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THE NORTHERN TREATIES OF 1719-20.

By J. F. CHANCE, M.A., F.R.Hist.S.

Read March 21, 1907.

IN a paper read before the Royal Historical Society in its last session I traced the northern policy of George I. to the time that the news arrived of the death of Charles XII. of Sweden, ending with the treaty of Vienna signed by Austria, Hanover and Saxony on January 5, 1719. My present paper has for its subject the peace-making which necessarily followed the death of Charles, a peace-making conducted by George I. in accordance with his own views, as modified by the necessity of consulting the wishes of the regent of France and by the recalcitrance of Denmark.

The question for the Swedes was, whether to purchase the help of George against Peter the Great by the sacrifice of Bremen and Verden to Hanover, or to resign to Peter a portion of his conquests in the hope of recovering with his aid their provinces in Germany. Peter was ready to restore Finland, and if he would have given back Livonia and the port of Reval, peace would almost certainly have been made with him.

George, in almost declared hostility with Peter, was bent not only on acquiring the duchies, but on restoring the Swedish barrier which of old had shut out Russia from the Baltic. In this aspiration he had the support of the public opinion of Great Britain, where the tsar's rising power was watched with growing jealousy. His plan was that the German provinces of Sweden should be given up to their present occupants, Hanover, Denmark and Prussia, who

would then take part in a general offensive league against the tsar. A scheme to this effect, emanating, it would seem, from the signatories to the treaty of Vienna, was circulated among the European courts in February.¹ It allowed to Peter only St. Petersburg, Cronslot and Narva and their depending districts, and proposed, if he refused those terms, to deprive him of those places also, and of Smolensk and Kiev as well for the benefit of the republic of Poland. That this scheme was sufficiently in accord with the ideas of George is clear from the despatches of James Craggs, secretary of state, as in the following example to Lord Stair at Paris:—‘Y.E. is acquainted with the King’s thoughts, which are short, by an alliance to be concluded between Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, Poland, the Emperor and His Majesty to the content of these Parties to recover to Sweden what the Czar has taken from her, and let him come into the treaty *nolens volens* upon these terms.’²

But George was the only one of the parties concerned, unless it were the king of Poland, to whom this scheme was acceptable. In the first place, according to the plan which the Count de la Marck brought to Paris from Sweden at the end of April, and which he claimed to be authoritative, only mortgages of Bremen and Verden and of Stettin, or cession of part of the former, were offered to Hanover and Prussia, and to Denmark only the duke of Holstein-Gottorp’s share of Sleswick, with reservation of certain revenues to him. In the second place, Frederick William of Prussia, on the worst of terms with his father-in-law, held obstinately to his alliance with Peter the Great, and would have been content with a mortgage of Stettin only. Thirdly, Frederick of Denmark was bent upon pursuing the war to its extremity, and compelling not only the cession of his share of Pomerania, but the restoration also of the provinces in Sweden lost sixty years before. He sent a special envoy,

¹ Printed by Dumont, VIII. ii. 8; copies sent from different courts in the English and French archives. Cf. Droysen, IV. ii. 254.

² March 9, o.s., Record Office, Foreign Entrybook 30.

Count Holstein-Holsteinborg, to England early in the year to endeavour to conclude the treaties so long under discussion, and to concert a joint plan of attack. And, lastly, it was essential to consult the wishes of the regent of France, with whom, under the stress of the war with Spain, George was more closely allied than ever.

Now the leading principle of French foreign policy was always repression of Austria. For this reason the interests of Prussia were placed only second to those of Great Britain, and it was insisted that Sweden must retain a footing in the empire. But, if the claims of Hanover and Prussia were to be allowed, this could only be at the expense of Denmark.

The necessity of acting in close unison with France was strongly impressed upon Lord Stair.¹ I need not examine here the vicissitudes of his diplomacy, but may refer for the difficulties he met with to his despatches and to the work of Wiesener. Besides what has been said above, the regent was not at all disposed to a rupture with the tsar. If the Swedes made peace with him, it was desired that France should have her part therein. The first step advocated at Paris was to separate the king of Prussia from the tsar and reconcile his interests with those of Hanover.

But George would not readily give up his Danish ally. Craggs wrote in March: 'The King in interest and in honour cannot think of abandoning him who of all the Northern allies has alone kept any faith with his Majesty.'² It was only when Count Holstein's overtures proved impossible of acceptance, when the mission of the Danish Colonel Lövenörn to Stockholm turned out as great a failure, and when it was seen that the Danes were resolved to prosecute

¹ *E.g.* in Craggs's despatches of January 12 and 17, o.s., *ibid.*

² March 9, o.s., *ibid.* And Stanhope wrote to Polwarth at Copenhagen as late as June 22: 'Your Lordship may with great truth assure them [the Danes] that Lord Carteret has the strictest orders to espouse their concerns with vigour in his negotiations in Sweden, and that Court shall not fail to be regularly informed by us of every transaction there which may in the least affect them, and may further be assured that no peace shall be made without their privity' (Record Office, S.P. Dom. Entrybook 269.) This, of course, was at a time when an accommodation with Prussia appeared to be impracticable.

the war at all costs, that George began to recede from this position. By the end of April he had decided to accede to the views of the regent and Dubois.

The measures taken by Frederick of Denmark were to send a fleet to blockade Gothenburg and to assemble an army of 34,000 men on the Norwegian frontier. He himself arrived at Christiania on June 24. He continued also his prohibition of trade to Sweden, although the British was withdrawn early in April. Consequently the Swedish government resumed the commissioning of privateers, which had been stopped for a time, and continued to prohibit all trade to the eastern ports. Peter the Great in reply notified his intention of seizing all ships bound for Sweden for so long as the prohibition lasted, but issued later a proclamation that his measures in regard to trade would be reciprocal to those adopted by Sweden. And he too prepared to invade that country on his own account.

The negotiation at Berlin was entrusted once again to the experienced Charles Whitworth, who arrived there on May 16. To Stockholm George sent first Colonel Adolphus Frederick Bassewitz on the part of Hanover, and later the young Lord Carteret as ambassador from Great Britain. In each case separate treaties were proposed with Great Britain and with Hanover. At the same time peace was urgently pressed at Copenhagen, and instances made at Dresden and Vienna, while everything had to be done in close agreement with France. These and at the same time other extremely difficult negotiations concerning the south of Europe were directed by Lord Stanhope from Hanover, whither he accompanied the king in June. Within little more than a year from then no fewer than eleven treaties or conventions were concluded. The ability displayed by Stanhope fully justifies the encomiums which have been bestowed upon him, though the difficulties he met with reduced him to discreditable expedients. They arose from Hanoverian opposition and insistence upon points of electoral interest only, from the fondness of Frederick William for his alliance with the tsar

and his hatred of the king of Poland, and from the impossibility, before he was secured, of sending to Sweden the naval help which was the price of her concessions. The electoral ministers were not only jealous of Prussia, but conscious that an alliance with that Power must entail a breach of the traditional relations with Austria.

My account of the negotiations is taken almost entirely from the English records, aided by such works as those of Wiesener, Holm and Droysen. Doubtless researches in the French, Hanoverian, and other archives would throw interesting light upon them, but without altering, I think, in any essential way the narrative of fact. But, working from one particular line of evidence, it is necessary to be guarded in accepting expressions of opinion. The Prussian Bonet, for instance, in spite of Whitworth's invective, no doubt wrote honestly from London what he thought his master ought to know. And we may believe that Bernstorff was actuated in his opposition to Prussia by a genuine regard for the interests of Hanover, as he conceived them.

What Whitworth had to do at Berlin was to persuade the king that alliance with Great Britain and Hanover was more advantageous for him than dependence upon Russia. Frederick William was convinced of the opposite; he both valued the friendship of Peter the Great and feared his enmity, because of the defenceless situation of Prussia proper. But he saw arrayed against him the allies of Vienna, Hanover, Saxony, and Austria, and he could not seek, as in former times, the support of France against them, because it was given to George. The French envoy at Berlin, Count Rottembourg, was Whitworth's most powerful advocate. Not strong enough to trust his own conclusions, sound and just as they usually were, Frederick William was the prey of indecision, which brought from him those violent outbursts of wrath recorded by Droysen. He wanted the impossible: to be friends with both George and Peter at once. At his own court, though the chief ministers, Ilgen and his son-in-law Knyphausen, were not indisposed to the new policy, a

strong party, headed by the prince of Anhalt and Grumbkow, and backed by the ambassador of Russia, employed every artifice in opposition.

