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Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954

Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Royal United Services Institution. Journal

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi19>

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Published online: 11 Sep 2009.

To cite this article: Lieut.-Colonel E. F. Chapman C.B., R.A., &c. (1881) The March from Kabul to Kandahar in August, and the Battle of the 1st September, 1880, Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 25:110, 282-315, DOI:

[10.1080/03071848109418261](https://doi.org/10.1080/03071848109418261)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071848109418261>

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Wednesday, March 9, 1881.

MAJOR-GENERAL HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF CONNAUGHT,
K.G., &c., Vice-Patron, in the Chair.

THE MARCH FROM KABUL TO KANDAHAR IN AUGUST,
AND THE BATTLE OF THE 1ST SEPTEMBER, 1880.

By Lieut.-Colonel E. F. CHAPMAN, C.B., R.A., &c.

IN July, 1880, there were in the field in Afghanistan two separate *corps d'armée* with distinct bases of operation, the one dependent on the Punjab and the Presidency of Bengal, the other on Scinde and the Presidency of Bombay; these were officially designated "The Northern Afghanistan Field Force," and "The Southern Afghanistan Field Force;" the division in Kuram, or the "Kuram Force," being, for the purposes of the military operations, grouped with troops in occupation of the city of Kabul and the valleys adjoining.

The separation of the province of Kandahar from Kabul had been promulgated, and, at the period under consideration, the political objects for which the two forces were maintained were entirely distinct, their Commanders reporting independently for the information of the Commander-in-Chief in India. At Kabul, steps had already been taken to prepare for the evacuation of the country so soon as negotiations, then being carried on with Abdul Rahman Khan, might be successfully completed; and, early in July, Sir Donald Stewart looked confidently to the 15th August as the date on which the last of the brigades under his command would leave Kabul. The plan of withdrawal had been fully considered, and it only needed the issue of final orders to set in motion upon two lines towards India the 18,000 men forming the army of occupation, the intention then being for Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts to command the troops retiring by Kuram, while Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart retained the command of those to move by the Khyber. The sick were already in motion towards Peshawur; warlike stores and baggage in excess of actual requirements had been despatched to the base; and, in the strictest sense, the Northern Afghanistan Field Force was held ready for movement.

It is not necessary to compare the arrangements that maintained at Kabul with those in force at Kandahar, nor to show how they had been matured by experience gained during two years of continuous field service; but before passing to a detailed account of the march which forms the subject of this paper, it is important to draw attention to the quality of the troops constituting the *corps d'armée* from which Sir Frederick Roberts's force was drawn, to lay stress on their superior physique, and to recall the fact that Officers and men

had gone through together the training of a lengthened period of active service. It is not too much to say that, in fighting power and intelligence, the troops in question could not be surpassed, while their equipment was in the very highest order.

The news of the defeat of Brigadier-General Burrows' Brigade at Maiwand, and of the withdrawal of our troops at Kandahar within the city, reached Kabul by telegraph on the 28th July, and it was at once felt by the Generals in command that, however great the efforts which might be made, the relief of Kandahar could only be effected from Scinde, at that season of the year, with great delay and difficulty; the possibility of a movement of troops from Kabul was indeed fully considered at the outset, and when Sir Donald Stewart was called on by the Government of India for his opinion, he counselled the despatch of a force from Kabul under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts to accomplish the object in view. The approval by the Government of India of the operation proposed, and the orders of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, were received by telegram on 3rd August.

These practically left the constitution of the force, its equipment, and other details to be decided on the spot. Sir Donald Stewart was, however, called on to state what was the earliest date on which the march could commence, and when the relieving force might be looked for at Kandahar. It was decided to leave Kabul on the 8th August, and it was estimated that, on the 2nd September, Kandahar would be reached. Meanwhile, during the last week of July, the arrangements initiated with Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan had been satisfactorily advanced towards conclusion, and it was determined to tell him the exact truth regarding the situation at Kandahar, and at the same time to seek openly his assistance in obtaining supplies during a march to be directed against his acknowledged rival. As, however, reliance could not be placed on Afghan assurances in such a crisis, the strictest independence in the execution of the movements then contemplated was ensured by careful preparation against any contingency. The 11th August was fixed for the withdrawal towards the Khyber of the troops destined to return at once to India, a Governor appointed by the Sirdars was placed in charge of the city, and arrangements were made for handing over the Bala Hissar, and the buildings in the Sherpur cantonment, to Abdul Rahman's representatives, on the morning our troops should vacate.

A march conducted without a base of operations or communications of any kind, through a hostile country, and towards a point presumably in the possession of an enemy who had been recently successful, could only be warranted by such necessity as had arisen; in this instance, however, the wisdom which prompted the measure, and the courage which executed it, sprang of experience, and of the confidence which claims success as a certainty. The result justified the conception, and the march from Kabul to Kandahar has been recognized as a great achievement. It will be remembered that at the time it was undertaken, and until a crushing defeat had been inflicted upon Ayub

Khan at Kandahar itself, the movement was condemned in no measured terms, by military critics, its originators being judged to have acted in complete disregard of the principles of military science; with troops, however, trained and equipped as were those selected for the undertaking, a commander may, humanly speaking, anticipate success in any enterprise.

The measures of thoughtful preparation carried out during the few days that remained to Sir Frederick Roberts, before movement commenced, may be classed under two heads:—

1. The selection of the troops, followers, and baggage animals.
2. The survey and completion of equipment.

No record of the work thus undertaken would be complete which did not set forward very prominently the self-abnegation and high military capacity evinced by Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart, who was in supreme command at Kabul, and who, without reference to the difficult task of withdrawal by the Khyber, which was to be his share of the programme, placed unreservedly at Sir F. Roberts' disposal the entire resources of the North Afghanistan Field Force in transport and equipment; nor would it be possible to pass by without respectful recognition the singleness of purpose and true genius with which the two commanders devoted themselves to perfect the machinery which it was intended to employ in the execution of a difficult enterprise. The spirit they evinced became the leading principle that guided all ranks in the task of preparation.

It is hard to appreciate fully the difficulties which beset a commander in the selection of troops for special service; it is at the same time important, in reviewing the duty which devolved on Sir Frederick Roberts, when called on to name particular regiments for the service in hand, to recognize that the exceptional hardships and difficulties involved in the undertaking were exactly understood by the rank and file of the Army. The sentiment with which the announcement that a force would march to Kandahar was received was that of a strong sense of duty, rather than the enthusiasm of troops who had their reputation to make. Very many of the corps serving at Kabul; more especially native corps, had been for two years absent from their homes; they had seen a good deal of fighting, and had suffered heavy losses in action and through sickness. The native troops in Northern Afghanistan had welcomed the possibility of an early withdrawal to India, and, very justly, felt themselves entitled to rest. It was not with eager desire that the honour of marching to Kandahar was sought for, and some commanding Officers of experience judged rightly the temper of their men, when they represented for the General's consideration the claim of the regiments they commanded to be relieved as soon as possible from field service. I lay stress on this fact, and claim for those Officers who subordinated their own wishes in the interest of the soldiers they commanded, as also for the General who acted on their representations, an insight into the character of our native troops, the result of long experience. It is not easy to estimate the confidence created by such knowledge as was thus brought to bear on the question of

selection, nor rightly to describe the sense of duty and of absolute trust in their commanders which marked the behaviour of the troops at this time. The enthusiasm which carried Sir Frederick Roberts' Force with exceptional rapidity to Kandahar was an after-growth, evolved by the enterprise itself, and came as a response to the unflinching spirit which animated the leader himself.

