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Two Books on Stoicism *Marcus Aurelius and the Later Stoics* ('The World's Epoch-makers' Series). By F. W. Bussell, D.D. Cr. 8vo. Pp. xi + 302. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1910. 3s. *Roman Stoicism: being Lectures on the History of the Stoic Philosophy, with special reference to its development within the Roman Empire.* By E. Vernon Arnold, Litt.D., Professor of Latin in the University College of North Wales, and formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. 8vo. Pp. ix + 468. Cambridge University Press, 1911.

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editors; and, since he has worked with photographs in front of him, his testimony to this or that reading must be regarded as decisive. But his great merit is to have broken with the tradition of Sillig. Baehrens broke with it. But Baehrens was not sufficiently

equipped to meet the consequences. Vollmer has collected and sifted a vast and intractable material, and he will deserve the gratitude of the next editor of the *Appendix*.

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TWO BOOKS ON STOICISM.

Marcus Aurelius and the Later Stoics ('The World's Epoch-makers' Series). By F. W. BUSSELL, D.D. Cr. 8vo. Pp. xi + 302. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1910. 3s.

Roman Stoicism: being Lectures on the History of the Stoic Philosophy, with special reference to its development within the Roman Empire. By E. VERNON ARNOLD, Litt.D., Professor of Latin in the University College of North Wales, and formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. 8vo. Pp. ix + 468. Cambridge University Press, 1911.

WE have read Dr. Bussell's book with unmixed disappointment. Its appearance in a series devoted to 'The World's Epoch-makers' seemed to promise a portrayal of Marcus Aurelius and his forerunners as representatives of a philosophy that was a prime moving force in the regeneration of the Roman world, left its impress on Christian theology, and still has a message for 'sunk, self-weary man.' These aspects of Stoicism are finding tardy recognition among scholars—we shall notice their prominence in Prof. Arnold's work—and a popular presentation of them would be of real service to all who, without special knowledge of philosophy, are yet interested in the history of ethical and religious thought. But to Dr. Bussell Stoicism appears simply as 'an untenable creed,' 'a phase of thought that can never recur'; he rejects almost contemptuously Renan's and Matthew Arnold's appreciations of Marcus Aurelius, and his present study of him is intended 'to disclose the lurking antinomies in any monistic hypothesis.' Accordingly, this professedly popular work has been made the vehicle for

an indictment of Monism, which no one need hope to follow who is not familiar with the history and terminology of philosophy—we must add, who cannot read Seneca, Epictetus and Aurelius in the original, for the examination of all three is conducted by means of extensive verbal quotation. The excerpts from Seneca are not translated at all; those from Aurelius occasionally; of those from Epictetus translations are given in an appendix, reference to which is not by consecutive numbers, but by the pages of Teubner's edition. What is worse, in the case of both Greek authors citation and running comment are jumbled together on the page in a way that must be seen to be believed; 30 out of 44 pages on Epictetus and 80 out of 150 on Marcus are unreadable by anyone not accustomed to deciphering classical lecture-notes. The general arrangement of subject-matter is chaotic; the book's special aim is not announced until the 'General Conclusion' (more than half of which is an appreciation of Dr. Rendall's *Marcus Aurelius*). The reader will look in vain for any biographical notice of Seneca or Epictetus, or any account of the origin and history of the Stoic school.

If we have dwelt on these faults of method, it is because a popular handbook must be judged first and foremost by its serviceableness to those for whom it is ostensibly designed. But we must further point out that they appear largely responsible for the confusion between what are, and what are not, genuine Stoic elements in the eclecticism of Seneca and Aurelius, and the intellectualised Cynism of Epictetus, which pervades Dr. Bussell's whole inquiry. For want of a thorough-going analysis,

quietism, individualism, and pessimism are set down as essential features of Stoic Ethics; for want of a survey of the evidence, the historical character of the school is, we submit, entirely misapprehended. On p. 28 we read with surprise: 'No practical efforts marked the earlier founders, whose sole business was to weld into a solid and coherent body . . . a certain theory of the world. Only when domiciled in Rome did the School mix in actual life, and become not a sect but a religion. The practical bent of the Roman mind transformed the Stoa from a mere house of dogmatic paradox into a temple of a devout though despairing Theism.' It is further insisted that passivity and 'abstentionism' are the keynotes of Stoic teaching: 'None preached more assiduously than the Stoics the futility of human effort.' Is not all this contradicted by the plain facts of history? The aims and outlook of Zeno himself were as distinctly practical as those of Socrates, his chosen model; the public usefulness of his life and teaching were acknowledged by a well-known decree of the Athenians. Three of his personal disciples held office at the courts of kings. Cleanthes was especially zealous in proselytising the unlearned many. Again, as Prof. Arnold well remarks, the rapid diffusion of Stoicism to such centres as Pergamus, Seleucia, Tarsus, Sidon, and even Alexandria, indicates the growth of the School into a 'sect,' in the sense of a society recruited from different races and classes united by common beliefs and a common sentiment of brotherhood. How could this come about unless Stoicism, like Christianity, was from the outset a 'way of life'? Once more, was it not because the School *exalted* 'human effort' and claimed to regulate it, that it appealed to the Roman temperament as none of its rivals did? And how, if it preached 'abstentionism,' are we to account for the leading part played by Roman Stoics in public affairs, not only under the Republic, but under the Principate and amid the growing distaste for political life?

