the end striven for is consistently maintained. The thought that the psychological value of an end depends upon the closeness of the relation felt between the ego and the end, a relation involving a significant social reference, is a very important one. The discussion might have gained somewhat had the difference between volition, as an objective phenomenon, and willing or self-determination been introduced.

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ETHICS AND RELIGION.

La Morale ancienne et la Morale moderne. V. BROCHARD.

Revue Philosophique, January, 1901, pp. 1-12.

M. Brochard's thesis is that noteworthy differences of conception in historical systems may well help us in properly grasping and attacking difficult problems. As instances of such differences he points out that the Greeks and Romans conceived of God as limited and as pure or passive intelligence, while modern philosophers conceive of him as infinite and as omnipotent will; that, while the ancients thought of matter as different from body, the latter requiring form as well as matter for its full specification, in modern thought matter is identified with body; and again that, while matter is the vague, the indefinite, the unspecified to the Greeks and Romans, to us matter is, if not identical with extension, as Descartes taught, at least, essentially extended and figured.

But the chief differences M. Brochard points out and discusses are those distinguishing the moral conceptions of the ancients from our own. Ancient philosophers had no conceptions of, they even had no words for, duty, moral imperative, conscience, sin, responsibility, or moral liberty, which find so important a place in our moral systems, often lying at their foundation, and though the conception of immortality was familiar to them, it had for them no ethical import.

To be sure duty, and the moral conceptions allied to it, were present in the religious thought of the Greeks and Romans, and even of earlier peoples. But they remained religious conceptions, and no account was taken of them by ethical philosophers. As a religious phenomenon morality was essentially a matter of duty, as an ethical phenomenon it was essentially a matter of conduct profitable to the individual. To us, on the other hand, both the problem of duty and the problem of self-interest are ethical problems.

On this basis, M. Brochard makes the suggestion, very tentatively, that the ancients may have been nearer right than we. He would not

be surprised if the confusion in our ethics, and the failure to establish the science on a positive foundation, were due to the futile attempt to combine two inconsistent points of view.

In support of his position he might have cited the difficulty experienced by Butler, by Sidgwick and Utilitarians generally, and even by Kant, in reconciling duty and self-interest.

But in criticism of his suggestion it should be urged that obligation and the rest are facts, and basal facts, of the moral life, that their relation to religion is quite as much one of support as one of derivation, and that they are products and constituents of the social consciousness as a whole, which includes the religious consciousness, but includes much more besides.

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Les principes de la morale; La loi morale. CH. DUNAN.
Revue Philosophique, June, 1901, pp. 594-624.

This is one of a series of three articles in the *Revue* under the same caption, dealing respectively with the highest good, conscience and the moral law. The three are, moreover, extracts from the author's forthcoming book, 'La Morale,' which is to form the third part of his 'Essais de Philosophie générale,' the two earlier parts of which dealt respectively with psychology, empirical and rational, and with metaphysics.

Naturally, conceptions and points of view whose elucidation must be sought elsewhere, appear in this article. But, on the other hand, the author's views have a cosmic sweep that is satisfying, they are articulated into a unitary whole under a watchful eye, and their exposition gives opportunity for the exercise of the high order of keenness and dialectical skill which readers of M. Dunan's earlier writings have come to expect of him. To be sure, his treatment is somewhat abstract, and his dialectics at times border close upon, if they do not verge into sophistry, but the general soundness of his conclusions and the free use of the facts of biology and of the history of ethical theory remove all grounds of serious quarrel. M. Dunan's ethical system seems to be a synthesis of Kant, Spencer and the Stoics unified by his metaphysic.

In the first article morality is said to consist, as the Stoic formula runs, in 'life in accord with oneself and with universal nature,' and that, too, is declared to constitute the *summum bonum* for each man. In the second article the author argues that, just as what he calls the vital instinct sees to the preservation of life in sub-human beings, so