The detail of the Force placed under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts, and destined for special service, was given in Northern Afghanistan Field Force Orders of the 3rd August. The returns of batteries and regiments placed the effective strength as follows:—

	British Officers.	British N.C. officers and men.	Native Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men.	
Staff.....	79			
6 8 Royal Artillery (Mountain Battery).	6	95	Drivers and Muleteers. } 139	Royal Artillery.
11 9 Royal Artillery (Mountain Battery).	6	95	Drivers and Muleteers. } 139	
No. 2 Mountain Battery (Punjab Frontier Force).	5	..	.. 140	
9th (Queen's Royal) Lancers.	19	318		Cavalry Brigade.
3rd Bengal Cavalry	7	..	.. 394	
3rd Punjab Cavalry (Punjab Frontier Force).	9	..	.. 408	
Central India Horse	11	..	.. 495	1st Infantry Brigade.
92nd Highlanders	19	651		
23rd Punjab Inf. (Pioneers).	8	..	.. 701	
24th Punjab Infantry	7	..	.. 575	2nd Infantry Brigade.
2nd (Prince of Wales' Own) Goorkahs.	7	..	.. 501	
72nd Highlanders	23	787		
2nd Sikh Infantry (Punjab Frontier Force).	7	..	.. 612	3rd Infantry Brigade.
3rd Sikh Infantry (Punjab Frontier Force).	7	..	.. 570	
5th Goorkah Regiment (Punjab Frontier Force).	8	..	.. 561	
2 60th Royal Rifles.....	21	616		
15th Sikhs	10	..	.. 650	
4th Goorkah Regiment.....	7	..	.. 637	
25th Punjab Infantry	8	..	.. 629	
	274	2,562	7,151	

These numbers were, ultimately, slightly increased by the discharge of sick men from hospital, as will be seen from the figures given in the Appendix.

The constitution of the command may be described as that of a force consisting of an infantry division of 3 brigades of 4 battalions each (viz., 1 British and 3 native battalions), a brigade of cavalry

consisting of 4 regiments (1 British and 3 native regiments), and an artillery command of 3 batteries of mountain artillery.

The infantry division was complete in itself, with the requisite Staff, the cavalry brigade working independently, and its commander reporting direct to Field Force Headquarters. Batteries of artillery were attached to infantry brigades.

The determination to dispense with wheeled artillery has given rise to much comment; the experience previously gained by Sir Donald Stewart and Sir Frederick Roberts made them, however, of one mind with regard to this important point, and it is certain that had even horse artillery been taken, it must have seriously delayed the march. The object placed immediately before the General was the relief of Khelat-i-Ghilzai and Kandahar, and it was essential to aim at the extreme of mobility.

It is beyond question, that whenever Afghans have been possessed of wheeled artillery during military operations, they have been so hampered by their guns as to be easily vulnerable, and in mountain warfare generally, a commander will gain less by the possession of guns, other than mountain guns, than he will lose by having his march restricted to regular roads. The important part, however, played during the Battle of Ahmed Khel, in April last, by a battery of horse artillery, a light field battery, and a heavy field battery, when scores of fanatics were killed by case-shot fired from the 9-prs., and when well directed shell from the 40-prs. checked a turning movement undertaken by the enemy's horsemen, should not be forgotten. We may well be proud of the work our gunners did on that day, and acknowledge that the 1,300 rifles which formed the fighting line of infantry could scarcely have withstood the charge of 3,000 fanatic swordsmen, if they had not been supported by field artillery. The movement of Sir Donald Stewart's Force, when he marched from Kandahar to Kabul, was, however, regulated by the pace of the heavy guns which accompanied it. Its first objective was Ghazni itself, and the possession of wheeled artillery was essential to its purpose. It would have been impossible for 40,000 of the enemy to have collected and to have delivered an attack, such as was made at Ahmed Khel, against troops moving as rapidly as did those under Sir Frederick Roberts' command, the essential qualities of the force he led to Kandahar being mobility and striking power.

The possession of field artillery by Ayub Khan was well known, but it was rightly understood that he could not, with any advantage to himself, advance his artillery on the Kabul side of Kandahar, and it was confidently anticipated that the guns belonging to the Kandahar garrison might be available for use in operations carried on near the city itself, or to the west of it.

The absence of companies of sappers was met by the employment of the 23rd Punjab Infantry (Pioneers), a regiment of Musbi-Sikhs, trained to all practical engineering work, and which furnished 700 rifles to the fighting line; there was no intention to delay at Ghazni, if that place were occupied, and whatever road-making might be required to facilitate the movement of a force so lightly equipped, could

be performed by the infantry; a small reserve of engineer equipment was, however, attached to one of the infantry brigades.

The preponderance of Sikhs and Goorkahs in the native portion of the force is to be noticed; soldiers belonging to these races were designedly chosen to operate against the Pathan army of Ayub Khan; it happened, however, that particular native regiments, in which there were a large number of Pathans, had already been very frequently engaged, and as previously explained, they were not in consequence detailed to accompany the force.

Equipment

Tables given in the Appendix detail the allowance of camp equipage, equipment, baggage, &c., considered sufficient for the several arms, as also the number of followers, sick carriage and transport animals. It is enough here to say that, without endangering efficiency, everything was reduced to the lowest possible limit, and that, for the object in view, the allowance was found sufficient, though the troops detained in the field for some time after arrival at Kandahar suffered a measure of hardship. In communication with Army Headquarters at Simla it was arranged that articles of clothing and equipment likely to be required after arrival at Kandahar, should be forwarded at once to Sibi for despatch, as soon as possible, to the front; these were chiefly ammunition, boots, shoes for Highlanders, and native shoes for the native troops, socks and articles of warm clothing, reserves of medicines, &c. They reached Quetta too late to be of much service to the force.

Throughout the preparation carried on, the principle of regimental independence was maintained, and under brigade direction each regiment was made in itself complete.

Hospitals.

It is true that, with reference to medical arrangements, the plan of a general hospital system was applied in a modified form to brigades, but the constitution of brigades (there being one European regiment with each) resulted in the brigade hospital section being invariably attached to the European corps; with native regiments the hospital system was strictly regimental. Hospital sections had already been for some time associated with brigades, and the medical equipment generally was in a satisfactory condition. No reduction was made in the allowance of transport required for hospitals on the ordinary field service scale; they were, however, completed with a three months' supply of medicines, and with a sufficiency of stores and medical comforts; in arranging this, it was found necessary to adapt many articles of equipment specially for mule transport.

Supplies.

The question of supplies naturally caused considerable anxiety; it had, however, been ascertained, during Sir Donald Stewart's march from Kandahar, that sheep and flour could, though with

considerable difficulty, be procured throughout the whole extent of the route chosen, with the exception of some 30 miles lying immediately on the Ghazni side of Khelat-i-Ghilzai, provided only the march was executed with sufficient rapidity to prevent the inhabitants from secreting their grain and driving off their flocks. The crops of Indian corn throughout the country had reached the stage previous to ripening, when the grain in the ear is admirable feeding for cattle, and is eagerly eaten by natives of the country; it was, therefore, reasonably assumed that forage could be obtained.

On this basis, the amount of supplies ordered to be taken was as under:—

For British troops in regimental charge.