Similar confusion meets us when we arrive at the study of Aurelius himself. It is one thing to prove that Stoic Monism involves antinomies; another,

to show that an admittedly heterodox Stoic expresses beliefs incompatible with Monism. In endeavouring to do both at once, Dr. Bussell not infrequently seems to lose sight of the difference. But the fact is, the attempt here made to extract a definite 'Creed' of the Emperor from his desultory reflections in order to demolish the Stoic position is foredoomed to failure. As well base a polemic against Calvinism on the *Pilgrim's Progress*, or against Catholic dogma on the *De Imitatione*. We look to Stoicism for an explanation of the thought of Marcus Aurelius; we cannot look to him for an explanation of Stoic first principles.

Wholly different is the view of Stoicism presented in Prof. Arnold's full and learned work—viz., that it forms 'the bridge between ancient and modern philosophical thought.' There again the title is somewhat misleading, for the writer takes as his province the entire history and substance of Stoicism. Admirable alike in general execution, wealth of information, and clearness of style, the book inevitably suffers from the vastness of its programme. Disproportionate space seems allotted to introductory chapters, and the historical sketch of Greek thinkers from Hesiod onwards was surely unnecessary. On the other hand, room might have been made for more adequate treatment of Heraclitus; we miss especially discussion of those important *crucies*, what he meant by *Λόγος*, and whether he taught the *ἐκπύρωσις*. As regards the former, Dr. Adam's interpretation is tentatively accepted (§ 39); the *ἐκπύρωσις* is described (§ 109) as 'an essential part' of H.'s physical theory, without notice of the fact (recognised by Zeller) that it is incompatible therewith, or of the strong case made out by Prof. Burnet (following Lassalle) for holding that the Stoics imported the doctrine from some non-Heraclitean source. Chapter I., on 'the World Religions,' among which Stoicism is ranked, contains several interesting theses imperfectly worked out. The alleged immense influence of Zoroastrianism, or, as Prof. Arnold prefers to call it, Persism, on the Greco-Roman world needs fuller demonstration than is given here; while the epithet

'Persian' bestowed *passim* on the doctrines of immortality, future rewards and punishments, and 'the body a prison,' is question-begging. In this connection the influence of Orphism and Pythagoreanism seems unaccountably ignored. For the startling assertion that the Persian invasions of Greece were 'a religious crusade' no more cogent proof is adduced than the destruction of the Athenian temples, due, it is argued, to iconoclastic zeal. Yet the same 'image-breakers,' we remember, treated Delos as inviolably sacred and burned incense on Apollo's altar! On the whole, however, Prof. Arnold is at his best in dealing with the historical side of his subject, and the chapters on the 'Preaching of Stoicism,' 'The Stoic Sect in Rome,' and 'Stoicism in Roman History and Literature,' excellently depict the School's development into a great intellectual and social force.

In consonance with the book's general plan, we have throughout exposition rather than investigation of the Stoic philosophy. It would not be fair to expect the problem of the criterion to be thoroughly grappled with in the chapter devoted to Dialectic, but the Stoics' failure to do so seems too easily condoned. The practical bearing of their theory of knowledge on conduct and education is well brought out, but the hollowness of its foundation hardly sufficiently emphasised. The unwieldy division of 'Physics' is conveniently broken up into separate chapters on metaphysics, physics proper, the ultimate problems, theology, and psychology. Under the division of Ethics follow chapters on the 'Law for Humanity,' 'Daily Duties' (an unsatisfactory rendering of *τὰ καθήκοντα*), 'Sin and Weakness,' and 'Counsels of Perfection,' as Prof. Arnold oddly terms the *praecepta* of the School. It is impossible within the limits of a review to criticise this exhaustive survey in detail; we can only briefly notice the following points of interest:

