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THE THEOLOGY OF DR DU BOSE.

SINCE the publication of *The Gospel in the Gospels*, it has been obvious that Dr Du Bose must be reckoned one of the foremost philosophical theologians of our time. *The Gospel in the Gospels* has been quickly followed by *The Gospel according to St Paul*, and by the republication of an earlier book, *The Soteriology of the New Testament*. There is now, therefore, considerable material for the estimate of Dr Du Bose's contribution towards a philosophy of the Christian religion.

That contribution takes the form of an unusually coherent system. It is true that the form of the books themselves is somewhat unsystematic, that the style is homely and at times slipshod, that there is considerable repetition, and that the outward appearance of great work is lacking. But through all this there emerges one coherent view of God and man, held with a singular conviction and clearness of grasp; and though this is often in the background, its influence is all-pervasive. Though the exposition is sometimes devoid of order, the thought is always clear and harmonious; and though the language may be homely, the thought is of such elevation that it often carries the language with it to real heights of eloquence. In no writer is there less attempt at fine writing; but high thinking must have its effect on the style in which it is embodied.

The theory which emerges from these books, in which it lurks as an ever-present major premiss, is really nothing less than a philosophy of the Christian religion. Christianity is true, because it recognizes the facts of human nature and illuminates them: it would be untrue if it did not spring from those facts, and were not necessitated by them. Dr Du Bose tries to shew in outline, what those facts are, that by themselves they con-

stitute a problem, that 'in the New Testament there is to be found a consistent body of truth, and that in this body of truth the solution of the problem is contained. The Christian revelation is true because it fits the facts of experience, and it is the business of the Christian philosopher to shew how it fits those facts.

'Men of profoundest thought and of sincerest life in our own time have, in spiritual and moral extremity, found salvation in Jesus Christ, simply because they discovered in Him what did not exist for them without Him—a meaning and a reason for human existence and human life. . . . To St Paul the Gospel is no new or disconnected incident or event in the history of humanity or in the course of nature. It is that which, for the first time, gives fulness of meaning to them both' (G¹ p. 18, P p. 27).

Dr Du Bose's contribution to Christian thought really consists in the developement of this theme; and therefore it is rightly to be considered as philosophy.

Perhaps a few preliminary words should be said about the writer's relation, first to orthodoxy and heterodoxy in theology, and secondly to contemporary movements in religious philosophy. With regard to the first point, he gives us a very suggestive combination of orthodoxy and liberalism. Himself a believer in full catholic truth, he is prepared to learn from any quarter. On the one hand:—

'Truth is one and is a whole, and not seldom we can say that that which is less than truth is as untrue as that which is contrary to it. . . . In proportion as we conceive the Gospel of God in its entirety and in its immensity, in just that degree do all scriptural, as well as all truly Christian and catholic, statements of it, no matter how partial and seemingly contradictory in themselves, fall into their proper places and serve to magnify the greatness and harmony of the whole. . . . Mistake any one fragment or aspect of it for the whole, and all other fragments and aspects will be involved in confused and hopeless contention with it for the usurped position. Let the whole stand out for itself in its complete proportions, and every part falls of itself into its proper place, and is confirmed and supported in it by every other part' (G p. 4, pref. p. viii).

Completeness, catholicity, then, is vital, since what is less than the whole may, for that very reason, be positively antagonistic to

¹ I use the initial letters G, P; S to distinguish references to the different books.

it. It is this that was the justification of that process of exclusion,¹ by which the dogma of the Church was slowly built up.

But that which is the true method in one age is not necessarily so in another. And the method which Dr Du Bose adopts is, to use his own terms, one of 'inclusion' rather than 'exclusion'.

'So far from saying that only that is true which is the whole truth, I bring forward the complementary and not contradictory fact that that which has in it any part of the truth is so far true' (G p. 4).

We have to remember, though we are too apt to forget,

'that the so-called *whole* of truth is quite as apt to ignore or pervert the parts, as the parts are to be blind to the other parts and the whole' (G p. 7).

Consequently, for the proper appreciation of some particular aspect, we are often driven to 'some fragmentary sect', holding what we consider a mutilated conception of Christianity.

It is this consideration which dictates the form of *The Gospel in the Gospels*. It starts from the conception of Christianity held by so many leaders of thought both in Germany and in England,

'including now some of the greatest upon earth . . . men, among the greatest, and scholars the most learned, the most conscientious, the most devout' (G pp. 5, 9).

