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LECTURE.

Friday, May 15, 1874.

VICE-ADMIRAL SIR FREDERICK W. E. NICOLSON, Bart., C.B.,
Chairman of the Council, in the Chair.

THE VOLTA EXPEDITION, DURING THE LATE ASHANTEE CAMPAIGN.

By Captain Sir JOHN H. GLOVER, G.C.M.G., R.N.

I BELIEVE that I have the honour of standing before you to-day in consequence of so little having been known of the expedition which I had the honour to command during the late Ashantee campaign, and for this reason, that we had no reporters of the press with us. One daily paper having dubbed us all "filibusters," and having said on our return that we should be tried for our lives twenty times over, satisfied themselves with that, and left us. That, I very much regret, because I am sure that the public, and we ourselves, lost much by not having an account of our proceedings duly reported.

On the 3rd of August last, having been honoured with the confidence of Her Majesty's Government, I was told to go out and organise an expedition of 10,000 men; and the confidence which Her Majesty's Government placed in me was fully evidenced by what I shall tell you. Lord Kimberley was good enough to let me name my own salary, and I was not only allowed to choose my own staff, but every detail of the expedition was left to me; in fact, the fullest confidence was placed in me. On the 19th of August, I left England, and having arrived in due course at Accra, we encountered our first difficulty. That difficulty arose from the opposition of the native kings on the seaboard, and from the system of slavery which, I am sorry to say, exists there. A great deal of time was apparently lost before any movement was made; consequently, I regret to say, no very great result was anticipated from the expedition; but I think when I have put before you what took place between the time when we landed at Accra, namely, the 12th of September and our crossing the Volta on Christmas Day, the public will see that our time was fully occupied, and that we did not allow the grass to grow

under our feet. On my way out, of course, I laid before the members of my staff the operations that were likely to take place; and having pointed out to them that the enemy were then occupying a position before Cape Coast Castle, our first duty was to create a diversion in the rear of the enemy, and thereby loosen the grip which they were holding on the seaboard near that place. I had with me a very distinguished officer, Captain Sartorius of the 6th Bengal Cavalry, and showing him where the enemy was, and where the first operations were likely to take place, I offered him the north-west frontier and the organisation of the two Akim tribes. I need not say that Captain Sartorius accepted that service, and immediately on our landing, he proceeded to make preparations for organising those forces.

On arriving at Accra, the first point was to assemble all the Kings and Chiefs of the Eastern Protectorate; and I thought it would save time if, instead of calling them all to Accra to have a week's carouse, we should ourselves go half-way to meet them; we therefore went up to Akropong, and summoned them to assemble there. That, of course, was readily obeyed, with the exception of the two Kings of the Akim tribes, who, in consequence of the heavy state of the roads which prevented travelling, did not appear. Some time therefore, was lost; and somewhat later we collected these chiefs at Accra. There a great deal of swearing took place, and a great deal of enthusiasm was manifested. They swore by Sir Charles Macarthy's old blue coat, which is their great oath, and threatened to forfeit their heads if they did not obey the orders given them, and expressed the utmost regard for the Queen and the British Government. But swearing the great oath seems to be with them the beginning, and very nearly the ending of their duties; they consider that having sworn the oath, that is sufficient.

I told you that our difficulties arose from the system of slavery. I was ordered to raise and organize a force of 10,000 men, 1,000 of whom should be Houssas. I am sorry to say we were only successful in adding 250 men of the Houssa tribe to the force already collected, in consequence of what I am about to tell you. As soon as it was known that the Houssa force was to be increased, all the kings and chiefs on the eastern seaboard, proceeded to put their Houssa slaves into irons, and it was (with few exceptions) only those men who broke their chains and came to us, that were enlisted. The Houssa men who had been with me at Lagos for many years, and who were in the habit of considering, that, when a slave put his foot on British territory, he was free, could not discriminate between the difference of position of a slave in a protected territory, and that of one coming on *bonâ fide* British soil, and, therefore, when they found the King of Accra was putting his own Houssa men into prison to prevent them enlisting in the Queen's service, they broke down the king's prison. On the people of Accra disapproving of that proceeding, we got into difficulties, the Houssa men chopping open the chiefs' heads and flogging the townspeople, and giving me a great deal of anxiety, because I was quite certain, that if, immediately on landing, we came into contact with the natives, it would be said that our endeavours to

