Part IV. contains Professor Wundt's views on the practical problems that arise in the different departments of the moral life, under the captions, The Individual Personality, Society, The State, and Humanity. Very little, if any, explicit reference to the principles of morality earlier discovered is made. But the moral significance of such possessions and institutions as property, intellectual cultivation, associations, the state considered as a financial, a legal entity, etc., and international law, are interestingly discussed on the broad basis of the author's ethical outlook. Some of his more striking views may be briefly suggested. It is the duty of the state to see that private labor has the freedom requisite to a share in intellectual interests. In natural science, political science, and history all should be educated; in philosophy, philology, and the history of civilization only the higher grades of mankind. Woman is intellectually capable of certain higher kinds of employment, but she is out of place in politics, and science has been shown not to be her true province.

Criticism, which may well be at fault, is the most fitting tribute to a scientist of Professor Wundt's standing. Appreciation is a matter of course. Two contributions, if no others, would, I venture to believe, place his work among the most important of its kind and century; first, the modern formulation of the conception of the social will, the insistence, as against narrow individualists, on its reality, and the happy employment of this profound truth to solve several knotty problems; secondly, the insight and demonstration that the moral task of mankind is ultimately indescribable, an inspiring ideal of the reason. The English translation of such a work is to be warmly welcomed, because of its difference from our other authorities and because of its intrinsic excellence.

The translator of Volume III. has done her work surprisingly well. An unusually idiomatic and involved German text has been rendered into equally idiomatic and decidedly readable English. I have noticed only three blemishes, an unfortunate use of 'when' and 'where' on pages 91 and 118 respectively, and the mistranslation 'self-regarding' towards the bottom of page 100. The volume has an index, which, however, might well be fuller.

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Beiträge zur Philosophie des Gefühls. Von F. RITTER VON FELDDEGG. Leipzig, Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth. 1900. Pp. vi+122.

Conceptions of the world as force and will, as idea, thought and reason, have been entertained in every age; but the author, in this

confessedly dogmatic and polemical treatise, develops a view of reality in which feeling is fundamental, and he understands feeling in a somewhat unusual sense of the word. "The aim of modern philosophy is to achieve a synthesis of the world as matter and the world as consciousness; but until recently philosophy has only tried to realize this synthesis *in abstracto*; and yet, exactly this synthesis is more concretely given, as an actual feeling within my consciousness, than any other in the world. Empirically to trace out, in this feeling, the dual basis of real and ideal, of objective and subjective being, is the chief problem of every psychology which seeks to go beyond the achievements of the past; and, as such a psychology necessarily stands in close relation to philosophy, it must also be one of her greatest needs" (27). Philosophy is here repeatedly arraigned for trying to realize this synthesis by a definition and elaboration of abstract conceptions, instead of seeking for it among the given facts of experience. The abstract dualism of thinking and extended substances apprehended by the 'understanding,' with which Spinoza struggled, was certain to fail. Spinoza's 'understanding' is a mere x which cannot be further deduced, because it appears at the end, instead of the beginning, of his system, and cannot be derived from the notion of 'thinking substance.' Essentially the same difficulty shadows every philosophy which does not find in consciousness a concrete synthesis of subject and object, of thought and thing. The demonstration of an in itself monistic and self-identical subject-object alone can overcome this difficulty (28). Fichte's logical 'ego' and Hegel's 'Spirit' are not centers of consciousness in the concrete, but its outermost abstract periphery; Schopenhauer's 'will' stands to consciousness in a relation of exclusion; Schelling's 'unconscious spirit,' which is in the main synonymous with von Hartmann's 'unconscious,' is absolutely useless as the foundation principle of a philosophy of consciousness. The mistake of all these philosophers (except perhaps Schopenhauer) lies first in their beginning with an abstract conception instead of a concrete self-conscious experience, and secondly in their placing self-consciousness, as an ideal product, at the end of a biological development, instead of at its beginning. These fundamental errors rest at bottom upon a confusion of self-consciousness and self-knowledge. The latter comes late in the process of growth; the former is the germ of all growth. The former is a feeling, the latter an ideal product. "Self-consciousness is accordingly the original state, the root of all mental life; self-knowledge, its flower" (p. 30 f.).

