THE GROWTH OF THE INTELLECT.*

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Whether we look at mankind in the aggregate and consider the race historically, or confine our attention to the development of an individual human being, it becomes equally clear and certain that the capacity of the human mind is not a fixed quantity, but that it has, as a whole, during the countless ages of the existence of the race upon this planet continuously grown, just as also each individual mind, following as it needs must, the course pursued by the general mind, unfolds, expands, and develops from its origin at birth to its culmination in middle or advanced life.

To trace this growth of the general human mind through all the details of its wonderful course (if that were possible) would be not only to follow in their progress from minute beginnings all the sciences, philosophies, arts and religions which man has created, but to add to these a new science and a new philosophy of farther reach and broader scope than any that have ever yet existed. Such an enterprise, even were the data accessible, is probably far beyond the capacity of any individual human mind which this earth has so far produced. It is not however difficult to see that such a development as that spoken of has actually taken place and to indicate in general terms its course and nature.

The task I have undertaken to day is to treat in outline not the development of the whole mind but that

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part of it which we call the intellect; and in my endeavor to fulfill it, I beg that you will have patience with me if I occupy a considerable portion of the time you grant me telling you things that you know already; and especially I wish all those who may be disposed to listen critically to what I am about to say to bear in mind that I shall speak broadly and generally, omitting all details and exceptions but those which must be included in order to convey the fundamental idea which is the basis of my thesis; to include details and exceptions other than these would only confuse my argument without serving any useful purpose.

The whole mind (excluding the senses) consists of two main divisions which are, in their development as well as in their essential nature and physical bases radically disparate and distinct the one from the other. These two divisions are: first, the intellect, and second, the moral nature.

The intellect is that part of the mind which knows; the moral nature is the part that feels. Each particular act of the intellect is instantaneous; whereas the acts of the moral nature are continuous. Language corresponds to the intellect and is therefore capable of expressing it perfectly and directly; on the other hand the functions of the moral nature are not connected with speech and can only be expressed indirectly and imperfectly. Intellectual acts and states are complex and decomposable into many parts; moral states are either absolutely simple—as in the case of love, fear, hate—or nearly so, that is, are composed of comparatively few elements. All intellectual acts and states are alike, or nearly alike as regards their intensity; moral states have a very wide range of degree of intensity. Intellect is synonymous with thought; the moral nature with emotion.

The intellect to which alone I propose to direct your attention to-day is made up of concepts, just as a forest is made up of trees, or a city of houses; it consists of concepts and nothing but concepts; these are simple mental images of things, of acts, of relations. The registration of these we call memory, the comparison of them one with another reasoning; for the building of them up into more compound images we have in English no good expression, we sometimes call this act imagination,—the Germans have a better name for it, they call it *Vorstellung*.

The large intellect is that which consists of a great number of concepts; the fine intellect is that in which these are clear-cut and well defined; the ready intellect is that in which they are easily and quickly accessible when wanted, and so on.

The growth of the intellect is nothing more or less than the growth of concepts.

Now although this growth is taking place constantly in every active mind during at least the first half of life, from infancy to middle age, and though we each know that we have concepts now that we had not some years ago, yet it would be probably more than the wisest of us could do to tell by observation made upon his own mind just by what process these concepts come into existence, or to say where they come from or how they come. But though we can not perceive this by direct observation either of our own or another person's mind, still it seems to me that there is another way by which this occult process can be followed, and that is by means of language.

As remarked already, language is the direct expression of the intellect: for every concept there is a word or words, and for every word there is a concept. As Trench says: "You can not impart to any man more

than the words, which he understands, either now contain, or can be made intelligibly to him to contain." Or as Max Müller says, using still more radical language, "Without speech no reason, without reason no speech." Speech and the intellect do not correspond with one another in this way by accident, the relation between them is inevitably involved in the nature of the two things. No word can come into being except as the expression of a concept, and it is doubtful if any given concept can exist until its correlative expression in language is found. Intellect and speech fit one another as the hand and the glove, only far more closely; say rather they fit as the skin fits the body, or as the pia mater fits the brain, or as any given species in the organic world is fitted by its environment. As is implied in what has been already said, it is to be especially noted that not only does language fit the intellect in the sense of covering it in every part, and following all its turnings and windings, but it fits it also in the sense of not going beyond it. Words correspond with concepts and with concepts only, so that we can not express directly with them either sense-impressions or emotions, but are forced always to convey these by expressing not themselves, but the impression they make upon our intellect, i. e., their intellectual image. In other words, before a sense-impression or an emotion can be conveyed in language, a concept has to be formed of it, which concept can, of course, be conveyed in words; but as a matter of fact ninety-nine out of every hundred of our sense-impressions and emotions have never been represented in the intellect by concepts, and therefore remain inexpressible, except imperfectly by round about description and suggestion.