raise a force would be a failure, and the people of England would have some anxiety as to the result. However, by putting plaister on the chiefs' heads and paying very great attention to their ladies,—which is a point I never overlook in those countries,—we succeeded in getting our force down to the Volta. The difficulty was,—and it was a very great one,—that when I once left Accra, the people there would not rise. I, therefore, left behind me a puncheon of rum, which was to be given to the ladies when they had flogged the men out of the town. That is their mode of getting the men to war and of raising their native army. It may be said, when it was known we were to march a force to Coomassie, that naturally a depôt would have been established on our line of march. This was not overlooked, and stores, provisions, and ammunition were landed at Accra, to be taken up to Khebi in Eastern Akim. The King of Eastern Akim was a young man, and eventually proved himself a very brave one, but, instead of devoting the money which I gave him to paying his people to carry up our loads of ammunition and stores, he invested it in salt, and therefore, as his people had to carry the King's salt up, they could not carry our provisions, consequently, all those provisions and stores had to be re-shipped from Accra, taken down to the Volta, and carried up that river to Duffo, and eventually brought overland at the last moment up to the Prah. As soon as Captain Sartorius had got up to Khebi, I received orders from Sir Garnet Wolseley, to say that he intended to cross a force from Western Akim, and that no communication should be entered into, between myself and the King of Western Akim, in order that the King should join the force before Cape Coast Castle. I am quite certain, had Sir Garnet Wolseley known the result of this order, he would not have detached the King of Western Akim from the force I was about to raise. No doubt he was advised by people in Cape Coast Castle, who were most anxious that the great fighting Chief of the Eastern Protectorate should join *them*, and be detached from *me*. I am quite certain, that had Captain Sartorius been allowed to organize the Western Akims with the Eastern, Sir Garnet would have had a most able force commanded by Captain Sartorius and one or two other Officers, and this combined force of Eastern and Western Akims, would have done much better service than did the Western Akims alone, who eventually deserted their Officers and were of no use at all.

We will now go to the Volta. It may be supposed that a great deal of time was lost there; but when I put before you all that we had to do in the way of discharging transports, drilling our men, and organizing a transport corps, you will see that our time was fully occupied; and I must here thank the representative of the *Standard*, and also of the *New York Herald*, who visited us, and who, to some extent, enlightened the public as to what we were doing. I should tell you, that our men had always three parades a day for drill, and each man fired forty rounds of ammunition at a target before we started, and on the last day I was encamped at Adda, the remainder of the force left there were employed in carrying coals from the landing place on the beach to the landing place on the river, which is just a mile, until half-past

ten. They were then allowed a few moments to put on their accoutrements, and we went up to the camp at Sophi. In the meantime Captain Sartorius had succeeded in assembling at Blappah 3,800 men, for the purpose of chastising the Awoonahs, a turbulent people on the left bank of the Volta; and so ashamed was I of the delay, that on two or three occasions I paid this force a visit, and gave them large presents to keep them quiet. I said how sorry I was that, in consequence of the beach tribes not having assembled, I was obliged to detain them. I wrote to the General, reporting the high state of preparation the force under Captain Sartorius was in, and describing their spirit and enthusiasm. I think it was about the 17th of December that I paid them my last visit, and finding that there was no chance of the beach tribes assembling in time, I ordered 1,000 men from Blappah to march by land to Sophi, where I had only collected some 500 men of the beach tribes out of 14,000. I was very much surprised when they told me that they had not the least intention of going six miles down, that they intended to cross there, and to cross nowhere else, and that they did not intend even to cross there for five days. I then felt I could not deceive the General, and immediately wrote and told Sir Garnet that he must not depend upon my crossing the Prah with any men besides those of my discipline force, under 1,000 men. On leaving the camp at Adda, I received the utmost assistance from Dr. Rowe, and without that able assistance we never could have crossed the Prah as we finally did. By his indefatigable exertions, he succeeded in bringing up to Sophi in three days some 10,000 men. On the 22nd of December we commenced to cross the force at Sophi, and, although it was intended to cross at daylight in the morning, in consequence of the hesitation on the part of our native allies, we got no men embarked until half-past ten. The enemy, the Awoonah, were in force on the opposite side, and having embarked some 300 men in steam launches and canoes, I sent them up the river to a point where the enemy were in position, evidently anticipating that we should land at that point. Having, then, got 250 men on a small steamer, which I had with me, I joined the flotilla, and, steaming down the river two miles, threw 500 men on shore at a point where we were not expected. The result was, we met with no opposition, and achieved a firm footing without suffering any loss. Two days were occupied there in crossing 9,000 men. I then rejoined Captain Sartorius at Blappah. You will see on the plan some hills marked: those hills were occupied by the enemy in force, and we saw their camps on the summit. The force which had crossed at Sophi was under the command of Mr. Goldsworthy. He was ordered to join me on the morning of Christmas Day, and to be at the base of these hills at six o'clock in the morning, but, in consequence of the disinclination of the natives to move, he did not join me till six o'clock in the evening. On the morning of Christmas Day a steam launch was sent down to shell the camps on the hills, supposing that Mr. Goldsworthy and his force of 9,000 men would be at their foot. However, not hearing anything of Mr. Goldsworthy by ten o'clock, we commenced to cross the Volta. I wish here to state, that Captain Sartorius and myself had a difference in opinion, and being the only difference

