

the most part it is the record of the reception of Christ, whether slowly, after much thought in the trenches, or suddenly, in the act of daring or even the article of death.

Mr. Robert Scott has published a cheap edition of *The Roman Catholic Church in Italy*, by the Rev. Alexander Robertson, D.D. (2s. net). Dr. Robertson has lived his life in Venice and has studied the ecclesiastical situation all the time. This is the seventh edition of the book.

In the year 1911 the Rev. G. B. H. Bishop, Vicar of Cardington, Salop, spent five months in a remote district of 'Little Russia the Blessed,' about one thousand miles from Petrograd. And now he has written a book on *The Religion of Russia* (London: Soc. of SS. Peter and Paul; 5s. net). He acknowledges that 'in so short a time it was possible to gain only a superficial knowledge of the people and their national institutions,' but he has written popularly, believing that if his knowledge is small ours is less, and he has submitted his book to experts.

He writes most sympathetically. For he is an Anglican who looks towards the East for that appreciation which is denied him in the West; and, besides, he was well treated by the parish priest. 'His eagerness to meet my wishes in every way was on one occasion a source of great embarrassment to me. I happened to be passing the church just as a funeral procession headed by cross-bearer and bannerers was setting out for the cemetery. Thinking myself unnoticed I prepared to photograph the scene, when to my horror Bátushka Johann called a halt, and the whole party, including the mourners, posed for their portraits with the corpse in the centre!'

The book is written with much simplicity and pleasantness. Its illustrations add greatly to its general charm.

From the same Society there comes a little book by Mr. Ronald Knox, Fellow and Chaplain of Trinity College, Oxford, on *Impetrative Prayer*. The title of it is *Bread or Stone*. Impetrative Prayer is prayer 'which is directed in the first instance, not towards the discipline of our own souls in a particular attitude, or the enjoyment of union with God, but towards the obtaining of special favours from Him, whether for ourselves or for others.'

The Rev. J. Politeyan, B.A., has written a book on *Biblical Discoveries in Egypt, Palestine, and Mesopotamia*, and Canon R. B. Girdlestone has introduced it to its readers (Elliot Stock; 2s. 6d. net). Mr. Politeyan believes that the Old Testament (he says nothing about the New) cannot be understood until its setting, its geographical and historical setting, is caught and comprehended. And he is very right. *East is East and West is West*, even though Mr. Kipling said so. We have to obtain the proper angle, more than that, almost a new personality, if we are not grievously to misjudge the Hebrews and their God. This it is that Mr. Politeyan provides. His book is thoroughly well illustrated.

From the Student Christian Movement there comes *A Book of Prayers for Students* (1s. 6d. net). It contains three parts. Part I. consists of a Service for each day of the week, which may be used either privately or for corporate prayer. Part II. contains a few Litanies; and Part III. a collection of Collects for use in relation to special needs or on special occasions.

## The Implications of the Golden Rule.

BY THE REV. E. W. HIRST, M.A.(LOND.), B.SC.(OXON.), GLASGOW.

I. IT is at the outset a matter of great significance that the Golden Rule distinctly contemplates man in society. The classical moralists have been far too prone to consider the individual *in vacuo* abstracted from all relation to his fellows. They have regarded him as though he were the inhabitant

of a desert island, and as if he could be 'good' all alone. But according to the N.T. idea of goodness, and according to the implication of the Golden Rule in particular, a Robinson Crusoe could not, strictly speaking, be 'good.' Religious he might be. Day by day he might fall down on

his knees and pray to God. But as for 'morality,'—there would be no one round him with whom he could practise goodness, no one to whom he could act as he would have them act to him. And it is the defect of the text-books on ethics, and of the classical moralists, that these books and teachers view man as an individual, whose conduct is supposed to be as individual a thing as his health. Even Kant is an offender in this respect, in that he considered the essence of goodness to lie in actions which all other individuals besides the doer have merely to imitate or 'universalize.' No doubt he does seem at times to treat other individuals somewhat less externally, especially in the formula that says: 'So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another, in any case as an end withal, never as a means only.' Indeed, Professor Votaw (*Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible*, Ext. p. 42a), likens the Golden Rule to this version of the Categorical Imperative.