Tea, sugar, rum and salt	for 30 days.
Preserved meat.....	for 2 days.
Flour (bread stuff)	for 5 days.
Flour for native followers	for 5 days.

For Native troops and followers in regimental charge.

Flour (atta)	for 5 days.
Dhall and salt	for 5 days.
Ghi, a small allowance, this article being purchased by the Commissariat whenever it could be obtained.	
Rum for native soldiers drinking spirits ..	for 8 days.
Sheep. Estimated requirements	for 10 days.

Commissariat Reserve:

Army food	500 lbs.
Lime juice	200 gals.
Preserved vegetables, all that were available, some	500 lbs.

Butcheries and bakeries were, with other necessary Commissariat establishments, detailed to regiments by the Deputy Commissary-General.

Reserves.

The Commissariat Reserve.

The Ordnance Park:

Containing the second reserve of S.A.

ammunition, viz..... 100 rounds per man;
the second reserve of British Mountain

Batteries 30 rounds per gun;

and the Field Treasure Chest containing 3 lacs of rupees, constituted the only divisional reserves, with the exception of the small reserve of engineer equipment already referred to. These were all, however, allotted to and remained permanently attached throughout the march to the infantry brigades, which furnished the requisite loading parties, guards, &c., as a brigade duty. Under this system a brigade became a unit of movement, and to render it complete in itself for separate service at a moment's notice, a battery of mountain

artillery was, from the outset, attached to it, and continued to be so associated.

Some few modifications in equipment sprang out of the use of mule and pony carriage, which may be noticed here, arrangements being made to provide a percentage of riding ponies as transport for sick soldiers and followers, as well as to carry the arms of the sick on mule-pads provided with special fittings.

Carriage for Sick.

The sick carriage or bearer transport on which an Indian army must rely for the conveyance of sick and wounded is at all times a very special weakness, but during the movement to Kandahar the condition of the doolie-bearers with the force became a source of serious anxiety. When the march was ordered, a large number of bearers had been drawn away from Kabul towards Gandamak and Jellalabad, the sick and wounded from field hospitals being, as already stated, in movement towards the base; the march could not in fact commence until some of these men had been recalled to complete the full number required to accompany the force under orders of movement; they only returned to Kabul by the 7th August, and could consequently have no rest before starting.

A careful inspection of all troops and of all public and private followers was made, and every care was taken that no one who was considered physically unfit to undergo special hardship or fatigue should accompany the force. It followed, however, from the cause already stated, that the doolie-bearers, to a very great extent, broke down during the march.

The sick transport amounted to:—

Doolies.	Dandies.	Doolie-bearers.	Ponies for riding.	Donkeys.
115	321	2,192	286	43

Six camels were detailed specially for the conveyance of certain equipment which could not be adapted for mule transport.

Transport.

The transport available at Kabul in the beginning of August was, for the most part, in a very high state of efficiency; the major portion of it had for some time been placed in regimental charge, and had been worked regimentally with success. Officers, both European and native, had been accustomed for several months to the duties of controlling and caring for transport animals, and the troops had been trained to appreciate their value; it was, therefore, only necessary, before movement commenced, to reject and replace such as were not considered fit to undergo the arduous march in prospect, to complete the numbers required by each corps previous to movement, to furnish carriage for the ordnance and engineer parks, the Commissariat reserve, &c., and to arrange for a reserve of 10 per cent. of mules and ponies. The number of animals that left Kabul amounted to—

Yabcoos (Afghan ponies).	Mules.	Indian ponies.	Donkeys.
1,589	4,510	1,244	912

The employment of donkey transport had been tried with success during the march of Sir Donald Stewart's Force from Kandahar to Kabul in April, and this class of carriage was found specially useful in the conveyance of provisions. Afghan donkeys will march with troops and carry loads of grain or flour averaging from 80 lbs. to 100 lbs. without any special strain. They keep pace with mules or ponies in a baggage column, as they avoid the frequent checks which retard the larger animals; they browse on the line of march, and find their own forage easily in the neighbourhood of camp; they were very easily controlled and cared for, and are on all accounts the most inexpensive transport in Eastern countries.

The several brigades were moved into camp at Beni-Hissar and Charasiab, in the neighbourhood of Kabul, on the 8th August, and on the 9th the march commenced. The more direct route to Ghazni, by the Maidan Valley, was not taken, but the march was directed by the valley of the Logar, in which the chance of supplies was greater; it was also thought possible, by adopting this direction, to keep the Afghans in doubt regarding the ultimate destination of the force. The route chosen during the first three marches leads directly towards the Shutargardan Pass and the Kuram Valley; the intention to march on Ghazni would not therefore be clearly indicated until the turning-point had been passed. Besides this, communication with Kabul by the Logar Valley was possible, whereas there had always been great difficulty in communicating through Maidan and Wardak. The latest news received from Kandahar previous to the departure of the force was of the 3rd August, on which date Ayub Khan was reported to be still 20 miles to the west of Kandahar. The troops under Lieut.-General Primrose's command were, however, shut up within the walls of the citadel and city, by a rising of the people of the district. It was known that the walls could scarcely be surmounted by assault, and that they could not be breached by field artillery; it was, therefore, reasonably assumed that the large garrison which held Kandahar could with ten light field guns and a heavy battery resist any attack which the Afghan army might make, and would be secure for so long a time as provisions held out. Nothing was known for certain about the amount of supplies at Kandahar, but it was hoped that, with the exception of live stock and forage, all articles were fairly plentiful. There was also some doubt about the water supply of the city, but this, drawn from wells, proved to be abundant and good.

The route pursued as far as Ghazni was as follows:—

Marches.

1. Beni-Hissar	to Zaidabad	16 miles.
2. Zaidabad	„ Zergunshahr	13 „
3. Zergunshahr	„ Padkao Rogani	16½ „
4. Padkao Rogani	„ Ashrak or Amir Killa	10½ „
	Cross the Zamburak Pass . . .	7,000 feet.
5. Ashrak	„ Takia, in the valley of the Shiniz	12 miles.

Marches.

6. Takia..... to Shashgao 17 miles.
(Haiderkhel).¹

7. Shashgao „ Ghazni 12½ „
Cross the Sher-i-Dahan Pass 9,000 feet.

Total..... 97½ miles.

Or an average daily march of 13½ miles.

N.B.—The route by Maidan is about 87 miles in length.

The first three marches led by the valley of the Logar, through a country fairly open, though brigades were necessarily restricted to one road. In forming the column of march the lead was taken by brigades in rotation, and similarly the leading position in brigade was allotted to corps according to roster. The plan adopted in marching is best indicated by the following extracts from the order books:—

“ Camp Zergunshahr,

“ No. 10.

“ August 10th, 1880.

“ When two or more brigades march together, the following will be the order of march:—

“ 1. *Troops constituting the fighting line*, with the first reserve of ammunition, rations and cooking pots for European regiments, doolies and dandies.

“ 2. “ Field hospitals.

“ Ordnance park.

“ Treasure.

“ Engineer park.

“ Led horses.

“ The baggage of brigades massed and moving in the order of movement of corps.

“ 3. The rear-guard, as may be detailed.

“ The baggage will be controlled in brigades by brigade Transport Officers.

“ All followers, with the exception of Officers' syces and cooks accompanying British regiments, will remain with the baggage, and will be under the control of the Provost-Marshal and his establishment.

“ No. 15.

“ Rouse to-morrow at 2.45 A.M.

