

life, which holds it to be the development of some form, the soul finding its perfection in God, has been generally accepted by philosophers. Lessing, Schelling, Hegel and other idealists have held the spiritual nature of the soul to be akin to that of the Absolute Being. By Schopenhauer it was identified with will.

A consideration of the opinions of the most prominent psychologists yields the following results. A truer conception of the nature of the soul based on the evolution of animal life is to be expected with the advance of scientific knowledge. We cannot attain to such a conception by analysis alone. "The psyche is a product of evolution." "Soul life is homogeneous throughout the animal series, that of man the highest product." What is found in the animal as vital force is the soul in man. Each species represents a type of soul and from this as a special form of the phylectic soul, and a result of heredity, the individual soul appears. The new psychology questions the use of the term 'soul,' urging that it carries with it an idea of substance from past theological discussions. It would substitute the narrower term 'self.' Empirical psychology recognizes only the phenomena of consciousness.

From the answers to a series of questions sent to the colleges the author reaches the following conclusions as to the modern popular idea of the soul. The materialistic conception of soul as a product of body has a very small following. The idea of a soul will exist as long as the desire for immortality is found in man. The popular belief in a soul substance is largely the result of religious teachings. It has been affected little by the hostile attitude of modern psychology. For the more highly educated the soul stands for an ethical ideal, for people in general it may be described as an undefinable mass of feelings. Theology, representing the emotional side of the belief, and philosophy as representing the cognitive, should be studied as correlated subjects. The mystical, vague belief of the ancients in a combination of vitality and mind, of soul and life, has been gradually replaced by an empirical mind, the basis of which is found in the functioning of a normal nervous system.

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Die Eigenart des religiösen Lebens und seiner Gewissheit. D. ADOLF MÜLLER. Archiv f. Phil., 1904, X., 166-229.

A uselessly long paper divided into six parts: Religion, Religions, Nature of Religion, Religion and Natural Science, Religion and History, Religion and Philosophy.

In the first and longest section the essence of religious life is discussed. The author would modify the well known definition of Schleiermacher: 'Religion is a feeling of dependence,' by the substitution of *Gemüt* for *Gefühl*. 'Feeling' seems to him not inclusive enough. He uses *Gemüt* in a very wide sense. It is 'Mut, Wille, Gefühl und intuitive Erkenntnisfunktion,' it is that 'keimkräftige Mutterboden seelisch-geistigen Lebens' which receives lovingly or rejects sternly all impressions, according as they correspond or not with its nature. He agrees, therefore, with those who refuse to identify religion with thought or with feeling, and who find the source of religious life at the very center of being.

A longer analysis of this paper would be out of place in a psychological magazine.

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ETHICS.

La Science Positive de la Morale. G. CANTÉCOR. Part I. *Revue Philos.*, 1904, LVII., 225-241, 368-392.

The article is an exposition and criticism of the so-called positive science of ethics, still vague but pervasive in its pretences, against which the author takes up the defence of conscience.

Not long ago moralists, whatever their tenets, were agreed on one thing—on the distinction between what is and what ought to be; and they recognized more or less explicitly the right of reason to impose rules on practice. They thus saw an opposition between the spontaneous impulse of instinct and the commands of reason. Both rationalist and empiricist held that the speculative reason can determine theoretically the normal form of individual and social life. Such is the conception which the partisans of the ethical '*science positive*' combat. In their attack they commit themselves to the performance of two tasks; 'we would ask,' they say, 'of MM. Simmel and Lévy-Bruhl that they show us the futility of theoretic ethics and the incapacity of reason to regulate life; while of M. Wundt and especially of M. Durkheim we would demand explanation and proof as to how an ethical system is possible which holds absolutely to the facts and is yet practical.'

In defence of their position they say, in the first place, that the traditional ethics has never really existed. All the moralists of the same epoch, however different their principles, have given forth the same precepts, due to the fact they simply borrowed these from the social