IX.—THE OBJECT OF THOUGHT AND REAL BEING.

By G. F. STOUT.

WHENEVER we think of anything we think of its having a being which does not merely consist in its being thought of. The being thus mentally referred to may be either asserted or merely supposed: if it is asserted the assertion may be either true or false; if it is merely supposed, the supposition may or may not be in accordance with fact. But in all cases the mental reference is not merely to the fact that the object is present to consciousness, but to some other kind of being which it is thought of as possessing. When I believe or disbelieve or suppose that a centaur actually exists, I must think of its actually existing. And what I mean by this is certainly not the fact that I think of it. On the contrary, it seems to involve an absurdity to suppose that what I think of has no being except the being thought of. For how can the being of anything be merely constituted by its being related to something else? Is it not a logical precondition of its being related to something else that it should have a distinct being of its own?

Indeed, it may be safely assumed that this position would never have been called in question, if there had been no erroneous judgments or fictitious suppositions. But in error and fiction it seems as if something were asserted or supposed which really has no being. Hence we are led to regard mere being for thought as distinct and separable from real or "transcendent" being. This view, however, when we examine it closely, turns out to be radically indefensible, even apart from the preliminary difficulty of something owing its whole being to its relation to something else. So far from explaining fiction and error this view renders them both inexplicable; and it involves true judgment in the same difficulty. We have to

insist in the first place that when once we have committed ourselves to the separation of real being and being for thought, we cannot confine it only to the case of error and fiction: we must extend it to all true judgments also, except, perhaps, those which assert the existence of a present feeling of the individual. So far as thought transcends immediate experience, no intrinsic character is assignable by which we can distinguish the general nature of the objects of false judgments from the general nature of the objects of true judgments. If the possible severance of what really is and what is thought is once admitted in some cases, it must be admitted in all. It may be urged against this that some propositions are not only true but evident, and that where there is evidence what is asserted must have real being. Now it may perhaps be conceded that what is evidently implied in what really is, must itself have real being. But this avails us nothing, unless we are already supposed to have a direct apprehension of some relevant reality. Apart from such direct contact with real being, evidence itself must be regarded primarily as an object of thought, so that for it also it is possible to raise the question whether what has being for thought has also being in reality. This question is always relevant except, perhaps, in the limiting case in which what is thought of is also existentially present in the mind, like a pain which is actually being felt. Allowing for this limiting case we may say generally that the severance between thought and reality, if it is admitted at all, must be consistently adhered to both for true judgment and false. But if it be consistently adhered to, the distinction between true and erroneous judgments inevitably becomes an external distinction. The only account we can give of it is that when a judgment is true there is some real being which agrees with, conforms, or corresponds to the object of the act of judging; and that when the judgment is false the object of the act has no such real counterpart. We cannot escape from this conclusion by an attempt to substitute identity for correspondence.

We do not escape by saying that when we believe A to exist then if it does exist, the A which exists is the very same A that we believe to exist; and that if it does not exist, what is non-existent is again the very same A which we believe to exist. For on the view we are examining the alleged sameness of A does not prevent its having two sides or aspects separable from each other—A as object of thought, and A as really existing: and between these two aspects the relation is one of agreement or disagreement, not identity. Thus, on the view we are examining, what is thought remains severed from what is.

But this view will not bear critical scrutiny. Instead of explaining the possibility of truth and falsity, it makes both inexplicable. Truth does not consist in the mere agreement or correspondence of what is thought with what really is, and error does not consist in the mere disagreement or non-correspondence of what is thought with what really is. To constitute truth or error, the agreement or disagreement must be an agreement or disagreement not with any reality but with some reality which the mind means or intends to describe or characterize in the act of judgment. Unless this reality as such is itself an object of thought the distinction between truth and error loses all meaning. The act of judging either rightly or wrongly must be ultimately concerned with what really is: what really is must be rightly or wrongly characterized, and for this to be possible what really is must itself be directly present to thinking consciousness and not something which merely represents it or stands for it. When I assert that "this match box is empty," the fact of some other match box being empty does not make my judgment true, and the fact of some other match box being full does not make my judgment erroneous. It may be that what I call a match box is not a match box, but something else. But, even if I am so far mistaken, there must still be some real being concerning which the mistake is made, and this must be an object of my thought in making the mistake. The article in my hand may not be a match box, but

