MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

I.—THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF PROFESSOR PRINGLE-PATTISON.

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I HAVE long entertained a sincere respect and admiration for the works of Prof. Pringle-Pattison. His "Hegelianism and Personality" has always seemed to me the best expression of the objections which I have felt and endeavoured, in teaching and writing, to urge against the kind of "Hegelianism" which was dominant in Oxford when I was an undergraduate, and when I first began my work as a teacher. That fact makes me the more anxious to offer some reply to the criticisms with which he has honoured me in his new book, *The Idea of God*. Without claiming that there is no difference between us, I cannot but think that the Professor has somewhat exaggerated the extent of the divergence. There is hardly one of the objections which I have been in the habit of urging against the Metaphysic of the late Prof. Green, of Mr. Bradley, or of Prof. Bosanquet which I do not find more or less definitely expressed — and no doubt in many cases much better expressed — in Prof. Pringle-Pattison's new book. Though he would probably not object to be called an "Absolutist" himself, I rejoice that an antagonist has at last arisen to the mode of thinking which Prof. Bosanquet and Mr. Bradley have done so much to propagate, an antagonist who can both appreciate the strength of their position and hold his own on equal terms against them. This makes me the more regret that, while not actually misrepresenting me (a favour which one can rarely acknowledge in philosophical criticism), he should

have, I think, formed, and conveyed to his readers, a somewhat misleading impression of the position which I have endeavoured to defend. While I shall confine myself for the most part to answering the Professor's direct criticisms, I can hardly do this without to some extent dealing with other differences between his point of view and mine. Without of course actually committing myself to all his positions, it may be assumed that I am in agreement with his general attitude except where I express dissent. This statement may perhaps render it easier for readers of the book to appreciate the points on which I differ without my attempting to summarise the large area which is common ground between us.

(1) Prof. Pringle-Pattison has not noticed anything that I have written in defence of the position usually known as "Idealism," but there is probably here some considerable difference between us. His own position in the old controversy between Realism and Idealism is a very balanced one. If compelled to choose a side, he would probably prefer to be called a Realist, or to call himself an Idealist while professing that most of those to whom that appellation is usually applied are guilty of the anathematised heresy of "subjective Idealism," or, as he calls it, "Mentalism". Nevertheless it would be possible to quote passages which seem to me to express the whole truth of Idealism. Such a passage is the following:—

"Externality, *i.e.*, the general system of nature, cannot be really separated from the foci in which it finds expression; to make this separation, as we argued in the first course, is to hypostatise an abstraction. . . And the abstraction may help us to realise, by force of contrast, that a being which exists in any degree *for itself*, as a conscious subject, rounds itself thereby to an individual whole, and acquires in so doing an independence which we should not attribute to a mere object" (p. 285).

Prof. Pringle-Pattison is here speaking, it is true, of "finite centres" of consciousness. But what he says must obviously be true in an eminent degree and *a fortiori* of the relation between matter and the supreme Mind: and in the above statement there is contained, as it seems to me, the whole truth which Idealists have sought to express by such phrases as "The mind makes nature" or "The world exists in and for the Mind of God," or, "God must be thought of as a Mind which creates the objects of its own thought". And here Prof. Pringle-Pattison differentiates himself quite sharply from such "Realists" as Mr. Bertrand Russell or

Dr. Moore, Mr. Prichard or the American authors of "The New Realism". Upon Prof. Pringle-Pattison's view it is clearly impossible that at any time it could have been said with truth, "There is nothing in the world but matter, whatever there is going to be," or, "Matter exists in and by itself". Nevertheless, Prof. Pringle-Pattison does not emphasise this side of the matter as much as he might have done, and at times (as it seems to me) seems, in his anxiety not to make the physical world a mere sham or delusion or purely subjective experience, to be timid in following out the consequences of his own thought. He would probably accuse me of 'Mentalism'. The truth is that the controversy over "the reality of the external world" has, for those who have grasped the fundamental truth expressed in the above quotation, resolved itself into a question of emphasis. In this matter Renan's dictum holds: "truth lies in the nuances". To my mind Prof. Pringle-Pattison emphasises the reality of the object a nuance or two too much, and under-emphasises the impossibility of subject without object. I prefer such a statement of the matter as may be found in Prof. Bosanquet's lecture "Mind and its Object". This will have some importance for the matters in actual controversy between us.

(2) The main difference between Prof. Pringle-Pattison and myself lies in his conception of the relation between "finite centres" of consciousness and the supreme Spirit whom he calls indifferently the Absolute or God. According to him, the Absolute includes all the finite spirits: in my view it is meaningless to speak of one consciousness as "included in" another; if God is conscious at all, and man (or any other animal) is conscious, man cannot be part of God: hence God by Himself is not the Absolute, and if we must talk about the Absolute at all (I should prefer myself to speak simply of "the Universe" or "the Whole") it is not God alone but God and the "finite centres".¹ This involves to Prof. Pattison the awful heresy of a "finite God" (I have never myself used that expression without a good deal of qualification) though he is good enough to acquit me of the still more awful charge of "Pluralism" in virtue of my distinct assertion that "finite spirits" must be supposed to have a beginning. The Professor might be disposed to quarrel with me for thus speaking of "spirits" as if they existed in-

¹ The word 'and' will probably be objected to in some quarters. I need hardly say that I do not regard the relation between God and the centres or between the lesser 'centres,' as one of mere juxta-position. They form a society or (if you please) an 'organism'.

