By the courtesy of the Editor I am enabled to make one correction of my article "Objectives, Truth and Error," in the last number of *MIND*. I was unfortunately unable to return the proof in time to have the correction made before the October number was finally made up. On page 501 I urge as against Mr. Russell's statement that the multiple relation of judging, in virtue of its sense, arranges the objects of the judgment in a certain order, that the objects of the judgment are already arranged in an order independent of the relation of judging, and that it is just the point of a true judgment that it announces such an objective order independent of itself. But then I went on to say that this objection that the mind in judging can only add itself to an independent objective complex, although true, is really a denial of Mr. Russell's main point that judging is a multiple relation. This, however, I saw almost as soon as I had sent my article to the Editor, is not the case. To adopt this common-sense, objective view of judgment is in no wise tacitly to deny that judging is a multiple relation. The matter can be illustrated by means of the relation of 'between'. When a third thing C adds itself to the two things A and B in a certain way the relation of 'between' arises. Nevertheless, 'between' remains a multiple relation subsisting between the three things A, B and C, although we have at least two new dual relations, namely that between C and A and that between C and B. Similarly when I judge that A is to the right of B, the two objects A and B are already arranged in an ordered complex to which the judging mind can only add itself. But this does not necessarily mean that the relation of judging which we are seeking to characterise is a dual relation between the mind, on the one hand, and the ordered objective complex A-r-B, on the other, although again we get new dual relations, namely between the mind and each of its objects, relations which, Mr. Russell insists, are involved in judgment but are not the essence of judgment. What the objection does tacitly deny is that the relation of judging is, so to speak, purely multiple, i.e. that the objects are never found except as related by the multiple relation of judging. But this can be rightly denied, for what all judgment seeks to do is to characterise such relations subsisting independent of the judging mind in its objects.

The objection, however, although sound so far as it goes, is not one on which we should rely before we have offered some solution of the difficulty of impossible objects and of error. It succumbs in turn to the counter-objection that to talk of the mind's adding itself to an objective complex is not to do justice to the essential nature of judgment. Judgment is no more such a complex + mind than it is two peas + a third pea. When, however, we have found some sort of solution of the problem of error, as e.g. by the doctrine of Objectives which I afterwards tried to formulate, it should encourage us to have this pre-scientific view as to the objective nature of judgment on our side.

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OBITUARY NOTICE.

On the 2nd December, 1914, a great loss to philosophy and a personal loss to an extremely wide circle of friends occurred in the death of Prof. A. Campbell Fraser, at the advanced age of ninety-six. An account of his career is being arranged for by this review.