There exists an important difference between a philosophy which starts with abstract conceptions and proceeds analytically, and a philosophy based upon actual experience: even professedly experimental philosophies sometimes start with an abstract definition of experience which vitiates their contents; but the time for such philosophies is, in the writer's judgment, once for always passed. "From now on one will have to seek for the basis of the world-order no longer in airy abstractions, but rather wherever the world-fact (*Weltthatsache*), in its most concrete form, is to be met with; and I do not conceal the opinion that this place is our feeling" (47).

In the preface, the author refers to the change which has taken place within recent years in the methods and aims of German philosophy, and expresses the hope that in the near future the Germans will again look up to the clouds for that which exists in the clouds. "The German to-day sees the smallest pebble along the way, but he no longer looks off to the horizon toward which he nevertheless journeys." He must seek a monistic view of the world; and this differs from pantheism in that the latter is always anthropomorphic and simply pushes the great problem of human nature one step further away, while monism seeks in nature as well as in man for the one explanatory principle of things. The mistake of all existing monistic philosophies lies in their starting with a dualism of abstract conceptions, matter and consciousness, whose opposition they can only resolve by some illogical *tour de force* which leaves us unsatisfied. The philosophy of feeling regards matter not merely as an abstract conception but as given in our feeling; and here it exists, not separate from our subjective being, but rather in identity with it. The essence of feeling consists in the identity of a subjective with an objective, and feeling is 'the original actuality of ourselves.' The philosophy of feeling teaches these two things, that in metaphysics feeling alone, out of the totality of consciousness, must be considered; and that in feeling these two fundamental data, matter and consciousness, are not simply given, but united in perfect identity.

The *Kritik der physiologischen Psychologie* deals chiefly with the views of Ziehen, but regards these as illustrating the general position of this new branch of science. He objects to its notion that consciousness begins with sensation—to the neglect of reflex and automatic processes. "In fact," he writes, "consciousness is to this psychology ('without a psyche,' to quote Lange) merely a sort of physiological cadence, the tip of a handkerchief, which protrudes from behind out of the physiological professor's coat-pocket, and of

which he would be ashamed if he did not find it so absolutely necessary." The tendency of the physiologists to despiritualize the ego is evident here. They first rob the ego, bit by bit, of its being, until nothing is left but an internally barren cell-heap: then proceed with infinite pains, bit by bit, to refill the empty cells. Secondly, he objects to Ziehen's account of the origin of sensation out of its stimulus. This view is contradicted by Ziehen's own doctrine of a psychophysical parallelism, according to which a sensation is a double thing—a physiological process with a psychic correlate. Likewise, physiological psychology reduces the attention to an association process dependent upon outer stimuli, and we become thereby our own spectators without will and without initiative. Virtues are simply ideas with positive feeling-tone; vices, ideas with negative; if there be an absolute good or evil, it must be the function of metaphysics and religion to show it. For Ziehen the problem of the freedom of the will sinks to a mere farce. Finally, the ego which physiology seems determined to drive out of psychology entirely, is still retained in altered form. My body moves itself in response to stimuli, and I become aware of those movements for myself; but what am I? A center of self-consciousness which cannot be identified with the body. "Thus physiology, against her will, has reached a spiritualistic hypostasis which, while it suspends the fundamental relation of identity between body and soul, contradicts all that, up to this point, she has taught." The physiological conception of the psyche is untenable.

In the essay on the Origin of the Psyche, the positions are taken that the individual psyche has no beginning in time; that it is originally a feeling, and that this feeling is ultimate reality. In the views of Du Prel as to the nature of the psyche, the author finds much that agrees with his own. Münsterberg and Otto Schneider are quoted in support of his views as to the nature of the ego and its relation to the content of consciousness. The Self of which we are conscious and the content of consciousness cannot be separated. The former without the latter is a ghostly abstraction; the latter without the former, a contradiction.

