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Pre-Socratic Philosophy *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. Griechisch und Deutsch. Diels Von Hermann. 2. Auflage, I. Band. Pp. xii + 456. Berlin: Weidmann, 1906. M. 10. *De Platone Prae-Socraticorum philosophorum existimatore et iudice*. R. H. Woltjer. Pars prior. Pp. iii + 219. Leiden : Brill, 1904.

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the water *together*. One particular phrase calls for special comment. *trino nundino*, Quint. ii. 4. 35, seems to have been formed by a mistaken analogy from *trinum nundinum* (for *nouem dinum*), an elliptical genitive plural. The *-um* genitive is regular in the 'distributive' and *trini* is preferred to *terni* with nouns that have no singular, Neue-Wagener *Formenlehre* II.³ 322. Cicero *De domo* 41. 'si quod in ceteris legibus *trinum nundinum* esse oportet, id in adoptione satis est *trium* esse *horarum* nihil reprehendo.' In later Latin *trinus* (whence *trinity*) had a very considerable vogue.

The common use with numeral adverbs claims a word. Normally we have 'bis *bini*,' etc., not 'bis *duo*,' etc. which would be poetical. 'bis bina sunt quattuor' ('Twice two is four'), Cic. etc., means properly, 'take a packet of two twice and you get four.' To an early Roman *bis duo* would have suggested a strange operation. The collective sense is traceable also in the expressions for numbers regarded as wholes or in themselves. Hence we get from the 'distributive' stem: *bin-io*, *tern-io*, *sen-io*, etc. Also the formations *bin-arius* *tern-arius* and the more common *den-arius*, etc., consisting of two, three, ten, etc.

The 'distributive' use proper is subordinate and derivative, and Brugmann well compares the use of compounds with *σύν* as

σύνδυο Xen. *Anab.* vi. 3. 2 ὅποια δὲ [κώμη] μείζων ἐδόκει εἶναι σύνδυο λόχους ἦγον οἱ στρατηγοί. This may be seen from e.g., Plaut. *Pers.* 471 'nam ego hodie compendi feci *binos* panis in dies,' 'I have made a saving of a couple of loaves for everyday,' *Poen.* 222 '*binæ singulis* quæ datae nobis ancillæ,' 'a pair of maids to *each* of us.'¹

The usage with words which have no singular in use, or a different sense in singular and plural, shows an interesting transference of meaning. *littera* is a single letter or character, *litteræ* 'a group of characters,' 'a piece of writing.' *binæ litteræ* could mean 'a two-group of characters' or 'two-groups of characters' (as we may see from *ternæ* in Plautus l.c. supra). But it was not much wanted in these senses; so it was utilized by being made to mean not 'two-groups of letters' one or more, but 'two letter-groups,' 'two pieces of writing.' A somewhat analogous shifting may be seen in the illogical expression of Plautus *Pseud.* 302 '*annorum* lex me perdit *quinauicenaria*,' which means the lex relating to persons who are under the age *quinum uicenum annorum*.

J. P. POSTGATE.

¹ If we choose, we may regard *singuli* as a real distributive, 'one at a time.' It is an isolated form that came into the system later. O. Latin has *prius* in the same sense.

REVIEWS

PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY.

Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Griechisch und Deutsch. Von HERMANN DIELS. 2. Auflage, 1. Band. Pp. xii + 456. Berlin: Weidmann, 1906. M. 10.

De Platone Prae-Socraticorum philosophorum existimatore et iudice. R. H. WOLTJER. Pars prior. Pp. iii + 219. Leiden: Brill, 1904.

THE first edition of Diels's important work was noticed at length in the *Classical Review* for 1904 (xviii. pp. 217 ff.); and no extended

comment is required on the present occasion. The substance, plan, and arrangement of the book are unchanged, but it has been subjected to a thorough revision in detail, so that many particulars which were formerly open to criticism have now disappeared. The new edition is reduced in bulk to the extent of about a hundred pages by the omission of the Appendix, which contained the fragments of the cosmologists and sophists. This is relegated to the supplementary volume, comprising critical matter

and indices, the appearance of which is still eagerly awaited. The author himself admits that it is necessary for the full appreciation of his work.