Whitworth was given the most elaborate instructions for his guidance. He was told what subjects of Prussian interest to handle, and how, and what to leave alone, and had minute directions how delicately to feel his way in ascertaining the king's sentiments towards the tsar, and in endeavouring to detach him from that alliance. The draft for the British treaty contained only four clauses : a Prussian guarantee for the Protestant Succession ; a British guarantee of the electoral treaty to be concluded, armed succour being provided for in both cases ; no peace to be made with Sweden unless commerce in the Baltic were restored to its former footing, in whoever's hand the ports might remain ; and the arrears due to Prussia from the war with France to be liquidated. The third condition Whitworth was informed was the principal aim of the treaty ; the fourth he was only to insert if insisted upon, but to use the expectation of payment to facilitate the remainder of his work. The Hanoverian draft was principally a confirmation of the treaty of 1715. So far as regarded making peace with Sweden under its conditions, the principal of which were the cessions of Bremen and Verden and of Stettin and its district, there was little difficulty ; but two clauses, the one requiring the transfer to Hanover of certain Prussian feudal rights and church-patronage in Brunswick-Lüneburg, stipulated in the treaty of 1715, but never carried out, the other in favour of the kings of Denmark and Poland, were strenuously objected to. The rights in question included the 'superioritas territorialis' over three Elbe villages in the extreme eastern corner of Brunswick-Lüneburg belonging to Bernstorff's estate of Gartow. These, commanding the post roads from the Altmark to Lenzen and the north, were of considerable political importance, and the king of Prussia had never been able to bring himself to part with his 'dominium' over them, while Bernstorff and his following were equally obstinate for its surrender. As to the king of Poland, recent acts by whom

had given the bitterest offence, Frederick William absolutely refused to have either him or the king of Denmark mentioned, but on the other hand was importunate to bring in George's enemy the tsar.

The draft treaty was returned to Hanover burdened with a number of conditions in regard to the three villages, which were declared there to render the cession valueless, and with the article about the kings of Denmark and Poland struck out. It was sent back with the conditions cancelled and the article restored, but modified by omission of reference to the king of Denmark. This under the existing circumstances gave considerable satisfaction at Hanover, but in regard to the rest Stanhope informed Whitworth that, if the new draft were not accepted, he must leave Berlin.

This proving to be the case, Whitworth returned to Hanover on June 22.¹ But the issues at stake were of too great importance to allow of this being the end. Stanhope and Whitworth contended strenuously for reconsideration, and Bernstorff was beaten. Stanhope attributes his success chiefly to the influence of the French ambassador Count Senneterre. Most of the Prussian conditions about the villages were allowed, and Whitworth was back at Berlin on July 14. He found the situation favourable, in consequence, he was informed, of advices received from Vienna. In spite of the threats and promises of Count Tolstoi, who now arrived on a special mission from St. Petersburg, and of the use he made of the Vienna treaty of January, he was able to persuade Ilgen to report that the treaties must be proceeded with as they were. The king told him that he now regarded them as made, and would observe them exactly; only he must have assurance that he would not be required to take action against the tsar. It was conceded that a guarantee of Prussia proper against

¹ Craggs wrote to Stanhope, June 17, o.s.: 'The Treaty being broke off, what I write to your Lordship is not very material, but I am extremely glad Mr. Whitworth did go to Berlin, since it not only shows us what we may depend upon from that Court, but shows all the world that the King neglected nothing to be well with them, a point as necessary as any for His Majesty's service at home' (Record Office, Regencies 73).

a possible Russian attack might be given in return for similar counter-undertakings.

On July 22 Whitworth received from the king an autograph letter saying that he would sign the treaties, and congratulating his father-in-law and himself on the happy results of his diplomacy. But five days later everything was again upset. Various news which came to Berlin awakened afresh suspicion of George's honesty.¹ Moved thereby, and conscious of having acted against his better judgment, Frederick William committed to paper a denunciation of England and Austria, which he deposited in his archives to serve as a warning to his descendants to keep the friends they had and to beware of false ones. Occasion to recant was afforded by the question of the three villages. This had been made the subject of a separate convention, which had been committed for examination to the department of State presided over by Grumbkow. The report condemned it, and a fresh draft was handed in, which had to be referred to Hanover. There were submitted besides amended drafts of the Polish article, omitting, according to Whitworth, everything that was essential, and a new proposition, obliging the king of England, both as king and as elector, to come to the aid of the king of Prussia, with as many ships and men as should be necessary, were he attacked in any part of his dominions. Forwarding these to Hanover, Whitworth expressed the opinion that delay was purposely being made to see the results of the Russian attack on Sweden and of the Åland conferences, and that the most important thing was to conclude terms with Sweden at once. Then, he said, you will have this court. He believed the king to be sincere, but suspected the good faith of the ministers. He looked upon the projected mission of Count Schlippenbach to St. Petersburg to explain the real nature of the proposed treaties as an indication that it was intended to complete them.

¹ Among the rest was the news of fortifications being hastily raised on certain islands in the Elbe, islands which Stanhope wished at the bottom of the sea (Droysen, p. 269).

While these exasperating delays were being encountered at Berlin, events in Sweden were progressing with inconvenient rapidity. Carteret reached the capital on July 11. He found the new queen (Charles's sister Ulrica Eleonora had been elected in February, after formally abrogating all the prerogatives of absolute sovereignty established by her father and brother), and her consort the hereditary Prince of Hesse well disposed to receive him, as also Marshal Dücker, so that he had the two chiefs of the army on his side. On the other hand a very powerful party, headed by the chancellor, Count Cronhjelm, preferring peace with Russia, opposed him from the first.

As in Whitworth's case, the important instructions to Carteret were private, his principal ones relating only to the re-establishment of freedom of trade. They contained assurances of personal benefit to the queen and prince if they could prevail, specious explanations of the policy hitherto pursued towards Sweden, representations of the necessity, particularly in the interest of the Protestant religion, of renewed alliance, and arguments to the effect that it would really be an advantage to Sweden to resign her German provinces. A third set of instructions, also private, stated that if the queen and prince would listen to the king's proposals for peace, and if the tsar refused to make such restitution as was necessary for the security of Sweden and the preservation of commerce upon the footing upon which it stood before the troubles, then the king would not only furnish assistance against him, but would employ all his credit and interest to persuade other Powers to furnish supplies which should enable the queen to bring him to reason.

Carteret found that Bassewitz had obtained a promise of the cession of Bremen and Verden upon condition (among others) that Great Britain should oblige herself, in renewing the treaty of 1700, to render help against the tsar in money, troops and ships. The Russian invasion being imminent, he was urgently pressed to send orders to Sir John Norris, now at Copenhagen, to bring his squadron up the Baltic at once.

When he replied that the conditions demanded of Bassewitz could not be accepted, the answer was that, if the ships were ordered up, they would not be insisted upon. He undertook to make the request, if the queen would declare herself to that effect and conclude the Hanoverian treaty. She consented, insisting only that Sweden must retain a footing in Germany. Carteret reflected: 'If the Muscovites land and beat the Swedish troops, there is an end of Sweden; if the Muscovites should be beat, which is most likely, Sweden will then be so elated, that there is an end of the king's business that way; but if she make a peace, which is the most likely of all, Europe, especially the trading countries, will feel the consequences of the Muscovite power in the Baltick.' The fleet, he advised, ought to come up; if the alarm of invasion were false, no great harm would be done.

