

## PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

*Analytic Psychology.* G. F. STOUT. London, Swan, Sonnenschein & Co.; New York, Macmillans, 1896. 2 vols. Pp. xi+289 and 314.

There can be no hesitation in pronouncing this the most important work in general psychology by a British author since Ward's *Britannica* article of a dozen years ago. That article marked an epoch in British psychology by its complete break with the traditional Associationism: it was a proclamation of independence. Mr. Stout's work shows that the independence has been won. "It may be said," he writes, "that at present the psychological world is divided into two camps; on the one side are the champions of Association, on the other the champions of Apperception. \* \* \* I have definitely sided with the second party" (ii., p. 41). What Oxford has done for metaphysics, that Cambridge has accomplished for psychology. And both movements, the psychological no less than the philosophical, stand evidently under the commanding though modified influence of the same man, Kant.

The 'Analytic Psychology,' however, follows, as its title indicates, the traditional English method. At the same time it suggests a contrast to another *genetic* psychology, and Mr. Stout's main interest is, he tells us, with the latter. But just as the geologist acquires knowledge of the nature of geological changes by observation of the changes that are going on now, so for investigating the origin and growth of mental products, it seemed necessary first to analyze the developed consciousness and to study the laws of mental process in present experience. In pursuing this method, Mr. Stout avoids the infelicities of an 'evolution' of mental life on the basis of imaginary 'principles of psychology,' and succeeds in giving a strong impression of what our mental life really is and of the principles which actually govern it, at least in those forms of it here considered. For, in the opinion of the author, some products of mental life can be more profitably studied from the point of view of their development, and their consideration is accordingly reserved for a future work. The number of topics omitted in the present work is certainly striking, but judgment on the special wisdom of the omissions may be deferred till the promised 'Genetic Psychology' is also before us for comparison.

The general plan of this treatise is as follows: An introduction on the scope and method of psychology is followed by two books, the first of which contains the general analysis, the second a more detailed examination of processes. Book I., after discussing the principle for the division of ultimate mental functions (Chap. I.) and the possibility of their analysis (Chap. II.), distinguishes the fundamental forms of the cognitive consciousness (Chaps. III.-V.) and concludes with a chapter on feeling and conation (Chap. VI.). Book II. follows a similar arrangement. Beginning with a discussion of the conception of mental activity (Chap. I.), it then examines, in a general synthetic order, the cognitive processes (Chaps. II.-XI.) and concludes with a chapter on pleasure and pain (Chap. XII.)

Psychology is defined as 'the positive science of mental process' (p. 1), including mental development (p. 9), in individuals (p. 7). Its data are distinguished as (1) products of past process, (2) the process itself as introspectively and retrospectively observed and (3) certain external signs. Specially valuable among the first is the material furnished by philology and anthropology; Mr. Stout thinks that the contributions from these sources may ultimately prove of at least as much importance for psychology as those yielded by physiology. Of greater interest is the author's adoption of the hypothesis of 'psychical dispositions' as a means of connecting present conscious process with the results of conscious process in the past. This conception controls the whole of his psychology. He considers it and, indeed, shows it to be distinctly preferable to the hypothesis of sub-consciousness and more practicable than the corresponding physiological hypothesis. Our ignorance of the precise correlation of mental process and physiological process is such, he says, that physiology cannot be made the sole basis of psychology. Under certain assignable conditions, the two sciences might be merged in one; but the realization of those conditions appears at present infinitely remote. Even when it is recognized that a 'psychical' disposition is a 'physiological' disposition also, it is still very often necessary for the sake of clearness to separate the purely psychological side of the process from corresponding physiological data and hypotheses.

As a positive principle for the division of ultimate mental functions, Mr. Stout adopts Brentano's—the mode in which consciousness refers to an object; but he criticizes Brentano's use of it, especially in identifying the 'object' with the immediate conscious content. According to Mr. Stout, there is present in all 'noetic' experience, over and above the presentation as modification of the individual conscious-