dependently of the physical world. But for the present purpose there is really no difference between us on that point. More strongly than he does, I disbelieve in the existence of an object which exists otherwise than for a subject; and therefore, so long as we avoid any Spinozistic attempt to resolve subject and object into some higher entity which is neither, I have no objection to saying "the material world is not outside God". And when we come to the relation of God to the finite spirits, I believe that the difference is rather one of expression than of substance. Prof. Pringle-Pattison has repudiated the attempt to make the individual a mere "appearance" of the Absolute, and equally so the more moderate expressions of the same fundamental (I can hardly help adding the epithet "brutal") contempt for the individual which pervades the writings of Prof. Bosanquet. He is equally free from the vague confusion between the individual and the "universal Self-consciousness" which he criticises in the writings of T. H. Green. He would, I am sure, refuse to echo Lord Haldane's dictum that the word "mind" should never be used in the plural except by way of metaphor. I could not wish for a better and stronger statement of the reality of the individual than many which are to be found in Prof. Pringle-Pattison's pages. He criticises Prof. Bosanquet's doctrine of the Absolute as "a whole in which all finites blend and are resolved" (p. 281). According to Prof. Bosanquet, he remarks, "the contents or qualities of the different selves are, as it were, shaken up together, and neutralise and supplement one another," and he then proceeds :—

"But, in fact, the whole conception of blending and merging, as applied to finite individuals, depends on the failure to recognise that every real individual must possess a substantial existence in the Aristotelian sense. Both Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, as we saw in the preceding lecture, insist on taking the individual as an adjective, thereby reducing it to a conflux of universals or qualities. But it is a trite observation that no number of abstract universals flocking together can give you the concretely existing individual. To exist means to be the subject of qualities, to have or possess a nature" (p. 282).

And with great insight he points out what is the source of the absurdity in which these eminent thinkers have landed themselves.

"There is a subtle danger in the term content—a suggestion that the individual is simply a very complex group of universals. But if, as we are agreed, the individual is not to be regarded as put together, so to speak, out of the abstract universal, in the shape of so many qualities, and the abstract particular in the shape of a point of existence, neither

can it be regarded as simply an intricately mingled group of universals—a highly complex adjective. So to think of it is to confound the abstractions of knowledge with the concrete texture of reality; it is entirely to overlook the unity and centrality which is the characteristic of concrete existence, and is what we mean by individuation. Such centrality is acknowledged by our authors in the phrase 'finite centres'. But we have seen how 'precarious and superficial' Prof. Bosanquet pronounces such formal distinctness to be. And when the whole stress is laid on content, the content comes to be regarded as somehow detachable from the centres, and capable of being rearranged and finally shaken up into perfect harmony in the Absolute. As Mr. Bradley puts it: 'We found no reason why such feelings, considered in any feature or aspect, should persist self-centred and aloof. It seemed possible, to say the least, that they all might blend with one another, and be merged in the experience of the one Reality. And with that possibility, given on all sides, we arrive at our conclusion. The "this" and "mine" are now absorbed as elements within our Absolute.'"¹

I could quote many other passages to the same effect. The only thing which I should wish to criticise in these statements is that the writer seems disposed to attribute no more individuality to a consciousness than to a mere individual "thing"—an attitude which seems inconsistent with that doctrine of degrees of reality in respect of which he identifies himself with the objects of his criticism. He is, indeed, somewhat chary of using the word "Consciousness" at all, and hardly seems to emphasise the essential uniqueness of every consciousness as strongly as appears to me to be demanded by the whole drift of the preceding argument. Still, he quite clearly holds that the individual has an existence which, no matter how much derived from and dependent upon that of the supreme Spirit (I use this term to avoid at present employing either the term 'Absolute' or the term 'God') is not in any way to be resolved into and treated as a mere phase or aspect of that Spirit's existence. This view of the individuality of 'finite centres' would seem to me to carry with it a similar or rather, if you like, an increased degree of reality or independence for the supreme Spirit. How far does Dr. Pringle-Pattison admit this consequence? It is difficult to suppose that he regards the supreme Spirit as being a mere collection or aggregate or again as a *mere* Universal, having no real existence at all except in the finite centres. Distinctly, though not quite as distinctly as I could wish, he indicates that he does think of God as a consciousness: he seems to imply that the Absolute is a self (p. 271); and quite certainly he has the courage—in the teeth of philosophic prejudice—to speak of God as a Person with less than the usual amount of apology for such abject anthropomorph-

¹ *The Idea of God*, pp. 283-284.

ism. He expressly speaks of God as an "experience," and it is made pretty clear that he does not think of that experience as merely an ideal or *ens rationis* having no real existence except in so far as it is realised in individual minds. He criticises Green for reducing God to the mere form of self-consciousness. Above all his strong assertion of the existence of moral qualities in God implies all that a plain man or a plain Theologian means when he speaks of God as "consciousness" or "mind".¹

If we assume that such is the Professor's meaning, we must ask "in what sense then can such a mind be said to 'include' other minds?" Dr. Pringle-Pattison very emphatically asserts that it does: but he has done nothing to make the idea more intelligible to those to whom such an assertion seems as absurd and self-contradictory as to say, "squareness is red, or roundness is blue". At bottom I believe he is misled by the very tendency which he criticises in others—the tendency to confound "content" of knowledge with the consciousness which has or knows this content. Because the content of knowledge which exists in fragments and confusedly in "finite centres" must be supposed to exist entire and distinct in the "perfect experience," therefore he assumes that the finite centres which have these fragmentary experiences exist in and form part of the Being which has the "perfect experience". No one has pointed out this confusion more clearly than Prof. Pringle-Pattison. And yet that confusion is the real basis of the language which the Professor still goes on using about an 'all-inclusive Deity,' an 'Absolute Mind' which includes the 'finite centres,' a 'Universal' which includes the particulars. In the passages just quoted all that he asserts is an 'identity of content which binds the selves together as members of a Universe'. But he has told us himself that a self or a person is not a mere element of content, a logical combination of universals; and

¹ It is true that there are expressions which I find it hard to reconcile with this interpretation, e.g., the statement that "the divine life is, in short, the concrete fact of this inter-communion" (p. 388). So again, when he speaks of "the fallacious character of any direct argument from the conditions of knowledge to the theorem of an All-Thinker and of the universe as the system of his thought" (p. 190) it seems as if he contemplated the possibility that those parts of the Universe which are not known to any finite thinker are not known to any Mind whatever. So again, "the presence of the Ideal is the reality of God within us" (p. 246). Does this mean that God is *merely* the Ideal in us? In spite of these passages, however, I cannot suppose that Prof. Pringle-Pattison's God is an Absolute which has no existence except in finite centres. So to understand him would be to make absolutely meaningless all that he says about 'the sense of a divine compassion' and a 'divine sympathy'.