But Norris's command included only eleven of the line and a frigate, all that could be spared in the exigencies of the war with Spain. The Russian fleet was known to comprise twenty-one men-of-war and four frigates, and it was feared that Danish ships might reinforce it. The Swedes were credited with only a few ill-equipped vessels. Norris therefore could not venture to advance. Stanhope wrote to him on July 11 that the only orders that could be given him at present were to dispose his ships for the best protection of the traders, and to appoint a frigate to convey Carteret's despatches between Ystad and Lübeck. He was informed by Bernstorff that a reinforcement would be sent to him.¹

¹ Stanhope wrote home (July 1, o.s., Record Office, Regencies 12): 'It were extremely to be wished that S^r John Norris had with him a force sufficient to put himself in the way of the Russes. I am persuaded that, if he had six English ships more than he has, he might barely by shewing himself, without striking a stroak or even declaring himself, entirely defeat all the Czar's designs and save Sweden. By the conversation I have had with Major Finbo, I have reason to believe that S^r Jn. Norris himself is of this opinion. He is extremely satisfied with the condition and quality of the ships he has, which are very well manned. And tho' I believe that even with what he has he would disengage himself without much loss from the Czar's fleet, yet the disproportion of their number is so great, that nobody can advise he should put himself in their way. And it would be a great misfortune if for want of some more ships, we should lose the opportunity of awing the Czar, saving Sweden, and by giving peace to

When Carteret wrote again, on July $\frac{1}{2}$ ^{$\frac{2}{3}$} and $\frac{1}{2}$ ^{$\frac{4}{5}$} , the Swedes were in the sorest straits. The whole Russian fleet lay off the coast, and galleys carrying some 30,000 men had entered the river of Stockholm. Its passages were too well defended to allow them to reach the capital, but the troops landed at various points to burn and pillage. In the south, Stromstad had capitulated to the Danes, and they were now besieging Marstrand. Small wonder that a large majority of the Swedish senators were for making peace with the tsar on any terms. But the prince of Hesse and Dücker stood out. To defend the capital they formed a camp of 20,000 men a few miles out.

The immediate effect, indeed, of the situation was the conclusion not of terms with Russia but of the preliminary convention with Hanover, under Carteret's written promise that the treaty of 1700 with Great Britain should be renewed in a form applicable to present circumstances, and that an express should be sent to Norris urging him to come on and act according to his instructions. It was signed on July $\frac{1}{2}$ ^{$\frac{1}{2}$} . 'Our success,' Carteret wrote, 'is chiefly owing to the Czar, he at the gates of Stockholm has reasoned the best for us'; only the expectation of the king's assistance had procured consent to the treaty.

Then came word that the Russians had landed. Carteret gives a graphic account of discussions continued throughout the night, of his hurried morning visit to the camp, of the presentation there of the tsar's ultimatum by Osterman. The Swedes insisted upon a definite interpretation of the word 'applicable' in Carteret's declaration. He was obliged in the end to sign a supplementary paper, which, he says, 'I almost quite changed from what they offered at first, having brought it as low and made it as general and obscure as I could.' He then sent off his secretary William

the North, of defeating the greatest hope which is now left to Spain, that of forming a strong alliance against us in the North. The Lords Justices will therefore consider, whether, being at present entirely free from all apprehensions at home, any reinforcement may be sent to S^r John Norris.'

Finch¹ to Norris, while the Swedish senators repaired to camp to confer with Osterman.

The principal conditions of this preliminary convention with Hanover were, complete cession of the duchies of Bremen and Verden with all rights and privileges attaching, payment in return of the sum of one million crowns, freedom for and encouragement to British commerce, and renewal of the old friendship and alliance with Great Britain. The parties agreed to send plenipotentiaries as soon as possible to the Brunswick Congress to conclude a formal peace under the mediation and guarantee of the emperor, and to make every effort there to bring about peace also with the kings of Denmark and Poland.

There was no mention of Prussia. Carteret had been specially warned, after his instructions were issued, not to concern himself with Prussian interests.² This, of course, was in consequence of the difficulties met with at Berlin. King George awaited the issue of the negotiations there before committing himself to procure the cession of Stettin.

The ultimatum delivered by Osterman contained, as reported by Carteret, demands on the part of both Russia and Prussia. The tsar asked for all Ingria with Reval, Viborg and Kexholm. For Livonia he would either pay a sum of money or hold it without payment for forty years. He would restore Finland and all Carelia excepting Kexholm. The king of Prussia offered to buy Stettin and the country to the Peene, or to accept the same on mortgage for four million crowns, the expenses of the sequestration and of the war, for a period to be agreed upon. Particulars were to be settled at the Åland Congress. Acceptance of these terms was only prevented by the threats of the prince and Dücker to throw up the command of the army, and by the firmness of the queen. In the end a counter-proposal was sent.

¹ Second son of the Earl of Nottingham. He succeeded Carteret in Sweden, and was later appointed to the Hague.

² 'Not,' he says, 'that I shall speak openly against that Court, but only with coldness and indifference, when I hear it mentioned' (July 3, o.s.).

Everything depended, Carteret wrote, narrating all that had occurred, upon the coming of the fleet; if it did not come the Swedes could not hold out long.

Before this, Peter the Great had sent frigates to Copenhagen to observe the movements of Norris and to inquire of him the reason of his coming, and whether his intentions were friendly or hostile. He required a written answer, saying that, failing one, he should understand the latter and take his measures accordingly. He disclaimed emphatically any design on his own part against the king of England's interests. With the letter were delivered copies of his manifesto justifying his attack on Sweden, a statement characterised by an honesty unusual in such documents, and of his declaration of June in regard to commerce. Norris only replied that he had been sent to the Baltic to protect the trade of the king's subjects, expressed surprise at offence being taken and the king's anxiety to maintain friendly relations, and said that he had sent the letters on to Hanover.

The uncertainty prevailing there is shown in Stanhope's reply of August 2 to Carteret's first despatches. He wrote of the 'unspeakable difficulties' caused by the doings of the Danes, and urged a peace with them by the cession of Stralsund and Rügen. Were they secured, he said, and if Sweden could furnish eight good ships, then Norris might have orders to advance. If, on the other hand, it were determined to come to terms with Russia, then 'averse as we are to the Czar,' the king would 'equally contribute his best offices to serve them that way.' In that case the treaty should be 'so managed as to lay a foundation of enmity and jealousy betwixt the Czar and Denmark,' the former being obliged to give help against the latter by sea and land. At the same time the necessity of a good defensive alliance with Great Britain should be insisted upon, seeing that no other Power, excepting France, could render equal service. 'Against the Czar they will ever be secure in us of an active and vigorous ally.' In the uncertainty regarding Prussia, that Power should be mentioned as little as possible. Of course, Stan-

hope went on, the guarantee of Sleswick and the German provinces, given under the treaty of 1700, could not under present circumstances be renewed, but till the general peace Sweden would be entitled to receive subsidies equal to the succours therein stipulated.

This despatch threw Carteret into consternation. 'If,' he wrote, 'your Lordship is under unspeakable difficulties, what must I be in? The moment a courier arrives my house is full of Senators enquiring about the fleet.' When he imputed their situation to the refusal to make peace with Denmark, they said that 'all was owing to their relyance upon the King of England. If they had not trusted to his fleet they had made peace with the Czar before any one town had been burnt, and by this time they should have had ample revenge of the Danes. With this they left me.' Carteret implored that Norris might come on; there was nothing, he said, to fear from the Danes, who would never join the Russians. Stanhope's advice that peace should be made with Denmark was taken as an insult. They would not give up Pomerania. If the fleet came, all might yet be well, but if the sea were not opened, Sweden would be starved into submission.

But in spite of Carteret's entreaties, of knowledge that a reinforcement was on its way, and of letters from Baron 'Claes' Sparre, the Swedish admiral-in-chief, saying that eleven men-of-war and two frigates were now ready at Carlskrona and eight frigates and a number of smaller vessels at Stockholm, Norris stayed on in Copenhagen roads. Stanhope instructed him on August 11 that it was neither advisable nor practicable for him to proceed before his reinforcement arrived,¹ for the Danes in their present temper might seize anything that was to follow.

Carteret's second set of despatches with the Hanoverian convention and its ratification reached Hanover on August 5. But Stanhope waited to reply till he knew the issue at Berlin.

¹ Sunderland's invective against Norris (August 4, o.s., see Mahon) would appear to have been undeserved. Such was the uneasiness about the Danes that Norris was even warned that they might attempt to seize his person.

He applied himself to a further contest with his Hanoverian colleagues, and as the result, was able to announce to Whitworth further concessions in the matter of the three villages : namely, consent to the two principal Prussian conditions and to all that was not definitely incompatible with the king's honour. The treaty with Sweden, he said, would be held back pending the king of Prussia's decision, who could not now refuse to sign. He must see the advantage of having Stettin guaranteed to him by Great Britain, France, Hanover, and later by the emperor. His undertakings were nominal, those of the king of England serious. But the latter must have an immediate answer, and if a favourable one were not given within three days from receipt of the present despatch, Whitworth must break off and come away.

