the attention of neurologists. The book is not only marked by the many personal observations of the writer but by admirably conservative recommendations in regard to prognosis and treatment.

In the introductory chapter the neurone theory is well discussed in its various relations and the objections to its acceptance are stated. This is followed by an extensive discussion of the injuries of nerves and the various forms of neuritis. This chapter is full and deserves special commendation. The chapter on the regional diagnosis of the diseases of the spinal cord is full and is illustrated by many original diagrams of the various tracts which are worthy of careful study. Progressive muscular atrophy and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis are treated as separate diseases. A separate chapter is devoted to primary lateral sclerosis, though the author recognizes the rarity of this affection as a primary disease.

In the chapter on the diagnosis and localization of cerebral diseases no mention is made of the work of Farrar and others on the histology of the motor cortex nor the recent work of Sherrington and Grünbaum on the motor cortex in the higher apes. In dealing with the question of the localization of the sensory cortical centers while coming to no definite conclusions the author seems to incline to the view of a separate sensory cortex, citing cases which seem to support this theory.

The illustrations are excellent and from the fact that many of them represent actual cases deserve more than passing notice. Many are original and these, especially, show careful selection in the subjects portrayed. Much more might be said would space permit.

The chapter on brain tumors with the exception of a few very minor details (such as the use of the term gliosarcoma) is admirable. Knowing Dr. Starr's extensive study of brain tumors one is disappointed in the fact that he cannot give a more hopeful prognosis.

Syphilis is dealt with in a short chapter in which attention is called to the fact that the symptoms are the same as those resulting from other causes producing the same lesions.

The book is in every way an excellent one and can be recommended to all who desire a knowledge of the present status of the organic diseases of the nervous system.

R. M. V.

Why the Mind has a Body. By C. A. STRONG, Professor of Psychology in Columbia University. (New York: The Macmillan Co.; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1903.)

This interesting title suggests a metaphysical problem of the first importance—that of the general nature of objectivity—but this problem itself is really not touched upon at all in the body of the work. The problem is rather that of the relation between mind and body—how it is possible that there should be any even apparent connection between them at all, and the nature of this connection. The discussion covers the ground of the late Professor Clifford's essays on "Body and Mind," and "On the

Nature of Things-in-Themselves," and the whole book, indeed, may be characterized as an elucidation and amplification of Clifford's theories.

The author carefully insists on that important distinction between philosophical and scientific method which is so often neglected by thinkers of the pluralistic school of idealism, as well as by those of the realistic type. The empirical part is devoted to a discussion of the observed facts of sensation and volition, and of the theories of automatism, parallelism, and interactionism as to the possibility of a causal relation between mind and body, and the nature of the relation in general. The author shows conclusively that the empirical method cannot give sufficient grounds for a settlement of the question, and then proceeds in the metaphysical part to discuss the ultimate nature of mind and matter, and by that route to explain their connection.

The most important pages are those which treat of consciousness, the nature of things-in-themselves, and the theory of "psychophysical idealism." in which the author sets forth his positive views. Professor Strong's thing-in-itself is not the unknowable of Kant and Spencer, but rather the "Mind-Stuff" of Clifford (though this term is not used by the author). His general theory, in fact, cannot better be expressed than in Clifford's own words, "The universe consists entirely of mind-stuff. The 'material universe' is an imperfect representation in the mind of the real universe of mind-stuff." The relation between consciousness and the "extra-mental" world of things-in-themselves is symbolized by the relation between the "brain-event" which must accompany the state of consciousness and the material phenomenon which, in popular parlance, "causes" the perception. The causal connection between the brain and the outer world is phenomenal, and symbolizes the *real* causal connection among things-in-themselves. It follows that consciousness, instead of being an entity apart and of a different nature from matter, is a thing-in-itself which, on the phenomenal side, is seen as the brain that "has" the consciousness. The body, and the whole phenomenal world, in like manner, symbolize a real world of mind-stuff. Consciousness is thus developed from more elementary forms of phenomenal matter.

Professor Strong acknowledges that his task is far from completed, and reserves for a later book a detailed investigation of the inner workings of consciousness. A serious defect in the present work is its failure to account for the continuity of the individual consciousness. The author rejects the idea of the entity of the soul, but he has an Ego, even though this Ego be but a momentary lightning-flash of consciousness which disappears the minute we begin to think about it. It may be doubted whether this Ego be any more satisfactory than that which he rejects. The great merit of the book is its reduction of both mind and matter to a level of one nature, and that an ideal one—therein consisting the justification for the title. This theory is substituted alike for that strongly persistent dualism which sets two coequal entities in eternal antagonism, and then wonders why the connection seems inexplicable, and for that monism which regards them both as phases of a third substance, thus multiplying entities instead of reducing them. For this, at the expense of an ultimate pluralism which

(as all pluralism as such must do) leaves the still open question as to how relation and oneness are possible at all, we are offered a theory which asserts a difference in level of reality between mind and the matter we ordinarily oppose to mind—the former being ultimately real, and the latter phenomenally symbolical of it. For a clearing up of the other questions which arise in view of Professor Strong's theory, we look to the later book which he has promised us.

JARED S. MOORE.