and greatest of all developments which Christianity has experienced in its contact with the world. Sixteen centuries have passed since Constantine and the ecclesiastics of his court inaugurated their fatal alliance between Church and State. Will the elder among us live to witness the reversal of a policy so far-reaching and of such long standing, and see realized in England the vision of *Libera Chiesa in Libero Stato*?

Dies docebit about that and other things. But there are, I am sure, enough changes which would bring things into nearer accord with the ideals of the Prophet of Nazareth and His first followers to satisfy the impulses of the most revolutionary among us. Developments may be for the better or for the worse; and if they seem to lead us away from the example of Christ and the teaching of His Church in the days when its inspiration was still fresh, we may at least claim that they must be first submitted to a searching test of time.

C. H. TURNER.

THE GROUP MIND OF THE CHURCH

THE study of Social Science has resulted in the discovery of the "Group Mind." A crowd, an army, a nation, is not a mere collection of separate individuals. It has an individuality, a quasi-personality of its own, embracing all the individuals of which it is composed, drawing from them their personal characteristics, and combining them in a unity which is greater than the mere sum of them. The crowd will do things which the individuals composing it blush to remember; the army performs deeds of heroism of which the soldier would be incapable, apart from his comrades. And as to a nation, Dr. McDougall, in his study of the "Group Mind," maintains that "a society when it enjoys a long life, and becomes highly organized, acquires a structure and qualities which are largely independent of the qualities of the individuals who enter into its composition and take part for a brief while in its life. It becomes an organized system of forces which has a life of its own, a power of moulding all its component individuals, and a power of perpetuating itself as a self-identical system, subject only to slow and gradual change."

In this gradual change of the society dominated by the Group Mind we trace progress or deterioration, as the case may be. The movement of social life runs along two distinct lines, moral and intellectual, and is conditioned in both by the innate and acquired characteristics of the race. Man's innate qualities, of course, descend from parent to child. Opinion, on the whole, is opposed to the view that it is so

with acquired characteristics also. The innate superiority, moral and intellectual, of the modern man over his ancestor of the Stone Age is generally denied. He is simply the inheritor of a far richer tradition. As Bishop Lightfoot puts it in one of his sermons: He is the little boy perched on his father's shoulders who says that he is the tallest person in the room.

It would appear, therefore, that man has certain innate moral and intellectual qualities which have remained stationary throughout the course of the development of human life. The intellectual qualities have, presumably, their seat in the brain, and their primary function is to enable the individual to make good his position in the general stream of life. The seat of the moral qualities cannot be so distinctly located, but their function seems to be the preservation, welfare, and development of the race as distinct from that of the individual considered apart from it. It is quite true that the individual may, and indeed to a large extent must, place his intellectual powers at the service of the race. In so far as he must, it is because his reason tells him that only by a system of give and take with his fellows can he attain the primary object which his intellect subserves—the establishment of his personal position in life. If he goes beyond this, and places his intellectual powers unselfishly at the service of others, it is because the moral side of his nature is predominant over the purely intellectual. From the purely intellectual point of view such action is foolishness. Mrs. Mona Caird, in an article quoted by Dr. Benjamin Kidd (*Social Evolution*) remarks that “there is something pathetically absurd in this sacrifice to their children of generation after generation of grown people.” There speaks the intellect, resting on rational sanctions, in opposition to the moral nature, whose sanctions are of a different, though not necessarily of a contradictory, character. Dr. Kidd calls them ultra-rational sanctions. They consist of facts of a higher order than reason unaided can attain to, for they are beyond the sense impressions from which reason starts its operations. They are often embroidered and misinterpreted by man's imagination, and in so far as this is the case they are open to the correction of reason, but apart from them the altruistic instinct which lies at the root of morality is an utterly unaccountable phenomenon; and as a matter of history, the rejection of them, in whole or in part, has inevitably been followed, sooner or later, by the weakening or rejection of the moral tradition up to that moment unquestioned. They are the subject-matter of our religions: truths, as we believe, revealed to us by the Spirit Source of all existence, Whom we call God. A progressive moral

tradition corresponds either to a progressive revelation of such truths or to a progressive apprehension of their contents.