And yet it is far from clear that this Kantian formula relates the *alter* to the *ego* in anything like the intimate way in which their connexion is regarded by the Golden Rule. In fact, the whole ethical teaching of Kant is vitiated by an imperfect doctrine of personality, by the idea that all selves are impervious, and are so many spiritual monads. It is claimed that each of these selves is an 'end' to itself because each possesses 'reason.' When, however, we inquire what it is to treat other persons as 'ends,' we are told by Kant that we cannot directly further their 'perfection' or 'self-realization,' but may contribute to their happiness only, though in treating ourselves as 'ends' we must seek our own 'perfection'—a purely individual pursuit. In spite of appearances to the contrary, Kant never establishes between ego and alter any intimate relationship. The underlying implication throughout is that selves are atomic and independent, and that morality is mono-personal. Therefore the identification of the Golden Rule with the Categorical Imperative seems hardly justified. For the former regards goodness, as the latter does not, as essentially inter-personal and social.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> No doubt Hegel emphasized the close relation of the individual to his fellows, and regarded society as a 'moral organism.' But in becoming 'organic' in Hegel's sense, the individual ceases to have existence for self, and the 'whole' for which he exists is not strictly 'moral,' inasmuch as its nature is at any time inevitable.

II. The Golden Rule has had plenty of critics. Perhaps the criticism that is most frequently urged is the one mentioned by Professor Henry Sidgwick, to the effect that the rule does not forbid reciprocity in evil. Each member of a band of thieves—to take the usual instance—shows to his comrade in crime the same loyalty which he desires to have shown to himself. Little discernment, however, is required to see that such robbers do not apply the Golden Rule in any real and universal way. They refrain from robbing one another just because they are thieves and desire each their share of spoil, not because they are men. If they refrained from robbing one another on the ground that they are men, for the same reason they would refrain from robbing any one else. We are to do, not simply to five or six particular men just the particular thing we want them to do to us, but we are to do unto man as man anywhere what we would have any and every man do to us.

III. In the *Hibbert Journal* for January 1914, Sir F. Younghusband makes another attack upon the Golden Rule. 'It cannot be said,' he writes, 'that the Golden Rule represents perfection, for men have gone further still, and not in theory only, but in actual practice. There have been many men, and probably still more women, who have loved their neighbours, not merely as themselves, but far more than themselves: who have given up their lives, not only in death, but, better still, in life, for their neighbours, for loved individuals, for their country, for humanity. Now they have not merely done unto others as they would that others should do unto them, but have done unto others a great deal more than they would ever expect others to do for them.'

Undeniably, circumstances do arise in which it may be one's duty to neglect oneself for others' sake, and even to surrender life itself. And this conduct is not necessarily incompatible with the Golden Rule. Of course, such circumstances must be exceptional. For if every person died for his neighbour, soon no neighbour would be left for whom to die. Or if every person merely weakened himself in health, or neglected his business or his culture, soon there would be no one left in the position of helper, for all alike would, in such a case, have become needy and helpless. Such an unequal love of neighbour, if universalized, becomes impracticable and absurd. Self-sacrifice, of course,

there must always be, but this involves not the immolation so much as the socialization of the self.

IV. A subtle interpretation of the Golden Rule has been given by Dr. A. T. Cadoux in the *International Journal of Ethics* for April 1912. He contends that the Rule starts from, and bases itself upon the desires of the individual—'Whatsoever ye would.' It does not, however, concern itself with the satisfaction of the individual's desires in any direct manner, but of these desires after they have been 'transferred in imagination to one's neighbour'—'Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them.' Cadoux then goes on to show how different desires are modified and enhanced by such a process. For instance, the desire for the praise of others, when, in accordance with the Golden Rule, it leads us to bestow praise on them, reacts upon our own fondness for praise, purifies it into the desire for genuine as distinguished from verbal appreciation, which desire in turn leads us ourselves to bestow on others appreciation that is sincere. In this way the pleasure of both giver and receiver is increased. The same process is illustrated in the case of the love of beauty, the desire for health, and the wish for happiness.

Now it is only necessary to read between the lines to see that, in so far as such a process of comparison results in a better treatment of others, it does so in virtue of an altruistic impulse which the process assumes to exist rather than creates. And the comparison is made primarily for the purpose of modifying the desires of the individual in such a way as to bring about their increase, and maximum satisfaction. The Golden Rule is used to provide a universal social reference such as will give to the desires of the individual, form, scale, and breadth.

But the Golden Rule in being so used appears misused. It becomes merely a means to enhance personal satisfaction, and is thus quite consistent with a doctrine of Egoism. We take it to be much more than a recipe for obtaining individual 'good,' 'life,' or 'satisfaction.' For it makes no direct reference to the content of the actual desires which any one may feel. Its real concern is that desires should be socialized, and that this should be done as an end in itself. It teaches that, as between ourselves and others, there should be impartiality of regard.