it is a portion of matter. Again, if we suppose that I am dreaming or under a complete hallucination, still there is a reference to surrounding space, which, if not occupied in the way I believe, is either otherwise occupied or unoccupied. Finally, if there is no space and consequently no bodies in it, there must be a reference to some reality which is mistaken for space and bodies. In the long run we always immediately think some reality which is indispensably required to supply the basis of truth and error. Further, the reference is in general not merely to the real universe as a whole, but to some special portion or aspect of it, which, if it is not determined in the way we believe, must be determined in some alternative way.

If this position is correct, the condition of erroneous judgments and of such true judgments as are by their intrinsic nature abstractly capable of being erroneous is as follows: Some real being as such is directly an object of consciousness; this real being is capable of alternative determinations; and one of these is fixed on by the mind in the act of judging as an alternative which is fulfilled* or, in the case of negative judgments, which is not fulfilled. It seems to follow that if in the act of judgment the mind has any objects which have being merely for thought, these must be what are called alternative possibilities. On the other, if alternative possibilities are not "creatures of the understanding," but belong to the constitution of reality, then we may assume that whatever is thought has some kind of being distinct from its being thought of, or at least that this holds for all objects in the act of judging.

To consider an alternative merely as one alternative among others, is vitally different from believing in it. But wherein does the difference consist? Does it consist in any difference

* I say "fulfilled" rather than realised or "actualised," because real being is here contrasted, not with possibility, but with mere being for thought; and because "actuality" naturally suggests only particular existence. In the sense in which we may say that *two-and-two-being-four* is an actual fact, the term "actualised" may throughout be substituted for "fulfilled" where I use this last word in the text.

in the object presented to consciousness? Or to be more precise, is there any other difference in the object besides its being, in the one case, something merely supposed, and in the other, something asserted? I cannot find that there is. It will not do to say that in mere supposition we only think of an alternative, whereas in belief we think of it as fulfilled. For we cannot think of an alternative at all without thinking of its being fulfilled. A possibility and its fulfilment are so related that the thought of the first involves the thought of the second. The possibility of an alternative is the possibility of its being the realised alternative. Nor will it do to say that in belief or judgment we not only think of a possibility being fulfilled, but actually have present to consciousness the fulfilled possibility itself. I do not doubt that this sometimes is so. But where it is so the judgment is necessarily true, and its object necessarily real. Hence the case in which the fulfilled possibility is itself an object of consciousness lies outside our present inquiry. For we are here concerned only with erroneous judgments, and with such true judgments as are not beyond the reach of possible doubt. But for these it seems to hold good generally, that if we consider only what is directly asserted as distinguished from the grounds or conditions which induce belief in it, this is, both in the case of truth and error, the fulfilment of a possible alternative, and not the fulfilled alternative itself; and the same holds also for mere supposals as contrasted with judgment. This being so, we find ourselves confronted by two questions: (1) What sort of being belongs to a possible alternative? (2) Why does belief in a possible alternative's being fulfilled, in distinction from the mere supposal of its being fulfilled, involve directly the antithesis of truth and error? As regards the first problem, it may appear obvious that alternative possibilities have being only for thought, and not in the real world. "How in the world," says Mr. Bradley, "can a fact exist as that strange ambiguity *b* or *c*? We shall hardly find the flesh and blood alternative