Dr. McDougall attributes no very high function to religion. It is "to preserve intact the current moral code, and to secure conformity to it." Religion, according to him, is always more or less prohibitive of progress. His hope for the future lies not in the attainment by mankind of the fulness of religious truth and power, with the consequent perfection of the moral life, but in the complete development of the intellectual tradition. "Not by any voluntary surrender of the reason, not by any subjugation of the intellect to the dominion of obscure transcendental ideas . . . but by a more strenuous use of our intellectual faculties, and by the growth of knowledge, especially a knowledge of the laws of human societies, will the stability and further evolution of nations be maintained." This seems to imply that the intellectual faculties, essentially individualistic, are to dominate those which are altruistic and moral. To many thinkers the prospect which such a process holds out is not of the stability and further evolution of human society, whether national or international, but its destruction; and this for the reason given by McDougall himself, that "the free play of the intellect [which presumably means the intellect untrammelled by moral considerations] is always a danger to society, for the reason that the customs and moral code of a society, however imperfect, and sanctioned by a religion however narrow, are yet the bonds by which alone it can be held together." Not that religion and intellect are to be set over against each other as irreconcilable opposites. No doubt a perfectly true religion, and a perfectly equipped and enlightened intellect, would meet in harmony. But they approach the problem of human life from opposite sides—the one altruistic, the other individualistic. In our imperfect state it is not surprising that they often seem to reach conclusions apparently inconsistent with each other. The perfect religion would be the sanction and justification of the perfect morality; and the perfect intellect would embrace those truths which to us at present are ultra-rational. The individual mind would attain its perfect satisfaction and complete enlightenment as a limited expression of the perfect Group Mind, the perfect realization of the moral and religious ideal. For the Group Mind, even in its imperfect manifestations in the crowd, the army, and the nation, clearly belongs to the moral rather than to the intellectual side of human nature. It upholds an ideal which is never simply that of ministering to the selfish gratification of its individual members. There is always the purpose of at least sharing the expected gain with others.

In its higher forms the Group Mind frequently demands and obtains the complete surrender of individual interests, as when a soldier sacrifices himself on the field of battle. And as an outcome of the moral tradition, it at least implicitly rests on religious sanctions.

For indeed religion has a far more important function than that assigned to it by Dr. McDougall. Every fresh religious truth, discovered or revealed, is a fresh illumination and test of the current moral tradition, establishing, correcting, supplementing it, as the case may be; certainly altering it, although generally not without a prolonged resistance of ingrained habits. New religious principles are often widely accepted, while yet their practical application is strenuously resisted. Dr. Kidd sees this process at work pre-eminently in the acceptance of the Christian religion by the Western nations. There was the long period when the principles of the Christian Faith had no very perceptible influence upon social life. For that reason McDougall denies it any great share in the formation of the Western moral tradition. But, as Karl Federn remarks in his *Dante and his Times*, "These principles were continually disregarded and violated in the Middle Ages, and not least by the Church herself; but then, the explanation of this lies in the fact that the wild and brutal men of those times were wholly incapable of fully understanding these doctrines, and much less of practising them in earnest. . . . How could the purity of the early times be preserved? How could it be attained when the wild German warriors, in whose souls the ferocious, warlike spirit of the race fought fiercely with the new doctrine, accepted it? Their whole life became a continual convulsion, a constant wavering now to this side, now to that; and of the same men the most frightful cruelties are reported, as well as moments of devoted ardour and meekest humility." Then came the Renaissance, and the Reformation following it. To the Reformation Kidd traces, with considerable exaggeration, the moral development of modern times, and finds it wholly admirable. It was, in fact, a revolt of intellectualism against authority, and yet it was not prepared entirely to abandon authority, and to take its stand upon solely rational sanctions. It appealed in some quarters to the Church of the first century—*i.e.*, to the Scriptures alone; in others, as in England, to the Church of the first six centuries—*i.e.*, to the Scriptures as interpreted by antiquity. In so far as its criticism of the Church of its day succeeded in showing that in part she had corrupted her message, in part suppressed it, the Reformation did good service. Especially by requiring that Scripture and the Church Services should be rendered in the vernacular,