that God is a person. There is, therefore, it would seem, a self-conscious Mind which is other than the finite centres. And yet the finite centres form parts of the Whole. He admits the uniqueness of my particular experiences: if they are unique, they must, it would seem, fall outside the supreme Spirit, and yet they fall within the Whole. The supreme Spirit may know what those experiences are, may even, if you like, know them "from the inside," may have similar experiences Himself, but my experience is not His experience, or part of it. If so, this supreme Consciousness is not the Whole, and *in that sense* is finite. I do not care about that word, because its associations are misleading, and because there are many senses in which the supreme Spirit may well be described as infinite. But it seems to me that Prof. Pringle-Pattison is compelled by the logic of his own position to admit that in the strict philosophical sense of the word the supreme consciousness is not infinite. And yet there must undoubtedly be an Infinite—a Whole, outside which there is nothing. The best way of representing this position seems to be not to call God the Absolute, but to say (as I have done) that the Absolute is not God alone but God together with the 'finite centres'.

Prof. Pringle-Pattison commits himself to the, to my mind, unthinkable doctrine of a Mind which includes all minds. And yet after all (so difficult is it to penetrate to the real thought which underlies the words of a philosopher, especially when he is repeating the orthodox phraseology of a school) I very much doubt whether at the bottom of his mind he really does hold the doctrine which I in my doubtless "crude" and "popular" way have tilted against. Here is Prof. Pringle-Pattison's own statement: it is rather characteristic of his method that, while the orthodox statement is embodied in the text, the fatal admission is relegated to a note:—

"In the concluding pages of *Hegelianism and Personality*, I have many times regretted, in view of the interpretations put upon it and the applications made of it, my use in these pages of the term 'impervious' to describe the nature of a self or personality. The exclusiveness of the self, especially in its relations to the divine, was, I have little doubt, too strongly emphasised in my argument. But the obnoxious term has to be understood in the context in which it occurs. The argument was directed against the fusion of real selves in a logical universal or (to put it in a frankly spatial metaphor) the identification of all selves at a single point of being. What I emphasised, as against this attempt, was the uniqueness of each self. I took the self, and I still take it, as the apex of the principle of individuation by which the world exists. Hence the phrase that each self is 'impervious'—not, it may be observed, to all the influences of the universe but 'to other selves'—'impervious in a fashion of which the impenetrability of matter is a faint analogue'. In other

words, to suppose a coincidence or literal identification of several selves, as the doctrine of the Universal Self demands, is even more transparently self-contradictory than that two bodies should occupy the same space. Apart from crudity of expression this still seems to me obvious, and it may be considered to underlie the argument in several of the preceding lectures. But I trust there is now more justice done to the identity of content which binds the selves together as members of one universe.¹

I have asserted nothing but what Prof. Pringle-Pattison here finds "obvious,"² and what, in my view and in Prof. Pringle-Pattison's, is distinctly denied by such writers as Edward Caird, Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet.

Prof. Pringle-Pattison is at times willing to accept the statement that God creates the finite centres (p. 292). He has withdrawn the statement made in an earlier work that selves are 'impervious,' a term for which (like the kindred term 'impenetrable') I have no affection: but at times it would seem as if all that he means by including the created selves in the being of the Creator is that, while "finite beings know one another from the outside, as it were," "there can be no such barrier, we may suppose, between the finite consciousness and the Being in which its existence is rooted. It must remain open and accessible—it must enter into the divine experience in a way for which our mode of knowing hardly furnishes us with an analogy" (p. 293). I have nothing to say against such a statement; but, if, as the Professor admits, we cannot understand such a relation, what right has he to say that the knowledge is not 'external,' and is internal in such a sense that the knower is part of, or wholly included in the known? Why make an assertion admitted to be unintelligible? Does it tell us anything more about the relation of God to man that the biblical statement that God created man (and is, so far, different from man), and created him in His own image, i.e., that there is a certain community of nature between God and man? I have no objection to Green's favourite expression that the finite centres are "reproductions in limited modes of the Universal Self-consciousness"—only I should emphasise the 're' as much as the 'production'.

To some minds—perhaps to Prof. Pringle-Pattison's—there is something shocking in denying infinity to God; because traditional Theology has decreed that God must be

¹ *The Idea of God*, pp. 389-390, note 3.

² Cf. also his criticism on Prof. Bosanquet on page 261. So again on page 264 he declares that "finite centres may 'overlap' indefinitely in content, but *ex vi termini*, they cannot overlap at all in existence; their very *raison d'être* is to be distinct and, in that sense, separate and exclusive focalisations of a common universe. It is not conceivable, of course, that Prof. Bosanquet means to deny such a commonplace."

called infinite: and my critic would perhaps be disposed to invoke "religious experience" as a witness against my position: but he must know very well that neither the ordinary religious person, nor the Theologian uses the term 'infinite' in the sense in which he and other philosophers use it. No religious mind thinks of itself as part of God, except a few, for the most part avowedly unorthodox, mystics. Even they generally think of identification with God as a goal or aim not yet actually achieved, bearing witness to the fact that most individuals are not at present identical with God. And how is this identification to be reconciled with Prof. Pringle-Pattison's own statement that "it takes two to love and to be loved, two to worship and to be worshipped" (p. 289)? Does he suggest that when the worshipper has accomplished the object of his prayers and his strivings, he will love and worship no more? This is surely not the idea of any Christian mystic. In other connexions Prof. Pringle-Pattison shows himself alive to the fact that orthodox Theology has borrowed the language of a Philosophy which does not represent its real convictions. It would be possible to quote plenty of protests from all kinds and schools of orthodox Theology—including ancient Fathers of strongly platonising tendencies—against the idea of such an inclusion in the Deity as Prof. Pringle-Pattison postulates. And it is important to note that the sense in which popular Theology is most attached to the term 'infinite' is one in which the Professor himself denies infinity to God. What the popular mind usually means by 'infinite' is 'infinite in power'. Prof. Pringle-Pattison's God is not only not 'Omnipotent': he is not even potent. But to this I shall return in a moment. The position I have adopted is one which does not deny any degree of dependence upon, or closeness of union with God which anyone likes to assert, so long as 'union' or 'communion' is not understood to mean identity or inclusion. I could adopt almost all that Dr. Pringle-Pattison asserts on this head. I should indeed in one respect go further than he does in denying independence to the individual soul. Though he repudiates 'indeterminism,' he seems to claim for the individual "free-will" or "freedom of choice" in a sense which is practically identical with the popular signification of the term. To God he absolutely denies "freedom of choice": he allows it to man, in a sense which seems to me to deny all that either Theology or common observation tell us about the laws of heredity. I cannot but feel that there are serious ambiguities in what Prof. Pringle-Pattison asserts on this head, but as he has not criticised me on this question,

and as the subject is one which cannot be dealt with briefly, I will say no more on that topic.