ness, a unique thought-reference to something which, as the thinker means or intends it, is not a present modification of his individual consciousness. "The object of thought is never a content of our finite consciousness" (p. 45). It is difficult to follow Mr. Stout here. The above statement, for example, taken literally, would seem to make psychology itself impossible. This, of course, is not meant. "The point is that the object as we mean or intend it, cannot be a modification of our consciousness at the time we mean or intend it" (p. 46). But is this really so? It is true that the process of cognition is distinct from its object, but it does not follow that the object is not immanent. Mr. Stout says, indeed, that in thinking of a sensation, I qualify it, as an event in my mental history, by reference to other experience not present, and that in considering abstractly a content as such, I generalize it, regard it as one of an indefinite series. But clearly, if for psychological purposes I attend to a visual appearance, as such, whatever reference to an 'external' object or to other portions of my experience may be implied, what I mean and intend is not those objects but just this present modification of my visual experience. It may be said, perhaps, that a modification of consciousness is continually changing, and that to be conscious of it, I must be conscious of it as a process, but that the parts of a process cannot possibly be all present together, and that consequently in grasping the unity of its successive phases, I necessarily transcend the immediate present. The reply to this is, that there is no evidence that modifications of consciousness form a succession of timeless instants. What we mean by a present modification of consciousness is a modification in the 'specious' present. The evidence has yet to be given that a present content of consciousness cannot be an object of thought while it and the process of attending to it lasts.

In the second chapter, the theoretical objection against the possibility of analyzing presentations, viz.: that a discriminated content cannot be identical with one that is undiscriminated, is met by the rejoinder of irrelevancy; it is not necessary that the two contents should be identical, but only that the undistinguished differences present in the original experience should be adequately represented by the analytic distinctions in the new. A similar explanation is given of the analysis of dispositions. Here, to be sure, the discovered distinctions do not actually exist prior to their discovery; they are, however, determined by a mental condition other than the process of fixing attention.

Sentiency as a mode of consciousness was briefly referred to in the

general analysis of 'noetic' experience in Chapter I.; but this side of experience receives scant consideration in the present treatise. Mere sentiency would be 'anoetic.' Chapters III. and IV. deal with modes of simple apprehension. Emphasis is placed on the apprehension of form of combination, corresponding to the German '*Gestaltqualität*,' as a unique mode of consciousness distinct from the apprehension of the matter and from the apprehension of relations, both of which presuppose it. Besides these modes of explicit apprehension, there are modes of implicit apprehension, which appear in all cases of 'psychic fringe' and one special case of which is that mental state we call understanding the meaning of a word. Mr. Stout's admirable discussion at this point forcibly illustrates the picturesque remark of Professor James in a similar connection that "introspective psychology must here throw up the sponge." Stout himself falls back on unconscious mental process.

Chapter V. follows Brentano in treating judging or believing as distinct from simple apprehension. The expression 'judging or believing' is misleading in that it suggests that the two are identical, and the comment on it on p. 98 is not, we think, altogether happy. However, the point is that judging, as implying belief, is a unique attitude of consciousness towards objects. Mr. Stout calls it 'the Yes-No consciousness.' Might we not, perhaps, call belief the psychical modality of judgment? Certainly, apart from emotional coloring, degrees of assurance seem to be, as Mr. Stout says, 'degrees of firmness or fixity rather than of intensity' (p. 110).

The cognitive consciousness has thus been analyzed into the three fundamental modes of sentience, simple apprehension and belief. Chapter VI. analyzes the volitional consciousness into feeling (pleasure or displeasure) and conation (desire or aversion). Specially noteworthy is the treatment of striving in 'noetic' consciousness as a mode of attention, the two being distinguished in dynamic reference only as the direction of mental activity to an end is distinguished from the activity itself in the successive phases of its realization (p. 126). From this point of view aversion is regarded as attention constrained.

The Second Book opens with an explanation of the conception of mental activity. Accepting Bradley's view that 'activity' implies a self-determined process in time, Mr. Stout finds physical analogues for the psychological conception in movement under the law of inertia, where the continued motion of a body is traceable to its own previous motion, but particularly in the reactions designated by Avenarius *vital series*, where the process not merely perpetuates

itself, but adapts itself to an end, and is directly and indirectly self-developing. The analogue is most striking in the central nervous system, where the physical process is actually correlated with the mental. The proof that the mental process is self-determining is (1) that it initiates the changes on which its propagation immediately depends, and (2) that the brain-substance in which these changes take place has been rendered capable of them only through previous psychophysical process in which it has taken part. The fact that its self-determination is indirect is no reason for regarding it as a fiction. In the sense, therefore, in which 'activity' can be referred to physical process, it can be referred to mental process. The point in which all physical analogies fail is that the mental process feels its own current. James, Baldwin and Bradley are wrong in identifying the activity of consciousness with certain selected aspects of the process. The distinction between its passivity and its activity is relative. The whole process is active. Mr. Stout seems at times to say that we have an immediate experience of its degrees (see, *e. g.*, pp. 160 f). He finds no meaning in the attempt to *place* the feeling-aspect of the consciousness in organic or muscular sensations. But suppose the question is put in this form: Could a disembodied spirit actually *feel* his conscious life as distinguished from being conscious of it?