V. It is an important question whether this impartial regard is equivalent to a doctrine of equality. The idea of the essential equality of men is certainly very old. It received impressive endorsement from the Stoics. Cicero, in particular, insisted on it, and, like others, based it upon the fact that all men possess reason. The doctrine was dramatically re-emphasized at the French Revolution. Indeed, throughout the history of civilization the idea has had its influence. It is, for instance, the root conception of administrative justice—which should be 'equal,' *i.e.* impartial. Politically as well as legally the idea has done good service, forming the basis of the theory of representative government. And probably for a long time we shall still have to use the notion for all that it is worth. Nevertheless it would appear to be a makeshift. Its inadequacy is inevitable; for the idea of equality is quantitative, while human nature is pre-eminently qualitative. There is, of course, no sort of physical or intellectual equality possible to men. Neither could there be an equality of circumstances. People must live in different countries and climates and conditions. Utopia, too, will need both scavengers and scholars. Moreover, the relations in which people stand to one another as master and servant, parent and child, teacher and pupil, necessarily preclude any exact similarity in the details of behaviour.

Equality of opportunity is, no doubt, a plausible ideal. But it would be foolish to treat all people alike without regard to sex, health, sanity, and race. And whatever initial opportunity is used for the purpose of classifying men must be crude and practically momentary, for diversity of endowment and morale will at once demand diversity of opportunity. For in Utopia different people will be doing different things and must be accorded different kinds of chances for learning these different things.

The idea which is characteristic of Christianity is not the equality but the unity of life. According to St. Paul, we all form one body, which body is none other than the body of Christ. In the New Testament, also, men are regarded as brothers in a great house of life in which God is the Father of all. And that impartial regard for one another which the Golden Rule inculcates finds its justification, not in the fact that men possess reason or personality, or have an equal capacity for 'virtue'—there appears to be nothing intrinsically grand

either in rationality or in personality—but in this great truth of the unity of all life and the brotherhood of all men.

Now the ideal principle in a perfect brotherhood is surely 'From every one according to his ability: to every one according to his needs.' Some who think this maxim rather dangerous would substitute the word 'services' for 'needs.' But in an ideal condition of things no one would be pauperized by being merely a receiver of the bounty of others, for all would be givers as well as receivers, each giving of the kind that he has, and receiving of the kind of which he is in want. Such a state would, of course, be consistent with great inequalities. Some will give more, and some will receive more. But if all are one, and realize their unity, this will neither matter nor be felt to matter. Any other principle like that of 'reward' for services it is impossible satisfactorily to apply, as Dr. Rashdall has cleverly shown (*Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. i. chap. viii.). Rashdall abandons as hopeless the maxim 'to every man according to his merit,' and adopts what he calls the principle of 'equality of consideration'—meaning thereby that the distribution of the goods of life should be according to the needs of men as these are socially determined.

And in the ideal commonwealth each one would receive eagerly in order that he might the better give. Should a gift to the uttermost be asked of a man—even the gift of his blood, as in the case of the present European war—the principle of the solidarity of life will inspire him as no abstract

principle of equality could. He will see that he is given innumerable blessings for which he never laboured, and is called to sufferings not always on his own behalf, but often for the sake of others, filling up in this way what is lacking in the sufferings of Christ.

A community inspired by the principle of unity—unity with one another and with God in Christ—will express itself through a State. That is to say, it will not be anarchist. Justice, however, will be swallowed up in love. This love will not take the form of charity, giving to your neighbours something for which he gives you no return. For all will have something to give, and love will express itself in such a system of exchange as will bless all with mutual benefits.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, love will be not the product of such a State, but its condition. A non-competitive society is possible or ultimately successful only when the human heart has ceased to feel the competitive spirit. To merge possessions is not necessarily to merge souls. And so the hope of the future can lie only in the greater prevalence of the spirit that desires to give rather than to get. Experience leads us to expect little from a mere social instinct or 'group-mind.' But love will prevail, we believe, when there is a greater realization by all men of their essential union with each other in God through our Lord Jesus Christ.

<sup>1</sup> In the same way, Ruskin, following Plato, maintained that wealth is an instrument of 'life,' and is to be shared co-operatively, as in a household.

## The Archaeology of the Book of Genesis.

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### Chapter ix.

18. Since Shem corresponds with Samu or Sumu, the ancestral god of the 'Amorite' or West Semitic kings of Babylonia, while Japhet is Iapetos, a Cilician deity (Steph. Byz. *sub voce* "Ađava), it would seem to follow that in Ham also we ought to find the name of a deity. As 'father of Canaan,' the deity would be Canaanite. Ham, however, was also the father of Mizraim or Egypt, with which in the O.T. the name is sometimes

synonymous, but there is nothing in the Egyptian pantheon with which the name can be compared. It is, therefore, possible that the Canaanite Ham has been identified with Qem, a name given to Egypt in the inscriptions, since in proper names Egyptian *q* may represent Assyro-Babylonian *kh* (ח) when the latter stands for West Semitic *ghain*. In this case the identification would have resulted from the use of the cuneiform script. In the