which ever existed between us during the campaign, I should just like to mention it. Captain Sartorius wished to cross with only fifty men; but, having had the experience of the two previous days, and finding I could throw 500 men across at a time, I told Captain Sartorius I really could not do him the favour which he wished, and I gave him 500 men instead of 50; that is the only difference of opinion we ever had. Captain Sartorius having got over with 500 men, the enemy's force, amounting to 2,000 did not long remain there; and, having driven the enemy from their position, we had a very comfortable Christmas dinner in their camp.

The next day I found both men and Officers too much done up to move. My intention was immediately to attack the enemy, some nine miles in our front, and (the probable successes of two or three days having put spirit and confidence into our force, which now amounted to 17,000 men) to have left Mr. Goldsworthy with some 8,000 or 9,000 men, and with the rest, to have marched to join Sir Garnet Wolseley in the Ashantee country. But the following day, namely the 27th, I received orders from Sir Garnet to sacrifice everything to the one object, namely to cross the Prah on the 15th of January, with the disciplined portion of my force. It was left to me that if I considered it better for the service, I might remain with the native force, but, under the circumstances, I declined to do that, and left the native force with Mr. Goldsworthy. I am sorry to state that the state of Mr. Goldsworthy's health has prevented him being present here to-day, and also putting in form a paper which, when he is able to do so, will be most interesting to the public, and will do justice to the gallantry which he displayed and the difficulties which he overcame, and which I am sure the public and the Government will appreciate, when the results of those exertions in the campaign are known. Mr. Goldsworthy fought two general actions in the open country with a large force of men. His loss of killed amounted to 50, and, I think, something under 200 wounded. He himself was dangerously wounded; and it was only when he had come to Cape Coast Castle to get medical assistance, having had no combatant Officers at all with him at that time, that the whole of this large force melted away and went home.

On the 27th of December, the Volta was re-crossed with the disciplined force which I had; but we laboured under this disadvantage, namely, that our artillery was left behind with the force on the other bank of the Volta, in consequence of all our transport arrangements remaining with the native force. The native allies refused to proceed with me to Ashantee until they had subdued the enemy on the eastern bank of the Volta. It was the intention, when I left England, that this part of the campaign should be first accomplished, because I was ordered to raise the tribes to the north-east of Coomassie, and it was impossible to reach their country until the tribes on the eastern lower bank of the Volta had been subdued, and our rear and right flank made secure. Therefore I impute no blame to the native force, that they declined to proceed with me to Ashantee, leaving their country open to invasion, and their wives and children exposed to all its perils.