which answers to our 'or.' This would be unanswerable if there were no kind of real being except particular existence. But the prejudice in favour of actuality, as Meinong calls it, is unjustifiable. Other modes of being, besides particular existence, are essentially involved in the constitution of the universe. The fact that *c*, for instance, that a particular event, is not itself a particular existent. Particular existents, again in endlessly diverse ways, are related to each other as sharing in a common nature, and so belonging to classes, sorts, or kinds. But neither a class, nor the peculiar unity of the members of a class which we call their sharing in or being instances of a common nature, is itself a particular existent. Are we to say, then, that really nothing can, in any respect, share a common nature with anything else, and that there are really no sorts or kinds or classes? We might as well attempt to suppose that there are only universals and no particular existents. In both cases, equally, there is no universe left. This bears immediately on our present problem. For if generalities belong to the real constitution of the universe it follows that alternative possibilities must also belong to the real constitution of the universe. For it is inherent in the very nature of what is general to admit of alternative specifications. On the other hand, there are no alternative possibilities which are not essentially relative to some generality as their basis. To quote Mr. Bradley, "'Man, woman, or child,' have a common basis in human being. 'In England or America,' 'alive or dead,' commit us to the statement 'somewhere not elsewhere,' and 'organised being.' And so, if we call a man 'bad or good,' we say at least he is a moral agent." In a disjunctive judgment what is asserted is that a certain general condition, or group of conditions, admits of certain alternative determinations and of no others. The view that what it asserts is ignorance on the part of the person who makes the judgment seems quite untenable. For the only ignorance which it can be supposed to express is ignorance as to which of a group of alternatives is realised. But this pre-

supposes the assertion that there *are* these alternatives. We must affirm "either A or B or C," before we can affirm that we don't know which. Further, in purely classificatory disjunctives, there is no suggestion or implication of ignorance at all. There is nothing of the kind, when we assert that "any triangle is either equal-sided or unequal-sided." What is asserted is that these are all the alternatives which the general nature of triangles admits of. The statement that "*this* triangle is either equal-sided or unequal-sided" does indeed naturally suggest ignorance as to which it is. But even here the ignorance presupposes the further judgment that, inasmuch as it is a member of the class triangles, it is one or the other. And when we know which it is the disjunctive proposition is not thereby falsified. In coming to know which alternative is fulfilled in the special case, we do not cease to know that the fulfilled alternative is one of two, which any instance of triangularity, as such, admits of. Otherwise, the categorical conclusion of a disjunctive syllogism would contradict the disjunctive premiss. In "A is either B or C, it is not B; therefore it is C," the conclusion "A is C," would be incompatible with the premiss "A is either B or C."

Another consequence of this position is the relativity of various series of alternative to correspondingly distinct general conditions, or groups of conditions. Just as A may be greater than B, although it is less than C, so something may be possible in relation to one generality, and impossible in relation to another. It is geometrically possible for a man to live and walk erect who is half a mile high, retaining in other respects the ordinary proportions of a human being. But it is not mechanically possible; the alternative which general geometrical conditions admit of, is other than any of the alternatives which general mechanical conditions admit of. This relativity of possible alternatives to variable generalities seems to supply a key to the difficult problem how impossibilities, as such, can be objects of consciousness. It would seem that an impossibility can be thought of only because, from another point of view, it is

a possibility. We may take, as a crucial case, the formulation of the law of contradiction. In one sense, we cannot apprehend the union of two contradictory propositions in a single proposition; for it is in the act of failing to do this that we become aware of the law of contradiction as self-evident. On the other hand, if we could not think of the union of contradictory propositions at all, we could never recognise it as an impossibility. The solution of the difficulty seems to be this: The general character of the propositions, considered merely as propositions, leaves open the alternative possibility of their being combined or not combined. Hence, from this point of view, we can think of their union as a possible alternative. It is only when we go on to develop our thought in the attempt to bring before the mind the special form which this alternative would assume under the special conditions, that we find our path barred. We can think of the two propositions being united in a single proposition. But when we ask what proposition would fulfil the special conditions, we find, not a thought, but a blank failure to think. It is in and through this mental act that we recognise that there is no such proposition but only an absurdity.

In distinguishing various modes of being, I by no means wish to suggest that any of them can be isolated from the others. On the contrary, they are inconceivable except in correlation with each other. Their being is being within the one system of universal reality. To assert that anything in any sense *is*, implies that it is an integral part or aspect of this system. There is no possibility apart from generality, and, in the end, there is no generality apart from particular existence. On the other hand, there is no particular existence which is not a particular case or instance; none, therefore, which is unrelated to other particular cases or instances in that unique and ultimate way which we name participation in a common nature. And there is no common nature which does not, as such, admit of the alternative specification which we call possibilities.