“ Brigades will march at 4 A.M.

“ The Cavalry Brigade and 2nd Infantry Brigade will cross the river at Hissarak, and march *via* Uni Saydan and Deh Moghlan to Baraki-Barak, and encamp on the sloping ground overlooking, and to the west of the village; their supplies to be drawn from the villages above named.

“ The 1st and 3rd Infantry Brigades will march in columns of brigades, the 2nd Brigade crossing the small Kotal (pass) to the

¹ A list of the marches from Haiderkhel to Kandahar accompanies the map at the end of the paper.

"west of the camp and marching through Dadu Khel towards His-sarak.

"These brigades will march on parallel lines to the rising ground situated to the left of Padkao Rogani, distance 15 miles.

"Supplies for these brigades will be drawn from Padkao Rogani and Baraki-Rajan."

NOTE.—In such movements, although halts were ordered at regular intervals, it was found impossible to assimilate the pace, and preserve a regular rate of marching. When the Highlanders led the column, the Goorkahs were worn out by their efforts to keep up, and when the Goorkahs were in front, the pace became generally so slow as to fatigue the Europeans and the Sikhs, yet it was very important for Brigade Commanders to strive at a uniform rate of marching, and to adhere to the halts of ten minutes ordered at the end of each hour of march, as well as the breakfast halt of twenty minutes, fixed for 8 o'clock.

The movement through the defile known as the Tangi Wardak, by which the Logar and Shiniz when united find their way from the Wardak country to the Logar Valley proper, was effected with some difficulty, and the passage of the Zamburak Pass threw hard work upon the troops; owing to the absence of wheeled artillery and to the equipment of the entire force with mule and pony transport, no halt was, however, found to be necessary, either before or after the passage of this difficult piece of country. It had been anticipated that the passage of the Zamburak would be disputed; but neither here nor at the Sher-i-Dahan Pass was any opposition offered; the road over the latter is open and easy, and had, only a few months previously, been made practicable for the movement of heavy field guns. It will be readily understood that the collection and distribution of food, fuel, and forage, together with the establishment of markets within the limits of each brigade, where the inhabitants might find a sale for articles of supply, necessitated an elaborate system; the work of marching, camping, and supply rested, however, with no inexperienced soldiers; it was not very often during the entire length of the march to Kandahar that the British troops had to substitute flour-cakes (chupatties) for the regular bread ration, and no instance was brought to notice in which either a soldier or a follower failed to receive his ration. The principle applied in marching, in the formation of camps, as well as in the distribution of supplies and forage, was that each individual in the moving body should, as far as possible, depend upon his own exertions. In the formation of camps, the positions of brigade and regimental headquarters were, as far as was practicable, the same on each day, and were readily recognized; everything was left to regimental agency, and action in brigade was rarely necessary. A sufficiency of wood for the bakeries attached to British regiments was obtained with the greatest difficulty; the country is almost devoid of trees, and, except near villages and when it was possible to take the roofs off the houses, strong fatigue parties had to be told off to dig up the roots of the "southern-wood" and shrubs which fortunately abounded. A fair price was invariably paid for the

wood, and it was found that the inhabitants were, for the most part, willing to sell their houses; the native troops were, however, most frequently reduced to collecting the roots of the "southern-wood," and on it the followers depended for fuel.

After leaving the Logar Valley, water was, as a rule, only found at more or less extended intervals. This caused much difficulty in selecting the site of each day's encampment, with due regard to the length of the march and the presence of a sufficient supply of water. Long stretches of desert had often to be traversed without a drop of water, causing great inconvenience and suffering to man and beast marching under a burning sun. Fortunately, when a stream was found, the water, as far as Khelat-i-Ghilzai, was generally good and fairly plentiful. The climate showed great variations of temperature between day and night, at times as much as 80°. The sun was throughout the day very powerful, and the nights comparatively cold, until Kandahar itself was nearly reached. This caused great inconvenience to the troops, who had to march in the same clothes when the thermometer was nearly at freezing point as when it reached 110°. They also suffered greatly from constant sand storms, and from the suffocating dust raised by the column on the march. It must also be noticed that the moon was in its first quarter when we left Kabul; the comfort derived from its light after a weary day's march, and in the preparation for an early start, cannot be over-estimated.

Ghazni was reached on the 15th of August. The tribal gatherings, which had been encouraged to fanaticism by Mushk-i-Alam during the early period of the campaign, and which had resisted Sir Donald Stewart's march, had long since dispersed; the faction which acknowledged Mahomed Jan as chief had accepted temporarily the Amirship of Abdul Rahman, and such of the Chiefs as professed themselves adherents of the Yakub Khan party had proceeded to join Ayub Khan at Kandahar. The temporary Governor of Ghazni professed to welcome the General, and promised to furnish supplies; it was, however, necessary to employ foraging parties to obtain them; there was everywhere a sullen objection made to provide what was required, and markets were established in camp with the greatest difficulty. The rapidity with which the transfer of 10,000 troops from Kabul to Ghazni had been effected had, in fact, prevented the possibility of combinations and consequent resistance, and all idea of organized opposition was abandoned, yet fear only prevented overt acts of hostility on the part of the inhabitants. As a matter of fact, the Ghazni district, and the district of Mukur which adjoined it, had too recently suffered in the battle of Ahmed Khel for the inhabitants to run the risk of further punishment.

N.B.—On the battle-field of Ahmed Khel a ziarat, to the memory of 1,100 martyrs, indicated the losses they had sustained.

Throughout the provision of the required daily supply caused considerable anxiety and entailed additional work on the troops and transport animals, many of whom had daily to be sent long distances

to bring in food after the march was over. As far as the watershed dividing the head waters of the Ghazni and the Tarnak Rivers, the route now followed the Ghazni River by a gradual rise, the country being far more open than hitherto, some modification of the order of march became therefore possible; considerable experience had already been gained, and marches of unusual length were henceforward made.

On the 16th August a march of 20 miles was accomplished, some of the brigades covering from 22 to 23 miles in their day's journey.

The orders for movement were as follows:—

“ Ghazni, 15th August, 1880.

“ The force will march to-morrow to ground beyond Nani, which will be pointed out on arrival.

“ The rouse will sound at 2.45 A.M., and brigades will move at 4.15 A.M.

“ The movement will be covered by the cavalry brigade at a distance of 5 miles in advance of the infantry column.

“ The Officer commanding the cavalry brigade will detach one troop to accompany the 1st Brigade of Infantry.

“ The baggage of the cavalry brigade will move after the infantry column has passed, and take place in rear of it, but in advance of the baggage of the infantry.

“ The doolies of the cavalry will head the cavalry baggage; spare horses of cavalry, led chargers of Officers, and all followers of the cavalry brigade will remain with the baggage.

“ The Infantry Division will march in the following order:—

“ The 2nd Infantry Brigade.

“ The 3rd Infantry Brigade.

“ Field hospitals.

“ Baggage of the 2nd Brigade.

“ ” ” 3rd Brigade.

“ ” ” 1st Brigade.

“ Ordnance.

“ Treasure.

“ Commissariat reserve.

“ The 1st Infantry Brigade will form the rear-guard, the Officer commanding the brigade ordering the time of its march.”

The manner of covering the movement rested with the Officer commanding the cavalry brigade; as a general rule the distribution of the brigade, however, consisted in the front being covered by two regiments, while a regiment moved on either flank at an average distance of a mile from the infantry column, the flanking regiments detaching one or more troops to the rear-guard. The hilly nature of the ground rendered it impossible for cavalry to be worked at a greater distance.