Our march commenced from Blappali, and, as far as Odumassie, it was over a very hot open plain. At this time the river had fallen so low, that our stores, ammunition, and provisions, could be got up no further than Daffo, and the river between Daffo and Medica (the point we reached) was so entirely dry, that the canoes in some places had to be dragged over the bed of the river. Medica may, therefore, be considered as the starting point of our land transport. At the foot of the Akropong Mountains our ascent commenced, and until we reached the Anoom River, our whole line of march was over continuous ranges of mountains and rivers; our road, a simple hunter's track, or the water-courses of streams, which the tropical rains very soon swell into torrents, which wash away all the soil and leave large boulders bare; in fact, our road over these mountains was a simple watercourse. At Odumassie our next trouble was transport. Every man wished to go to war and carry his gun, and to that no objection was raised; but he could not be persuaded without the greatest difficulty to carry a load. After all, we had to fall back upon the women, who are found to be our best friends in those countries. They provided our carriers. But no feeling of patriotism, nor a wish to assist us against the enemy, could induce them to lift a single load off the road until it was paid for; and, with long convoys of carriers, unless watched, they were very apt to throw their loads off their heads, right and left, and bolt. The consequence was, that instead of having a large depôt at Khebi, we had to bring all our stores, provisions, and ammunition, over these several ranges of mountains before we could attempt to cross the Prah. The difficulty was not in bringing up a certain number of men to the Prah on the 15th of January, but to get the force up without being footsore, and fit for work; and I am happy to say, by the discretion and good judgment of the Officers in command of detachments—for we could not march the whole force up in one body—we crossed the Prah on the 15th of January with 740 men, all in sound condition and ready for work. About seven miles from Akropong we came to the gold pits, and one of our great difficulties along the road was to prevent our horses and men going down these pits. On one occasion I jumped my mare over a very large tree, and how she escaped going down a hole I do not know, for she landed with her fore foot close to it. I pulled her up, and put her a little to the right, and there was another gold pit on the other side, and we very nearly went down *that*. I may say that from Odumassie to Akropong the whole country is marked as gold-producing by these pits on both sides of the road.

The more interesting part of our march was, I think, when we were approaching the River Prah. There I had with me only two officers, Captain Sartorius and Lieutenant Barnard, having had to leave the rest behind in a long string or tail at all the different places, to pay and hire carriers, to induce carriers, to coerce them, and to get our stores along. We sacrificed *everything* to the one thing—*ammunition*; our clothes, provisions, and everything were thrown aside: the thing was to get up the ammunition. In spite of all our exertions, we had no guns and no rockets when we crossed the Prah. We crossed that river with 100 rounds in the men's pouches, and

four spare rounds of ammunition per man. Captain Sartorius and Lieutenant Barnard, who were in command of the advanced guard crossed the Prah at half-past ten on the 15th; and it was with great satisfaction that by twelve o'clock on the same day I was enabled myself to be on the other side with a force of 740 men. Our astonishment was very great that we had been allowed to cross the river without opposition; however, we found ourselves there without loss. Having secured the two roads in our front, we slept there very contentedly that night, and next morning started for what we supposed to be a town 16 miles in our front. None of our friendly allies, who at Khebi had been ready and desirous to meet the enemy, had come up, and when I started on Sunday, the King told me it was impossible to lift the royal war-stool on Sunday, and therefore he must remain till Monday. I knew very well if he remained till Monday I should not see him, and, as it turned out, he did not join me until, some four or five days after, we had secured a firm footing in the Ashantee territory.

Starting from the Prah on the morning of the 16th, the advanced guard fell in with a piquet of the enemy, at a village half way between the Prah and Abogoo, and there we captured one man, and all their guns. There was something very curious about this man. He was to have been made the next day chief of Abogoo. The old chief of Abogoo and all his men had gone to the campaign before Elmina, and only some half dozen out of 400 or 500 men ever returned. The King of Ashantee thought it might be well to instal a new chief, and therefore sent down a large force from Coomassie to instal the very man we captured at the spy village, and to sacrifice forty slaves on the occasion. The forty slaves were ordered to bring in provisions from the farms to feed the King of Ashantee's people, and they of course gave us this information afterwards. This man was made prisoner, and put under charge of Captain Sartorius's dog "Bell," for we thought she would be able to take good care of him.