On the basis of the preceding analysis, I have to show that neither erroneous judgments, nor right judgments which are capable of being wrong, nor mere supposals, whether fictitious or not, involve the presence to consciousness of any object which has being merely to thought, and does not in any way enter into the "transcendent" constitution of reality. The case of error is of course of central importance. What then is necessary and sufficient to constitute mistake? First, some reality must be present to thought, and this reality must have and be thought as having a general nature capable of various alternative determinations. In the thought of this reality, and the belief in it, there is no error; neither is there error in the belief that some one at least of all its possible alternative determinations is fulfilled, provided no decision is made as to which this is. Nor, again, is there any error in merely thinking of some special alternative as such,* which, of course, includes the thought of this alternative being fulfilled, in as much as includes the thought of its being possibly identical with the fulfilled alternative. Error, or the risk of error, first arises when the mind not only thinks of a possibility being fulfilled, but also *believes* in its being fulfilled. But this does not involve any new object of thought; it only involves a new mental act in relation to the same object. When we believe in a possibility being fulfilled, our belief is false when the alternative asserted is other than any fulfilled alternative. The belief is true when the alternative asserted is coincident with a fulfilled alternative. Further explanation of this requires an examination of the mental act which we call believing, when its object is merely a possibility's being fulfilled. The object is not then the fulfilled possibility itself. What is thought of is some reality as being determined in a certain way among other possible ways, but the determinate

* This holds also in the case of a limited group of alternatives, as will be readily seen. For the sake of simplicity I have omitted to deal specially with error in disjunctive judgments.

reality itself is not apprehended in its determinateness. There is a difference, for instance, between thinking of a sound being heard and actually hearing a sound, or between thinking of a toothache as about to be continued and being directly aware through experience of its continuation. Now the vital point is this. The mental attitude of believing in a possibility being fulfilled, so far as it differs from that of disbelieving, doubting, or mere supposing, is, both in itself and in its influence on the further course of thought and conduct, similar to what it would be if we did not merely think of an alternative being fulfilled, but of the fulfilled alternative itself. Hence, when an alternative before the mind is other than a fulfilled alternative, the belief is in disagreement with reality. It does not agree with the reality to which the mind itself refers as its standard in the act of believing, as what requires to be specified in some determinate way. In other words, the belief is false.

It lies beyond my present purpose to discuss the conditions, logical or merely psychological, which determine beliefs whether false or true. I shall therefore only make some general remarks on this point, bearing especially on the distinction between judgments and mere supposals or "Annahmen." The distinctive character of the judgment asserting the fulfilment of one among alternative possibilities is that the alternative asserted more or less completely and persistently preoccupies attention to the disregard of other alternatives, as if there were no others. Hence it influences thought and conduct as if it were the only alternative. One important case is where what is really only one alternative among others, is from the outset presented to consciousness by itself, without any suggestion that there are others. Then the thought of the alternative at once coincides with belief in its fulfilment. Thus, to borrow an illustration from Spinoza, the thought of the actual present existence of a winged horse is also a belief in its actual present existence when nothing is suggested to the mind which excludes its actual present existence. As

Spinoza notices, this is a common condition of belief when we are dreaming. A vivid dream picture suggests the actual presence of a winged horse, and since, owing to the peculiar condition of the dream-state, there is no counter suggestion, the dreamer believes in the actual presence of a horse with wings. The absurd beliefs suggested to subjects in the hypnotic trance are similarly conditioned. For the most part, however, the mind initially apprehends an alternative as one among others, and the alternative is believed in because of conditions, logical or merely psychological, which give it a predominance such that it is treated as if it were the sole alternative present to consciousness with correspondingly predominant influence in determining the subsequent development of thought and conduct. When this does not take place immediately there is a shorter or longer interval of doubt or interrogation in which alternative possibilities are contemplated, and the question is raised as to which is realised; but none of them is decidedly and persistently fixed on. This interrogative attitude is that of doubt. It agrees with that of mere supposal, inasmuch as an alternative is contemplated merely as such, without being treated as if it were a fulfilled alternative. But mere supposal is further characterised by the absence of the mental act of questioning. There is in mere supposal, as distinguished from doubt, no attempt to decide which alternative is to be taken as realised. This account seems to me to cover all the cases which Meinong, in his epoch-making discussion of this subject, brings under the general head of "Annahmen."