The method of such marching as was now put in practice is not easy to describe; it combined the extreme of freedom in movement, with carefully regulated halts, and the closest control in every portion of the column; it employed the individual intelligence of each man composing the masses in motion, and called on all for exertion in

overcoming the difficulties of the march, in bearing its extraordinary toil, and in aiding the accomplishment of the object in view. Once movement had commenced, the animals of the baggage column, moving at different paces, were checked as little as possible; the large number of Officers detailed for baggage duty reduced confusion to a minimum, and secured a pace in marching that could not have been anticipated, the baggage animals reaching camp for the most part very soon after the arrival of the troops.

The utmost effort to systematize the march could not, however, prevent the rear-guards from being detained upon the road, covering and aiding the march of a weary following, pressing forward the feeble amongst the cattle, shifting loads and rendering such assistance as was required. Assuming that the march commenced daily at 4 A.M., the rear-guard seldom left camp before 7 A.M., and only reached the next encampment shortly before sundown. The actual length of the column of march, by the shortest computation, amounted to from 6 to 7 miles.

To appreciate the endurance of the troops under the circumstances detailed, or to understand the very high order of discipline they maintained, it seems almost necessary to have seen them at work, and to have witnessed the cheerful alacrity with which they responded to every call, refusing under all circumstances to acknowledge even that they were fatigued.

If it be realized that 10,148 troops, 8,143 native followers, and 11,224 animals, including cavalry horses, composed the column in movement, that the daily supply for all these was drawn from the country after arrival in camp, that food was regularly distributed to every individual, and cooked with fuel brought in from a distance, that bread was issued almost daily, and that ample forage was provided, the performance of the next eight days will be allowed to rank high in the annals of marches.

On the 16th August, the force marched from Ghazni to Yerghalta,				
				20 miles.
„	17th	„	„	Yerghalta to Chardeh,
				12 miles.
„	18th	„	„	Chardeh to Kerez-i-
				Oba, $16\frac{1}{2}$ miles.
„	19th	„	„	Kerez-i-Oba to Mu-
				kur, 14 miles.
„	20th	„	„	Mukur to Panjak, 21
				miles.
„	21st	„	„	Panjak to Gajai, 18
				miles.
„	22nd	„	„	Gajai to Baba Ka-
				zai, $16\frac{1}{2}$ miles.
„	23rd	„	„	Baba Kazai to Khelat-
				i-Ghilzai, $16\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

Making a total distance of $134\frac{1}{2}$ miles in eight days, or $16\frac{1}{8}$ miles daily.

Although a hostile population hovered on all sides ready to attack stragglers, but three native soldiers were cut off from the column between Kabul and Khelat-i-Ghilzai; there were two suicides among the troops, and the number of followers unaccounted for at the end of the march was less than 40, and many of those, being Afghans or Hazaras, had deserted.

Each day careful reports regarding the health and actual condition of troops and followers were submitted to the Lieutenant-General; with reference to the facts brought to light by these, it may be observed that for some days after the march commenced, the daily increase in the number of men reputed to be footsore or unable to march, through weariness or general debility, was calculated to make the General hesitate in maintaining the rate of marching; the limit of the strain, however, seemed to have been reached when the long march out of Ghazni was accomplished, and from that time, many footsore men rejoined the ranks; it was, however, evident, that although the troops were in great form, the bulk of the followers, and more especially the doolie-bearers, could not hold out much longer.

Every baggage animal that could be so utilized was employed in aiding the weary and footsore, and in bringing them into camp, but the apathy of despair led many a worn-out man of the native following to refuse all exertion, and the duty of the rear-guard in pressing forward the stragglers was often arduous and painful.

In addition to the daily ration, a tin of pea-soup¹ was issued to every two British soldiers, on the 18th August, and on subsequent days.

Extra rum was issued to all soldiers drinking spirits, both British and native, three times, and an extra ration of meat to those men who did not drink rum, a meat ration of 2 chittacks, or 4 ounces, was also authorized for all followers whenever a sufficient number of sheep could be obtained. A regular issue of lime-juice was also ordered for all ranks.

Intelligence.

No account of operations in an enemy's country would be complete which did not refer to the method adopted in gaining intelligence.

During the campaigns recently conducted in Afghanistan, the Commanding General has, on nearly all occasions, been invested with supreme political authority, and the Political Department, which is a branch of the Foreign Department of the Government of India, has been directly under his control. Excepting where our troops have been in actual contact with the enemy, the Political Department has been the real department of intelligence; its Officers, chosen for their knowledge of Persian or Pushtoo, or on account of special experience in dealing with frontier tribes, were assisted by native Officers and soldiers of tried fidelity, who would otherwise have been employed under a chief of military intelligence. The duty of obtaining complete intelligence regarding the people and general politics of the

¹ This pea-soup was commonly taken before the march commenced.

country thus devolved on the Officers of the Political Staff, who were also mainly engaged in assisting the Commissariat to procure supplies. In addition to this agency, however, and to the regular patrolling of the country by cavalry, what I would term purely military intelligencers were encouraged to acquire information under regimental arrangements, and much was thus done at Kabul, in such regiments as the Corps of Guides, the 5th Punjab Infantry, the 28th Punjab Native Infantry, and in the cavalry, to ascertain what was really going on in the country. An Officer of the Quartermaster-General's Department was also specially entrusted with the duty of gaining intelligence through Afghan agents.

The information obtained daily in the Political Department, and by the other means detailed, was compiled in the Quartermaster-General's office, and was submitted for the General's information, after which it was circulated to brigades for the information of the Staff and commanding Officers. This system worked well, and allowed of all information being properly sifted, as all intelligence acquired by military agency was at once communicated to the Political Staff.

During the march from Kabul to Kandahar, there was no departure from the plan thus outlined, military and political Officers being in the closest accord with regard to the acquisition of intelligence; there was, however, an efficient body of cavalry to cover the movement, and directly the presence of an organized body of the enemy was ascertained, recourse was had to reconnaissance.

It happened that copies of the maps which had been prepared during the march of Sir Donald Stewart's Force had not in August reached Kabul from India; tracings of the original sheets were, however, supplied to brigades, and were copied in regiments; so that all Officers could be expected to have a general idea of the country.

It may here be noticed that the great perfection to which the practice of army signalling had been brought made the heliograph a very important aid in the communication of intelligence. Under the direction of the late Captain Straton, Superintendent of Army Signalling at Kabul, the trained signallers of the force were constantly employed, and by the judicious use of the heliograph on many occasions, the troops, both cavalry and infantry, were spared fatigue, the several brigades being constantly in communication by signal. I refer to this subject under the head of "Intelligence," as the value of this agency can only be fully appreciated when it is applied in the field, and particularly during operations in mountainous countries, to convey rapidly information of importance. Later on, it will be seen how much depended on the working of the heliograph between Kandahar and the camp in the Tarnak Valley, on the 27th August, but the benefits conferred on the Kabul Field Force, by its staff of army signallers under their gallant leader, cannot be forgotten.

At Panjak, on the 20th August, Sir Frederick Roberts received a letter from Khelat-i-Ghilzai, dated the 18th idem. Colonel Tanner, who was in command, stated that all was well with the garrison, and that the neighbouring country was quiet; he had received news from Major-General Phayre, C.B., from Quetta, dated the 12th August, to

the effect that he hoped to reach Kandahar, not later than the 2nd September, with a large force of cavalry, artillery, and infantry.