As to the limits of the Objective and the Subjective in the Knowledge Process, the author holds that every phenomenon is entirely objective or entirely subjective, according to the point of view we take, the two points of view being grounded in the unity of subject and object—which self-consciousness always involves. The two phenomena, the object and subject, do not completely correspond in the

individual finite consciousness, as the fact of a threshold of sensation, for example, shows; but there is no reason for saying that the stimulus, even in this case, is not psychic. On the contrary, were it not so, no transition from a non-psychic stimulus to a psychic process would be conceivable; even the spatial separation of the two exists only for consciousness. The boundary separating subject and object should not be conceived as a surface standing at right angles to the line of perception, but as within the process of knowledge running parallel with it. "Upon a purely empirical basis we have to regard the intelligible and physical, the objective and subjective causal series, as two lines running parallel with each other and by no manner of means constituting, as physiology asserts, their own prolongation" (74).

The next essay deals with *The Ethical Movements of the Present*, which, while preaching morality heroically, fails to ground it philosophically. The ethical movement says, "Seek to realize your highest duty, because it is the crown and glory of humanity"; but when asked why humanity should be made an end, this movement replies: "Because humanity is morally good." It grounds morality in humanity and humanity in morality! Moreover, the law of motivation is here underestimated, or rather completely misconceived. Morality is conceived to be a matter of practice and education; man must be trained to goodness. But in this they forget that goodness can be realized only where profound conviction of the necessity of goodness exists, and it is never the result of mere practice. "No stone falls without a cause and no man acts without a motive" (87). The presupposition of all morality is belief in a supersensuous order, belief that morality is no mere social agreement or law of habit, and that, on the contrary, it has a superhuman as well as human validity (90).

So far we follow the author's discussion with great interest; but in the next essay, on *Palingenesis from a Psychological Standpoint*, he enters a field of speculation in which, as it seems to the reviewer, the weakness of this 'philosophy of feeling' becomes apparent. Each psyche is a synthesis of an empirical and a transcendental element. "Every part of the soul known to us is a self-identical being which is nevertheless joined to a second, unknown part whose identity we, from a psychological standpoint, can neither affirm nor deny"; and this simply opens a free field for the doctrine of the reincarnation of the soul upon earth. The transcendental, unknown half of the soul is the bearer of a transcendental individuality which runs through a number

of empirical reincarnations, because it combines each time with a new empirical half-soul. No knowledge is vouchsafed us, however, as to the nature of the bond which realizes their union, and no bridge of memory enables us to pass from one stage of existence back into previous stages.

The last essay of the book deals with the relation of this doctrine to the fundamental principles of morality. To be true to one's self, in the highest sense, means altruism, because this highest self is transcendental and universal; and yet, such altruism is but the highest form of egoism; and thus, a synthetic basis for morality is reached, enabling us to combine the ethics of hedonism and the ethics of reason with the ethics of perfection or eudemonism.

This is not the place for a careful discussion of this theory of reality; but we may be allowed to say something as to the impression it has made. That philosophy should start with the concrete fact of self-consciousness, rather than with some abstract logical construct, many are ready to assert and have asserted; but why conceive self-consciousness as pure feeling? Were there no element of discrimination in it, the rise of knowledge would be inconceivable. All the author's criticisms of the type of monism represented by the physiologists can be turned against this view by a simple substitution of terms. Moreover, why regard self-consciousness as pure feeling rather than as self-knowledge? The author will answer, because it is a feeling *before* it is a knowledge; but in doing so, he first assumes that primitive self-consciousness is pure feeling, and then attempts to base philosophy upon the lowest rather than upon the highest stage of evolutionary process. This demands that a missing and very careful account be given of the relations of the latter to the former. The deduction of knowledge and volition from pure feeling is as impossible as their deduction from the logical concept of matter. In other words, feeling as the author uses the term seems to us as much an abstraction as matter or thought. My self-feeling exists at the primitive stages of evolution no more than my self-knowledge or self-realizing volition. Many of the author's criticisms of current philosophical, psychological and ethical movements are well stated, though not always new; but whether they are wholly justified by the ancient mysticism into which his doctrine leads us is doubtful. It is an intensely interesting discussion, however, vigorous and earnest in style, and one to which the present writer feels much indebted.

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