There were yet difficulties. Frederick William still strove obstinately against breaking his troth with the tsar. Besides, he was ill at Wüsterhausen, and unable to attend to business for some days. However, after a seven hours' discussion on August 12, the treaties and separate articles were settled with the ministers, and two days later, with certain modifications, they were signed, excepting the second separate and secret article concerning the king of Poland, which was held over.¹

The provisions of the ostensible part of the British treaty were as previously given, omitting the clause about the arrears. Ranke remarks that it was extremely advantageous for Prussia, her newly acquired possessions being guaranteed by Great Britain, while the security of the Protestant Succession in England was her interest. The Hanoverian treaty confirmed that of 1715 in regard to Bremen and Verden and Stettin, and the mutual succour to be afforded, should occasion arise. It specially guaranteed the said provinces, and stipulated joint measures to be taken for their cession at the peace. The king of Prussia agreed to satisfy the article of the treaty of 1715 regarding the three Gartow villages, and to hand over the documents of cession therein promised ; and it was stipulated that the guarantees now given should only

¹ For Frederick William's views and expressions see Droysen, pp. 273-4-9.
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take force from the day that the cession was made and the documents handed over. The two parties agreed to persuade the queen of Sweden to make peace and send plenipotentiaries to treat at Brunswick, to do all they could to arrange preliminaries with Sweden in advance, not to make peace at all unless the cessions were agreed to, and to use every effort to obtain the emperor's consent to them; the king of Prussia, to facilitate this, giving assurance of never having taken or wished to take any engagements with the tsar contrary or prejudicial to the interests of the emperor and the empire. And it was agreed to concert with all the allies of either party, and with such neutral Powers as could be of assistance, the measures to be taken to establish a general peace in the north. The separate and secret article regarding the king of Poland was drafted as follows: The king of Prussia agreed not to trouble him in the peaceable possession of his crown or of his dominions in Germany, nor to do anything against the rights of the republic, the king of Poland undertaking to do nothing to disturb the other's incontestable right to the sovereignty of Prussia proper. When the king of Poland had explained his Fraustadt letter in a manner just and agreeable to the said sovereignty of Prussia, then the latter king would enter into negotiations with him to re-establish a perfect understanding. King George undertook to do all he could with the king and republic of Poland to obtain their recognition of the king of Prussia's quality, as it was recognised by the emperor and other crowns.

Besides the above there were two separate and secret articles attaching to both treaties. George agreed under the first, in case in consequence of the present treaties or of those to be made with Sweden the king of Prussia were troubled in Prussia or in Pomerania by any Power, to send him, to begin with, the succours stipulated under the present treaties, and if that were not enough, further succour sufficient to maintain him and repair his wrongs. And the latter undertook similar reciprocal engagements. The second article

recorded that the two kings would agree upon a sum of money to be paid to the queen of Sweden to facilitate a peace.¹

Now in order to make the demand for the cession of Stettin, it was necessary to make believe that this had been agreed to with Prussia before the Swedish treaty reached Hanover. At Whitworth's request, therefore, the treaties were antedated August 4, on the plea that they would have been completed then had not the king been ill. The Prussian ministers were with difficulty persuaded to agree to this, because, if we may believe what Whitworth says, it was just at that time that they had been most emphatic in promising the Russians not to conclude peace without them. But considerations of expediency prevailed. Only secrecy was requested for a time, in order that the rupture with the tsar might not be too sudden. So eager, says Whitworth, was Ilgen to discover excuses, that he himself expected to be relieved from the appearance of having directed the manœuvre.

A further piece of cleverness, or of chicanery, was practised by Whitworth on the question of payment of the arrears from the French war, which, as instructed, he had held out as an inducement to the Prussians to sign the treaties. Now he pleaded that, if they were paid at once, it might seem that the signatures had been bought, and so postponed this difficult matter.

There were yet long delays before the treaties were completed. Frederick William insisted upon the demolition of fortifications raised on the Elbe in the neighbourhood of the three villages. On hearing of the orders sent to Norris to destroy the Russian fleet if he could, he wrote, 'The English treaty I have made is my death, for it was the cause of my illness.'² There were also difficulties about the terms of the guarantee to be given by France. Not till September 27

¹ Record Office, Treaty Papers 59; the original of the British treaty, *ibid.* Treaties 410.

² Droysen, p. 277. As a matter of fact the king was a victim to the prevailing epidemic of dysentery, which had invaded the palace.

were the acts of cession of the Prussian rights in Brunswick-Lüneburg signed. Three days later ratifications were exchanged, and the French guarantee delivered. Then the king wrote letters to Whitworth and to Stanhope expressing his gratitude for their exertions. In November he paid an informal and successful visit to Herrenhausen.

The whole honour, Whitworth wrote, of 'laying the plan' and carrying it through belonged to Stanhope. The king of Prussia's vacillation and distress of mind had been terrible to witness, but Knyphausen was an 'admirable doctor for a queasy conscience.' Now the king was thoroughly pleased, 'and the good queen in the fulness of her joy.'

To procure the cession of Stettin a clause was sent to Carteret to be inserted in the British preliminary treaty. The plea which Stanhope advanced for it was that it had been guaranteed to Prussia by the treaty of 1715. Although, he said, that treaty had lain dormant in consequence of the refusal of the king of Prussia to carry out his undertakings, he had now given satisfaction, and his co-operation in the present juncture, if the Swedes could not come to terms either with Russia or with Denmark, was indispensable. The orders now being sent to Norris, and enclosed, could never have been issued, had not the king been sure of Prussia, and the uncertainty which prevailed on that head had been the cause of the delay in writing. Carteret must solicit a passport for a Prussian minister to come to Stockholm. The sum to be paid for Stettin must be left blank. France also having guaranteed Stettin to Prussia, it would be a pure impossibility for the Swedes ever to recover the place.

The orders to Norris made his advance dependent upon information from Carteret that the British preliminary treaty, with the clause for the cession of Stettin, was accepted and signed. Then, and having received his reinforcement, he might proceed as far as Hanö, and enter into communication with the Swedish admiral, but must not join the Swedish

fleet unless the Russian came down and obliged him to do so. If that did not happen, having obtained the best information possible and weighed all the circumstances, including the probability of the Russians being joined by the Danes, he must thereafter use his judgment as to whether, with the Swedes, he might venture an action with prospect of success. If he thought so, he was to send a letter to the tsar in terms of a threatening character, which Stanhope prescribed. Having allowed sufficient time for an answer, if none were sent, or if it were insolent, he was to join the Swedish fleet and act with it in the manner he should judge most effectual to destroy that of the tsar, 'than which,' said Stanhope, 'a greater service cannot be done to your country.' More positive orders could not be given; the king was happy to have in command of the fleet a man who could be trusted to supply their deficiencies. Norris must also use his judgment as to what was best to say to the Danes. 'You know His Majesty's view, which is to save Sweden, if possible, and to destroy the Czar's fleet. You are the only judge, whether the means you have are sufficient. If you think not, you must not attempt, and consequently not send the letter to the Czar. If you think you are likely to succeed, attempt in the name of God, and be sure of all the support the King can give you, even tho' the event should not answer your expectation.'¹

A secret despatch to Carteret informed him of the above, and stated that, if the Swedes would not accept the terms offered, he must break off, declaring that the king would do nothing further, and that the fleet would be recalled to England. The worst that could happen would be that he would save a million crowns and enjoy his acquisitions

¹ Cp. Sunderland to Stanhope, August 7, o.s. (Mahon): 'I own I have set my heart upon not losing this opportunity of giving a blow to the Czar's fleet, for besides the solid and lasting good, no one thing would be more popular here.' And Polwarth, August 18 (Record Office, Denmark 42): 'We must look upon the Czar, from what he thinks his interest, from his views, the size of our merchantships, his late letter to Admiral Norris, and indeed all his management, as undoubtedly an enemy to Britain.'

serenely under the guarantees of France and Prussia, to which those of Russia and Denmark might be added.¹

As to the payment to be made for Stettin, Carteret was given permission, if the Swedes insisted upon so much, to name two million crowns. This was an unwelcome surprise for Prussia, for the limit of Frederick William's intention had been half a million. Now he was asked to pay double the sum paid by George for Bremen and Verden. But he could not now recede, and had to pay it in the end.