On the morning of the 21st August, communication by heliograph was established with Khelat-i-Ghilzai, distant 33 miles, and on that day, the agents of the local Governor, who acted under Colonel Tanner's direction, came out to meet the force, and to assist in obtaining supplies; wood and other articles required were also sent out from the fort to Baba Kazai, under an escort furnished by the 2nd Biluch Regiment. The following message was received by heliograph: "I have sent in to-day's letter detail of sortie made from Kandahar. Our loss, 8 Officers, including General Brooke, killed, 5 wounded; 200 men killed and wounded. Troops in Kandahar in good spirits, and anxious to be attacked, as they are secure." The letter received from Colonel Tanner informed the General that supplies at Kandahar were abundant, with the exception of forage, which could, however, be made to last until the 1st September. Messengers were despatched from Khelat-i-Ghilzai to Chaman on the 23rd August, with letters to Major-General Phayre, giving him full particulars regarding the march of the force, and the probable time of arrival at Robat, at which point it was hoped that communication with the column marching from Quetta might be established in view to a combined movement on Kandahar being arranged.

On the 24th August the force halted at Khelat-i-Ghilzai. Before leaving Kabul, Sir Frederick Roberts had received no instructions with reference to the disposal of this fort and outpost; he, however, considered it inadvisable to leave an isolated garrison behind in a position to which supplies must be subsequently forwarded with great difficulty; besides which such a garrison, however capable of maintaining itself in the fort, could not attempt offensive action or influence operations against Ayub Khan, and must therefore prove a source of embarrassment. Fortunately the troops at Khelat-i-Ghilzai were equipped with transport for movement and possessed European supplies for ten days, besides reserves of preserved meat, soup, and vegetables, which were very useful to the Kabul-Kandahar force. Sir Frederick Roberts decided that the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghilzai should accompany the force to Kandahar, and arranged to entrust the fort to Mahomed Sadik Khan, a Tokhi Chief, who was willing to hold it in British interests.

By the route which follows the valley of the Tarnak, and is that ordinarily taken, Kandahar is 86 miles from Khelat-i-Ghilzai; it may, however, be reached by roads which pass along the Argandab and Argastan Valleys that lie north and south of the Tarnak Valley and run parallel to it. On arrival at Khelat-i-Ghilzai, Sir Frederick Roberts was, therefore, called upon to consider the possibility of the Afghan Army, under Ayub Khan, endeavouring to pass clear of his line of march, and make for Ghazni by either of the alternative routes. The retention or abandonment of Khelat-i-Ghilzai in no way bore upon this question, as the fort could be passed by either of the lines under consideration at a distance of some miles, and cavalry and infantry could move by easy passes to join the main Ghazni road

near Panjak; but, in the absence of all knowledge regarding what had happened in the neighbourhood of Kandahar since the sortie of the 16th August, it devolved on the General to decide whether from this point he should keep his force intact and continue his march by the valley of the Tarnak, or detach some portion of his troops by the Argandab, to meet and check a possible move on the part of Ayub Khan, whose best policy it appeared to be to avoid an encounter and gain possession of Ghazni.

In January, 1879, when Sir Donald Stewart moved by the Tarnak Valley from Kandahar to Khelat-i-Ghilzai, with a division of all arms, it had been decided to send reconnoitring columns to pursue the alternative routes that existed, the character of the valleys of the Argandab and the Argistan was therefore well known, and the routes passing through them had been fully reported on. No doubt existed regarding the impossibility of moving wheeled artillery by the Argandab Valley; it was, therefore, certain that unless Ayub determined to abandon his guns he must be encountered in the neighbourhood of Kandahar itself, or be overtaken if he endeavoured to carry his artillery with him in a retirement towards Herat. Apart from the relief of Kandahar, it was imperative to inflict upon Ayub Khan a defeat which would satisfactorily re-establish the superiority of our arms, and the acquisition of the enemy's artillery would mean little if he avoided a battle. Under these circumstances, the General made up his mind to march as rapidly as possible, by the Tarnak Valley, to a position from which communication by heliograph might be established with Kandahar, in order that satisfactory information regarding Ayub's movements might influence his further march.

On the 25th August, the force marched to Jaldak, 15 miles; and on the 26th marched to Tirandaz, 15 miles.

At Tirandaz a letter was received from Kandahar dated the 25th, which conveyed the intelligence that the rumour of the arrival of the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force at Khelat-i-Ghilzai had caused Ayub Khan to change his position; that, on Monday night, the 23rd, the villages east and south of Kandahar had been abandoned by the mixed garrisons of Ghazis and regulars who had been entrusted with the investment of the city, and on the 24th Ayub had struck his camp and moved to a position on the Argandab River between Baba Wali and Shaikh Chala, due north of the city; he was reported to have with him 4,000 (regular) infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and many Ghazis, his artillery being stated to consist of six 12-pr. guns, two 9-pr. rifled, four 6-pr. smooth-bore guns, and one 4-pr.

Orders were then issued for two regiments of cavalry to march the following day to Robat, distant 36 miles, for the purpose of opening direct communication with the citadel of Kandahar, the remainder of the force being directed to move to a point about half-way to Robat. It was further arranged that in the event of information being received that Ayub was relinquishing his position and carrying his infantry and cavalry towards Ghazni by the line of the Argandab, a movement should be made to intercept his march. The camp of the

infantry division was, on the 27th August, 39 miles from Kandahar, and from the position in which it was placed, the Argandab Valley could be reached in two marches of 17 miles each, by a road passing through a valley known as the Bori Valley, and emerging in the district of Dallah, about 40 miles above Kandahar upon the Argandab River. Some 7,000 troops of arms were held in readiness, in the lightest of marching order, to proceed on the 28th August by this line, it being intended that, if the movement was undertaken, the two regiments of cavalry thrown forward to Robat should cover the movement, and strike the Argandab some miles nearer to Kandahar than the point where the infantry would debouch. The field hospitals and non-effectives, baggage, &c., would, at the same time, have been advanced slowly towards Kandahar, under an escort of not less than 2,500 infantry, 2 field guns (belonging to the Khelat-i-Ghilzai garrison), and a regiment of cavalry, with the idea that they might be placed in an intrenched position at or near Robat during the conduct of whatever operations might follow.

At 1 o'clock on the 27th, heliographic communication with Kandahar was established at Robat, from which point signals were flashed to the infantry camp. It was then ascertained that the Afghans were still in position behind the Baba Wali Pass, overlooking the city, and that Ayub Khan was not credited with any idea of flight, it being stated that the Ghazis whom he had assembled would force him to fight.

On the morning of the 28th of August, the entire force was brought together at Robat, regular communication with the city having been opened the previous afternoon, when Lieutenant-Colonel St. John and other Officers arrived in the cavalry camp under escort of two squadrons of cavalry. It was ascertained that, although the investment of Kandahar was at an end, and the garrison were free to move about the villages near the walls, or even further in the direction of Robat, the position occupied by Ayub Khan was perfectly concealed. The information obtained regarding his dispositions amounted to little or nothing; it was, however, clear that the Afghan Army held a strong defensive position, and evinced no intention of abandoning it without a struggle. This being the case, Sir Frederick determined to halt at Robat for one day, troops and followers being much in need of rest. The entire force encamped at Momand on the 30th August.