We see in the lower animals a state of things that serves well to illustrate this proposition; they have acute sense-perceptions and strong emotions such as fear, rage, sexual passion and maternal love. There is no doubt that they are fully though perhaps dimly conscious of these, yet they can not express them because they have no system of concepts with corresponding articulate sounds. Granted to us our sense-perceptions and emotions, we should be as dumb as they are were it not that our intellect forms a mirror in which these may be reflected, and from which their images can be thrown, by means of language upon the outer world.

Now as this correspondence of words and concepts is not casual or temporary but resides in their nature and continues during all time and under all circumstances absolutely constant, so changes in one of them must correspond with changes in the other. What I propose then is to examine the growth of the intellect through language, that is to study the birth life and growth of concepts which can not be seen by means of words which are their correlatives and which can be seen.

Some years ago Sir Charles Lyell in his work on the antiquity of man pointed out the parallelism which exists between the origin, growth, decline and death of languages and of species in the organic world. To illustrate the point which I wish to bring before your notice, I propose to extend the parallel to words and concepts. [See Tables I and II.]

You see at a glance how wonderfully exact the parallel is to which I have drawn your attention, that, between the evolution of species and languages, not being more so than is the parallel between either of these and the unfolding of one word from another in the

TABLE I.

TABLE II.

growth of a single language; and this again, as explained above, being necessarily still more precisely typical of the evolution of concepts, since (as we shall see more fully as we proceed) these two last are not two phenomena, but rather two aspects of a single phenomenon.

The conclusion which I draw from this comparison is that the constituent elements of the intellect, which we call concepts, grow by division and branching as new species branch off from older ones, and I conceive that a normal growth is encouraged and an excessive and useless development checked by the same means in the one case as in the other—that is, by natural selection and the struggle for existence.

By natural selection new concepts, and words expressing them, which correspond with some external reality (whether this is a thing, an act, a state, or a relation), and which are therefore of use to mankind since their existence places him in more complete relation with the outer world, on which relation his life and happiness depend,—such concepts, being useful, are preserved by the process of natural selection. Some again which either do not correspond at all, or only imperfectly, with an objective reality are replaced by others which correspond better with the reality which they aimed at expressing, and so in the struggle for existence they are gradually disused and die out.

For it is with words as with every other living thing, thousands are produced for one that lives. Toward whatever subject the mind is especially turned, it throws out words often with marvelous profusion. Thus five or six thousand years ago, when Sanscrit was still a living language, and while fire was still looked upon as being either an actual God, or at least as being especially sacred, men's minds being greatly occupied with its various properties and aspects, instead

of having a few names as it has in any modern language, such as fire, flame, blaze, &c., it had some hundreds of names. So Max Müller says:

We can hardly form an idea of the boundless resources of dialects. When literary languages have stereotyped one general term, their dialects will supply fifty, though each with its special shade of meaning. If new combinations of thoughts are evolved in the progress of society, dialects will readily supply the required names from the store of their so-called superfluous words. There are not only local and provincial but also class dialects. There is a dialect of shepherds, of sportsmen, of soldiers, of farmers. I suppose there are few persons here present who could tell the exact meaning of a horse's poll, crest, withers, dock, hamstring, cannon, pastern, coronet, arm, jowl, and muzzle. Where the literary language speaks of the young of all sorts of animals, farmers, shepherds, and sportsmen would be ashamed to use so general a term. The idiom of nomads as Grimm says, contains an abundant wealth of manifold expressions for sword and weapons, and for the different stages in the life of cattle. In a more highly cultivated language these expressions become burthensome and superfluous. But in a peasant's mouth the bearing, calving, falling and killing of almost every animal has its own peculiar term, as the sportsman delights in calling the gait and members of game by different names. Thus, Dame Juliana Berners, lady prioress of the nunnery of Sopwell in the 15th century, the reputed author of the "Book of St. Albans," informs us that we must not use names of multitudes promiscuously, but we are to say: A congregcyon of people, a hoost of men, a felyshyppyng of women, and a bevy of ladyes, we must speak of a herde hartys, swannys, cranys, or wrennys, a sege of herons or bytourys, a muster of peacockys, a watche of nyghtyngalys, a flyghte of doves, a claterynge of choughes, a pryde of lyons, a slewthe of beerys, a gagle of geys, a skulke of foxes, a sculle of frerys, a pontyfycalyte of prelates, a bomynable syght of monkes, a dronkenshypp of coblers, and so on of other human and brute assemblages. In like manner in dividing game for the table the animals were not carved, but a dere was broken, a gose reryd, a chekyn frusshed, a cony unlacyd, a crane dysplayed, a curlewe unjointyd, a quayle wynggyd, a swanne lyfte, a lambe sholderyd, a heron dysmembryd, a pecocke dysfygured, a samon chynyd, a hadoke sydyd, a sole loynyd, and a breme splayed.