As against Zeller and others, Prof. Arnold maintains with clearness and force that the Stoic system is neither materialistic in the sense in which that term holds good of Epicureanism, nor

pantheistic, if by pantheism is meant the even diffusion of the Deity through all things. The former contention is supported by an examination of the pivotal conception of 'Body' as the one ultimate element—a conception further shown to surmount the apparent dualisms of soul and body, matter and force, to be met with in all the Stoic writers. But it is admitted that in the end the Stoics are forced to grant a quasi-existence to *ἀσώματα*, and to bolster up the monistic principle by including 'bodies' and 'things not bodily' in the supreme class of *τὸ ὄν*. The weakness of their manifold attempts to 'justify the ways of God to men' and account for the existence of evil in the best of all possible universes, is duly recognised; but where so much is set down to their credit more stress might have been laid upon the spiritual insight which redeemed their worst philosophical shortcomings. Whatever other difficulties they shirked, when faced with the alternative of denying either the omnipotence or the goodness of the Deity, the School spoke from first to last with no uncertain voice; they had the boldness to limit the power and knowledge of God rather than leave doubtful His moral perfection.

We wish more space had been accorded to the theory, and less to the content, of Stoic Ethics. That its central aim was not, as currently held, 'to erect a shelter for the individual,' we agree; on the other hand, to assert that it 'was based on the demands of the supreme Law' is to overlook its real starting-point. That, surely, as with all the post-Aristotelian schools, was Aristotle's conception of the *τέλος* as not an End external to the organism, but the complete realisation of its own *φύσις*. It seems not doubtful that this idea is implicit in Polemo's definition of the Chief Good as 'life in conformity with nature' (*τῇ φύσει*), which Zeno set out from, and that neither had in view 'the nature of the universe.' It was only when the older sense of *φύσις* was obscured that Chrysippus had to reinterpret the definition; and in doing so he introduced an *ἀπορία* which the School never successfully resolved. 'How,' their opponents loved to ask,

'can you make the initial End of Action the acquirement of the *πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν* and yet make Virtue, which by your definition is not one of these, the Supreme End?' But Chrysippus' 'conformity with the Universal Law' is still distant from the idea of obedience to a paramount authority, which, we suggest, was the contribution of the Roman genius. Does not the whole contrast between the Greek and the Roman conception of Law come out in two passages cited together by Prof. Arnold, where Chrysippus speaks of *ὁ νόμος πάντων* as the *criterion* of right and wrong; Cicero, of '*lex . . . quae iubet . . . prohibetque*'? We question, again, whether the idea of the Universe as a 'World-State' was fully developed until Imperial times, and whether the 'Cosmopolis' of the Cynics and earlier Stoics was more than a picturesque embodiment of the new sense of human

brotherhood. In any case, it should not be identified with Zeno's ideal 'Republic,' which was as essentially a City State as Plato's. Prof. Arnold is sound but hardly illuminating on the subject of *προηγμένα* and *ἀποπροηγμένα*; these and the other principal parts of Stoic doctrine are clearly stated, but their inter-relation is left vague.

The book concludes with an interesting chapter on 'The Stoic Strain in Christianity'; we hope that a companion one on Stoic influence in modern philosophy and literature, which has been crowded out, will appear elsewhere. Students will value the full bibliography appended and the mine of references supplied by the footnotes. Their convenience has been consulted by giving references in general to von Arnim's '*Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*.'

W. M. L. HUTCHINSON.

TRICHOTOMY IN ROMAN LAW.

Trichotomy in Roman Law. By HENRY GOUDY, D.C.L., Regius Professor of Civil Law in the University of Oxford. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910.

THE mystery of the number three, in spite of much labour spent on the problem, has never been successfully explained, as we may gather from the first few pages of this volume. But whatever be the explanation, we can all illustrate the reverence paid to this number even from our own reading and experience. To divide a subject (as formerly the sermon-text) into three parts is more pleasing to the mind than to divide it into two or four. I looked up the Church Catechism just now, and found three examples before turning a page. Only yesterday I was told of an eminent artist who always took three portmanteaus with him on a journey, even if he had to leave one of them empty.

This last example will exactly serve to explain the thesis of Dr. Goudy's very curious and interesting little book. He shows, on the whole quite successfully, that the great Roman lawyers,

and especially Ulpian, being in respect of the number three the slaves of literary or philosophical tradition, liked, in dividing a subject for presentation, to put it (so to speak) into three portmanteaus, even though one or even two of them might be more or less empty. The emptiness they seem to have ignored, or to have shut their eyes to it; a strange item in the history of human delusion. Thus they left behind them a legacy of confusion where all might have been made clear, and have wasted the time of legal commentators during nineteen centuries. It is consoling to think that if Dr. Goudy be right in the main line of his argument, there should be no further vexation of legal minds about these puzzling divisions.

I will give two examples of delusive trichotomy, one from each of Dr. Goudy's two lists; of which lists the first is taken from the primary divisions of law in Gaius, Justinian, and Ulpian, and the second from the departments of the law relating to things and actions.

Gaius divided the subject-matter of private law into persons, things, and actions. This, as Dr. Goudy points