Hebraic scholar who was in the habit of repeating Hebrew texts aloud.

The question dealt with in the last chapter is the relation which exists between the gift of tongues mentioned in the New Testament and "glossolalia" in general. The author identifies them and gives them both a purely psychological explanation; but in order to do so he is led to affirm that the Biblical account is not exact (*ungeschichtlich dargestellt*). At this point the question becomes one of historical criticism, or of theology, with which we are not concerned here. The reasons advanced by Mosiman appear to us to some extent arbitrary. They are not convincing. There are theologians who hold an opposite opinion (comp. Pratt, *Théologie de Saint-Paul*. Paris: Beauchesne; pp. 175, 184).

An extensive bibliography is added.

JULES PACHEU

PARIS

L'Expérience Mystique et l'Activité Subconsciente. J. PACHEU. Paris: Perrin, 1911. Pp. 312.

This interesting work contains a simple and clear exposition of Mystical Union (the central fact of mysticism), and a criticism of the subconscious theory as applied to that experience. Using first-class authorities, the author separates clearly the affective from the noetic element at every one of the several degrees of that experience. It includes feeling and also knowledge: the Mystic is aware, even if in an obscure way, of the divine presence.

The exposition is done with much exactness; it evinces a thorough knowledge of the topic. The author insists very properly upon the ethico-religious value of this experience; he shows the harmonious development to which mystics tend beyond asceticism; one sees very clearly how the mystical experience makes part of the religious life. The theory which would bring back these facts to mental pathology is vigorously discussed.

Can mystical experience be explained as an eruption from the subconscious? Must it be supposed that the mystical intuition is nothing more than a revelation of the subject to himself, helped by his reflection and his work and which, having ripened subconsciously, appears to him external and superior to himself? The interruptions and the disproportion which characterize these states have seemed to some adequately explained by the hypothesis of the subconscious, on condition that it be given its full value, and that it should be assim-

lated to, for instance, scientific and artistic invention. Against this hypothesis, the author formulates the following objections: (1) How are we to explain on this hypothesis the sporadic and at times unique character of the mystical intuitions? If the subconscious is the author of them, it should easily lead to a flowering of phenomena of that kind. (2) The efficacious play of the subconscious supposes a kind of mental disaggregation; how is one to conciliate these dissociations with the admirable unity of the mystical life? (3) The continuity of memory and of consciousness in the mystics seems to establish the unity of their consciousness. (4) In order to explain the mystical facts, one is compelled to enlarge the subconscious hypothesis to such a degree that it loses all precise meaning. Certain authors, particularly M. Delacroix, endow the subconscious so richly that it "becomes a marvellous fairy more difficult to scientifically imagine than Viviane, or Morgane, the fay, or simply the divine reality of which the mystics speak." The posited creative subconsciousness—a dynamic, constructive automatism—is in fact copied after the descriptions of the great mystics. "This hypothesis, suggested by the facts which are to be explained, is applied to them as a sufficient explanation. There is a gap and an apparent *petitio principii*: that which is assumed is precisely that which is in question."

Our author is of the opinion that subconsciousness cannot be left to its own resources; it seems rather an instrument in the hands of a superior power, God. As psychologists, our conclusions cannot affirm God; but we have not the right to exclude Him, in fact psychology seems to point to Him.

In closing, the author quotes from a letter in which M. Delacroix explains how he conceives the relation between psychology and metaphysics and also religion.

The only critical remark which I will make refers to the fourth objection. The moment always comes when an hypothesis resembles the facts for which it is intended as an explanation; it must perforce contain them. The question is whether it contains only those facts; if so, the hypothesis is in truth merely the expression of those facts and it cannot serve to go beyond them, to relate them to other facts. But is this truly the case of the subconscious hypothesis? I do not think so. The authors criticized by M. Pacheu have merely complicated an hypothesis already in existence in order to make it include the new facts in question; and they have found support in intermediary facts, for instance, the rôle of subconsciousness in artistic and scientific invention.

The book of M. Pacheu manifests a very sincere and talented effort to place the religious reader face to face with the analyses and theories of the psychologists, and to draw from them whatever is possible from the point of view of religion. This book shows that psychologists and religious souls can walk together for a considerable time. If the moment comes—the moment of explanation—where they diverge, they know at least on what they agree and on what they disagree. This book shows also that serious differences can be indicated with much tolerance and perfect courtesy.

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Mysticism as Seen through its Psychology. W. E. HOCKING. *Mind*, 1912, 21, 38-61.

This is in part a criticism of the views concerning mysticism held by Royce, Godfernaux, Delacroix, and Leuba, and in part a positive theory (both psychological and metaphysical) of the mystic consciousness. Royce's mistake, according to Hocking, is in failing to distinguish the mystic's motive, which is worship, from the motive of speculation in general. Leuba's interpretation of the mystic's love as a branch of the sexual impulse is only a half truth; the whole truth being that sexual love is a part of the mystic worship. Godfernaux is right in viewing rhythm as the great characteristic of the mystic life, but he is mistaken in identifying this with the vital rhythm of *cœnesthesia*. Delacroix recognizes the rhythm of the mystic consciousness but regards it as not absolutely essential and as, in fact, outgrown by the greater mystics. As a fact the mystic never does and never can get beyond this rhythm, for it is a function of his will and is correlated with the laws of attention. It is, in fact, based upon the psychological and epistemological law of alternation,—the necessity of turning from the whole to the part and from the part to the whole.

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Essai d'une Classification du Mystique. F. PICAVET. *Rev. Phil.*, 1912, 74, 1-26.

The mystics have been classified according to two principles: the perfection they aimed at, and their nervous abnormal phenomena. The author would make three classes: (1) The Mystics who seek a development of their personality by means of union with the Su-