After further correspondence with Sparre, and receiving the report of an officer sent to Carlskrona, Norris determined to advance, 'to give a countenance to Lord Carteret's negotiations,' as he expressed it. His fleet was now a powerful one—eighteen of the line, a frigate and two fireships. It anchored off Hanö on August 28. On the 30th the *Port Mahon* brought despatches from Stanhope of the 24th. Those to Carteret informed him that it was desired to conclude the final or 'solemn' treaty with Hanover at once, rather than to refer it to the Brunswick Congress, that a draft for it was therefore sent to Bassewitz, that it had been arranged to mention in the preamble the good offices and mediation of the king of France as having advanced and facilitated the peace, that like mention ought to be made in the first two separate articles of the British preliminary treaty, or, if that were already signed, in a separate act, and that Sweden should enter into an engagement to listen to no propositions from Spain. Peace with the Danes, the despatch went on, appeared to be necessary to save Sweden, otherwise they might combine with the tsar. Recognition of the king of Poland ought to be obtained as a preliminary to peace with him; an article on this subject was enclosed. If the cession

¹ In a similar spirit we find Robethon reporting to General Bothmer Stanhope's opinion that it might be a good thing for Sweden to accept the tsar's terms, for then the king would be in perfect security, whereas in the contrary case, if he made peace with Sweden alone, he would burden himself with an ally that had no money, ships or troops, and would incur the hostility of Russia and Denmark, and perhaps of Prussia. Peace between Sweden and Russia was therefore not looked upon as a misfortune, seeing that one with Denmark appeared to be impracticable.

of Stettin were agreed to, it was important for the king of Prussia to stipulate in return that he would give no help to the tsar directly or indirectly.

The demand for the cession of Stettin fell on the Swedes as a thunderbolt. Discussions waxed furious, and Carteret said at last, 'the short question was, Would they detach the King of Prussia from the Czar, or not, and give him their provinces at the interposition of the King of Great Britain, or at the interposition of the Czar?' Get them back they could not. But the senators persisted, and the situation was desperate, when a despatch arrived from Norris, 'so prudently and discreetly writ,' says Carteret, that he could show it. This, he continues, 'prevailed infinitely more than anything I could say, turned the balance in my favour.' The treaty was now agreed to with some small alterations, which Carteret disputed, he says, almost to breaking off. But he had to give way, and was obliged also to sign a declaration that Norris would come on to Stockholm at once. To him, said Carteret, the success must be attributed; if what he had done were not approved, himself would take the blame. 'It was as hard in this case for me to follow orders punctually, as it was for your Lordship to give them. I think I have followed His Majesty's intention and the interest of my country.'

The treaty was signed on August $\frac{18}{28}$, and ratified by the queen late the next night, and by George on September $\frac{3}{14}$. The most important part of it was contained in the separate articles. The first confirmed the preliminary treaty with Hanover, and particularly its article ceding Bremen and Verden, the cession, it being stipulated, to have complete effect without any alteration being introduced into it at the final peace-making, and one-third of the million crowns to be paid at once, the remainder at times to be fixed by the formal treaty, work upon which was to be set forward at once. The second promised to Prussia the cession of Stettin and the district between Oder and Peene and the isles of Usedom and Wollin in return for a payment of 2,000,000 crowns,

the cession, however, to be conditional upon the king of Prussia obliging himself to give no help, directly or indirectly, to the tsar against Sweden. The third promised that, if Sweden could be brought to treat with Denmark, the king of England, as soon as such treaty was concluded, would not be content with having assisted Sweden by his good offices and by the subsidy specified, which subsidy was to be continued until peace with Denmark and Russia was made, but even if peace could not be made, would nevertheless join his forces with those of Sweden to act as auxiliaries against the tsar as reasons of war should demand, should he refuse the king of England's mediation and continue hostilities. Under a fourth King George undertook to make pressing instances with France for payment of the most considerable subsidies possible to Sweden until peace was made.

But this was not the final form. In the ratifications preserved at the Record Office the separate articles signed as above by King George differ from those which bear the queen of Sweden's signature. The explanation is that the latter, given the same date, were substituted afterwards.¹ For the regent of France had been prevailed upon to give a French guarantee of the treaty, and his envoy brought it to Campredon at Stockholm, with the sum of 300,000 crowns in gold ingots, just after the treaty was signed there. It was necessary to make mention of this guarantee, and also of French mediation, and that being done, of the mediation of the emperor also, in order to make his acquiescence possible. The first two separate articles, therefore, were altered accordingly. And from further attention to France the fourth was omitted, in order that it might not appear that the French subsidies to Sweden had been obtained by the influence of Great Britain.

It must be said that Carteret's success was not wholly due to the events narrated. He makes no secret, except to write in cipher, of the fact that the senators were freely bribed. Their pressing poverty made the inducement irresistible. The five commissioners appointed to treat had 10,000

¹ Originals, Record Office, Treaties 528, 529.

crowns apiece from Bassewitz, while Carteret was authorised to expend in like manner 10,000*l*. He engaged himself further to 110,000 crowns of Prussian money. Stanhope promised that if this sum were not paid in full value (the Swedish coinage being much depreciated) the balance should be made good out of the arrears owing to Prussia. And here we may note the complaint of the Dutch ambassador, Burmannia, that he was not provided with like funds, and consequently was not listened to. Influential persons, he said, were interested in the privateering which he was endeavouring to stop, and they must be compensated.

As soon as he learnt that the treaty was signed Stanhope sent word of it to Berlin, desiring Whitworth to obtain formal acceptance of the Stettin article and payment of the 110,000 crowns. This he was able to do. The treaty, Stanhope said, must be kept secret until reference to the mediation of the emperor and the mediation and guarantee of France had been duly inserted.

Norris, notified of the signature of the treaty, sent Carteret the letters for the tsar and sailed northwards, joining the Swedish fleet on September 5. An immediate attempt on the Russian fleet was proposed, but not carried out. It was, indeed, already back at Reval, and an attack on that place was decided to be impracticable. According to his own account,¹ Peter withdrew his fleet in deference to the queen of Sweden's entreaties sent by Osterman.

Great rejoicings attended the arrival of Norris at Stockholm, as Carteret narrates. Action against Russia was postponed to the next year, and measures were discussed for it. The letters to the tsar, in terms greatly modified, were sent to the Åland Isles, but were not accepted or allowed to go further. Norris stayed on in the neighbourhood of Stockholm till the middle of November, and then sailed for Copenhagen and home.

¹ Published in *Relation véritable du retour de la Flotte Russe dans les Ports de Revel et de Cronstot, dressée sur des Journaux Authentiques*, Revel, 1719; copy with Polwarth's despatches, Record Office, Denmark 42.

George was rewarded for what he had done for Prussia by some action on the part of Frederick William against the tsar. Offering, immediately after his visit to Hanover, the joint mediation of Great Britain, France, and Prussia, he covered the offer by instructions to his envoy Mardefeldt, which amounted to threats. But Peter was by no means disposed to give way. His general answer to the representations made was conveyed in the well-known memorial delivered by his resident Veselovsky in London towards the end of the year. Recapitulating from Peter's point of view the conduct of George towards him since 1715, this ended with a strongly worded protest against the minatory letters sent by Carteret and Norris, with the formal assurance that he continued disposed, as always, to cultivate King George's friendship.

There was still delay about the final Hanoverian treaty, chiefly owing to difficulties raised by Bassewitz in regard to the titles given to the queen of Sweden, and on points concerning the internal affairs of the duchies. Carteret complained bitterly. 'My Lord,' he wrote, 'entreat the King to give orders that they [the Hanoverians] do not insist upon trifles, otherwise, with great concern I say it, his business will never be done. . . . If I was to write to your Lp. all, it would make you sick as it does me.' And similarly in other places.