It seems then that Prof. Pringle-Pattison does not really believe the doctrine which I repudiate, though he persists in using the traditional language of that doctrine. And here I must confess that in this matter I experience precisely the feeling which he himself acknowledges in reading Prof. Bosanquet—"the hopeless kind of feeling which so often oppresses us in philosophical controversy—a sense of despair at seeing the one party accumulating proofs, and reiterating assertions, of what it has never occurred to the other to deny" (p. 272).

(3) I now pass on to a point on which the difference between us is serious, though not so great as my critic imagines. Prof. Pringle-Pattison absolutely denies efficient causality to God: and he is inclined to ridicule me for suggesting that Hegel's doctrine "without the world, God is not God" presents to me the picture of "God as perpetually annexed by some unintelligible fate to a world quite alien to His own inner nature as to some Siamese twin from whom He would perchance, but cannot part" (p. 387). The reader of Prof. Pringle-Pattison's quotation would not perhaps gather that my remark occurs in a criticism not directly of Hegel (still less of Prof. Ward who adopts the saying) but of Green's conception of the relation between God and the world. Now the gist of this criticism is very much the criticism which the Professor himself has constantly urged against Green. Green reduces God to a purely knowing consciousness. He thinks of God in terms of Mind, but never of Will.¹ In spite of occasional vague references to final causes, his usual way of speaking about the relation between God and the world seems to banish the idea of Purpose altogether from his conception of God, and indeed from the Universe except in so far as the purpose is that of finite selves. Against this attitude Prof. Pringle-Pattison frequently polemises. His vindication of Teleology is indeed the gist of the whole book. He attacks not merely the leaving out of Purpose from our conception of the Universe as a whole, but even the mode of thinking which (as in Prof. Bosanquet),² while nominally admitting it, practically tends to reduce the Universe to a mechanism, or to resolve all causality into 'systematic connexion'. He

¹ This is dogmatically denied by Prof. Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 372. It would be more to the point if he would indicate where Green has recognised that the Absolute is Will.

² Prof. Bosanquet admits purpose within the Whole (e.g., in biological phenomena) though not a purpose of the Whole.

insists strongly that we must include in our conception of Purpose the idea of conation; contends that the idea of conation implies that of satisfaction or value (pp. 334-337), and holds that "in an ultimate account of things, the logical criteria themselves—completeness, harmony, coherence, any terms we like to use—imply, as much as any ethical or æsthetic criterion, the reference to a conscious experience appreciative of value" (p. 337). He quite definitely attributes Will to God or the Absolute. In a criticism upon Spinoza he says:—

"And yet there is a danger in Spinoza's denials; for although the discursive and scheming intellect is rightly denied, intelligence in some larger, directer form—of which we may have hints and anticipations in our own experience—must be affirmed, if we are not to treat that which is highest as lower than ourselves, and to assimilate it to unconscious nature. And with intelligence goes will, not as a meaningless freedom of choice but in the sense of continuously affirming and possessing one's experience, which is the characteristic, or at least the ideal, of the self-conscious individual. So far as Spinoza appears to deny these characteristics to his ultimate Individual, he abandons the principle of interpretation by the highest we know, and in that case, or so far as he does so, necessity, even the necessity of the divine nature, tends to suggest not the inwardly affirmed movement and rhythm of a concrete experience or life, but a kind of abstract destiny imposed on the universe. It is the idea of the divine necessity as a self-affirmed life, and not as a blind force acting within the universe like a fate which it undergoes, that constitutes the differentia between a theistic and a non-theistic doctrine.

"The terms we have just used, however, do not carry us, of themselves, beyond the contemplative felicity of Aristotle's eternal thinker. But if we revise our idea of perfection—if we keep in view the conclusion to which we were led in the two preceding lectures, and definitely abandon the conception of God as a changeless and self-sufficient unit—the movement to the finite and the realisation of the infinite in the finite must be taken as the fundamental character of the divine life. And if so, what term could be devised more fitting to describe the relation of the time-world and its process to the divine totality than to speak of it as 'the eternal purpose' of God? Like every term of our mortal speech, it retains the associations of time. The end appears as a "far-off divine event"—a consummation delayed, and beyond doubt the finite point of view cannot be transferred literally to an Absolute Experience. But so far as the ideas of process and ultimate achievement embody the conception of effort—nay, of *difficulty*—they may be accepted as truer to the great Fact of the universe than the language even of a philosopher like Hegel when he speaks of the Absolute Life as the eternal play of love with itself. In short, if the finite world means anything to God, the ideas of activity and purpose are indispensable. If he is not himself active in the process, he is no more than the Eternal Dreamer, and the whole time-world becomes the illusion which many absolutist systems pronounce it to be."¹

The system here attacked is the system of the Universe which I have criticised. Dr. Pringle-Pattison does not attribute it to Green, but he does attribute it to Prof. Bosanquet.

¹ *The Idea of God*, pp. 339-341.