To support this position adequately, it would be necessary to deal in detail with all the various kinds of Annahmen. Perhaps, however, it will suffice for our present purpose to select as a crucial instance, the play of fancy or imagination. Consider, for example, a fictitious narrative such as Thackeray's *Vanity Fair*. Both the author and reader of this book start with the implicit presupposition of certain general conditions

of human life at a certain time and in a certain locality and among certain classes of society. These general conditions in their generality admit of an indefinite multitude of alternative developments in detail. In the fictitious narrative, the mind follows out one of these. The process of invention is at bottom a process of discovery, the discovery of a special development of which the general conditions are capable. And in so far as the mental attitude is purely one of supposal,* the special development is regarded merely as being one alternative, without any question of its being realised. So soon as this question is raised, there is either doubt or positive or negative judgment.

In conclusion, I may refer to the obvious analogy between supposal and merely feeling an inclination towards a certain line of action, between doubting and practical deliberation, and between judgment and voluntary decision. The parallel may be suggestive to the pragmatist.

There may still appear to be one difficulty remaining in the way of the view that no object has being merely for thought. How, it may be asked, do I explain negative judgments? Can the word "not" stand for anything but a creature of the understanding which has no place in the universe of real being? The problem is a very old one, and I can only repeat an old solution. Plato in the *Sophist* proposes the question, How can non-being be? and answers it in a way which I find essentially satisfactory. Non-being is otherness, and the word "not" means "other than." "Red is not blue," or "Chalk is not cheese," mean the same as "Red is other than blue," or "Chalk is other than cheese." "Birds do not suckle their young," means "Whatever attribute a bird may have is other than that of suckling its young," or "Every bird is other than any animal which suckles its young." "Perfect circles do not exist" means "Perfect circles are other than any figure belonging to

* Perhaps it never is completely so.

a physical thing actually existing," or "Straight lines cutting a circle in more than two points do not exist," means that such lines are other than anything which has being as a geometrical possibility. There is no example which cannot be similarly treated. But if non-being is otherness, it certainly belongs to the constitution of the real universe. It would be a queer universe in which nothing was really other than anything else.

Note on the Views of Mr. BRADLEY and Mr. RUSSELL.

I feel that the foregoing discussion needs to be supplemented by some reference to the relevant views of Mr. F. H. Bradley and of Mr. Bertrand Russell. As regards the question at issue, my divergence from Mr. Bradley is most pronounced and emphatic. My position, that whatever is thought, in so far as it is thought, is therefore real. His position is, that whatever is thought, in so far as it is thought, is therefore unreal. The ground of this point-blank opposition seems to lie in the different view which we take of the distinction and connexion of thought and feeling. For me, thought and feeling, though necessarily united in the inseparable unity of knowledge, are radically disparate in their nature, so that if once we suppose them separate, they could never have anything to do with each other. Mr. Bradley, on the contrary, treats thought as being feeling transformed in a certain way. More precisely, he regards thought as "mutilated" feeling. The mutilation ultimately consists in the divorce of the nature or "content" of feeling from its existence. Further, the whole development of thinking consciousness resolves itself into an endeavour to reconstitute the unity which it has destroyed. But, as its own being is constituted by the severance of the terms which it attempts to bring together, its success would be suicide. It follows inevitably from this theory that thought must, as such, be unreal. For, thought being feeling transformed, what is thought can only be real in so far as it is felt. Now, the only reality which can belong to feeling, as such, is actual existence

such as belongs to a toothache in actually being felt. But the mutilation of feeling which yields the object of thought as such, deprives that object of all claim to this sort of reality. Neither the "that" severed from the "what," nor the "what" severed from the "that," can actually exist as a particular toothache exists in being felt. Hence the object of thought must be unreal just because it is an object of thought.

My divergence from Bradley is thus a divergence in the ultimate presupposition with which we approach the problem of truth and error. My disagreement with Russell, on the other hand, is, comparatively speaking, one of detail. The following fundamental propositions are accepted by both of us:—(1) Whatever is really before the mind as an object of thought (whether or not it is also existentially present as an immediate experience) really is and is not *merely* thought of. (2) Hence truth cannot always be merely constituted by the reality of what is thus before the mind in the act of judging; for, if this were so, there could never be any error. (3) In some cases, at least, the truth of a judgment may consist wholly or partially in the being of what is before the mind and *pro tanto* the judgment is incapable of being false. (4) Where a judgment is capable of being false, its truth or falsehood is essentially conditioned by the presence or absence of a certain relation between what is before the mind in judging and what is not.