At length the treaty and the documents appertaining to it were signed on November $\frac{9}{20}$. It differed much from the preliminary convention. The majority of the clauses were concerned with the internal affairs of the duchies of Bremen and Verden ceded. I need only speak here of the ninth article, which confirmed the treaties of Westphalia, so far as not affected by the present treaty or at the future peace. It was put in partly out of consideration for France, as a guarantor of those treaties. It would serve, Stanhope had written to Dubois,¹ to stop the mouths of French objectors, and as it would be very ill-received at Vienna, knowledge of

¹ October 8.

it should be kept from that court as long as possible, in any case till the treaty was signed. But reference to a cession of Stralsund and Rügen was omitted. When sending the draft of the article to Carteret¹ Stanhope had said that, while presenting a memorial for that cession, he might intimate that the intention was rather to show the Danes with what vivacity their interests were supported than to compel Sweden to make it. It were better, out of remaining consideration for Denmark, to dispense with the article, but if no other course were possible he might promise, even in writing, to insert it, and risk the consequences.² Carteret received these directions with joy; they would enable him, he said, 'to cut short a great deal of chicane.'

It was in fact decided now that Stralsund and Rügen must be restored. Denmark had failed. Although Marstrand had capitulated on July 26, and the whole of the flotilla in that important harbour had been destroyed and captured, it had not been possible to do anything further. The army had retired from Sweden in the first week of August. The only effect was to embitter the Swedes yet more against the Danes, and to defeat King George's efforts to bring about a peace. Count Holstein, the king of Denmark's best minister, had fully warned his master of this, and that his action was necessarily believed to be taken in concert with the tsar, but his advice had been disregarded. Plain language was used both at Hanover and at Copenhagen; it was said that, whether there were a concert with the tsar or not, the evil wrought was the same, and that the limit of time within which Denmark could obtain a satisfactory peace might come sooner than was expected.

Yet the Danish demands remained enormous. An ultimatum presented by Holstein at Hanover asked, besides Stralsund and Rügen and Gottorpien Sleswick, for Marstrand

¹ September 30.

² 'Vous avez risqué de vous commettre pendant le cours de votre négociation pour le service du Public, et le Bon Dieu vous a béni. Je me commets peut-être en vous écrivant ceci, mais je feray de mon mieux pour soutenir tout ce que vous ferez en conséquence.'

and the provinces of Bohus, Halland, Jemteland and Herjedalen.¹ Such pretensions were ridiculed. There was offered, in land-compensation, only a British guarantee for Sleswick, conditionally upon King George's mediation being accepted and a cessation of arms agreed to. Stanhope, in a long piece of special pleading, argued that Denmark by accepting a sum of money for Stralsund and Rügen would fare better than Hanover or Prussia, for they had to pay for their acquisitions, and besides had exposed themselves to the resentment of the tsar. And he threatened that if Sweden had to be saved from starvation during the winter by the employment of British men-of-war, the offers of mediation and guarantee would be withdrawn, and the rights of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp to Sleswick be supported. The mediation, it was said, had been accepted by Sweden, and was offered at Copenhagen upon condition of consent to an immediate armistice.² A very different document this from Peter the Great's straightforward utterances.

Lord Polwarth at Copenhagen exerted himself to the utmost in memorials and frequent conferences, but the Danes—or, as he intimates, the king—would not give way.³ On October 10 they delivered a definite answer in writing. Premising that King George had not shown more good-will towards them than they to him in resigning to him Bremen and Verden for a small sum of money, that they earnestly desired peace, having of late borne almost the whole brunt of the war, and that the terms now proposed were really too easy, considering the present state of Sweden, they reduced their demands to Stralsund and Rügen, the province of Bohus with Marstrand and Vigen, and abolition of the exemption

¹ Enclosure in a private despatch of Stanhope, September 1, Record Office, Regencies 12; also British Museum, Add. MSS. 2815, f. 134.

² Stanhope to Polwarth, September 19, o.s.; cf. the same, August 16, o.s. (H. O. Regencies 12). Norris was informed on September 25, o.s., that if the Danes continued to molest trade, he must make reprisals (Foreign Entrybook 220).

³ On Frederick's pertinacity, once he had made his resolution, see Holm, pp. 677, foll.

from the Sound tolls. In regard to Sleswick, it was said, Sweden need only undertake never to interfere therewith. On receiving a British guarantee thereof an armistice should be agreed to and the king of England's mediation accepted. If, in spite of everything, the Swedes would not give up Stralsund and Rügen, an equivalent must be found in land.

Polwarth in reply desired to be informed, without delay or evasion, whether the mediation were accepted or not. Whereupon the Danes partly yielded, accepting the mediation, and agreeing to a removal of the prohibition of trade and an armistice for six months, conditionally upon previous receipt of the guarantee of Sleswick. But they still insisted upon compensation for Stralsund and Rügen in land. The concession, however, was appreciated. 'Certainly,' Stanhope wrote to Carteret, 'it will now be incumbent on Sweden to improve this good temper of the Danes by some facilities on their side.'

The Swedes, on the other hand, in a definite statement handed to Carteret early in October, offered in exchange for Stralsund and Rügen and Marstrand only Wismar, upon condition that it should not be fortified, that no port should be constructed, and that it should not be mortgaged or sold to any other Power. They said that the peculiar tenures of and treaties concerning Holstein and Sleswick obliged the interests of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp to be referred to the emperor, it being hoped that, as he had been neutral in the war, his dominions would be restored to him, or, if that could not be, that he would be compensated to his full satisfaction. Carteret indulges in long arguments in support of these proposals.

Much further correspondence and discussion ensued before a convention between Great Britain and Denmark was signed on October 30. Under its terms Frederick accepted British mediation, and consented to a complete suspension of arms for six months and to liberty of navigation and trade. George undertook to maintain him in peaceable possession of Sleswick against all aggressors as under the treaty of 1715,

the guarantee to continue in force not only during the armistice, but for all time to come, after peace was made ; and further to employ his best offices to procure that in the treaty of peace Sweden should engage never to trouble him in that possession. And Frederick agreed, if Sweden could not be brought to cede Stralsund and Rügen, to give them up in return for an equivalent as demanded in his declarations, persuading himself that George would obtain for him at the peace conditions just and equitable.

Among the correspondence may be noted a private letter of Stanhope to Polwarth, authorising him to expend 4,000*l.* or 5,000*l.* in bribing the Danish ministers. After the convention was signed, Polwarth distributed notes payable to bearer accordingly. But the four leading ministers, Wibe, Schestedt, and the two Holsteins returned them. The reason given by one of them, that the offer was premature and the money not yet earned, conveys the impression that acceptance under existing circumstances was difficult. The other beneficiaries did not refuse.

The immediate effect of the convention was finally to separate Denmark from Russia. There was violent re- crimination at Copenhagen between the tsar's ambassador Dolgoruki and the Danish ministers. Polwarth reported 'a very strong and threatening memorial' delivered on the tsar's behalf, and 'a pointed and as strong an answer given.' He advised the making of a defensive treaty with the Danes, 'to keep them in heart, and bring them into measures in order to bring the tsar to reason.' When, later, relations were improved, matters were advanced too far for common action.

The Swedish convention for an armistice was signed on October 27
November 7. It agreed to a suspension of arms for six months, and to freedom of navigation and commerce during that time. It contained a provision against Danish privateers being allowed to sail under Muscovite colours and commissions, and stipulated liberty of transmission of corre-

spondence, as before the war, and maintenance of the *status quo* during the armistice.

But peace was still a long way off. Covering the above Carteret wrote that the Danes would not make it without a strong assurance of keeping Sleswick, nor the Swedes, if they had to admit much more. They looked on the tsar, he said, considering the state of his health and the likelihood of a revolution in Russia after his death, as a temporary foe, but on Denmark as an eternal enemy. Little more was effected in regard to peace between Sweden and Denmark till the following year.

The next work was the negotiation of a treaty between Sweden and Prussia. For this purpose Knyphausen came to Stockholm at the beginning of November. Carteret and the French envoy Campredon acted as mediators, the former being instructed to insist especially upon an article providing for the re-establishment of freedom of trade in the Baltic, whoever might hold the ports. Knyphausen began by broaching a Prussian ambition, overtly disclaimed in deference to the objections of France and England, but ever privately nourished—the purchase of Stralsund and Rügen as well as Stettin. He said that on this condition only would the king of Prussia give active help against the tsar, who could not be reduced without that help. Carteret was taken with the proposal, but the Swedes would not listen to it. Stair at Paris took occasion to press for further subsidies, which should encourage their resolution, and the regent granted not them only, but also a sum of money for the prince of Hesse's private use.