If it is attributable to Prof. Bosanquet, it might *a fortiori* be ascribed to Green, who does not recognise Teleology even to the extent to which it is recognised by Prof. Bosanquet. That being so, it seems to me that Dr. Pringle-Pattison might very well have adopted my comparison of Green's Universe to the Siamese twins. At all events what he says against Green, against Spinoza and against the Spinozistic tendency in Prof. Bosanquet, expresses just the point which in my doubtless blundering and anthropomorphic way, I intended to make against Green. My words were not directed against the Welt-anschauung expounded by Prof. Pringle-Pattison: for Prof. Pringle-Pattison distinctly recognises that God is Will. And yet after all he denies to Him causality.

How we can have creation, will, activity without causality, it is not given to all of us to apprehend. Prof. Pringle-Pattison will probably say, 'What I deny to God is not causality, but efficient causality'. What sort of causality he does recognise in God, is not so apparent. The drift of his argument might lead us to suppose that he would not object to attribute to God final causality. But after all what do we know of final causality without efficient causality? The only way in which we can understand how an end which is still in the future can cause the means which lead up to that end is by supposing that the end is actually present to the Mind which aims at and wills both the end and the means. And that is what we actually experience in volition. If Prof. Pringle-Pattison is going to be serious with his doctrine that God is to be thought of as Will, that He purposes, that He is active, one would suppose that he must think of the relation between God and the world in the same way. His refusal to do so is the more remarkable inasmuch as he accepts what I believe to be the truth about causality—that the only sort of real causality which we know anything about is the causality of Will.

"Activity, as I am now using the term, is the characteristic of the living and the conscious being alone; any application of the term, or any transference of the associations, to the happenings of physical nature and the causal relations between one phenomenon and another is rightly branded as anthropomorphism. . . . The facts of life and of mind cannot be truly described, in short, except teleologically, that is to say as activity directed towards some end" (p. 357). It is true that he goes on to insist that "the end may be 'in' the creature rather than consciously present to it". Certainly that must be the case in the kinds of activity which we recognise in the lower living creatures. But if this is the way in which he

would propose to think of activity in the Divine Mind, if he is going to make the purposiveness of the Divine Mind unconscious, he is not faithful to the principle which he adopts as the fundamental principle of his Philosophy—the principle that the lower can only be explained by the higher, and that we ought to think of God in the light of the highest kind of existence which is immediately known to us. This is the principle in virtue of which he braves the wrath of the conventional philosopher and describes God as a Person. Must not the principle carry with it the application to God of the same kind of causality that we are conscious of in ourselves?

I find it very difficult to account for what seems to me the fundamental inconsistency in Prof. Pringle-Pattison's thought. Up to a certain point he follows the drift of what seems his own real thought, and seeks to understand the relation of God to the world in the light of our highest human experience. Then at a certain point he suddenly stops short, and falls back upon an attitude which is natural enough to Green, to Mr. Bradley, to Prof. Bosanquet, but which seems open to the criticisms which he has himself used against those thinkers. The only consideration which may perhaps throw some light upon this hiatus in Prof. Pringle-Pattison's Metaphysic is that after all his Idealism was, as we saw, not complete or thoroughgoing. After having stated with admirable clearness the central truth of Idealism—that the idea of an object without a subject involves an impossible abstraction, he still talks about the 'independent existence of the object'. If the Professor had recognised as fully as Green, or Mr. Bradley, or Prof. Bosanquet the impossibility of a thing possessing real existence independently of consciousness, then with his own view of a God who is Will as well as Thinker, he could hardly have failed to take seriously the quite orthodox Hegelian conception of a God who wills the objects of his own thought. But with his hesitating attitude on this subject he apparently recoils from the logical consequence of his own doctrines. He has told us that God is Will; but what He wills, does not appear. Not apparently matter: that would involve a position too much like that of the mere Theologian, if matter is thought of realistically, while to think of matter in the sense of the Idealist—as existing only in and for Mind—would strike the man in the street as extravagant, and, for the Professor, would involve a relapse into 'Mentalism'. So God, it would seem, is relieved of all responsibility for the existence of matter and its laws. And yet apparently He does will something. In one place he

admits that the origin of finite centres "is, perhaps, the only fact to which we can fitly apply the term creation, for they necessarily import into the universe an element of relative independence and separateness which is not involved in the notion of externality as such" (p. 285), and ends by acknowledging the 'essential mystery of the fact'. If Prof. Pringle-Pattison were a "Theologian," he would probably be accused of invoking 'miracle': but in truth it is something more miraculous than miracle that finite centres should appear at a moment of time, and yet not be caused by anything or any mind already in existence. If God does cause these centres to appear, that surely admits that He exercises an "efficient Causality". But it is surely a very dualistic conception to suppose that the appearance of such centres is not due to the same ultimate source as the happenings of the material world. Such a conception would certainly seem to involve just that interference with Nature *ab extra* which Prof. Pringle-Pattison is elsewhere so anxious to repudiate. That objection would still more apply if it were supposed that God does not will the appearance of the souls but does in some way will events in their subsequent history. If God does not will the events of nature nor the first appearance of souls, nor anything in the life of souls, what is there left for Him to will?

No doubt the philosopher who attempts to think of the relation between God and the world after the analogy of the relation of a human willer to the events which he wills, is employing an analogy which he knows to be wholly inadequate. Some might even describe the analogy as a metaphor, or even a 'symbol'. But the same inadequacy is involved in the attempt to think of God after the analogy of the human thinker, and still more so (as nobody has recognised more clearly than he) in Prof. Pringle-Pattison's own attempt to attribute to God, purpose, will, love. I accept all that he says by way of apology for his own anthropomorphism, and submit that my way of thinking of God as willing all the events of the world demands no more apology than his own conception of God as Will or purposeful Love. I should have no objection to accept the formula: "God is cause only in the sense of ground, that is to say, the Being whose nature is expressed in the system as a whole" (p. 302), if only it is made plain that the 'nature' which is expressed is a conscious, rational and righteous Will, and not a 'system' of thought-relations or a Spinozistic Substance. I can quite understand why Absolutists who treat God only as a Thinker do not speak of Him as causing the laws of nature; I can see no reason why Prof. Pringle-Pattison should object to it. If

the 'nature' which the system as a whole expresses be really a Will, surely it is as legitimate to speak of events as caused by that Will as it is to make a similar assertion of acts which express the character of a human being.