The additional citations are not numerous or important; among the more interesting we may select the introduction of Euripides as an imitator of Xenophanes in *H.F.* 1341 ff. and fr. 282, the quotation from the Scholiast on Nicander in illustration of the Heraclitean law of *ἐναντιότης* on p. 59 (where in l. 31 we should surely read τὸ γὰρ α ἐπιτατικόν ἐστίν), and the comparison of the human soul to a spider on p. 72. But there are few pages of the book that do not contribute something to our knowledge of these early writers. I will take one illustration from Empedocles' theory of respiration (fr. 100). Here Diels is unquestionably right in translating *λίφαιμοι σύριγγες* by 'blutarme Röhren,' for Aristotle's paraphrase is conclusive that *λίφαιμοι* does not mean 'bloodless.' Hence we must correct L. and S., and Jebb's note on *Soph. Ai.* 1412. In the 'difficult lines (18 f.) of the same passage respecting the experiment of the clepsydra, Diels rightly preserves *ισθμοῖο δυσηχέος*, and refers *πύλας* to the upper orifice; but I think something could be said for placing the comma after *ἐρύκει* rather than after *δυσηχέος*, so that *ἄκρα κρατύνων* might go with *ἄμφι πύλας*.

Prof. Diels is certainly to be congratulated on the fact that in little more than three years a second edition of his book should have become necessary. This may be taken as a measure at once of the need formerly felt, and of the completeness with which the gap has been filled. For it cannot be too strongly emphasised how necessary is an acquaintance with the pre-Socratics for the student of Greek philosophy. The pre-eminence of Plato and Aristotle, accentuated by the facilities offered for their study in the survival of their most important works, has overshadowed the reputation of their predecessors; and there is a danger of these being regarded mainly as ingenious triflers, whose unverified guesses have no philosophical importance. It is not necessary to consider whether Empedocles and Democritus may be rightly styled the forerunners

of our modern physicists and biologists; but we must not forget that to the early Greek thinkers, who first undertook the investigation of truth untrammelled by authority or tradition, is due the inception of the scientific spirit. To open up scientific questions for solution as such, instead of acquiescing in the ignorance and indifference of their age, and to insist on the unconditional supremacy of reason were services of inestimable value to posterity.

To take another point of view, it is impossible to understand Plato without some knowledge of the influence exerted on him by Heraclitus and Parmenides. But those who turn to Woltjer's dissertation for enlightenment in this respect will be doomed to disappointment. It is to be wished that the author had laid more deeply to heart the warning of Plato which he cites with approval:—*περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, ἀποστῶμεν· εἰ δὲ μή, πλείω αἰὲ ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον* (*Theaet.* 177 B). Unfortunately, this is exactly what has happened. The *πάρεργα* are such matters as the genuineness of certain dialogues, the importance of fixing the proper limitations of the subject, the meaning of *φιλόσοφος*, and many more. The result is that we do not reach the threshold of the real argument until p. 129. The remainder of the volume is occupied with a discussion of Plato's allusions to Orpheus; and the only conclusion arrived at is that Plato cannot be proved to have regarded the poems popularly attributed to Orpheus as being actually his work. The Orphics as distinguished from Orpheus, together with all the pre-Socratic philosophers, are held over for another volume. I will only say that in his treatment of *Tim.* 40 c the author fails to mention the evidence of Proclus, which is the strongest part of the case against him.

It is to be regretted that so much industry has been misapplied owing to a faulty method of execution. The writer shows himself quite capable of sifting and appraising his material, if he would confine himself within a moderate compass.

A. C. PEARSON.