These quotations will serve to show how the human mind feels along the face of the outer world that is presented to it, attempting a lodgment in each cranny it finds, however slight and precarious may be the hold that it gets. For the mind of man is from age to age testing itself by the facts of the outer world; its growth indeed consists in tallying or covering these as ivy spreads over the stones of a wall; the twig that secures a hold strengthens and puts out other twigs, that which does not secure a hold after a time ceases to grow and eventually dies.

But the main thing to notice for our present purpose is that just as in the case of the child learning to talk the race also began with a few words (or as Geiger argues in his "*Ursprung der Sprache*," with a single word), that is to say, men began to think with only a very few concepts, or with a single concept, and from those few, or that one, the enormous number of concepts and words now current have proceeded. Nor will this (supposed) evolution of the entire intellect, even from a single initial concept seem incredible or even very marvelous, to those who bear in mind that the whole complex human body, with all its parts, organs and tissues, is built up of hundreds of millions of cells, each one of which, however much it may differ in structure and function from those belonging to other organs and tissues than its own, is yet lineally descended from the one single primordial cell in which each one of us had his origin. If this comparison is well founded, it follows, as it also does, I think, from a direct study of the facts, that as we look back into the past the words and concepts in use become more and more vague, and general, and less and less definite. Thus going back only such a very short distance as to the time when Latin was a living language, during

which brief time only a very slight difference can have taken place in the structure of the intellect, we find one word (*specio*) the concept corresponding to which includes the notions of seeing and looking, and covers by its breadth and generality a number of modern concepts, each with its corresponding word. If we go back behind "*specio*" and all words of its own time related to it we find that they all converge in the dim distance in one word "*spac*." Now this "*spac*" was in its time a live word in every-day use, just as its descendant "*spectacle*," for instance, is at present; but what did it mean? There is no doubt that it covered a concept now long dead and gone, so broad, general and vague, that it would be utterly impossible for us now to receive it in consciousness, since the human intellect has so changed in that time, that just as those distant people could not if these had been presented to them, have thought our highly specialized thoughts, so we could no more think their more broad and general thoughts.

But if language began with one or a few words, that is, if (as seems to me almost certain) intellect began with one or a very few concepts, then we must suppose that at the time "*spac*" was a live word, it had other words related to it by common descent from some still more ancient word. This pre-root, as we may call it, from which "*spac*" and its congeners, in their turn descended, had of course in its turn a concept corresponding to it which would be necessarily still more broad and general than that which corresponded to "*spac*," and of course still more unthinkable by us.

Just as men in remote ages, having none but what we should now consider vague and general concepts, necessarily used, to express them, vague and general words, so backward minds at the present day with a highly specialized language at their hand use it almost

as if it was composed of such words as "spac;" thus young children make a vocabulary of a few dozen words answer all their needs by using one word for a great number of different things, each one of which however is the same thing to him (thus I know a young child who calls every person it sees "man," not recognizing evidently that the persons differ one from the other, or even that they are multiple, but taking each one to be the same person). Grown up people of low intelligence do the same thing, though never perhaps to the same degree; they make a small vocabulary go a long way by using one word where an educated person would use half a dozen or more. An excellent example of this is afforded by the use made of the verb "to tote" by the lowest class of people, both white and black, of the Southern States. This word "tote" takes the place with them of at least four of the words in our vocabulary, it means to carry, to lead, to guide and to drive. A man will say to another, "Here, you, tote this wood to the house," or, "Say, boy, tote this horse to water," or "Say, you Sam, tote this stranger to Mr. Jackson's," or "Here you boy, go right away and tote the cows home." Now in using this one word for those four distinct words, it does not cover in their minds four distinct concepts; on the contrary, it covers only one, but that one is so broad and vague that it covers the ground occupied in one of our minds by the four. If the four concepts "carry," "lead," "drive" and "guide" had each a separate existence in their mind, nothing is more certain than that they would use a separate word for each, especially as distinct words exist ready for use.