By the middle of January 1720 all important points of the Prussian treaty were settled, excepting in regard to certain tolls levied on the rivers Oder and Peene, which Knyphausen agreed to refer to commissioners. But now he received new orders from Berlin, from which he was enjoined not to depart a single iota. He could not, therefore, sign what had been arranged. But the final British treaty was being delayed till the Prussian was settled, and it was urgent

that both should be signed before the meeting of the Riksdag fixed for January $\frac{1}{2}$, to avoid criticism by that assembly. The two mediators, therefore, took upon themselves the extraordinary course of accepting a treaty signed by the Swedish plenipotentiaries alone, to be ratified, it was hoped, by the king of Prussia later. This and the British treaty were signed on January 21
February 1, the day before the Riksdag actually opened. Among other conditions, in return for the cessions made, the king of Prussia was to engage in the strongest manner not to assist the tsar directly or indirectly in his war with Sweden, to make every effort in conjunction with the king of England to obtain the restoration of Stralsund and Rügen, and to withdraw his garrison from Wismar as soon as peace between Sweden and Denmark was concluded. Three of the separate articles were concerned with the internal affairs of Pomerania; the other provided in strong terms for the defence of the Protestant religion within and without the empire, particularly in Poland and Lithuania, as under the treaties of Westphalia and Oliva. The mediators promised that, if the king of Prussia did not accept and ratify the treaty within six weeks from date, the document should be annulled. 'I can say one thing,' Carteret wrote, 'which I thinke will please you, that there is not a scrap of publick paper in the world that can shew that the treaty has been dependent upon that of Bremen and Verhden.'

The action of the mediators was justified by the result. Frederick William, caught by Rottembourg and Whitworth at the right moment, accepted the terms prescribed. Knyp-hausen was able to sign them on March 6, and ratifications were exchanged a week later.

The final treaty between Great Britain and Sweden was a Latin document of very great length and particularity, renewing the defensive treaty of 1700, lately lapsed, with changes and additions suitable to present circumstances. It included elaborate provisions for mutual defence, for the maintenance of the Protestant religion, for freedom of trade

and navigation, for a commercial treaty, and so on. The queen of Sweden guaranteed the Protestant Succession, and promised not to give asylum or any assistance whatever to the Pretender or his adherents, but to deal with the latter as traitors. It was agreed that the military and naval succour to be given might be considered as auxiliary, and need not engage the party giving it in war, or oblige him to cut off all friendship and commerce with the other's enemy ; provided that peace should not be made by one party without inclusion of the other. Great Britain was still exempted from paying subsidies while engaged in war with another Power, but the case of the war with Spain was excepted, and Sweden undertook not to listen to any propositions from Spain. Subsidies due under the treaty of 1700 were to be calculated from the conclusion of the war with France, and to be taken into account in assessing and balancing the damages done to trade on either side. In regard to the northern war, if it continued, King George agreed to send to the Baltic in the spring a strong squadron, to be at the queen of Sweden's disposal and assist her fleet in repelling the tsar's attack. If, contrary to expectation, the war with Denmark outlasted that with the tsar, the subsidies stipulated were to be paid during its continuance. And as it was of very great importance that the Baltic should not be under the domination of the tsar, if he refused to make peace and restitution, then the king of England promised to use his good offices with his allies to obtain their help in enabling Sweden to restrain him. The treaty was to last for eighteen years, and to be made perpetual, if at any time thought fit.

There were two separate articles. The first was an engagement to combine in defence of the Protestant religion in the empire and everywhere else. Under the second King George undertook to be a guarantor of the engagements of all treaties of friendship made by Sweden heretofore with Great Britain, and lately with Hanover and Prussia, and of that to be made with Denmark. And he particularly engaged to maintain and guarantee the treaties of West-

phalia both as regarded the Protestant religion and the appropriations to Sweden, so far as these were not excepted from in the treaties concluded or in that to be made with Denmark.

Another work of January 1720 was the signature of preliminaries of peace with Augustus of Poland. They had been in negotiation since September. George took an active part, his main object being to reconcile the kings of Poland and Prussia in order to bring them into line against the tsar. The provisions on which he most insisted were for the security of the Polish Protestants, and that the crown, particularly in view of the electoral prince of Saxony's change of religion, should remain elective; matters of special interest to Frederick William as the foremost champion of the Protestant cause. We may take this Protestant zeal, shown also in the other treaties, to have been, perhaps, a consequence of the Prussian alliance. By a convention, signed at Stockholm on January $\frac{7}{18}$, Augustus was recognised as sole and lawful king, and after him whomsoever the republic should elect, for Stanislaus being reserved a suitable provision to be settled at the formal peace. And it was agreed that, in the solemn treaty to be concluded under the mediation of the emperor, Great Britain and France, the treaty of Oliva should be confirmed in all its articles. These preliminaries remained an empty form for many years. Augustus continued to disregard the rights of the Protestants and the efforts of George and Frederick William in their behalf. He was, however, persuaded to give an explanation of his Fraustadt letter of March 1719, and to declare that there was no question of the 'supremum dominium' of the king of Prussia in Prussia.

While offering mediation, George did not at all desist from his attempts to form a general offensive league against Russia. Every effort to this end was made at Vienna, and Count Flemming, when at Hanover at the beginning of November, was sounded on the subject of Polish help. The price he asked was Courland for a Saxon prince and Kiev

and Smolensk for the republic. But, he said, money must be given, the first use for which would be to pay for the expense of a solemn embassy to the Russian court to make demands. George allowed and provided for the purpose 60,000 crowns, and sought for a like sum from France. The Saxon minister Le Coq was sent to Paris to support Stair in this matter. Stair used every possible argument, whether of his own or of a series supplied by Stanhope.¹ He brought up again the danger of the Swedes selling Stralsund and Rügen to Prussia in return for an army to help them to recover Livonia and Esthonia, if they could not get help from Poland. The regent allowed that the tsar must not become master of the Baltic, and said that he had no consideration for him, partly because he knew for certain that he was making every possible effort to induce the king of Spain to continue the war. But against a grant of the money he advanced various objections, the root of his reluctance being distrust of the Poles. Only the personal efforts of Stanhope at Paris in January obtained it from him, and it was then too late for it to be of use. The Poles, besides, were extremely averse from war; firstly, because of the embarrassment of their affairs; secondly, because they feared the entry of Saxon and other foreign troops into the republic, to the prejudice of their liberties.²

The last treaty which lay within the scope of George's scheme was that with Denmark, and here an accord seemed impossible. During the winter all the arguments of Carteret and Polwarth were fruitless. The former obtained with great difficulty permission for a Danish envoy to come to Stockholm, but postponed his coming till the Riksdag should have finished its principal labours, and he himself have obtained from the Swedes the utmost concessions possible. These were embodied in preliminaries signed by them on March $\frac{4}{15}$. All that they accorded, in return for the restoration of Danish Pomerania, was the abolition of the Swedish exemption from

¹ In a long despatch of December 16 from London, Record Office, *S.P. Dom.* Entrybook 414.

² James Scott from Warsaw, February 6 and 14, 1720, *ibid.* Poland 26.

the Sound tolls, and a sum of money to be settled at the Brunswick Congress. In regard to Holstein, an immediate fief of the empire, the expectation was expressed that the emperor would obtain its restitution to the duke. The question of Sleswick was referred to Brunswick. Marstrand was to be restored, in the state in which it had been taken, when the final peace was made. It was made an absolute condition that the king of Denmark should give no help to the tsar during the present war with Sweden, directly or indirectly. If the preliminaries were not accepted before the armistice expired, then, it was stated, the Swedes would not further be bound by them.

Both George and Frederick wished the compensation to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp to be what the duke himself desired, and had constantly sought to compass during the summer: his nomination as successor to the Swedish throne. George sought to make the prince of Hesse's assent to this the condition of an advance of money long in negotiation. But he would not hear of it, attributing the proposal to ill-will on the part of the Hanoverian ministers. Carteret, too, opposed the project, and it was not pressed; when brought before the Riksdag it was formally rejected. In April the prince of Hesse, on the queen's proposal, was elected sovereign in her place; he was crowned on May $\frac{8}{14}$ as Frederick I. of Sweden.