While at Robat Sir Frederick Roberts received a letter from Major-General Phayre which put out of the question all hope of co-operation by the force advancing from Quetta, the leading brigade being still occupied in the passage of the Khojak Pass. The difficulties which had been encountered in moving troops by rail through Scinde at the end of July, and in marching them through the country intervening between Sibi and Pishin, can only be referred to in this paper to explain the unavoidable delay in General Phayre's movements. The hardships and privations undergone by the troops advancing from Scinde were of no ordinary character; the patience they exhibited,

and the eagerness with which they sought to overcome all obstacles, are worthy of remembrance!

The water supply to the west of the city was at this time in the enemy's possession, and it became necessary to organize the march of the 31st so as to gain the karez which furnished it, as well as to secure a position for camps covering the city itself, and within striking distance of Ayub's intrenchments.

The force moved from Momand on the morning of the 31st August, two brigades of infantry leading the advance, while the cavalry covered the baggage on either flank, and the remaining infantry brigade formed a rear-guard. The direction of the march cleared the city on the south. After marching 12 miles, however, a halt was made near the Shikarpore, or south gate of the city, where, in communication with the General Officer commanding at Kandahar, arrangements had been made for the troops to breakfast. At 10 o'clock the leading brigades were pushed forward, the baggage remaining massed under the city wall, and a position stretching from the range immediately above Old Kandahar through Karez Hill and what is known as Picket Hill, was occupied. From this the enemy could be observed in occupation of the Baba Wali Pass, with cavalry pickets thrown forward upon a low ridge overlooking the cantonment and the city. The ground taken up for our camps was selected as being outside the limit of range from the pass itself, though later on more than one shell from the enemy's rifled guns at the Baba Wali fell within camp limits. The dispositions of the enemy were entirely concealed; as soon, therefore, as the ground for camps had been allotted, and pickets were thrown out covering the water supply, a reconnaissance was ordered. The 3rd Bengal Cavalry, the 15th Sikhs, and two guns 11 | 9 R.A., were detailed for this duty, under the command of Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, C.B., V.C. The reconnoitring column moved out, about 1 P.M., from the left of the line of pickets towards some high ground immediately above the village of Gundigan; here the infantry and guns were halted while the cavalry advanced for a mile or a mile and a-half, clearing, as far as possible, the orchard ground which shut in Gundigan itself, and emerging on a stretch of turf directly in front of, and distant about a mile from, the village of Pir Paimal, where the enemy appeared to be strongly intrenched. This movement at once drew the fire of the enemy's artillery, while the dry water-channels forming an intrenchment along the whole front of this position rapidly filled with men assembling. As soon as the enemy's fire along his entire line had been drawn, the cavalry fell back very cleverly, taking shelter under the orchard walls, and two companies of infantry thrown forward to cover this withdrawal became slightly engaged with the enemy's skirmishers now entering the orchards, while the mountain guns were brought into action at a range of about 1,800 yards from the enemy's artillery in front of Pir Paimal. At this time the Afghans were observed to be pressing rapidly into the orchards in front of Gundigan, and as soon as the cavalry had passed in rear of the line, retirement was ordered. The cavalry movement had been carried out with great coolness and

with singular good fortune, no casualty having, up to this moment, occurred. Following the cavalry, the guns were then withdrawn towards the line of pickets under escort of two companies, while six companies of infantry held the Gundigan Hill. The instant these fell back, the enemy in large numbers occupied the ground just vacated, and took possession of the village itself; the guns were then pushed forward to the left picket, and one of them came immediately into action, the companies which had served as escort being brought back in support of the companies returning from the hill, which were steadily pressed by an enemy momentarily increasing in strength. The enemy eventually assembled in such large numbers, and endeavoured so persistently to follow up the reconnoitring column, that the whole of the troops in camp were placed under arms, and about sunset firing was taken up along the whole line. The shooting of the Afghans was, happily, very indifferent, only ten casualties being reported. The reconnaissance had been made with previous knowledge of the ground, and with positions noted on a well-executed map, the information obtained enabled the Lieutenant-General to form his plans for the next day's operations. The enemy's position had been discovered to lie too close to that held by the force for him to be left for many hours undisturbed, and an attack was at once decided on.

As soon as the General's plans were formed, about 8 p.m., Officers commanding divisions and brigades, with their Staff and the Officers next in rank in brigades, were ordered to assemble at Headquarters at 6 a.m. on the 1st, and a line of field telegraph having been erected between Headquarters and the city, Lieut.-General Primrose, commanding the Kandahar garrison, was also communicated with, orders were issued for troops to breakfast at 7 a.m., and to prepare a day's cooked ration, for camps to be struck and packed, and for the entire force to be under arms at 8 a.m.

On the morning of the 1st September, Lieut.-General Sir Frederick Roberts communicated personally to commanding Officers his plan of attack, and the following distribution of troops was made before the advance was ordered.

The Infantry Division Kabul Field Force was drawn up in rear of Picket and Karez Hills, and in prolongation to the left as far as Chil-Zina (immediately below the range which covers Old Kandahar). The 1st and 2nd Brigades were to form the column of attack, and were massed behind Karez Hill, the 3rd Brigade, which constituted the reserve, being extended to the left.

The Cavalry Brigade Kabul Field Force, with E | B Royal Horse Artillery (four guns), two companies 7th Fusiliers, and four companies of Bombay Native Infantry, under the orders of Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, C.B., V.C., were drawn up in rear of the left, the order to General Gough being that if, when fire was opened, he found his front clear, he should push forward the infantry and guns to occupy the position above Gundigan, which had been so useful during the previous day's reconnaissance, the cavalry being pushed to the bed of the Argandab, from which point the enemy's line of retreat to Girishk could be easily closed, and that which led to Kakrez might be

threatened. The cavalry brigade was ordered to carry two days' cooked rations.

The troops of the Kandahar Garrison, under the orders of Lieut.-General Primrose, C.S.I., were directed, after sufficient guards for the city gates had been detailed, to move towards the positions held by the infantry destined to attack. C | 2 Royal Artillery was, however, ordered to join the 1st Brigade Kabul Field Force, to which 6 | 8 R.A. (screw guns) was also attached. Brigadier-General Burrows' Brigade, with 5 | 11 R.A. (four 40-prs.), and the cavalry of the Kandahar garrison, were meanwhile allotted to a position to the north of the old cantonment, and under shelter of some high ground actually in the enemy's possession, from which point the guns were to shell the Baba Wali Pass, and cover the main design in the attack. The cavalry, under Brigadier-General Nuttall, being ordered to move to the right, and cover the approach to the city from what is known as the Murcha Pass, the extreme left of the enemy's position.

Shortly after 9 A.M. the dispositions above outlined were completed; it was, however, apparent that the enemy, regarding our withdrawal in reconnaissance, the previous evening, as a further success, were determined to act offensively. Gundigan was occupied in force by them early in the day, and the movement of the cavalry was consequently delayed until the main attack to be delivered by the infantry on the right should be developed. The very strong defensive position about the village of Gundi Mulla Sahibdad, some 1,400 to 1,500 yards from our line, was held, and all along the front, through the orchards and gardens which connected the two villages of Gundigan and Gundi Mulla Sahibdad, the enemy's skirmishers covered the movement of very large numbers from Pir Paimal towards our line. The Baba Wali Pass was crowded with Ghazis, and the regular cavalry of the enemy held the comparatively low ground in advance.