it laid renewed emphasis on the fundamental Christian truth of the essential equality of all souls in God's sight; which now began to be taken as a working principle in social life, and has, as Kidd says, resulted in an unprecedented advance of the moral tradition. But there were also grievous losses. Rationalism, admitting certain alleged ultra-rational sanctions, assailed others, and in some cases successfully, proving them to be, not ultra-, but ir-rational. The process went on under various political and social conditions, with the result of what appears to be a hopelessly divided Christendom, the evils of which we are experiencing to-day. To it must be ascribed the alienation of vast masses from the Christian Faith—*i.e.*, from the ultra-rational sanctions of the Christian moral tradition. Unless these wanderers can discover, or have revealed to them, fresh and better sanctions, or, failing that, return to those they have discarded, morality must go by the board, and civilization founder. The search for fresh sanctions has so far yielded no very promising results. The only hope would seem to lie in a return to the old.

And yet a return either to the Reformation or the medieval standpoint seems unthinkable. The one would retain the causes which have produced the evil; the other would revive the state of things against which the Reformation was so largely a justifiable protest. We must go back beyond the divisions of the Reformation, but it must be to a Church whose authority is seen to rest on a more intelligible basis, and to function in a more vital and less mechanical way, than was supposed to be the case in the Church of the Middle Ages.

We have seen how Dr. McDougall denies any improvement of innate moral qualities, as much as he denies intellectual. All he concedes is evolution of the moral tradition. And surely he is right in this. The "natural man" is what he ever was. Yet the progress of the race is something more than the enrichment of the moral tradition. Kidd's contention that the Christian religion has been the foundation of the special type of altruism which distinguishes Western civilization, although attacked by McDougall, has not, I think, been disproved. This religion was certainly not adopted because of its congeniality to the innate qualities, whether moral or intellectual, of the Western nations. It was dead opposed to them. It had a tremendous fight with them all through the medieval period. The Church which embodied it was not uninjured in the conflict. The Renaissance meant going back to the old title-deeds of the Church, the Holy Scriptures, and a critical treatment, at first of their interpretation, afterwards of their text. The Reformation which resulted was in part

a reaffirmation, in part a misinterpretation, of them. The altruism belonged to the reaffirmation, the anarchy to the misinterpretation.

Altruism must inevitably at last seek refuge from anarchy in authority. That authority cannot be found if Christianity is nothing more than a development of the moral tradition.

But Christianity from the first professed to be something far greater. It asserted itself as a new, and primarily a social, life. From the first the Saints have been in evidence, and their difference from others has just been the new life moulding the moral tradition, and gradually commending it to a reluctant world. The partial reception of the moral tradition is not *per se* the reception of the new life; wherever that is found in action, there is more than an improved moral tradition: there is a passion for righteousness, and for something called holiness, which is infinitely stronger and warmer than tradition. It is a new Group Mind striving to make good in society, through first making good in individuals; and the definition of it is found in St. John's Gospel, in St. Paul's Epistles, in the Holy Eucharist—the central act of Christian worship—and in the patristic teaching gathered round it. It is Christ proclaimed as the Life of His Church.

It may be objected that both in the Johannine and in the Eucharistic teaching our Lord is represented rather as the life of the individual than as that of the Church. No doubt; but while this may be accounted for by the immediate practical aim of the teaching, it is impossible to suppose that the Johannine, the latest contribution to the Canonical Scriptures, regarded the life of the believer as something apart from the general life of the Church; and the jealous restriction of the Eucharist to those who remained in her communion implies the same thing. Our Lord is the Life of the Church, and therefore of the individual member. Nor does the doctrine of the Holy Spirit invalidate this teaching. "John of Damascus," remarks Professor Swete in his *Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church*, "fairly represents the wide outlook of the great Greek theologians. The cosmic work of the Spirit is recognized, as well as His work in the economy of human salvation; and in regard to the latter, justice is done to the profound view that saw in the Incarnation nothing less than a divine scheme for the 'deifying' of human nature—the restoration of man to the image and likeness of God, which is mirrored in the Incarnate Son, and which the Spirit of the Son reproduces in the regenerate life of His Body." This teaching, implicit along Johannine and Eucharistic lines of thought, is explicit in St. Paul, the earliest of Christian writers. Two of his epistles

set forth the local Church, one—that to the Ephesians—the Universal Church, as *THE BODY OF CHRIST*.