The Danish envoy chosen was again Lövenörn, now a major-general. He reached Stockholm on March $\frac{20}{31}$. So far from accepting the terms offered, he still demanded the cession of Marstrand and the province of Bohus. The loss of Stralsund and Rügen, he argued, was definite, the questions of Sleswick and of money-compensation of uncertain issue. But nothing more could be got from the Swedes, though negotiations dragged on till June, after the armistice had expired and had been renewed. In almost every despatch Carteret announced his intention of leaving with Lövenörn for Copenhagen. The latter was not impervious to his arguments, but was bound by orders from home.

But now it appeared likely that, if the Danes persisted in their claims, they might lose even Sleswick. In January an imperial mandate had issued to Hanover and Prussia to make an execution in Holstein, if the Danes would not restore that duchy.¹ This was consequent upon the duke's betaking himself to Vienna, after his efforts to obtain support for his cause in Sweden and at Hanover had failed. It became known, too, that the Russian diplomatists at Vienna were giving him encouragement. This was followed by his sending an emissary of his own to St. Petersburg. It was announced, with foundation, as the sequel showed, that he was to marry Peter's daughter, without foundation, that he was to have Livonia. Then came a letter² from him to the queen, his aunt, saying that the tsar had declared his willingness to protect and support him. In accepting this, he assured the queen, he intended nothing inimical to Sweden, only his own security and that of his hereditary dominions. And, later, he repaired to St. Petersburg himself. Further, it was intimated by Polwarth—and the threat was emphasised by repetition—that the British guarantee of Sleswick, lapsing with the armistice, would not be renewed unless peace were speedily agreed to. And Knyphausen told Carteret that though his master had given Denmark guarantees for Sleswick and Pomerania, there were pleas enough to absolve him from them. Prussian troops, he said, would soon bring the Danes to reason.

At length, therefore, the Danes gave up the demand for compensation in land, and discussions were narrowed down to the amount of money to be paid by Sweden, and the question of Marstrand. The final offer and demand were 600,000 and 800,000 crowns respectively ; but here both sides stood

¹ This, Carteret wrote, could not be resisted, as the Danes, if the execution were made, by the laws of the empire would be liable to refund the money extorted from Holstein during seven years, at least double the ordinary revenue of some 200,000 crowns a year (February 10 and 11, o.s.). George was accused of instigating the mandate, but repudiated the imputation strongly, and indeed declined to act upon it.

² Vienna, March 16, 1720.

firm, although King George, in his anxiety to bring matters to a conclusion, offered, upon certain conditions, to find 400,000 crowns himself.

At length Carteret took upon himself to act as he had done in the case of the Prussian treaty. He accepted preliminaries signed by the Swedish plenipotentiaries alone on June $\frac{3}{14}$, and at the same time Campredon signed a French guarantee of Sleswick. Then Carteret and Lövenörn set off to explain matters to the king of Denmark at Frederiksborg. They were successful, the treaty was accepted, and signed on July 3. The French guarantee was handed over at the same time, and the British three weeks later. But the greatest difficulties were still encountered in obtaining the ratification of the former, the promise of which had only been obtained by the personal efforts of Stanhope at Paris, and in consequence the exchange of ratifications of the treaty was not effected till October 22, Carteret staying on in Denmark till this was done.

The treaty differed from the preliminaries on the points of Holstein, Sleswick, Marstrand, Wismar, and the compensation in money. The last was fixed at 600,000 crowns. Of Holstein nothing was said; only the king of Sweden undertook not to assist the duke in any way, nor to oppose what should be decided by the mediating Powers in regard to Sleswick. The Danish troops were to be withdrawn from Wismar, and the incontestable rights of Sweden over that place acknowledged. Marstrand was included in the territory to be restored. Such was the meagre return for all the expense and enterprise of the ten years' war.

With the peace with Denmark all that George was able to do for Sweden ended. His efforts to assemble an army to act against Peter the Great in Livonia failed entirely. A British squadron, eager to destroy the tsar's fleet, duly came to the Baltic in 1720, but the fleet kept out of its way. Nor could the men-of-war follow the Russian galleys among the rock-studded shallow waters north of Stockholm; when four Swedish frigates made the attempt they ran aground and

were destroyed ; the tsar's troops landed to ravage unhindered. A naval attack on Reval, unsupported by a land force, was pronounced impracticable. George was reduced to advising the Swedes to make peace with Russia on the best terms that they could get. In October, William Finch, who had succeeded Carteret at Stockholm, was authorised to offer King Frederick 20,000*l.* to be employed among the senators, and 100,000*l.* more, if the expense of a squadron for the next year could be saved. Another bribe was a proposal to make the crown hereditary in his family. But the Swedes would not give in. Another squadron and more subsidies were furnished for their help in 1721, with as little utility as before. Two new causes further diminished the possibility of driving Russia from the Baltic. The one was the financial crash which crippled both France and England ; the other was the sudden death of Stanhope, the prime mover of what had been done since 1716. Sweden was obliged to accept at Nystad terms which she had better, as it turned out, have accepted before. The trust placed in George's power had proved illusory.

As the result of the pacification, then, Hanover benefited greatly, Prussia considerably, Denmark very little. Great Britain was not much affected, for the possession of the East Country by Russia did not bring the ill consequences to commerce that had been feared. And that commerce was of less importance now that every year naval stores were coming in increasing quantities from the American plantations. There are two points to notice affecting general European history : the one, the value to George of his French alliance, without which nothing could have been accomplished ; the other, the ill effect upon his relations with Austria. The emperor was naturally incensed by the conclusion of treaties affecting provinces of the empire without reference to himself. He particularly objected to the mention of his mediation, when it had not been exercised, and to the co-mediation of France. He resented also the alliance with Prussia, as the Hanoverian ministers had always pointed out that he would

do, and showed his resentment by refusing to grant to Frederick William the investiture of Stettin, while George was prevented by his English ministers from accepting that of Bremen and Verden separately. Then there was the persecution of the Protestants in the Palatinate, Saxony and elsewhere, continued in spite of the urgent representations of the two kings. And, lastly, there was the support given to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, and the approximation of Austria to Russia which followed. The northern settlement aggravated the discord arising from the difficulties of the peace with Spain, and from it sprang some of the causes which in 1725 enabled the treaty of Vienna to be immediately countered by that of Hanover.

DISCUSSION

Sir HENRY HOWORTH drew a parallel between the position of England under William III., hampered by a Dutch alliance, and the same nation under George I. sacrificed to a Hanoverian policy. In both instances this country found itself on the wrong side. The position of Sweden at the latter date was heroical but quite impossible. Russia could no longer be isolated, nor could the expansion of Prussia be hindered with impunity. If Prussia had been given a free hand in Hanover and Poland the political situation in Europe would have been greatly simplified.

Professor C. H. FIRTH wished to call attention to the mass of Foreign State Papers still unexplored at the Record Office. The importance of this collection could be estimated by the present Paper, and Mr. Julian Corbett had also recently called attention to the subject. The action of the Royal Historical Society in promoting such researches would be commended by all historical students.

Mr. R. P. MAHAFFY observed that the partition of Sweden established a precedent for similar arrangements during the eighteenth century and later. England was especially interested in the Baltic timber trade in connection

with the building of ships and houses. The Irish forests were nearly exhausted and Norway 'deals' were cheap and serviceable. In the event of the complete domination of Sweden by Russia these supplies would have been cut off. Hanover was entering on a period of political expansion and was a far more serious rival of Brandenburg for the headship of Germany than was generally supposed.

The PRESIDENT (Dr. W. HUNT) pointed out that the policy of England at this juncture was largely swayed by the necessity of maintaining her naval supremacy and the designs of Russia on the Baltic endangered that supremacy by cutting off the supplies of naval stores. The King's speech in the Parliament of October 1721, had referred to this danger and to the desirability of encouraging the production of naval stores in the American plantations by means of bounties. This was the commercial aspect of the question. In its purely political aspect Sweden was an important factor in the calculations of the Jacobites. Down to the date of the death of Charles XII. they had considerable expectations from this quarter. Subsequently, however, the Jacobites and their Tory allies in Parliament opposed the support of Sweden by the Government of George I., since the success of this policy would have meant the aggrandizement of Hanover. Hence the keen opposition to the vote of the Swedish subsidies in 1720 and 1721.