point the way to Absolute Imma­
nence, which alone can do it. This teaching claims direct descent from
Kant's a priori synthesis, to which, it is ingenuously said, Hegel gave a new
significance, and by it led the way to the Copernican conception of the
world, which "in logic is directed against the thing-in-itself, in action
against the heteronomy of the 'ought-to-be,' and of all abstract ideals."
The human spirit is the individualized manifestation of the Eternal in
the form of contingency from moment to moment. It is "actuality,
concreteness, search and attainment, aspiration and achievement." There
can be no abstract; "the abstract simply does not exist, it is an
optical delusion produced by thought projecting itself in advance of the
process of thinking." Does it not seem more difficult to envisage the world
of absolute Immanence, than that of the humbler idealism in which the
mind made nature out of a material that it did not make?

In German philosophy Ruggiero, starting from the Naturalism that
succeeded the classic idealism, examines the various types of thought
that rested on immediate experience—Schuppe, Mach, Wundt, and
Brentano. None offer a reasonable explanation of experience. Eucken,
for instance, in seeking a foothold for the Spirit above subjectivity, and
Munsterberg's mystic vision of ultimate reality attained by an act of
will, are vague and unsatisfying. The concept of "value" is "a mere
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evasion, an ambiguous term between an affirmation and a negation, that
betrays an inconsistency in consciousness itself."

In France it was Lachelier who succeeded best in basing on Kant the
conception of a world of creative spontaneity above that of mechanical
causation; self-affirmation and freedom were his watchwords, and he
and Weber are the heralds of absolute Immanence. In a way they lead
up to Bergson, but Bergson's "fundamental vice" is his Intuitionism,
for Intuition must have a transcendent object. His doctrine of matter
as an interruption of the élan vital shows that he regards life as nature,
not as dialectic. Blondel, again, though his Activism is similar to
Gentile's, fails to "resolve the transcendent"; that is to say, he allows
God a separate existence for Himself apart from His manifestation in
humanity, and so far fails of the goal of absolute Immanence.

After playing with the English Empiricists in a way that will delight
all Idealists, Ruggiero deals at length with the Hegelians. Green and
McTaggart mix up Plato with Hegel, resolve the world into the Unity of
the Idea, and lead to a conflict between Idea and Experience that produces
Bradley's scepticism. Royce, with his "diverse processes and multiple
individualities," goes astray; for pluralism calls for an abstract centre
outside thought, which can only be the God of Theism.

The Italian philosophy is represented as an historical development
from Machiavelli to Gioberti. The revival of speculation in the nine-
ten century leads on to the new metaphysic of Spaventa, "whose
ideal is the expression of reality in terms of the human spirit and nothing
else, and the resolute denial of all transcendence," which it is held that
Croce and Gentile have worked out satisfactorily.

The scope of this book is immense; but you must be an absolute
Immanentist to sympathize with its audacity. As an early Italian
Hegelian Vera said: "Hegelianism can only be imparted to an Hegelian," and
when asked: "How does one become an Hegelian?" had to answer
that Hegelians were born not made, so this later teaching is difficult even
to conceive. In the light of it (or the dark of it) we can understand the
strong reaction to Thomism in the Roman Church, and its enforced
propagation as a sane system of metaphysics.

But however little we may sympathize with the point of view of the
writer, or be affected by his ideals, it must be admitted that there is no
book in which the streams of thought in Europe and America have been
so fully and subtly compared as the expressions of one spirit. The
criticism of Naturalism throughout is exceedingly acute and telling.

W. J. FERRAR.

Alice Drayton Greenwood. The Bede Histories, Series III. S.P.C.K.
8s. 6d. net.

The excuse proffered by the editor of this series for the addition of yet
another to the formidable array of school history textbooks is that
scarcely any of its rivals already in the field give an adequate and intelli-
gent account of the work of the Church in the growth and development
of the English nation. The indictment is true and the excuse therefore
adequate. Unfortunately, the treatment of Church questions in the
volume before us, though full and interesting, does not seem to us con-
ceived on the right lines. It is too insular. We turned to the Index and