Already the enemy's shell were falling occasionally within our line, and a desultory fire from the gardens was aimed at the troops wherever they were visible, when, about 9.20 A.M., the 40-prs. opened against the pass. This signal was to initiate our attack, the object of which was the village of Pir Paimal. It was, however, necessary to dislodge the enemy from Gundi Mulla Sahibdad, and C | 2 R.A. and 6 | 8 R.A. being in position to shell this village, the 1st Brigade, under Brigadier-General Macpherson, C.B., V.C.,¹ moved directly against it, the 2nd

¹ *Troops of the Kabul Force Employed in the Attack.*

1st Brigade (Infantry), Brigadier-General Macpherson, C.B., V.C., Commanding.

92nd Highlanders.

2nd Goorkhas.

23rd Pioneers.

24th Punjab Native Infantry.

6 | 8 Royal Artillery (attached).

2nd Brigade (Infantry), Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, C.B., Commanding.

72nd Highlanders.

2nd Sikhs.

3rd Sikhs.

5th Goorkhas.

Brigade extending to its left and moving through the orchards, in connection with the 1st Brigade, until its left touched Gundigan. The 3rd Brigade was at the same time formed in support in advance of the village of Abasabad. The shell-fire of the batteries was very effective, but the enemy found cover in the underground chambers in the village of Gundi Mulla Sahibdad, which was carried by the 2nd Goorkahs and 92nd Highlanders in dashing style; the enemy, driven out, retired leisurely, however, many of them remaining behind to meet the bayonets of the 92nd. Meanwhile, the 2nd Brigade became engaged while clearing the orchards on the left; and it was here that Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow, C.B., and Captain Frome, of the 72nd Highlanders, lost their lives. The enemy's right at Gundigan was, however, rapidly withdrawn towards Pir Paimal, and the forward movement of the two brigades continued after the capture of the first village almost without a pause. The position of the 3rd Brigade at this time was designed as a support to this advance, as also to meet any counterstroke which Ayub Khan might attempt from the Baba Wali Pass against the troops under command of Brigadier-General Burrows. The main body of the Afghan regular troops was known to be immediately behind the pass, and until the shoulder of the hill had been reached by our advance, and the attack on Pir Paimal itself was fully developed, the 3rd Brigade was not moved. The cavalry¹ on the left were, however, at once relieved, and scouting, as far as Kokeran, advanced rapidly to execute the extended movement entrusted to them.

Turning the shoulder of the hill (a very precipitous one) above Pir Paimal, the 1st Brigade came under a heavy fire, and a stout resistance was offered in the village itself; our troops, the 92nd and 2nd Goorkahs still leading, were not, however, to be deterred, and the village was gained at 12.15 p.m., the 2nd Brigade being, at this time, clear of the village, and so far advanced as to be obliged to delay until Pir Paimal was carried.

Covering the main camp at Mazra, there still remained a strong

29th Bombay Native Infantry (2nd Biluchis).
(Khelat-i-Ghilzai Garrison).
No. 2 Mountain Battery (attached).

3rd Brigade (Infantry), Brigadier-General MacGregor, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E.
Commanding.

2 | 60th Rifles.
4th Goorkahs.
15th Sikhs.
25th Punjab Native Infantry.
11 | 9 Royal Artillery (attached).

¹ *Cavalry Brigade.*

Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, C.B., V.O., Commanding.
9th Lancers.
3rd Bengal Cavalry.
3rd Punjab Cavalry.
Central India Horse.

position to the enemy, and behind this several field guns were placed; to this the two brigades moved forward without interruption, fighting their way; the final charge, made by the 92nd Highlanders, the 2nd Goorkahs, and the 23rd Pioneers, resulted in the capture of the guns and the precipitate flight of the enemy.

Ayub Khan must have realized some time previous that the day was lost to him. His regular troops made off through the thick gardens and orchards of the Argandab, the Herat regiments towards Zamindawar and Herat, and the Kabul regiments by the Argandab valley towards Ghazni.

By 1 o'clock our troops were in possession of Ayub Khan's camp and all his ordnance.

During the last stage of the advance our signallers with the leading brigade moved to the Baba Wali Pass, just abandoned by the enemy, for the purpose of signalling the result of the attack to Lieutenant-General Primrose's headquarters, now stationed on Picket Hill, Sir Frederick Roberts having advanced with the 3rd Brigade in support of the main attack. Captain Straton, the Superintendent of Army Signalling, pressing forward in eager haste in advance of the party, was here shot by an Afghan who had concealed himself behind some rocks.

An order had already been despatched for the cavalry on the right to move over the Baba Wali Pass and pursue the retiring enemy by the direct road leading through the Argandab Valley, and very shortly after Sir Frederick Roberts reached Mazra, the 3rd Scinde Horse and 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, under Brigadier-General Nuttall, were advanced in pursuit.

On the night of the 1st September, the 1st Infantry Brigade encamped at Mazra, the remainder of the troops returning to their encampments near the cantonments. Our cavalry reached camp between 8 and 9 P.M., after inflicting a loss of some 300 upon the fugitive enemy.

Just as it is difficult to understand the rapidity with which large numbers are assembled in Afghanistan for fighting purposes, so the dispersing of an Afghan Army and its attendant masses of tribal levies in flight is almost beyond comprehension; men who have been actually engaged in hand-to-hand combat dispose of their arms in the villages they pass through, and meet their pursuers with melons or other fruit in their hands, while they adopt the rôle of peaceful inhabitants.

Of the thousands serving with pride under Ayub Khan's orders on the morning of the 1st September, but a few horsemen and a small party of Herat infantry accompanied him in his flight; the rest were not!

By estimates subsequently made, the strength of the Afghans in position on the 1st September has been fixed at—regular infantry, 4,000; cavalry, 800; Ghazis, 5,000; irregular cavalry, 3,000. When the attack was made it was, however, almost impossible to come to any conclusion regarding their numbers, while it was equally impossible to measure the loss inflicted on them; the battle of Kandahar is,

at the same time, one of the rare instances in which a Mahomedan army has been so completely routed as to make but small effort to carry off its dead. From 700 to 800 bodies were buried by us during the three days immediately following, and every possible opportunity for removal was given to the Afghans. The British loss, as given in returns, amounted to 40 killed and 228 wounded.

The DUKE OF CONNAUGHT: As no Officer wishes to offer any remarks, it only devolves upon me to express to Colonel Chapman the thanks of everyone present for the admirable paper to which we have just listened. I hope I may be allowed to endorse the remarks of Colonel Chapman as to how much we regret the absence of Major-General Sir Frederick Roberts. All that we have heard has proved how admirable were the arrangements made by that distinguished Officer. We have heard a full description of his march from the time when he first received orders to the time after the Battle of Kandahar. We have seen how thoroughly he understood what the components of an army must be for an operation of this kind, and how he entrusted to the different Officers their several positions and responsibilities. Gentlemen, it would be very venturesome on my part, and it would not be in good taste, if I were to make any remarks on the subject. I only wish to say how very much gratified we have been at the very full and able manner in which Colonel Chapman has placed everything before us. As far as it is possible we, who were not present and have only been able to follow the accounts given in the newspapers from day to day, have now been placed in possession of full information on this most important subject. In your name, then, I beg to thank Colonel Chapman most heartily for his most interesting lecture on the important march terminating in the Battle of Kandahar.