(4) There is one particular difficulty in the way of treating God as the efficient cause of the Universe which demands a little further attention. Prof. Pringle-Pattison might urge, and does urge, that efficient causality implies time, and that, unless we are prepared to accept the extremely difficult conception of a creation in time, we cannot think of God as the efficient cause of the successive events which make up the history of the world. One event causes a successive event: but how can we think of a Cause which is not prior to the whole series of events, as causing that series? There cannot be a Cause which is prior to a series which has no beginning. In answer to this difficulty I would make three remarks:—

(a) Prof. Pringle-Pattison himself recognises (as we have seen) that physical causality is no true causality, that is to say, causality is, as I should hold, ultimately the same thing as activity. It is true that he does not say, in so many words, that true causality is activity, but such would seem to be the implication of the passage quoted above. If the successive events in physical nature really do cause one another, that is attributing to them "activity" with all the associations of that word. If the events are not really and ultimately caused by the preceding event, by what or by whom are they caused? If Prof. Pringle-Pattison says "By the system as a whole," then he attributes causality to the whole and that is for him the same thing as attributing it to God—in spite of the difficulty involved in attributing causality to a Being which is not thought of as previous in time to each and all of the events in the series. The truth is that when we think of cause as activity, the element of succession in time no longer becomes vital to it. It is true that, since all our experience is in time, it is difficult to get an actual instance of a cause which is contemporaneous with its effect: for of an event in time some of the conditions must necessarily be previous conditions, but we do commonly think of co-temporaneous conditions as *part of* the cause, even when we are speaking in the ordinary language of physical Science and of common life, and think of physical events as really causing each other. Still more, when we think of willed events, they are not necessarily prior to the effect. In attention it may no doubt be said that the state of my mind at one moment is the cause of the succeeding state being what it is: but all the same we do rightly think of my attention as being

the cause of my understanding a book that I am reading at the very moment that I am understanding it. True, it is not the whole cause: for if I had not been attending the moment before, I should probably not now understand, but equally I should not understand if I were not now attending. I do not say the analogy is completely satisfactory, but it does, I think, help us to appreciate the possibility of a Cause which causes a series which has not a beginning. The truth is that the difficulty really disappears as soon as we give up the notion that one event really causes another event, and recognise that the true Cause is not an event but an Entity which persists through a succession of events. If Prof. Pringle-Pattison will not admit that the Whole or God is the true cause of the physical events, and yet holds that the only true cause is Will, then it would seem that these events must be uncaused, and moreover that there is no such thing as efficient causality in the Universe. At times he seems disposed to accept Prof. Howison's doctrine that God is not the efficient but the final cause of events (p. 318). If so, the difference between us would diminish.¹ But I confess I cannot understand final Causality without efficient Causality. I should prefer to say that the true conception of Causality is one which includes all that we usually mean by efficient Causality and all that we mean by final Causality: and that the one conception is not fully intelligible without the other. When Prof. Pringle-Pattison speaks of "a continuous manifestation of a single Power," he concedes all that I want— if only any real meaning is given to the word Power. Power is just the element that is banished from the Universe by the theories against which he and I protest.

(b) After all I frankly admit that I cannot get over all the difficulties involved in the fact that our experience is in time. The old antinomy remains. We can neither conceive of an endless succession of events—an infinite regress or an infinite progress: nor, on the other hand, can we conceive of a beginning or an end of time. Nobody has illustrated better than Prof. Pringle-Pattison the mistake of the attempt to treat time as merely subjective and illusory after the manner of Mr. Bradley and of most Hegelians. I have little to add to what he has so well said. And yet it seems to me that after all this criticism he disposes of the time difficulty much too easily, and ends by adopting an attitude towards time, which is almost indistinguishable from that of the criticised. After objecting to the term "first" Cause (which I have never used),

¹ Since Prof. Pringle-Pattison does not (like Prof. Howison) regard the finite selves as eternal.

he continues; "God is cause only in the sense of ground, that is to say, the Being whose nature is expressed in the system as a whole. In other words, God is cause only when *causa = ratio*; for the reason or ultimate explanation of anything is only to be found in the whole nature of the system in which it is included" (p. 302). The statement seems to overlook the fact that the 'system' of the world is a system of successive effects. If God really 'explains' the occurrence of each successive event, why may we not call Him the cause of each such event? The word cause—even the word efficient cause—means precisely that which explains an event in time. The attempt to get rid of the word 'cause' is usually due to the desire to avoid admitting any reality in the succession, or to reduce the laws of physical nature to necessities of thought which God knows indeed but which are no more willed by Him than the equality of angles at the basis of an isosceles triangle can be said to be willed by God. Prof. Pringle-Pattison certainly does not exhibit the first of these tendencies; and in view of his Teleology he ought not to yield to the second. In the absence of such a tendency, his desire to get rid of the word cause seems to be an unnecessary concession to philosophical prejudice. The term "ground" would no doubt do as well, but it is more ambiguous. At all events there is no difficulty in the way of the application of the word cause to God arising from the antinomies involved in the nature of Time which is not equally involved in the attribution of Purpose to the Absolute. All that Prof. Pringle-Pattison says by way of meeting this difficulty, I can heartily accept, but he should be more frank in admitting that the difficulty is really insoluble. Prof. Pringle-Pattison sometimes seems to adopt the usual Hegelian assumption that, when once you have admitted that time cannot be predicated of the Absolute, the difficulty is over. However much you reduce temporal succession to something subjective, an appearance, an unreality, the antinomy is still there. You may suppose that the Absolute contemplates the succession as a whole—eternally contemplates it (a notion which after all implies time), still we must ask "What sort of series does he contemplate—an endless series or a series with a beginning and an end?" The difficulty remains: "An endless series of real events is as unthinkable as a series which has a beginning and an end". Prof. Pringle-Pattison attributes much more reality to time than the "Absolutists" whom he criticises: but yet he seems to deal with the antinomy as if he had "transcended" it: practically in the end he accepts the be-

gunningless and endless series. And yet he has to fall back upon the statement that "the time-process must enter somehow into that experience" (p. 363), *i.e.*, the experience of God. I could quite accept this statement; only I should print the "somehow" in capital letters: and I cannot think Prof. Pringle-Pattison's attempts to explain the difficulty any better than those of the philosophers whom he justly accuses of underestimating the reality of time. After all such attempts to transcend time always means at bottom the admission: "The Absolute knows how to solve the problem, but I don't",

