S. Kierkegaard als Philosoph. HAROLD HÖFFDING. Stuttgart, Frommann, 1896. Pp. x+170.

This brochure is the third in *Frommann's Classiker der Philosophie*, a series similar to *Blackwood's Philosophical Classics* which is being issued under the editorial supervision of Prof. Falckenberg of Erlangen, already well known through his *Grundriss der Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*. Besides the present work, volumes on *Fechner* by Professor Lasswitz and *Hobbes*, by Professor Tönnies have already appeared. Among the notable announcements of numbers to come are Riehl's *Hume*, Paulsen's *Kant*, Höffding's *Rousseau*, Lasson's *Hegel* and the volume on *Lotze* by the editor. The series will be of especial value because of its additions to our list of standard compendiums on the classical writers and systems.

Kierkegaard (1813-1855) finds a place in the series as the foremost thinker which Denmark has produced (p. 2) and as a notable personality in the philosophico-religious movements of the century. Professor Höffding leads up to his subject proper by chapters on *Die romantisch-spekulative Religionsphilosophie* (Schleiermacher and Hegel), *Kierkegaard's ältere Zeitgenossen in Dänemark* and *Kierkegaard's Persönlichkeit*. Then follows the discussion of Kierkegaard's philosophy under the two principal heads of epistemology and ethics. This forms the body of the work, which concludes with a somewhat briefer explanation and criticism of the philosopher's attitude toward the Christian faith and his breach with the 'weakened and softened Christianity' of the Church. Central in the whole development and of great psychological interest is the influence of Kierkegaard's temperament upon his speculation. Possessed by an inherited melancholy tendency, extremely conscientious, and with a dialectical gift which forbade him to glide over antinomies, he reproduced in his thinking, especially in his ethical and religious conclusions, the lonely individualism, the unceasing inner conflict, the paradoxical outcome of his life. In the beginning he is satisfied neither with Hegel's speculative theology and its impossible iteration of the threefold rhythm nor Schleiermacher's easy renunciation of a direct knowledge of the absolute. As he frames his own ethic, he emphasizes freedom and the essential individualism of moral culture, only to void morals of all social content and, by giving them an exclusively transcendent basis, to reduce morality to asceticism. Toward the close of his life he feels himself compelled publicly to censure the existing Christianity as a degenerate travesty of the pure religion of Christ and to demand a return to the unworldly simplicity of the

primitive Christian community. Then, worn out by his labors and his sufferings, he dies when only forty-two, after profoundly affecting the thought of his time and country.

The book is written with the customary skill of its author. The touch is so deft that the reader wishes it were possible to read the Danish original of Professor Höffding instead of the German translation; and so sympathetic, in spite of grave differences of position between the subject and the writer of the work, that he is ready to agree with the opinion expressed in the preface by Schrempf, one of Kierkegaard's principal German admirers: *Dass hier ein Philosoph der Continuität den Irrationalismus Kierkegaard's darstellt und auf seinen wirklichen Wahrheitsgehalt prüft, kann auch der Verehrer Kierkegaard's nicht bedauern, sondern nur mit Freude begrüßen.*

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Ueber physische und psychische Kausalität und das Prinzip des psycho-physischen Parallelismus. MAX WENTSCHER. Leipzig, Barth, 1896. Pp. x+122.

The two essential elements of modern psycho-physical parallelism are stated by the author to be: first, the assumption of a uniform parallelism between any given psychical process and its corresponding cerebral process; and second, the affirmation of an entire absence of any causal interaction between these two kinds of processes. Wundt lays greater emphasis on the second part of the doctrine, but concedes the impossibility of consistently maintaining an absolute independence of the individual consciousness. This principle, which is advanced by its supporters merely as an expression of empirical facts, is in reality a metaphysical doctrine, for it goes beyond experience in all its teachings, and if it were really based on observed facts it could serve only as a preliminary formula and would require some explanation.

A study of physical causation shows the impossibility of proving that we are here dealing with a closed, independent system of processes. We can discover only the phenomenal aspect of causation; its essential nature is beyond the reach of our observation. That any description of phenomena by the physical sciences should seem to support the doctrine of an independent physical causation follows from the circumstance that only physical facts enter into the discussion. The extension of the principle to realms in which other kinds of facts enter in, is not justified by its apparent confirma-