Lieutenant Barnard, in advance, had the guide next to him wounded, and at half-past three, after some quarter of an hour's firing, the town of Abogoo was carried by a rush of the Houssa men under command of Captain Sartorius and Lieutenant Barnard. We only suffered a loss of eight wounded, three mortally, who died a day or two afterwards. We found at Abogoo, 200 sheep and all the vegetables which had been brought in from the farms by the forty slaves, who were to have been executed, so we spoiled that afternoon's diversion for the Ashantees. We took also some Ashantee prisoners. The slaves could give us no information of the country before us. They had been brought down some years before from the interior, put on a farm to work, some three or four miles from Abogoo, and beyond the road from their farm to Abogoo, they could tell us nothing. The few Ashantees we took, declined to give us any information, and I think it does great credit to the organisation or system of the Government of the King of Ashantee and his chiefs, that they certainly have instilled into their people a wonderful degree of patriotism: they would tell us nothing. At Abogoo we had to remain

until our ammunition came up, and some of the carriers; for, as I said, we had crossed the Prah with only four spare rounds of ammunition. The time, however, was not lost. The villages on our right and left flanks were visited and destroyed. Three or four days after we were at Abogoo, our friendly allies came in, and begged that they might be allowed to take Bonsoo. I let them go with 300 or 400 men, and Bonsoo they certainly took with a loss, I think, of two killed, and some three or four wounded; but the sight of their own blood so frightened them that they never wished to take any other place.

On the 22nd January (having crossed the Prah on the 15th), and having had to wait for ammunition and our friendly allies, Lieutenant Barnard and a force of 200 men (supplemented afterwards by 300 native allies) were sent to Prahsu. Prahsu, he took, without any loss. I then sent him 200 men, which made up his force to 700. I beg your attention to this particularly, because it was very important for us, and saved us from loss. Indeed, I think, had not Lieutenant Barnard succeeded on that line of road, we should not have reached Connomo, and we should not have been able to have assisted Sir Garnet Wolseley as we did, by having a force on his right flank so far up as Connomo. Bonsoo and Prahsu having been taken, and eventually Jowassy, it was arranged on the 26th, between Lieutenant Barnard and myself, that he should take Odumassie at half-past one, and that I, with the main force, should move up to take Connomo at the same time. About five miles from Connomo, my force fell in with the deserted camps of the Ashantee army, and had their troops only remained on that road, I doubt very much whether the small fighting force we had—some 450 men—(because I had to leave 200 behind at Abogoo), would ever have reached Connomo. But Lieutenant Barnard succeeded in reaching Odumassie, not at half-past one, but at half-past three, carrying it by a rush, as we had carried Abogoo some days before, the whole of the native force remaining behind, and coming into the town some quarter of an hour after he had occupied it. You will see that Odumassie commands both roads—the road in the rear from Connomo to Duabin, and also it cuts off the road to Coomassie. Therefore, the Ashantee force occupying Connomo and some four or five miles in its front hearing Lieutenant Barnard's firing on their right rear, thought it was time to be off, and I am happy to say, for my force and myself, they left the road clear for us. We did not reach within a mile of Connomo until late in the evening; and here I wish to give all credit to the King of Eastern Akim, who was with me, and who crept in and found Connomo deserted. It was then occupied, and the next day I joined Lieutenant Barnard at Odumassie.

I may now give you an instance of the dependence to be placed on our native allies. We must have had in Connomo 1,400 or 1,500 men, but in the morning before joining Lieutenant Barnard we were not sure of our position, because we did not know that he had taken Odumassie, and he did not know that I was in Connomo. Some 400 yards in front of Connomo was a river, and there might have been 400 or 500 Akims washing and bathing. Suddenly an alarm was raised, and the

whole of our native allies brought out their loads and prepared to go. I endeavoured to find out the reason of this alarm; at last the young King said to me, "We see Ashantee." "Well," I said, "that is what we all came to see." "Oh, but we see Ashantee;" and immediately all their loads were put on their heads, and they were quite ready to start off for the Prah. Dr. Rowe came in, and I asked him, "Have you seen this Ashantee?" "No," he said, "I have seen nothing; it was your bugle that brought me back." I instance this, to show how much dependence could be placed upon the native allies that were with me, and who were supposed to be assisting us against the Ashantees. However, it required great caution to communicate with Lieutenant Barnard, because he having Akims and we having Akims, and the Akims and Ashantees being very much alike, there was great danger that we should fire into each other, and it took us some three and a half hours, although we were only three miles off, before we were able to join at Odumassie. At Odumassie we had to remain till ammunition and carriers came up. I mention this, because I think, had I been allowed three or four days more over the Volta, I should have been enabled to have brought a much larger force up in time to assist Sir Garnet Wolsley before Coomassie.

