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ON ODYSSEY XXIV. 336 *sqq.*

IN the current number of the *Journal of Philology* there is an article (*Emendationes Homericæ*) which, beside other interesting and ingenious suggestions, contains an attempt to prove that the text of the *Odyssey* has been tampered with in the following passage (Bk. xxiv. 336-344).

εἰ δ' ἄγε τοι καὶ δένδρε' εὐκτιμένην κατ' ἄλω^ν
εἶπω, ἃ μοί ποτ' ἔδωκας, ἐγὼ δ' ἤτεόν σε ἕκαστα
παιδνὸς ἑὼν, κατὰ κῆπον ἐπισπόμενος· διὰ δ'
αὐτῶν
ἱκνεύμεσθα, σὺ δ' ὠνόμασας καὶ ἔειπες ἕκαστα
ὄγχνας μοι δῶκας τρισκαίδεκα καὶ δέκα μηλέας,
συκέας τεσσαράκοντ'. ὄρχους δέ μοι ὦδ' ὀνό-
μηνas
δώσειν πενήκοντα, διατρύγιος δὲ ἕκαστος
ἤην· ἔνθα δ' ἀνὰ σταφύλαι παντοῖαι ἔασιν,
ὅππότε δὴ Διὸς ὦραι ἐπιβρίσειαν ὑπερβεν.

The principal objection taken to the text is a common sense one, and this is reinforced by another based upon philological grounds. It is urged that it is absurd to represent Laertes as giving the boy all these trees, the whole orchard, in short, and the whole vineyard, as the writer of the *Emendationes Homericæ* thinks. Also that the sense of 'you promised' assigned to ὀνόμηνas by Monro, while necessary with the received text, is without parallel and inadmissible. The key to the original sense is supposed to be in the words

σὺ δ' ὠνόμασας καὶ ἔειπες ἕκαστα,

and it is maintained that in the original text Laertes in answer to the boy's questions tells him the names of the trees, as he points them out, and the number of them.

Accordingly it is suggested that δῶκας in l. 340 must be wrong, and that δείξας or something like it should be read. Similarly a word like δείξας or δειξας is to be substituted for δώσειν in l. 342. Line 337 is thought to have been still further corrupted and ἤτεον (I asked for) substituted for the original ἐρόμην (I asked about).

The case for these very serious changes is put forcibly, and at first reading one inclines to agree. But on second thoughts the new text seems open to graver objections than the old one both from the point of view of common sense and from that of philology.

But before coming to these, there are some preliminary difficulties, so great that

they seem enough to vindicate the text at least against the argument before us.

If the story in the text is so absurd, how can we account for the fact that it should have been deliberately substituted for the rational and straightforward narrative which the original is supposed to have contained?

The objection here really seems to defeat itself, for to assume the alteration made is to allow that the story did not seem absurd to the Greek who was responsible for it; besides that the version of this single rhapsodist or redactor should have displaced the one found everywhere else, implies that it could not have seemed absurd to a Greek audience.

Again the argument from the meaning of ὀνόμηνas also defeats itself. It is a part of the writer's case against the text that in it ὀνόμηνas must be interpreted as 'you promised' for he expressly calls this interpretation 'a concession to the actual requirements of the passage.' But how could a forger who altered δείξας into δῶκας, and went on in consequence to alter ἐρόμην into ἤτεον fail to complete his work by altering ὀνόμηνas, when he had substituted δώσειν after it for δείξας? It cannot be replied that he could not find a word suitable, for he would not on that account have left something which, if the critic is right, is not Greek.

We may now come to the difficulties in the proposed text taken in itself.

In the first place there is one the importance of which is all the more apparent from the fact that the writer avoids it by an inconsistent translation. σὺ δ' ὠνόμασας κ.τ.λ. ὄγχνας μοι δείξας τρισκαίδεκα is rendered 'you told me the names of each. . . you shewed me thirteen pear trees': while ὄρχους δέ μοι ὦδ' ὀνόμηνas δειξας πενήκοντα is rendered 'you shewed me and counted up fifty rows of vines'.

But ὀνόμηνas δειξας applied to the vines should have the same meaning as ὠνόμασας . . . δειξας applied to the other trees. If then ὠνόμασας means 'you named,' in the sense of 'you told me the names of,' as the writer thinks it important to maintain, ὀνόμηνas should have the same meaning and the second passage should be translated 'you named for me and pointed out to me fifty rows of vines.' The difficulty of the expression is obvious. 'To point out and tell the name

of so and so many objects' naturally implies either that the objects have different names, or, if they all have the same name, that the name of each has, for some reason to be given singly.