The special analysis of mental process takes up, first, (Chaps. II., III.) attention, which is regarded, not as a 'special activity,' but as a process coincident with noetic consciousness generally. The treatment is masterly from every point of view. It has the prevision, the sureness of touch, the finish of a skilful demonstration in anatomy or, let us say, of a performance by a great artist on the violin. Stress is laid on the systematic complexity of the process, on its character as a prospective attitude, on its relation to mental development, especially in its dependence on preformed dispositions. Its teleological aspect—its tendency to go on until the end is reached and then to stop—is excellently considered, as is also its inhibitive aspect, for which a purely psychological explanation is found particularly in the systematic unity of the process and its relation to preformed dispositions. As to the physiological correlate of attention, some such conception as that of higher and lower level centres (Houghlings Jackson) is preferred to that of special centres of attention (Wundt) as corresponding more closely to the features of the psychological process. Wundt's postulate rests on the grave psychological error of separating the activity of attention from its content. Among other points of interest in the chapter are the conception of interest as the hedonic aspect of atten-

tion (p. 225), the careful discussion (pp. 225-236) as to whether attention is ever determined by pleasure and pain, as such—which is seriously doubted—and the refutation of the other common opinion that attention makes its object clearer and more intense (pp. 244 ff). Exception may be taken to this statement or to that, but the analysis as a whole is carried through with remarkable strenuousness and consistency. It would be easy to point parallels to every single feature of the doctrine, but as here worked out, it is, we think, a distinct advance on anything that has been written on the subject hitherto in English. This is particularly to be said in view of certain applications of it in the sequel.

Chapter IV. deals with the more mechanical aspects of conscious process, retentiveness, habit and association. The well-worn subject of habit receives new light from the suggestion that the transition from volitional to automatic action is due, not merely to the effect of repetition, but also to the teleology of attention (p. 265).

Chapter V. deals with the synthesis of presentations in the reference of thought to a single object. 'Noetic synthesis' implies "the introduction of a distinct kind of mental factor, the apprehension of the whole which determines the order and apprehension of the parts" (ii., p. 41).

In Chapter VI., with explicit reference to Bradley's criticism of Associationism in his *Principles of Logic*, Mr. Stout dwells on the constructive synthesis which pervades even the lowest phases of mental process. While associationists tend to represent the whole as due exclusively to the combination of the parts, the thesis here maintained is that every new synthesis results from the further determination of parts within a pre-existing whole. The special aspect of the process treated in this chapter is 'Relative Suggestion,' *i. e.*, the continual spontaneous readaptation of already acquired experience to novel conditions. There is no such a thing as a mere 'literal resuscitation, revival or reinstatement' of former associations.

Chapter VII. on 'Conation and Cognitive Synthesis' develops the counterpart of the doctrine that all conation is attention, namely that all mental process is, as such, conation. From this point of view cognitive synthesis is regarded, not as a web which conative tendencies spin, but as a further defining and differentiation of those tendencies themselves.

Then comes the great chapter (VIII.) on Apperception in which all the preceding discussion is brought to a head. This emphasis on apperception is new in British psychology. Mr. Stout's conception

of the process is also new. He has been greatly influenced by the Herbartians and it is in Herbart's sense rather than in that of Leibniz or of Kant that he uses the term. But he differs from Herbart primarily in his conception of the preformed mental system as an organized whole involving noetic synthesis—this as opposed to the conception of a mere apperception-mass of presentations—and then in regarding the entire process as an evolution in which neither the apperipient nor the apperceived factor is at any time either exclusively passive or exclusively active. He defines it as "the process by which a mental system appropriates a new element, or otherwise receives a fresh determination" (p. 112). It expresses the growing point of mind and is a feature common to all understanding, interpreting, subsuming and the like. Among the important features of the doctrine are the conceptions of 'negative' and 'destructive' apperception, the former occurring where the effort to incorporate a new element is defeated, the latter where "one system by appropriating a new element wrests it from its preformed connection with another system." The effect, however, in either case is to develop an apperceptive system of some sort. In the case of 'negative apperception,' for instance, though the system incorporates no new element, it receives a fresh determination and the process can never be repeated under precisely the same conditions again, while as part of a more comprehensive process, it directly conditions positive mental development. Of even greater interest, if possible, is the working out of the conceptions of the coöperation and competition of apperceptive systems, of the conditions which determine their strength and of their conflict and its issue. These topics are all skilfully handled with abundance of acute observation and illustrative detail. The hypothesis of psychical dispositions formed under the influence of attention from which they derive their systematic complexity—the conception of such preformed dispositions reacting on the further process of attention thus becomes, in the hands of the author, a powerful instrument for analyzing the most intricate of mental processes, the process of mental organization and growth. Doubtless much remains to be done in exhibiting the mechanical aspects of the process, and the unity of apperception which appears as an ultimate datum of the analysis constitutes an important and difficult problem. But the thorough and comprehensive treatment of the subject here given is likely to remain for long a standard of reference. One word as to terminology. Is it necessary or desirable to speak of the process of the further determination of a content of attention as a process in which one idea, group or system