We arrived at Odumassie on the 26th of January, and were then only 20 or 25 miles from Coomassie. One of our women prisoners told me that, starting from Odumassie in the morning with a load upon her head, she could reach Coomassie, and had often done it, in company with her mistress, by six in the evening; so that, on the 26th of January, we were within two marches of Coomassie. Three or four miles in front of Odumassie runs the Anoom river, and for ten miles the line of that river was held by the Ashantees, in great force. You will see two fords, one on the road leading to Duabin and the other to the left, by which we crossed and occupied the enemy's positions before we proceeded to Coomassie. I suppose the enemy must have been in great force in the camps which we occupied; they must have had 8,000 men on the Coomassie road, and some 2,000 on the road to Duabin.

On the 1st February I dispatched Captain Sartorius to endeavour to open a communication with Captain Butler's force, that was supposed to be operating half way between the General's and my own. Captain Sartorius crossed the Anoom as we had crossed the Prah, without having been discovered, and surprised, on the other bank, a picket of the enemy. He then marched a small force, only 130 men, through two camps. Of course, he was not aware that he was approaching these Ashantee camps, and, having got on to the first camp, he went into it before he knew where he was. The Ashantees were as much surprised as he was. Coming to the second camp, he did the same: You will then see that his rear was completely cut off, and that he might have been prevented from rejoining my force at Odumassie, so he dispatched 40 Houssas back, who went through these two camps with only one man wounded in the head, and they rejoined me at five in the evening. But very anxious I was about Captain Sartorius, and I sent Lieutenant Barnard at ten o'clock that night, with all the men I

could spare—only 150—to reinforce him. I wish there were time to read to you the very modest, almost misleading report of Captain Sartorius. I may say this—Captain Sartorius, having lost his way or having been misled by the Ashantee guide, returned, and thinking that he could not be in a safer place than near the enemy, encamped very close to their second large camp on the line of the Anoom river, intending, if he was prevented going through their camp the next morning, to cross the river and rejoin me. However, in the morning he heard the friendly sound of firing, and Lieutenant Barnard's force was coming up. They joined, drove the enemy out of their camp, and occupied it with their small force, having some four or five men killed and eleven wounded. I say, so modest and misleading was the report of Captain Sartorius, that it was not until I, with the main force, crossed the Anoom and occupied those camps, that I was at all aware of the difficulties that he and Lieutenant Barnard had had to overcome, not only from the enemy, but from the nature of the ground they passed over. They never ought to have got where they did; they never ought to have come back.

I was detained at Odumassie (only two marches from Coomassie), because we had not sufficient spare ammunition to go on with. I felt that, as soon as I left that place, I must make up my mind that all communication with my rear would be cut, and that I should obtain no further supplies. I was unaware where Sir Garnet Wolseley was. It was quite true my confidence in the General and also in the British troops he commanded, assured me that he would be in Coomassie on the day named, but still I had no communication with him and he had had none with me, except by the long route, nine days' journey south of the Prah, and therefore to go on with the small force I had, and with only enough ammunition to carry us through one or two days' fighting, was not to be thought of. However, on the 6th, Lieutenant Moore and 2,000 of the Aquapims and Croboes came in from the other side of the Volta, bringing up three guns, rockets, &c., and some 250 spare rounds of ammunition. In the mean time, news had reached me that Coomassie had fallen, but those who brought it, had not come from that place. It was only hearsay. A man who had been in Coomassie had told them, and they, being slaves, made their escape from a town near Duabin, and were endeavouring to make their way to my force when our scouts fell in with them. This information was not very reliable, but, having got the ammunition, we started on the 8th from Odumassie to join the General in Coomassie. On the morning of the 8th, messengers came from the King of Duabin offering his submission to the British Government, and stating that, as the King of Coomassie had been very foolish and had lost his town, it was not at all his intention to do the same, and therefore he begged I would accept his submission and send it on to the General. The Akims, whom I had left to watch the line of the Anoom on the road to Duabin, acting upon this, immediately started for Duabin, so that as soon as I was in Coomassie, they were in Duabin, although I was unaware of it. Having crossed the Anoom, I occupied the second Ashantee camp on the 8th. That camp was capable of containing

2,000 men, and the first camp 1,000. Starting the next morning we went some five miles, and, to our surprise and astonishment, came upon another large camp, which must have contained 5,000 men, so that there must have been 8,000 men on that road alone. Here we found corn and corn-flour; in fact, the whole line of march, from the camp on the Anoom, to the large camp and for several miles beyond it, was strewn with corn and corn-flour, which we benefited by, and our horses too. The day afterwards, we reached Essianimpon, and there we captured some Ashantee prisoners. One Ashantee prisoner was very much intoxicated and very troublesome, and therefore we kept him and put him in irons, but the others we let go. He informed us that the King of Ashantee was on our left, with a very large force. We had also captured a Houssa woman, who had told us that her son was one of a large force in camp on our right, so that we were between two large forces of the enemy.