The difficulty exists in the first statement (*ὀνόμασας κ.τ.λ.*) though it may be obscured by an arrangement of the words, as in the translation offered for the new text, which the second statement does not admit: for it really comes to this 'you named for me and told me each one, and pointed them out to me: to wit, thirteen pear trees, etc.' The names might be given singly, if the child were so young that he had to be told of each of the thirteen pear trees, *e.g.* that it was a pear tree, he not being able to see at once they were of the same sort. But this need not be considered, for, as we shall see, it is part of the view before us that the child must not be supposed so young as that; and in any case such an explanation would not suit for the vines, which are enumerated by the row, implying the child could see the whole row was of the same sort.

If it is contended that

ὄρχους δέ μοι ὦδ' ὀνόμηνas
δείξας πενήτηκοντα,

'you named for me fifty rows of vines and pointed them out to me,' really means, 'you pointed out the vines to me, told me their name, and that there were fifty of them,' one must ask, as in the case of all such interpretations, If the poet meant something which could be said so simply, why did he choose a form of expression which normally means something else? Besides such a drastic alteration as the one we are considering, cannot be convincing unless the sense required for the new text commends itself at once as the obvious and natural meaning of the words.

But suppose the above objection is put aside, there is another to which the critic's method renders him particularly liable. It is but reasonable to suppose that to a boy who could count to fifty, and lived in the open air, the trees in his father's orchard would already be objects of familiar, and (as fruit-trees) interesting experience, and he would not need to be told which was an apple tree and which was a vine. Now it is a part of the writer's contention that the child is not to be supposed too young. 'The boy,' he says, 'is a boy and not a prattling baby ready to ask for the moon or anything else that was handy,' and so he substitutes 'being but a lad' for Butcher and Lang's 'being

but a little child,' as translation of παιδὸς ἐών.

There is therefore here a serious difficulty if we may use for this part of the *Odyssey* the kind of common sense test which the writer applies to it himself.

There is, however, also a philological difficulty in the sense here assigned to *ὀνομάζω*. Perhaps it would be too much to say that it was quite insuperable, but it constitutes a real objection to an alteration of the text which is otherwise involved in difficulties. As we have seen, *ὀνόμασας* and *ὀνόμηνas* are rendered inconsistently, but it is essential to the view before us that *ὀνόμασας* should mean 'you named' in the sense of 'you told me the names of.' Now *ὀνομάζω* and *ὀνομαίνω* have normally two main meanings, (i) to give a thing, or person, a name, *i.e.* impose a name upon it, call it so and so (cp. *Il.* xxiii. 90) or, (ii) to mention by name. Neither of these is the same as 'tell what the name of a thing is.' If it is said that either of the above two meanings might pass into that of giving information about the name of a thing, it may be fairly answered that this requires to be proved. It seems no more natural that *ὀνομάζω* should have this meaning than the word 'name' in ordinary and non-technical speech. The Greek lexicons do not seem to give instances of such usage in any author, nor is there any in Homer, if the concordances are sufficiently complete.

There is one place in the *Odyssey* which at first might seem an exception, because in it *ὀνόμαζε* may be rightly enough translated 'tell me the name of.' But it is really no exception and only an illustration of the ordinary normal use, 'to mention by name.'

Odyssey iv. 496. Proteus says to Menelaus,

ἄρχοι δ' αὖ δύο μούνοι Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτώνων
ἐν νόστῳ ἀπόλοντο· μάχη δέ τε καὶ σὺ παρήσθα.
εἰς δ' ἔτι πονὺς ζωὸς κατερύκεται εὐρέϊ πόντῳ.

ib. 551. Menelaus asks for an explanation of this dark saying:—

τούτους μὲν δὴ οἶδα. σὺ δὲ τρίτον ἄνδρ' ὀνόμαζε,
ὅς τις ἔτι ζωὸς κατερύκεται εὐρέϊ πόντῳ.