It is when we have to assign the nature of this relation between what is before the mind and what is not that our divergence begins. My position is that what is before the mind in possibly erroneous judgment is a possible alternative, and that what is required to make the judgment true is the identity of this with the actualised alternative. This is so because judging involves believing, and because the mental attitude in believing, so far as it differs from disbelieving or merely supposing, is identical whether what is before the mind is only a possible alternative or its actual fulfilment. Hence,

if the alternative believed in is other than the actualised alternative, the belief "disagrees with reality"—in other words, it is false.

Mr. Russell's explanation proceeds on a quite different track. It is based on a distinction between dual and multiple relations. In a dual relation one term A is related to one other term B. In a multiple relation one term A is related not to a single term but to a plurality as such. If the other terms are B, C, D, we must not suppose that these are united with each other in a single complex, and that it is this single complex to which it is related. For this would yield only a dual relation. Nor is it enough that A should be separately related to B and also separately related to C, and again to D; for this would be not a multiple relation, but three distinct dual relations. What is required is that A should be related at once to all three in their multiplicity. Mr. Russell gives as an example, A loves B in June. Here A is related as a lover to all three terms B and June and in. But he is not so related to each of them severally. For he is not said to love June or the temporal relation expressed by the preposition, in. Nor is he related as a lover to a single whole containing B and in and June as constituents. For there is no such whole in any relevant sense. The existence of B in June may indeed be a single complex. But it is not the existence of B in June which A is said to love when he is said to love B in June. B, and in, and June do indeed enter into a single complex, but only on condition that this complex shall also include A and the relation of loving.

Now I see no reason for calling in question the validity of this distinction between dual and multiple relations. But I have the greatest difficulty in following Mr. Russell's attempt to apply it so as to explain the distinction between true and false judgments. His position may be stated as follows:—Judging is always a relation of the judging mind to what it asserts or believes. But in mere judgment, apart from actual

perception, what is believed is nothing single. It is always plurality as such, and the mind's relation to this plurality is a multiple and not a dual relation. Thus if what is believed is "that A loves B," "that A loves B" is not by itself a unity constituting a single object of belief. A and loving and B are three distinct items not connected in a complex whole. There is only one complex whole, that which includes, besides A and loving and B, the mind and the multiple relation of believing. Now follows the explanation of the difference between a true and a false belief. What is believed must contain at least one item which is itself a relation. In the judgment as such this relation does not really relate the other items so as to form a single complex. But it may be that in reality apart from the process of judging there is an actual complex in which the relation does relate the other items. When this is so the belief is true; otherwise it is false. If what is affirmed is that A loves B, the relation of loving does not really relate A and B within the judgment. But if A actually does love B, there is a complex apart from the mind in which the relation of loving really does relate A and B. This makes the judgment true.

Passing to criticism, we have to deal first with the theory of the nature of judgment and then with the application to the problem of error. As regards the first question, it may be argued from Mr. Russell's own account of the matter that the manifold items to which the mind is related in judging do have a unity of their own and are apprehended as having a unity of their own distinct from that of the whole complex formed by the judging mind and its object. What seems to me decisive of this point is the requirement not only that that one of the items should be itself a relation but that it should have a "sense" or direction with reference to the other terms. The belief that A loves B is different from the belief that B loves A; and the difference, as Mr. Russell himself expressly recognises, can only be accounted for by saying that in the first case the relation of loving is appre-