'apperceives' the idea which it appropriates or by which it is otherwise determined? We do not say that the idea of red 'perceives' the idea of hardness. The Kantian terminology is here, we think, decidedly preferable to the Herbartian because it relates 'apperception' to that consciousness of self as subject which, whether contributing anything or not to mental process, is certainly very much in evidence and moulds and colors the significance of common speech.

The chapters on 'Comparison and Conception' (Chap. IX.) and on 'Thought and Language' (Chap. X.) deal especially with the problem of the universal. Conceptual thinking is thought of the universal, as such. Psychologically the universal is the apperceptive system with its universal objective reference. The problem is, to get this into the foreground of consciousness; its solution is chiefly by comparison and by language. The great function of language is to fix and detain, and so render capable of further manipulation, apperceptive systems by means of expressive signs (p. 192). The way language does this is very carefully explained.

Chapter XI. is on 'Belief and Imagination.' Belief is regarded both as a condition of activity and as a result of the limitation of activity. An illustration of the latter principle is the belief in external reality. The brief summary of the author's controversy with Dr. Pikler on this point (pp. 245-248) leaves, however, a rather confused impression. And, as regards the former principle, while it is no doubt true that the acceptance of a proposition means that I *can* make it a starting-point or a link in a process of reasoning ultimately affecting conduct (p. 238), it is by no means clear that I *always* must. A large number of our theoretical beliefs, accepted on mere authority, appear to yield themselves in fact to no further theoretical uses and to have no direct bearing on conduct.

In the final chapter of the work, the author applies his general conception of mental process as activity tending to an end to the theory of 'Pleasure and Pain' (Chap. XII.). Pleasure, it is held, arises where the activity is unhindered, pain where it is for any reason thwarted or checked, the intensity of the affective state depending on the intensity and complexity of mental excitement and the degree of its hindrance. The theory is abundantly illustrated, and the first part of it, at any rate, may be regarded as fairly well made out for all cases susceptible of psychological analysis. The second part—Mr. Stout unfortunately does not make the distinction—is more doubtful, for it is obviously impossible to compare directly with any accuracy, degrees of intensity of affective states or degrees of complexity of the processes con-



cerned in them. There is, besides, a difference between intensity and amount of feeling, *e. g.*, in the pleasure of indolence as compared with some other pleasures, and this difference requires to be accounted for. In its psychological form, the theory is admittedly inadequate to account for the so-called pleasures and pains of sense. At this point, Mr. Stout translates the principle into physiological terms. Following the clue of the psychological analysis and, assuming that the tendency of mental process is correlated on the physiological side with a tendency of disturbed neural arrangements to equilibrium, the thesis is that "pleasure and pain depend respectively on the uninterrupted or interrupted course of the vital series" and that "intensity of pleasure or pain depends on the intensity and complexity of the pleasant or painful excitation." The theory is then applied to the affective states connected with various classes of sensations, Mr. Marshall and the 'nutrition' theorists coming in for a good deal of effective criticism by the way. His own theory recommends itself to Mr. Stout, in the absence of any positive knowledge of what the physiological process really is, by its comprehensiveness—it assumes that pleasure and pain are produced in all cases in the same way—and because of its basis in psychological experience. It should be noted, however, that the psychological basis is the teleology of the process of attention. The pleasures and pains of sense, on the other hand, have to do directly with 'anoetic' consciousness. And here the process may be quite different. Certainly, as Mr. Stout himself admits, the conception is quite vague when applied to cutaneous pain, especially, we may add, when its purely sensational character is admitted and even the possibility of special pain-nerves.

Though but a fragment of a larger whole, the present treatise is as complete in itself as—may we say?—Schubert's 'Unfinished Symphony.' In each case the intention of the author is completely worked out and in both the execution is finished in the highest degree. Mr. Stout elaborates his thought through all the intricacies of its movement with masterly freedom, sustained power, copious illustration and in the classic style. The book is extremely well written. Severely rigorous in analysis, fixing and defining the most subtly evanescent and baffling of phenomena, it rarely happens that the thought is not clearly expressed. It is one of the books that will live. It will take its place among the great works in the history of English psychology.

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