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Plato, *Republic* VI. 507 D and 507 B

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dar's designation of Hiero as Συρακόσιον (V; other older MSS. Συρακουσίων) βασιλῆα (B.C. 476; *Ol.* i. 23) and ὃς Συρακόσσαισι νέμει βασιλεύς (Pyth. iii. 70), might seem to support the belief of Diodorus. Whether Hiero possessed the title by right or not, βασιλεύς was a name which he would assuredly have liked to hear from the mouth of a poet, and therefore we cannot ascribe much importance to the passages of Pindar. But all the more important is the negative evidence furnished by the three odes of Bacchylides. Not once does Bacchylides style the tyrant βασιλεύς; had Hiero borne the title, he would hardly have failed to do so.

Possibly Hiero (and Gelon) held a civil office under the constitution. This is suggested by Pindar's θεμοστέιον ὃς ἀμφέπει

σκᾶπτρον (*Ol.* i. 12) and Bacchylides' [τεθμ]ίου σκᾶπτρον Διὸς [ἔχοντ]α (iii. 70).

One point more. The metaphor ἱέρωνι φέρων εὐδαιμονίας πέταλον in Bacchylides v. 186 suggests that the use of πέταλα at Syracuse for voting was older than the introduction of the form of banishment known as 'petalism.' We may infer that πέταλα were used in the Syracusan Assembly for the election of officials. And we may take the expression in Bacchylides as a confirmation of the probable view that under Gelon and Hiero at Syracuse, as under Pisistratus at Athens, the outward forms of the constitution were maintained. For a phrase suggestive of abolished freedom would have been infelicitous.

J. B. BURY.

PLATO, *REPUBLIC* VI. 507 D AND 507 B.

THE first passage upon which I propose to comment runs as follows: Ἐνούσης πον ἐν ὀμμασιν ὄψεως καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντος τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ, παρούσης δὲ χροᾶς ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἰ μὴ παραγένηται γένος τρίτον ἰδίᾳ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεφυκός, ὁσθα ὅτι ἡ τε ὄψις οὐδὲν ὀφεται τὰ τε χρώματα ἔσται ἀόρατα.

Plato is drawing a distinction between the sense of sight and all other senses. Whereas hearing (for example) requires only ἀκοή and φωνή (507 C), sight requires, besides ὄψις and χροᾶ, a third γένος viz. light. For whereas we can hear in the dark, we cannot see except where there is light.

The meaning of the sentence which I have quoted above is clear enough, except so far as the words ἐν αὐτοῖς are concerned. If the text is sound, ἐν αὐτοῖς can only mean ἐν τοῖς ὀμμασιν; and so Schneider understands the passage. No recent critic, so far as I know, has followed him in this interpretation, which cannot be reconciled either with the rest of Plato's analysis or even with *Tim.* 67 C, if I understand the passage correctly. Both here and in the *Timaeus* l.c., colour is viewed as something inherent in things rather than in the eyes (although, according to the *Timaeus*, it ἐμπίπτει εἰς τὴν ὄψιν in an act of sight): see 508 C ὦν ἂν τὰς χροᾶς τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχη.

By Schmelzer and Jowett and Campbell αὐτοῖς is interpreted as τοῖς ὁρατοῖς 'from τοῦ ὁρατοῦ supra.' But the grammatical difficulty is considerable, and in any case

Plato could hardly have expressed himself in so ambiguous a fashion.

A great variety of emendations has been suggested. Stallbaum, who takes αὐτοῖς as τοῖς ὀμμασιν, would expunge ἐν or (with Ast) read ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. Biehl (*Die Idee des Guten* 52) boldly conjectures ἐφ' ἣ ἔστι instead of ἐν αὐτοῖς. The latter remedy is, of course, absurd, but Biehl deserves credit for seeing that χροᾶ is here looked upon as the proper object of the sense of sight. Other suggestions are ἐν αὐ τοῖς <ὁρατοῖς> (Richards in *Cl. Rev.* viii. 25), and ἐν αὐτοῖς <τοῖς ὁρωμένοις>, which I ventured to submit in the foot-notes to my edition of the text, comparing 508 C and 599 B.

Further study of the passage leads me to think that the error is much less extensive and its cure much easier.

It will be observed that in the last line of the sentence the objects of sight are spoken of as χρώματα and nothing more: cf. *Tim.* 67 C ff. and Arist. *de An.* ii. 7, 418^a 26 ff. If, however, we interpret ἐν αὐτοῖς as ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὁρωμένοις or anything of the kind, we introduce a fourth term, viz., τὰ ὁρώμενα distinct from χροᾶ, as well as from ὄψις and the γένος τρίτον. It is true, of course, that Plato constantly speaks of 'things seen' without meaning colours, but it would be extremely awkward to distinguish between χροᾶ and ὁρώμενα in the middle of a sentence which ends by treating colour as *itself* the ὁρατόν (τὰ τε χρώματα ἔσται ἀόρατα). Plato is speaking scientifically, and from the scientific

point of view colour, and colour alone, is the object of sight, as *φωνή* is of hearing (507 C).