Here *ὀνομάζω* does not mean to tell what a person's name is—to inform anyone what is a given person's name. Menelaus knows that already: he knows that the son of Laertes is named Odysseus. It means 'to mention a person by his name'—a name in this case already known to the person addressed, instead of by a description or periphrasis, such as

εἰς δ' ἔτι πονὺς ζωὸς κατερύκεται εὐρέϊ πόντῳ.

The passage may be compared with *Od.* xiv. 145

τὸν μὲν ἐγὼν, ὃ ξεῖνε, καὶ οὐ παρεόντ' ὀνομάζειν αἰδέομαι.

'To tell the name of,' in Homer is, as might be expected εἰπεῖν ὄνομα, or a cognate expression. *Od.* viii. 550 εἴπ' ὄνομα: ix. 16. ὄνομα μυθήσομαι: 355 τὸν οὐνομα εἰπέ: vi. 194. ἐρέω δέ τοι οὐνομα λαῶν.

If then we make ὀνομάζω and ὀνομαίνω mean 'to tell the names of' we have (1) the difficulty described arising out of the combination of this with the number of the trees as it is made in the text; (2) the difficulty that the boy would presumably know the names already; and (3) the difficulty that the proposed usage is in itself doubtful, and requires therefore confirmation which, however, does not seem to be forthcoming.

There is, however, an established sense of ὀνομάζω and ὀνομαίνω which suits the passage perfectly: the sense which the writer himself has given to ὀνόμηναι. The sense of 'mentioning by name' includes, naturally enough, the specification of the items in a list (nominatim recenseo, percenseo, Stephanus), and thus it comes close to the idea of enumeration and Eustathius (cit. Stephanus) renders it by ἀριθμεῖν κατ' ὄνομα. Cf. *Il.* ii. 488 πληθὺν δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ' ὀνομήνω. So *Od.* iv. 240; xi. 328, 517. More especially, it is regularly used for the specification of a number of gifts. It is important, for several reasons, to quote some passages fully: *Il.* ix. 515 εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ δῶρα φέροι, τὰ δ' ὅπισθ' ὀνομάζοι; i.e. 'specified the gifts which were to follow.' *Il.* xviii. 448

τὸν δὲ λίσσοντο γέροντες

Ἀργείων, καὶ πολλὰ περικλυτὰ δῶρ' ὀνόμαζον.

i.e. 'Specified the presents they were prepared to make.'

Il. ix. 121

ἡμῖν δ' ἐν πάντεσσι περικλυτὰ δῶρ' ὀνομήνω
ἔπ' ἀπύρους τρίποδας, δέκα δὲ χρυσοῖο τάλαντα,
αἰθώνας δὲ λέβητας ἐέικοσι, δώδεκα δ' ἵππους...
δῶσω δ' ἑπτὰ γυναῖκας ἀμύμονα ἔργα ἰδυίας...

Other gifts are mentioned by tale in the context, e.g.

ἑπτὰ δέ οἱ δῶσω εἰναίόμενα πτολίεθρα.

These passages shew that this use of ὀνομάζω and ὀνομαίνω is, so to say, 'common form' in the Homeric account of the gifts of heroes.

In the last passage ὀνομαίνω is followed by a specification, or naming, of the various kinds of gift together with the number in each. Now these are exactly the features of the passage before us. It reproduces the 'common form' and gives the enumeration in the style of the passage which recounts the gifts promised to Achilles. It is indeed the kind of imitation of the Homeric model we might expect in this part of the *Odyssey*, which, as scholars agree, is a continuation of the story by a later and inferior poet. ὀνόμασας and ὀνόμηναι then simply mean 'you specified by name.' 'In reply to my childish request you named (i.e. specified) the trees you would give me, to wit, thirteen pear trees, etc. etc. And of vines you named fifty rows to give me.'

The passages quoted from the *Iliad* shew another thing. The writer of the article, as we have seen, objects to Monro's translation of ὀνόμηναι by 'you promised.' 'Elsewhere,' he says, 'ὀνομαίνω never means anything like "I promise."' But in *Il.* ix. 515, xviii. 448, ix. 121, ὀνομάζω and ὀνομαίνω do just mean something very like 'promise,' for they refer to the enumeration of intended gifts. We actually find that τὰ δ' ὅπισθ' ὀνομάζοι in *Il.* ix. 515 has corresponding to it below, in 519, as its equivalent τὰ δ' ὅπισθεν ὑπέσθη.