I may say here that to suppose the intellect to have been developed in the manner for which I am contending, it is of course necessary to grant that man has

existed as man, that is as an animal that thinks and speaks, for a much longer time than is usually thought; and this necessary element in my argument is not wanting, for present indications point to the probability that it will soon be demonstrated that man has not lived on the earth less than some four hundred thousand years, and perhaps for a much longer time even than this; such a period would probably be sufficient for the evolution supposed.

Those of you who have not given some attention to this subject may be inclined to think just at first (and I should not much blame you if you did), that it is all very well as a speculation, but that it is up in the clouds and does not admit of verification. Well, perhaps it does not admit of proof in the same sense that a Theorem in mathematics does, but for all that there is evidence of its truth, both direct and indirect, well calculated to impress those who will take the pains to consider it.

It is well known that the higher animals, including man, in the course of their intra-uterine development, in a general way pass through phases of existence proper to the various classes of animals below them in the organic world, and that this is depended upon (and rightly so as it seems to me) as one evidence of the evolution of higher from lower forms of life. Just in the same way is the evolution of the individual mind an abbreviated repetition or summary of the development of the general mind, and what is true in the case of one of these is, beyond all doubt, true (at least in a general sense) in the case of the other.

Now it is true that although we (many of us) live among children a large part of our lives, we can only tell in a very general way, by direct observation, what their mental operations are like, and I believe the main

reason of this is that their thoughts are so different from ours that we can not think them; that is to say we can not put ourselves in their place and see (mentally) with their eyes; that in fact the child's intellect (as we know is true in the case of its moral nature) corresponds very closely with the primitive human mind, the general character of which I tried a moment ago to suggest to you. For what do we see in fact? The young child first of all acquires sensations (just as in ascending from the lower animal forms to the higher we meet sensation before we meet either emotion or intellect), and by the time it is three or four months old, it probably has vague elementary emotions, but it is somewhat older than this before it has a single concept (that is a mental image of which it is conscious). Then at the age of perhaps six, eight, or ten months, (for children vary a good deal in this respect) it begins to think, and, either at the same time or immediately afterwards, to speak. For many weeks its whole vocabulary consists of a word, which is probably "ma," and I believe that at this time its whole intellect is composed of one, or, at most, of two or three concepts, at all events every one must admit that their number must be very limited. It would be as impossible for a grown man to think that child's thought or thoughts as for the child to think those of the man. The child's vocabulary extends month by month and year by year, and at the same time its mental images multiply and become less and less vague and general, and more and more special and definite. Now, from having one or half a dozen concepts, how does the child come to have a large number? That is, by what mode are they multiplied? Do the new concepts spring up alongside of and independently of the old, or do they spring from those already formed, as new branches of a tree spring from older

ones, as new species in the organic world spring from prior species, as new languages spring from an older one, and as new words spring from their antecedent so-called "roots"? It seems to me that analogy as well as all the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of this last view. For instance, to the young child when just awakening to consciousness there exists no such thing as different persons, each person who takes it up or attracts its attention is the same person over again, and as its knowledge of any person whatever is confined to one fact, the capability, namely, of affording food, the child, if it happens to be hungry, shows by its actions its desire to be suckled by whoever takes it up. The child then begins its knowledge of humanity with one very broad and very vague concept. As the child learns to know individuals it is manifest that the different concepts which stand for these are offshoots of the general concept under which at first every one indifferently was comprehended. So, were sufficient time given to the task it could be shown that an adult's knowledge of humanity, including all persons, organs, acts and attributes which come within his or her cognizance is an outgrowth from, or an unfolding of, that one primordial concept.