Captain Sartorius having volunteered to take a despatch from me to the General so soon as I should find myself in a position to send it, I availed myself of his offer, and sent him on from the next place to meet the General. He had with him 20 picked Houssa men whom I could rely on; but so sure were we that the General was at Coomassie, and wishing Captain Sartorius to get into Coomassie that night, I sent them off with only forty rounds of ammunition in their pouches in order that they might march light. Had I known that the General was not there, I need hardly tell you that they would not have been sent at all. I kept the Ashantee before-mentioned till the morning. He told me the same account when he was sober, and I, therefore, concluded that his story was correct. You will, therefore, observe we had now got between the King of Ashantee and his capital. I gave Captain Sartorius time to communicate with me the next day, and then waiting two hours longer, and hearing nothing from him, I began to feel anxious; but my orders were *not to cross the Dah, nor to approach nearer Coomassie than ten miles without orders from the General*, and it was for that reason that Captain Sartorius was sent to communicate. However, finding he did not come back, I went on to look for him. We got into Coomassie about two o'clock the next day, viz., the 12th, and found it deserted, no signs of Captain Sartorius, and the place having a very disagreeable smell indeed, and the flies very troublesome, and also having heard that the King had accepted the terms of Sir Garnet, and that the first instalment of the gold had passed down, I felt there was nothing for me to do in Coomassie, although I should very much have liked to have remained there and to have visited the tombs of the kings and the country palace. It was not for me, however, to finish a work which Sir Garnet Wolseley had considered sufficiently done. I therefore followed the road down towards the coast, and very glad indeed I was to get on a good road, because our road hitherto had been a mere hunter's track; and although the route described from the camp at Adda to Coomassie is something under 200 miles, I suppose you may add another 150 to it for the usual turnings and twistings of a native road. About five miles from Coomassie (I need not describe the road to you, it is not a pleasant picture to put before you), I came to the burly

form of a man without his head, and, curious enough, he was very white. I at once said, "There's poor Sartorius." I rode on half a mile and fell in with a wounded Houssa man, whose thigh was broken. He was propped up against a tree, and had some bunches of plantains and calabashes of water, evidently some one had made him, under the circumstances, very comfortable. I told my Houssa men to make a hurdle for him, and to bring him down. I said, "Who gave you 'these plantains?'" "Oh," he said, "a white man passed here two 'days ago with 20 Houssas." I need not describe to you the relief to my feelings, because that proved to me that it was not Captain Sartorius's body which I had seen headless on the road.

Our difficulties were now of course over, and on arriving at the Adansi Hills I was made aware, that the force I had left on the Anoom River had occupied Duabin. I received messengers from the King of Ashantee, conveying a very handsome gold salver and some fourteen ounces of gold, begging me to order my force at Duabin to withdraw across the Prah. I told them to take the gold back to the King, and as I had no orders to treat with any one, I would simply give him a copy of the instructions that I had received the day previous, which if he chose to send to my force, he might.

In the morning I sent for the messengers to have the letter, which I had written, read to them, and then it was that I discovered the cause of the King's anxiety that my force should be withdrawn. They were not where I had supposed them to be, on the Anoom; but they had occupied Duabin about the same time that I must have occupied Coomassie, and the reason the King of Ashantee was so very anxious they should be moved south of the Prah was, that they were inducing the King of Duabin to withdraw his allegiance from the King of Ashantee, which that chief has done subsequently, and is now, I believe, under British protection.