The difficulty on which the proposed re-modelling of the text is grounded, the exaggerated character of the gift, is no unreal one. But even if nothing could be done to remove it, enough seems to have been said to shew that there are greater common sense difficulties and philological difficulties in the new text than in the old one. Indeed in the latter, or, at least, in the part of it with which we are concerned, there are no philological difficulties whatever. But a suggestion may be made about the exaggeration itself. The key to the understanding of it may be partly in the words παιδνός ἐών and partly in the peculiar character of this part of the *Odyssey*. It is a familiar fact that children delight to be allowed to think they can exercise the same kind of ownership as the grown up, and their childish requests are often humoured, the ownership not being taken very seriously. The present writer remembers that in this way (παιδνός ἐών, though quite able to count) he 'owned' in succession all the dogs belonging to a complaisant neighbour. Perhaps the poet here intended the gift to be in earnest, but still by the words παιδνός ἐών he indicates that the request was a childish one. Whether or not he also intended the gift was

not of a serious kind, it must be admitted that its magnitude remains a difficulty, though we need not suppose, with the advocate of the new text, that there were only ten apple trees in all in the orchard. However is it not quite enough to suppose that the poet, who has given abundant proof of his want of taste elsewhere, was here exaggerating a common incident of child life,¹ to the proportions he imagined proper to the heroic world to which father and child belonged?

Have we not, in short, here a caricature of the royal generosity which the Homeric heroes display to one another, and a parody of such passages as that above quoted from the ninth book of the *Iliad*?

The learned and ingenious writer of '*Emendationes Homericæ*' seems not to

¹ Mr. J. L. Myres informs the present writer that the Greeks in the country and in the islands are remarkable now for the way in which they spoil their children; and he makes the interesting suggestion that perhaps the poet wishes to represent Odysseus as the specially indulged child, which would give point to the reminiscence as a means of recognition.

have allowed for the fact that the passage before us occurs in the 'Continuation' of the *Odyssey* by a later poet. Contrasting this addition with the original, Mr. Monro writes 'But in the "Continuation" no such attempt is made to give the story an air of credibility. The consequence is that the concluding events are unnatural in themselves, and that they caricature the most important part of the poem.'

Finally one must hold it far easier to suppose a fault of exaggeration in the original author of this part of the poem than to believe that a story simple, sufficient for its purpose, and free from all exaggeration (such as would be contained in the emended text) should in the first place have been so perversely altered by some 'reciter or redactor,' and then that this piece of perversity should have prevailed against the intrinsic superiority of the original, and against all other texts, or the tradition of all other rhapsodists.

J. COOK WILSON.

ON *ILIAD* I. 418.

In the *Classical Review*, xi. 243, is a note by Mr. M. L. Earle on *Il.* i. 414 foll. suggesting that in 418 we ought to read *τὼς* instead of *τῶ* on the ground that *τῶ* does not give the required sense. I observe that this suggestion is endorsed by the authority of Dr. Leaf in his note upon the passage (2nd edition).

I confess that I do not find any difficulty in the ordinary reading, nor, as far as I know, do the commentators. No doubt the remark of Mr. Earle that '*therefore* ill-starred did I bring thee forth in the hall' (*τῶ σε κακῇ αἵσῃ τέκον ἐν μεγάροισι*) is 'not what we expect here' is true, but then I fear that he is not giving the correct interpretation of the sentence. The true predicate is not *τέκον* but *κακῇ αἵσῃ* and the sense is 'therefore to an ill lot it was that I

bore thee (as I now know).' In 415 Thetis calls herself *αἰνὰ τεκοῦσα*, next she justifies the use of that phrase in ll. 416, 417, and then repeats the words *αἰνὰ τεκοῦσα* in *τῶ σε κακῇ κ.τ.λ.* There is nothing abnormal in the use of *τῶ*.

There is a passage similar to this in *Il.* v. 204 foll. where Pandarus says he has come to Troy relying upon his bow and arrows, 'but they were not destined to profit me,' for, he says, when I wounded Tydides and Atreides I only 'provoked them rather.' Then he concludes *τῶ ῥα κακῇ αἵσῃ ἀπὸ πασσάλου ἀγκύλα τόξα | ἥματι τῶι ἐλόμην* *δτε κ.τ.λ.* which line virtually repeats 204. Mr. Earle is logically obliged to read *τὼς* here as well as in i. 418.

R. C. SEATON.