Before I conclude, I should like to say a word in more direct reply to the Professor's criticisms upon myself. He quotes the following passage from my *Theory of Good and Evil*: "The Absolute cannot be identified with God, so long as God is thought of as a self-conscious Being. The Absolute must include God and all other consciousnesses, not as isolated and unrelated beings, but as intimately related (in whatever way) to Him and to one another, and as forming with Him a system or Unity. . . . God and the spirits are the Absolute—not God alone. Together they form a Unity, but that Unity is not the unity of self-consciousness" (p. 387);

Prof. Pringle-Pattison continues as follows:—

"It is true, he protests against the idea of a limitation *ab extra*, by a hostile power or an independent matter; the limitation in question is, in the language of the theologians, a self-limitation. But, as Prof. Ward pertinently says, commenting on this phrase, 'self-limitation seems to imply a prior state in which it was absent, whereas a limitation held to be permanent—as we hold creation to be—suggests some ultimate dualism rather than an ultimate unity'. And if we hold, as Prof. Ward says, that 'God is God only as being creative,' the deceptive *prius* disappears, and with it the wholly inappropriate conception of limitation. This was the gist of our argument in Lecture VII. Why should the creation of finite spirits be treated like a pegging out of claims in a hinterland, by each of which the rights and privileges of the original proprietor are proportionately diminished? Surely the older theologians were right in regarding the existence of spirits not as an impoverishment but as an enrichment of the divine life. The divine life is, in short, the concrete fact of this intercommunion."

If I have ever accepted the Theologian's favourite phrase "self-limitation" (and I have certainly not done so lately), I have accepted it by way of concession, and never without explaining that I mean by it not an act of voluntary self-limitation due to the Will of God, when He might, had He pleased, have willed something else, but an act of Will springing (like all God's volitions) from the necessity of His own nature.

God is eternally limited in power just as He is eternally self-conscious, and cannot help being self-conscious. I do not think a beginning of Matter—of the system of physical nature known to us—is *a priori* unthinkable; though if there were such a beginning, we should still have to think of a series of prior events in time of some other kind, even if they were merely successive thoughts or experiences of the Divine Mind. If the Physicists mentioned by Prof. Pringle-Pattison should be right in the theory that a beginning is required by purely physical considerations, I should be prepared to accept it. But I do not postulate such a beginning. So far as we are justified in forming any opinion on a matter about which we have no direct evidence, I should suppose such a beginning to be extremely improbable. I have always explained that Creation may very well be an "eternal creation". This, I need hardly say, is perfectly orthodox Hegelian language. If there is any difficulty in it, the difficulty exists equally for Prof. Pringle-Pattison's view of a purposive God.

I have already tried to show that Prof. Pringle-Pattison's objection to my refusal to think of finite spirits as included in the Being of God (identified by him with the Absolute) seems to me to rest upon a misunderstanding, because my critic himself does not at bottom treat the actual consciousness of the individual as part of the consciousness of God. The statement that God and the finite spirits together make up the Absolute, seems to me the natural way of formulating what he believes as well as myself. Prof. Pringle-Pattison goes on to make the familiar charge that this involves treating God as 'one of the centres,' or treating the universal as one of the particulars. 'To speak of God in this sense as one of the selves is to justify all the criticisms which treat personality as a limitation inapplicable to the sustaining and containing Life of all the worlds.' This reply, it seems to me, shows that the Professor is really hovering between two totally different and inconsistent conceptions of God. If God is what we ordinarily mean by a logical Universal, then, of course, it follows that He has no existence except in the particulars. If what we call His consciousness is only an element in this 'universal,' that means that His consciousness is merely the aggregate or (to avoid the idea of mere juxta-position) the 'system' of the particular selves, and that there is no divine consciousness outside these centres—just as there is no 'humanity' except the humanity which is present in Plato, Socrates, and other individuals. That part of the content of the Universal which is not realised in one or all of the particulars, or in all of them put together, would

not be real at all, and for an Idealist of the Absolutist type there could be no such content. But this is precisely the conception of the Absolute against which the whole of Prof. Pringle-Pattison's polemic is directed. If, on the other hand, he is in earnest with what he says about God being Will, a Person, purposive and righteous, then his criticisms are as applicable to his own position as to mine. I strongly suspect that his distinguished antagonists, Mr. Bradley and Prof. Bosanquet, would endorse this contention. It is a bitter disappointment to me to find that the most formidable criticism which has ever been directed against the School in question should end, if not in capitulating to the enemy, in leaving us with an ambiguous and self-contradictory "idea of God".

I do not think I need say much about Prof. Pringle-Pattison's treatment of the problem of Evil. His criticism upon me is mainly directed against my conception of God as not in the technical sense 'infinite' in the sense that He is not a Whole of which finite spirits are parts. He has nothing to say against my not attributing to Him 'infinite power'. He could not well object to this because when he relieves Him of all responsibility for the laws of nature being what they are, he denies to Him any power at all. From this point of view the difficulty about evil disappears: there is no problem to solve. If God has no more power over the laws of nature than I have, no doubt He is not responsible for evil, and may be perfectly good Himself: but then the doubt arises, "Is He God? except in a sense in which the avowed Dualist may speak of God—a God who is outside of, and possibly antagonistic to, the system of nature?" If the reply is that the laws of nature are parts of the being of God, though not caused by His Will, we must ask "what connexion has this side or aspect of His being with that aspect in respect of which Prof. Pringle-Pattison is content to describe Him as 'eternal Love'?" If he says 'no connexion whatever,' we have an avowed Dualism masked by a merely verbal inclusion of these aspects in the same Being. If he says 'the laws of Nature are such as to make the Universe wholly good, they are expressions of absolute Love,' then the evil must be merely apparent, as is contended by Mr. Bradley and all sound Hegelians. But this is precisely the position against which Prof. Pringle-Pattison's whole book is a protest. If, on the other hand, the laws of nature are such as to realise not, indeed, good without evil, but good on the whole, more good than evil, the greatest good that is really possible, that is practically my position, and that is why these laws