When the messengers returned with my letter, the King of Duabin cursed the King of Ashantee, and the King of Ashantee's messengers; and all the chiefs of the country lying to the eastward of Duabin and reaching to the Volta, have handed over the symbols of office which they received from the King of Ashantee, to the King of Akim, who was with me. The King of Duabin has given his niece in marriage to the King of Akim, and his sister as a pledge of his adhesion to the British Government, so that the whole country south of Coomassie has seceded from the King of Ashantee; and the whole country, not only east of Duabin to the Volta, but north-east up to a most important southern outpost of the Mahomedan power named Sallaga, has also fallen away from the King of Ashantee.

My private secretary, whom I left at Abogoo, and who was afterwards in communication with the force of the King of Duabin, has since informed me of the actual force which we held in check from co-operating against Sir Garnet Wolseley. I supposed that we had 10,000 men opposed to us on the line of the Anoom, but the entire force which the Kings of Duabin and Coomassie had in our front was not 10,000 but 20,000 men. I conclude, therefore, that we did some good service to Sir Garnet in withholding that force from attacking him.

When we were at Odumassie I wished the force at Connomo, which was then increased to some 2,000 men, to occupy the road leading to Duabin up to the line of the Anoom River. I supposed in the morning that this force had gone; I waited until mid-day, and having received no intelligence, I sent an Officer over to the King of Akim, to find if the force had gone. That Officer found the King and Chiefs in great council. The reason the force did not occupy that very limited line of road that day, nor indeed the day after, was this: one of the King of Akim's people in passing through Asuom, south of the Prah, had run against one of the fetish chiefs of that town and knocked him down. The King of Asuom on hearing this, immediately brought the King of Akim before a council in camp, and the decision of this great case as to what fine the King of Akim should pay to the Chief of Asuom on account of one of his men having knocked over this fetish priest, occupied two days. To give you another instance of our difficulty, when I got to Asuom, the chief of that place, the same troublesome man who fined the King of Akim, came into my camp and told me that one of my men had fired a gun off on a fetish day. There are four fetish days out of seven on which no work is done, no guns are allowed to be fired, and no one does anything but carouse; therefore, I must be fined. I told this chief we really had not come to be fined by him, and that under the circumstances, I should fine him, and as I was more in want of carriers than anything else, I fined him fifty carriers, and he said under the circumstances he supposed he must pay, which he did, partly in women. When I got up to his town, about a mile in advance, the fifty carriers were not produced. He sat down under one tree, and I sat down under another and had my breakfast. I then sent for him: he said he was very sorry, his people would not carry. I told him there were two ways of helping the Ashantees: one was by obstructing our advance, and the other by firing upon us; that I looked upon what he was doing as quite as obstructive as Ashantee hostility, that I should treat his town as an Ashantee town and burn it. He then thought better of it, went into the bush, cut a large stick, and with the assistance of his stick in about twenty minutes he had flogged out the men, produced some women, and I had my carriers. This man subsequently gave me great trouble after crossing the Prah, he took all these carriers away from me. One morning requiring carriers to carry the rockets which had come up I sent for this Chief of Asuom. He came, and exceedingly insolent he was. "Yes, he 'had taken his people away, and meant to take them.'" I immediately ordered him to go to his camp and bring them out, he hesitated. There happened to be an old Ashantee chair near, and with the assistance of that applied to the small of his back, I persuaded him to fetch the carriers.

In conclusion, I dare say that you have seen the very able statement of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, as to the new government which is to be organized on the Gold Coast. There is to be a force of 1,000 Houssas. To show you the opinion the natives have of this Houssa force, I may state, whenever the King of Akim was in trouble about his people,

he used to come and say:—"Only give me two Houssas to go with me and I will get you what you want," and having given him the two Houssas, the thing was done; the King not caring to go in by himself. I am sure the Officers who were with me, will all bear testimony to the élan, bravery, and good conduct of the Houssas; and doubtless there are many Military men present, who will understand me, when I describe them as the *Sikhs* of Africa. I do not know that I need trespass further upon the patience of the meeting.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, I am sure that you will all join with me in thanking Sir John Glover, for the highly interesting lecture that he has given us this afternoon. Though we have heard a good deal of the Ashantee Expedition, I believe that this is the first public occasion on which we have heard so many details of that branch of it which was under his able command. When we look round and see the large assembly that has met together here, it is manifest that the interest in that expedition has not abated; and I have no doubt that I only express your feelings in giving our cordial thanks to Sir John Glover for having given us so interesting an account of his expedition.