As illustrating and confirming what I have said, I wish as briefly as possible to point out that apparently the evolution of function of the sense organs corresponds very closely with the scheme of development which I have attempted to show is proper to the intellect. Thus the eminent philologist Geiger points out in his work "*Zur Entwicklung der Menschheit*," that it can be proved by the examination of language that as late in the life of man as the period of the formation of the original Aryan language, perhaps not more than fifteen or twenty thousand years ago, man

was only conscious of one color; that is to say that he did not distinguish any difference in tint between the blue sky, the green trees and grass, the brown or grey earth and rocks, and the golden and purple clouds of sunrise and sunset; that at a later period, but still before the time of the oldest literary composition now extant, the color sense was so far developed beyond this primitive condition that red and black were recognized as distinct; still later when the bulk of the Rig Veda was composed, red, yellow and black were recognized as three separate shades, but these three included all color that man was at that age capable of appreciating; still later white was added to the list, and then green; but throughout the Rig Veda, the Zend Avesta, the Homeric Poems and the Bible, the color blue is not once mentioned. This omission can hardly be attributed to accident, for the 10,000 lines of the Rig Veda are largely occupied with descriptions of the sky; and all its features—sun, moon, stars, clouds, lightning, sunrise and sunset are mentioned hundreds of times. So also the Zend Avesta, to the writer of which light and fire both terrestrial and heavenly are sacred objects, could hardly have omitted by chance all mention of the blue sky. In the Bible the sky and heaven are mentioned over four hundred and thirty times, and still no mention is made of the color of the former. In no part of the world is the blue of the sky more intense than in Greece and Asia Minor where the Homeric Poems were composed—is it possible to conceive that a poet who saw this as we see it now, could write the forty-eight long books of the Iliad and Odyssey and never mention it once? But if we could believe that all the poets of the Rig Veda, Zend Avesta, Iliad, Odyssey and Bible could have omitted the mention of this color by mere accident, etymology

would step in and assure us that blue was unknown at the time of which we are now speaking, for at that time the subsequent names for blue were all merged in the name for black. Blue itself and the German blau, descend from black—the Chinese hi-u-an, which now means sky-blue, formerly meant black. The word “nil” which now in Persian and Arabic means blue is derived from the name of the “Nile” or the “black river,” of which word the Latin “niger” is a form.

It seems to me impossible that, at the time when men recognized only two colors which they called red and black, these appeared to them as red and black appear to us,—though just what the sensations were which they so named can not of course be now ascertained. Under the name of red it seems they included with that color, white, yellow, and all intermediate tints; under the name black—blue and green (or did they see red as red and every other shade as colorless or black.) As the sensations red and black (so-called) came into existence by the division of an original unital color sensation, so in process of time these divided. First, red divided into red-yellow; then that red into red-white. Black-divided into black-green; then black again into black-blue; and during the last twenty-five hundred years these six (or rather the four, red, yellow, green and blue) have split up into the enormous number of shades of color which are now recognized and named.

[See Table III.]

It can be shown in an entirely independent manner that if the color sense did come into existence as here supposed, the order in which the colors were recognized was really such as has been drawn from the study of ancient documents and of etymology, and the scientific facts that I am now about to mention must be admit-

TABLE III.

ted to be remarkably confirmatory of the conclusions drawn from sources entirely independent of them. The solar or other, rays that excite vision are as follows: Red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo and violet. Now these rays differ the one from the other in the length and amplitude of the waves which compose them, and both their length and amplitude diminish in the order in which I have given the colors; but the force or energy of any wave, that is to say its power of exciting vision is proportional to the square of its amplitude. According to this law the energy of the red rays is several thousand times as great as the energy of the violet, and there is a regular and rapid decrease of energy as we pass down the spectrum from red to violet. You will see at once that if there was such a thing as a growing perfection in the sense of vision, by which from being insensible to color the eye became gradually sensible to it, red would necessarily be first perceived, then yellow, then green, and lastly the different shades of blue; and this is exactly what both ancient literature and etymology tell us took place.

Then further the modernness of this color-sense is attested by the large number of people in all countries who are what is called color-blind; that is, people who are at the present day either entirely or partially without color-sense. (It is important to notice that only the centre of the retina, called the "yellow-spot," is sensitive to color, though its whole surface is sensitive to light, shade, form and distance).

