criticism. It is, however—and this is the point—chiefly from the practical, ethical standpoint that these theories are proven untenable, and to this end the chapters on historical and educational illustrations are original and important contributions to the general intuition of the book.

In forming an estimate of a work the plan of which is confessedly popular, and in which the method employed is more or less an ethical *argumentum ad hominem*, one should always have in mind what is left out! Consequently, while it cannot be said that the epistemological dualism which lies inevitably in the scientific standpoint is convincingly shown to be impossible, yet, as a general intuition of a monistic metaphysics, the book is enlightening. Of the metaphysical conclusions drawn from psychological theory one needs to be somewhat skeptical, especially since the author is not always quite clear as to what the psychological theory in question is. It scarcely appears how, for instance, “the existence of a distinct sense of motion is enough to refute the dualism of mind and matter, the physical and the psychical,” for motion, as far as psychology is concerned, still remains a primary quality of *matter*. Nor is it likely that the temporal and causal distinctions which the author deplors in the current theories of emotion, feeling and will can be dispensed with in psychological analysis, even though they imply an untenable dualism. If the author had made clearer the relative validity of such scientific analyses, and then sought to show how they might be modified from an absolute standpoint, the argument would probably be more convincing. In general, however, one may properly doubt whether these theories themselves are definitely enough formulated to admit of any far-reaching metaphysical conclusions.

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PRINCETON.

Einfühlung und Association in der neueren Aesthetik; ein Beitrag zur Psychologischen Analyse der Aesthetischen Anschauung.

PAUL STERN. Hamburg and Leipzig. 1898. Pp. 81.

This monograph, the fifth in the series edited by Theodor Lipps, is equally valuable as a historical study of the development of the psychologizing tendency in modern German *Æsthetics* and as a critical study of the merits of the controversy between the metaphysical *æsthetic* with its symbol-concept and the psychological Association theory. Dr. Stern finds the beginning of the subjectification of the *æsthetic* problem in the Romantic school, which rightly sought the explanation of the *æsthetic* in the sphere of the feelings. ‘Der Einfühlungs

Gedanke,' the notion that the æsthetic intuition is in its essence a reading of our feelings and emotions into the object, is to be found throughout the writings of Jean Paul, Novalis and Schlegel.

Within this early school, however, the symbolic character of the object rather than a psychological analysis of the symbolizing processes was the main problem. Not until the careful analyses of Fr. Vischer and Lotze brought the subjective æsthetic act into the foreground was the psychological standpoint, implicit in this notion of romanticism, set over against the symbolic. Robert Vischer continues the psychologizing tendency.

Later formulations of this subjective principle of 'inner nach-erleben,' the successor of the 'Einfühlungs-Gedanke' of the Romantics, is traced in the theories of Siebeck, Biese and Groos. Especially in Groos is the more psychological aspect of the problem separated, but, as the writer points out, by means of an unwarranted abstraction. The æsthetic intuition is supposed to consist of an 'inner imitation of the sensational act rather than of the object of the sensation. But psychical acts are obviously merely explanatory hypothetical terms, and not immediately given psychological data to be imitated.

This entire development of the psychologizing tendency in æsthetic is an attempt to give a technical psychological formulation to this, originally, more than psychological concept of 'Einfühlung.' But the difficulty of exhausting the content of this notion by means of the ordinary laws of psychic mechanism leaves symbolic idealism still in the field. Volkelt's criticism, from this standpoint, of the Association principle, as formulated by Fechner, is in turn subjected to criticism by Dr. Stern. He shows conclusively that Volkelt's objections rest upon an untenable doctrine of association itself; the development of the true doctrine of association (along the lines of Lipp's psychology and æsthetic) being sufficient to account for the 'innerlichkeit' in the æsthetic psychosis, for the explanation of which Volkelt and the idealists in general require a doctrine of metaphysical symbolism. Association is then the technical psychological expression for the old 'Einfühlungs-Gedanke.' Dr. Stern has given a clear presentation of this standpoint, but those who think that association does not explain the æsthetic psychosis might properly object that in getting away from the formalistic theory of association he has gone too far in the other direction. When the association which constitutes the condition of the deepening of un-æsthetic to æsthetic feelings is an identity association which sets the entire psyche in resonance and brings about a sympathetic modification of the feeling of self-worth, too much is asked of association.

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