can still form part of the nature of a loving Being. It would be absolutely identical with my position, if he would only be content to say that these laws of nature express the Will as well as the 'Nature' of God. When the Professor formally refuses to say this, he leaves us with the old difficulty in which I have already sufficiently insisted : God, according to Prof. Pringle-Pattison, is Will as well as Thought ; but what does He will if He does not will the laws of nature and all that happens in consequence of them ? If the laws of nature express the 'nature' of God, and Will is part of that nature, then surely God wills them. And if He wills laws which involve so much evil because we could not get the good without them, His Power is finite.

This difficulty reaches its climax when the Professor expresses his sympathy with the Christian (but not technically orthodox) conception of a suffering God. If the sufferings of mankind are not an evil, why should God sympathise or suffer with them ? If He has a will, can He be good, and not will to remove them ? If He wills to remove them, but can only remove them partially and progressively, the power of that Will must be limited : or if His Will cannot do anything at all to remove them (as is sometimes suggested), what becomes of the religious thought of God as the source of moral improvement or salvation ? Indeed, what becomes of religion itself ? At bottom, I feel in reading his book, as a whole, that my view of the Universe is much the same as Prof. Pringle-Pattison's—only, as I venture to think, more candidly and consistently expressed, but from time to time I come across passages which make me doubt whether I am right in attempting to identify Prof. Pringle-Pattison's position with my own. For instance, in the next passage to my last quotation, I read : " The contingency is, in the deepest view, contributory to—or rather an essential condition of—the perfection of the whole " (p. 416). Now on the premisses of Mr. Bradley or Prof. Bosanquet, such a statement would be intelligible enough. If all the value lies in the whole, and individuals don't matter, if perfection is something quite different from moral perfection, if the Absolute is super-moral and the evil in the world is merely apparent, then it is easy to understand that the problem of evil disappears : the misery of the world, to put it coarsely, is good sport for the Absolute, and increases the variety and interest of the world-drama enacted for His (Mr. Bradley would say " its ") entertainment. But if the individuals are important, if they are not mere appearances of the Absolute or elements in the only real 'experience,' how can an Absolute be perfect whose

nature is "expressed in"—if we may not say "causes"—so many miserable and sinful lives? The only answer that seems to me to be open to Prof. Pringle-Pattison would be to say: "The Absolute, being morally perfect, must Himself regret and suffer from all this individual misery, but He cannot produce more good or less evil than He does without a loss of good on the whole". That is substantially my own answer to the problem of evil. Prof. Pringle-Pattison only avoids giving this answer by falling back into precisely the attitude which he criticises in his distinguished opponents.

I can only account for the inconsistency which seems to me to run through Prof. Pringle-Pattison's thought by supposing that, though less bound to Shibboleths than most philosophers, he still feels it necessary to bow the knee before that Shibboleth of the schools which declares that all complimentary epithets are to be showered upon God, even when they obviously contradict one another. He must be infinite (for to be finite seems contemptible), even at the cost of having Cæsar Borgia treated as part of Him. He must be Omnipotent in the popular sense of the word, although the notion that He could remove the world's evil is pronounced ridiculous. He must be pronounced good, although He does not remove the evil when he could do so. He must be Love, although there is nothing for Him to love except parts of Himself.¹ He must be the Absolute, although the Absolute is the opposite of the relative, and love implies relation. It is supposed by Prof. Pringle-Pattison at all events that "we needs must love"—and therefore be related to—"the highest when we see it". Prof. Pringle-Pattison does not really share the mode of thinking which usually styles itself 'Absolutism,' and which no one has attacked more powerfully than he; and yet he must needs use most of its phraseology, lest perchance he should be set down as an Individualist or a Dualist, or a Pluralist, or a 'popular philosopher' or (still deeper degradation) as a "Theologian"—or be called any of the other bad names which Absolutism has invented for the enemies on whom it tramples with a ruthlessness strongly suggestive of the Absolute in which it believes. All that Prof. Pringle-Pattison has to say against my conception of God as a Being of limited Power is: "It seems strange to find Dr. Rashdall saying in a recent essay on 'The Problem of Evil': we see how individual character is tried and strengthened by the struggle with temptation and difficulty, with evil within and

¹ Of course in the view of the Absolutists they are not merely parts but absorbed into a relationless "experience" in a way which Prof. Pringle-Pattison finds unintelligible.

evil without. *But why there should be this conditioning of good by evil we cannot say*" (p. 407). But he has said very much the same thing in other words. "Contingency is written across the face of nature—not in the sense that what happens is not determined by natural law, but in the sense that it appears to be *only* so determined, and cannot, in its detail, be brought within the scope of any rational or beneficent purpose" (p. 415). But is not this saying in effect: "We cannot say why there should be the amount and the kind and the distribution of evil which there actually is"? No doubt his is a more distinguished and philosophical way of saying it; but my way of putting it is more intelligible to the "plain man". Prof. Pringle-Pattison agrees with me in holding that God is a Will whose nature is expressed by the world of matter and finite spirits; but imperfectly expressed, since this world contains evil which cannot be explained by a benevolent purpose, and yet the purpose of the Divine Mind is benevolent. What is this but to say that God has power, but that that Power is limited? He is Omnipotent only in the sense given to that word by St. Thomas Aquinas (and you cannot be more orthodox than St. Thomas Aquinas), in the sense that "He has the power of doing all possible things". Prof. Pringle-Pattison quotes and approves that very definition: so far there is no difference between us. What I find difficult to understand is whether Prof. Pattison's God can properly be said to "do" anything at all, and if so, what it is that He does. But however, this question is answered, God is not, according to him, Omnipotent in the only sense in which I have denied His Omnipotence.