A body may be either a physical organism, of which the various portions mechanically obey the direction of the living mind; or it may be a social body, the unity of which consists in the submission, voluntary or coercive, of the living minds of the members to an ideal, a stimulus, a control emanating from the Group Mind. The Church is clearly of the latter class. It possesses all the characteristics noted by McDougall as belonging to such bodies. In particular, the power of raising the conduct of its members, especially in crises, above the normal level is in no other body so strikingly exhibited. Nevertheless, in one fundamental particular the group life of the Church is unique. That of an army or a nation is something developed out of the group, and, were the group dissipated, would automatically cease to exist. The Life of the Church first appears as an individual Life, inspiring a physical Body. Only through self-sacrifice unto physical death does It pass into a higher stage of existence, from which It gives Itself to be the living Group Mind of the Church. It is not developed from below; It is given from above by the operation of the Holy Spirit, Who conveys It. But when It reaches the Church, It has to subdue to Itself the individual minds of the members, and that not by coercion, but by persuasion. The powers of evil have waged a stubborn war against this process, and the divisions of Christendom have dimmed almost to extinction in many quarters the very consciousness of its character as a divine Group Mind striving to draw within its controlling influence the wills, the affections, and the intellects of all “who profess and call themselves Christians.” It promises the perfect satisfaction of all these elements of human nature, and points back through the ages to an individual Life in Which they found their satisfaction; but human nature takes very long to combine into the perfect Group Life.

The final stage, the “divine, far-off event,” in the history of the Church would seem to be the manifestation of a perfect moral tradition, not indeed innate, as that word is usually understood—that is, not inherited through natural generation—and yet not simply acquired, but in a sense innate through the new birth of Water and of the Spirit. This tradition, embracing a mode of group life, will possess an outward visible form to express it, and an inward spiritual power, which will make it no dead code, but a living force, by its intrinsic magnetism (so to speak) drawing wills, affections, intellects, into harmony with itself.

Some such group life the world, with its Boards of Conciliation and its League of Nations, is blindly endeavouring to evolve. The spectacle it presents at the present moment is that of many peoples deeply conscious that social life is far from perfect, and struggling to reach their unattained ideals; some willing to destroy all that has been hitherto won, and to start afresh from the beginning; some anxious to conserve what has been already gained, and by various expedients, political, eugenic, etc., purge it of its imperfections. It seems as if every path is destined to be explored which even looks as if it might possibly lead to perfection, before men wearily turn to take the gift so long held out to them. Only when they have convinced themselves, by mournful experience, that what they desire cannot be developed from below, will they have so far advanced as to be willing to receive it from above.

And yet the social experiments are anything but valueless. Men must develop from below in order to receive from above. If history has any lesson for us, it is that every form of spiritual power has to await its "fullness of time" for acceptance. Events lead up to it; premonitions of the wise put men on the outlook for it; the powder train is laid—it only awaits the spark. But that spark it cannot create. And nature tells the same tale. Matter must have reached an unique degree of sensitiveness when life entered into it and it became an organism; the living creature which first became conscious must have been the most highly organized of the then existing species; and the first being into whose brain there floated the glory of spiritual vision must have been, the moment before, the king of those we call the lower animals. And the general trend of events by which one nation was prepared, through much experience of failure and disillusionment, for the lofty, monotheistic Faith of Judaism, and ultimately to be the starting-point of the world's redemption, no critical treatment of the books of the Old Testament can ever obscure. It seems, indeed, as if this world of ours were swimming in an infinite ocean of divine grace, wherein first one part and then another opens out to receive this or that element of the wondrous whole. God does not suddenly resolve to give; man becomes slowly fitted to receive. Perhaps only by comparison with all possible earthly approximations in group life will the human race be furnished with the knowledge and the sense of pressing need strong enough to stimulate the general will to accept that perfect Group Life so long manifested and offered to us, the Life of the Incarnate Christ energizing in the Church, and from the Church reaching out to draw all men—nay, all life—unto Itself.

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