We ought (I believe) to read: 'Ενούσης που ἐν ὀμμασιν ὄψεως καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντος τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ, παρούσης δὲ χροᾶς, ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται γένος τρίτον ἰδίᾳ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεφυκός, οἶσθα ὅτι ἡ τε ὄψις οὐδὲν ὄφεται τὰ τε χρώματα ἔσται ὁράτα ἰ.ε. 'there is *one* genus—making three in all—specially constructed by Nature for this very purpose, in the absence of which to reinforce them, sight, as you are aware, will see nothing, and the colours will be invisible.' The position of ἐν (recalling δὲ ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται τρίτον just above) is intended to make Adimantus concentrate his attention on the crucial fact that there is *one* element in an act of sight to which the other senses furnish no parallel. By this means Socrates invites the question which his pupil at once asks viz. 'What *is* this element'? The answer is 'light' (δὲ δὴ σὺ καλεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φῶς)—a truly valuable or precious substance (εἴπερ μὴ ἄτιμον τὸ φῶς): so that Socrates justly claims to have proved his assertion, which was that the organisation of sight is more expensive or extravagant (πολυτελεσ-τάτην 507 C) than that of hearing and the other senses. If the words from ἐν αὐτοῖς to ὁράτα are taken closely together, as protasis and apodosis ought to be, and αὐτοῖς referred rather to ὄψις and χρώματα in the apodosis than to ὄψεως and χροᾶς before, the emphasis on ἐν is (to my ear) precisely what is needed to bring out Plato's point. It ought to be mentioned that Morgenstern proposed to read παρούσης δὲ χροᾶς (*praesente item colore* Ficinus), ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐὰν μὴ κ.τ.λ., but ἐν is unpleasing, and ἐν αὐτοῖς too weak to precede ἐάν. The confusion of ἐν and ἐν occurs

again in A and other MSS. at vii. 526 C and elsewhere.

Perhaps I may be allowed to add a short note on 507 B above, where I have printed καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων, ἃ τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν· πάλιν αὖ κατ' ἰδέαν μίαν ἑκάστον (ἐκάστον MSS.), ὡς μίᾳς οὐσης, τιθέντες, δὲ ἔστιν ἑκάστον προσαγορεύομεν. The first part of the sentence depends on εἶναι φαμέν κ.τ.λ. preceding. In the latter half the MSS. read ἐκάστον. It appears to me certain that δὲ ἔστιν-ἑκάστον is (as Bosanquet holds) in the predicate after προσαγορεύομεν, and for this reason I wrote ἑκάστον for ἐκάστον: 'we call each "δὲ ἔστιν-ἑκάστον"' i.e. (for example) we call the αὐτὸ καλὸν δὲ ἔστιν-καλὸν etc. But κατ' ἰδέαν μίαν is still a difficulty. Read καὶ ἰδέαν μίαν ἑκάστον, merely changing κατ' to καί, and all our troubles (I think) disappear: 'reversing our procedure, we postulate also one idea of each, believing that there is but one' (cf. x. 597 C, D) 'and call it the essential so-and-so.' We postulate for example one idea of δίκαιον (as well as πολλὰ δίκαια 507 B) and call it δὲ ἔστιν-δίκαιον. That ἰδέαν is not here class, but Idea, is clear from μίᾳς οὐσης: cf. also in the next sentence καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ὁρᾶσθαι φαμέν, νοεῖσθαι δ' οὐ, τὰς δ' αὖ ἰδέας νοεῖσθαι μὲν, ὁρᾶσθαι δ' οὐ. The interchange of καί and κατὰ is illustrated in Schaefer's Greg. Cor. 234 n. 26. That of κατ' and καὶ is even easier, for a sloping accent might easily be mistaken for the transverse stroke of τ, and in uncial MSS. the apostrophe is constantly left out between an elided preposition and its noun.

J. ADAM.

'FOURTH CLASS CONDITIONS.'

As this caption intimates, the present paper is an outgrowth of discussions with my beloved and revered master, Prof. Goodwin, upon his schemes for the conditional sentence in Greek. Part of this very study has recently passed under his eye, and allusions occur below to his comments thereon. My own heresy has gathered strength and widened however since then.

As the lamented Prof. F. D. Allen, in his revision of Hadley's *Grammar*, followed Prof. Goodwin, and acknowledged a large debt to him, in the classification of conditions, it

will usually suffice to quote the elder scholar's latest published revision of his formulae.

I cite first from Mr. Goodwin's *Greek Grammar* (1892), § 1408. 'When a supposed future case is stated in a *less distinct* and *vivid* form (as in English *if I should go*), the protasis has the optative with *εἰ*, and the apodosis has the optative with *ἄν*.' The italics are partly intended to bring this construction into closest mental association with 'Future conditions, *more vivid form*,' just treated in § 1403. (See also *G.M.T.* § 16.)