hended as proceeding from A to B and in the second as proceeding from B to A. This seems fatal to the view that nothing single is before the mind in judgment except the complex formed by the judging mind itself and the manifold of objects to which it is related. In his published work Mr. Russell does not notice this difficulty. But in a recent correspondence which I have had with him,* he writes as follows:—"As regards the sense of the relation r in judging $A\ r\ B$, you make a point which had already occurred to me. But it is met by a slight re-wording of the account of sense in judgment, and this re-wording is in any case necessary to my theory. There must never, so I now perceive, be any relation having sense in a complex except the relating relation of that complex; hence, in the act of judging $A\ r\ B$, the sense must be confined to judging, and must not appear in the r . But judging being a multiple relation, its sense is not merely twofold like that of a dual relation, and the judging alone may arrange the terms in the order Mind, A , r , B , as opposed to Mind, B , r , A . This has the same effect as if r had a sense in the judgment, and gives all that one wants without being obnoxious to your objections." Now this explanation appears to me to be infected by an ambiguity. Clearly what Mr. Russell means to mean is that the manifold which is the object of judgment has no unity of its own at all, and that the only unity is the complex which includes together with this manifold the judging mind. But he seems to me to slip unconsciously into an essentially different position; the position that though the manifold of objects has a unity of its own, yet this unity is in some way derivative from their relation to the judging mind. In the first half of the quoted passage he expressly asserts the first view; in the other half he seems to lapse into the second view. In order to be thorough, let us consider the two alternatives separately. On the first, we do not really apprehend the relation of loving as proceeding from A to B rather than from B to A. What we apprehend is,

I presume, the relation of judging as passing from A to loving and from loving to B, rather than from B to loving and from loving to A. But this is plainly not what we mean when we assert that A loves B. If it were, we could not fix attention on A as loving B without *eo ipso* and *pro tanto* fixing attention on our own minds and on the act of judging or believing. Thus judgment could only assume the form "I believe that A loves B," never the form "A loves B." Further, if we are to avoid a vicious regress, even in this form the judgment would never be mere judgment, but would also include a perception of the mind as believing. The second alternative is suggested by Mr. Russell's statement that "the judging alone may arrange the terms in the order Mind, A, r, B," and that this has the same effect as if r had a sense in the judgment. Such language is naturally interpreted as meaning that the "judging alone," in constituting the total complex, Mind, A, r, B, constitutes within it subordinate unity A, r, B, in which r has a sense with reference to A and B. Further, though Mr. Russell does not really intend to put forward this position as his own, yet a confusion between the two views tends to invest his own position with a plausibility which it would not otherwise possess. The doctrine itself will not bear examination for a moment from Russell's point of view. If A r B is really thought of as a unity, and r is really apprehended as having a sense, then according to the postulate with which the whole discussion starts, r must, in fact, have this sense and A r B must, in fact, be a unity. Thus the judgment cannot be false; for it produces the condition of its own truth. This is its "effect."

Mr. Russell's application of his own theory of judgment as strictly interpreted to explain the distinction between truth and error also seems to point to a result which is incompatible with his fundamental principles. We must not forget that according to him the A and r and B which are present to the mind in judging are the real A and r and B as they exist and not "ideas" or representations or even mere possibilities. If I

think of A as loving B, A and loving and B must actually exist, and it is their actual existence which I apprehend. But as apprehended they are a mere manifold without unity; they only form part of the total complex including also the mind and the act of judging. How then can they form a unity apart from the mind, as they must do if the judgment is to be new? How can they do so except through some unifying condition?

Now, this unifying condition cannot be their own reality, for, as apprehended, they are already real. What, then, is it? The only obvious answer that it must be another mind. But even this would not make them into a unity; it would only supply what is required to complete a complex within which they would fall as partial constituents. It looks as if Mr. Russell, the uncompromising realist, was here unconsciously moving in the direction of a very thorough-going idealism. This is, of course, meant only as an *argumentum ad hominem*. I do not myself regard the idealistic tendency of a theory as a *reductio ad absurdum*. But, so far as Mr. Russell is concerned, it certainly seems to me that, from his present position, the hard and unsympathetic treatment which he has given to the idealistic doctrines of Leibniz ought no longer to be possible.*

* A word of explanation may be needed as regards my reference to Mr. Bradley. What I have said is not meant to be a statement of the essentials of his system. So regarded, it would be grossly unfair. The points I am concerned with are (1) that for him the object of thought must be unreal, as falling short of that immediate unity of content and existence which is found in feeling, and (2) that what for him distinguishes thought from feeling is this severance of content and existence.