In color-blindness the general vision is not affected; the person distinguishes light and shade, form and distance as well as other persons; this goes to show that the color-sense is more superficial, less fundamental, and probably therefore acquired later than the other parts of the function of sight; for a person could not

lose one of the more fundamental elements of vision (the sense of visual form for instance), and retain the other parts of sight unimpaired.

Color-blindness is in fact an instance of what is called atavism, or relapse into a condition which was normal in the ancestry of the individual, but which does not properly belong to the species in the time in which he lives. The frequency of this relapse (estimated to occur in England in one person out of sixty) indicates that the color-sense is comparatively modern; for atavism is more frequent in proportion as the organ or function either lost or improperly taken on (as the case may be), is less remote as a normal condition in the species; and less frequent in proportion to the remoteness of the time when the condition relapsed to was the normal condition of the race. The reason for this is obvious; it is simply that the longer any organ or function is in existence in a race, the more certainly it is inherited.

The phenomenon of color-blindness therefore tends to show that the color-sense is modern; the comparison of the different colored light rays show that if the colored-sense was acquired, it would certainly have been acquired in the order claimed from etymological considerations; and the concurrence of these two sets of facts drawn from natural science, with the deductions from etymology and from the examination of the most ancient books, is so striking that we can hardly refuse assent to the conclusions reached.

A parallel case to that of the development of color-sense is that of the evolution of the sense of fragrance and bad odors. In the Vedic hymns no such thing as fragrance is mentioned; it is spoken of once only in the Zend Avesta. Geiger says:

The custom of offering incense with the sacrifice is not yet met with in the Rig-Veda, though it is found in the more recent Yashurveda. Among the biblical books the sense of the fragrance of flowers first makes its appearance in the "Song of Songs." According to the description in Genesis there were in Paradise all kinds of trees "that were pleasant to the sight and good for food." The Apocryphal book of Henoah (of the last century, B. C., or even later), extant in Ethiopian, likewise describes Paradise, but does not omit to extol the delightful fragrance of the Tree of Knowledge as well as of other trees in the Garden of Eden.

Besides these evidences it is said to be capable of proof from language that no such sense as that of fragrance existed in the early times of the Indo-Europeans. And it is also worth mentioning in this connection that no animal (although many of these so greatly surpass us in recognition by scent), possesses, as far as we know or can discover, any sense of fragrance, and that children do not acquire it until they are several years old—not indeed for several years after they have acquired, more or less perfectly, the sense of color; thus corresponding in their mental development (as we pointed out once before) with the evolution of the general human mind, for the color-sense came into existence in the race many hundred years before the sense of fragrance.

If time permitted facts connected with the unfolding of the other senses, hearing, taste and feeling, might be adduced corresponding with those given in regard to sight and smell; but this would be entirely unnecessary, since the proposition which I set out to establish—that the intellect grows by successive cleavage or fissure of concepts—has been, I think, sufficiently illustrated.

Before closing I wish to refer very briefly to a corollary from the preceding argument—it is this: The process indicated, that is (in Herbert Spencer's language),

the process of evolution by successive differentiations and integrations, as it has had, as far as we can see no beginning (for it is seen in the making of systems and worlds, and governs all changes in the inorganic as well as in the organic kingdom), as I say, it has had no beginning, so it can have no end. Cleavage of concepts and sense-perceptions will go on in the future as it has gone on in the past. Being involved in an infinite series of changes we are always in the middle of our course—as any given spot is the centre of infinite space. Our present concepts will divide and the new ones again divide, giving rise to finer and clearer mental perception, until our present thoughts will seem as coarse and crude to our remote descendants, as do those of an infant or savage to us.

By successive alterations, such as those indicated in our intellect and sensations, along with analogous but far more important changes in our moral nature, of which I have treated at large elsewhere, is being constructed, and shall at last be built up, that “new heaven and new earth” foreseen by John in his Apocalyptic vision. A vision which may be seen with as great certainty and clearness by the true scientist as by the inspired seer.

For the world itself is perfect and has been from the beginning; its sky was as blue, its flowers as fragrant, and their tints as exquisite, thousands of years ago, when men had no faculties to perceive these qualities, as they are to-day; and it still contains invisible splendors and beauties more divine than any yet revealed to our sense, which wait for the coming man who shall have faculties to see and feel them.

I swear the Earth shall surely be complete to him or her who shall be complete;

I swear the Earth remains jagged and broken only to him or her who remains jagged and broken.