This Dr Du Bose calls 'the gospel of the earthly life; or the common humanity'.

'In the simple fact that Jesus Christ was the man He was, and lived the life He lived, they find as much of gospel and of salvation as, they think, humanity can or humanity ought to receive on this earth (G p. 5).

From this he gradually works up to full catholic views of the Work and Person of our Lord, shewing at each stage how the lower postulates and leads up to the higher.

On the side of religious philosophy, Dr Inge, in this JOURNAL, (vol. ii pp. 618-619), distinguishes two streams of thought in modern idealists; to describe which, he adopts Prof. Royce's titles, 'Ethical Individualism' and 'Monistic Idealism'. The view of the former school he gives in Prof. Howison's words:— 'The central and real meaning of the Christian religion lies exactly in the fact that the Creator and the creature are reci-

¹ Cf. *Lux Mundi* pp. 239-240.

procally and equally real, not identical; that there is a Fatherhood of God and a brotherhood of man; that God recognizes rights in the creature and acknowledges duties towards him; and that men are accordingly both unreservedly and indestructibly real—both free and immortal.’ And with this Dr Inge couples the plain man’s view, ‘that persons are fixed and mutually-exclusive units’. On the other side, ‘we have on the same idealistic basis a revival of more distinctively *Greek* ways of thinking. The Logos-doctrine again becomes the centre of Christological and even of cosmological theory. Among the more ecclesiastical writers we find increased emphasis on divine immanence, on the idea of the Church as the Body of Christ, on sacraments as symbols, and a complete resuscitation—the more striking because partly unconscious—of the Eckhartian views of human and divine personality.’ Profs. Howison and Royce are the protagonists of these two views in America. Among English theologians, Dr Rashdall (*The Theory of Good and Evil* bk. iii) holds a slightly modified form of the first view, and Dr Inge himself (*Personal Idealism and Mysticism* ch. 4) is a strong supporter of the second.

Now Dr Du Bose has affinities with both of these schools. But, if I interpret him rightly, what he really gives us is a reconciliation or synthesis of the two. And the reconciliation is to this effect: that both are true, but that they are not *equally* true, nor true in the same sphere.¹ They belong to different ‘levels’ of experience.

This is illustrated by the separate discussion, in the Second and Third Parts of *The Gospel in the Gospels*, of the gospel of the Work and the gospel of the Person. In the Second Part, the author is shewing what Salvation must be in the field of our ordinary experience, and on the basis of our familiar psychological distinctions. Here that reciprocity and co-operation between God and man, on which the Ethical Individualist insists, are necessary. In the Third Part, he is considering what deeper truths as to the

¹ Cf. Dr Sanday (*Life of Christ in Recent Research* p. 288) ‘The opposing truths are not really *in pari materia*; they are not truths that can be held side by side; they belong rather to different spheres, and the reconciliation between them is to be effected, not by proposing the one as an alternative for the other, but by a careful delimitation of these different spheres’.

nature of God and man, seen not from the point of view of ordinary experience, but, as it were, *ex specie aeternitatis*, are seen to be involved in ordinary Christian experience when thought out; and here Monistic Idealism is the more adequate. But the two are not mutually exclusive. We must start with an anthropocentric, and end with a theocentric, view of the universe. But the process is continuous; and it is experience itself which compels us to theorize about experience.

The nature of this 'reconciliation' will, I hope, become clearer when we consider Dr Du Bose's exposition in more detail. The outline of that exposition I shall now attempt to give, using, as far as possible, the author's own words.

I

The nature of our problem is determined by the facts of our present existence; and, for us as for St Paul, the outstanding fact is the fact of Sin. St Paul's presuppositions are,

'that sin exists; that sin is universal, a race as well as an individual fact; . . . that nevertheless sin is not the true nature or law of humanity; . . . that humanity can be or become itself only through a redemption or salvation from sin and the death which is its consequence' (P pp. 58-59).

What, then, is the nature of sin? Dr Du Bose's psychology is very careful. In the *Soteriology* (pp. 52, 64) sin seems to consist in the bondage of the *ἑσώ ἀνθρώπου*, the real 'person' or 'self', who is always on God's side, to his 'nature' ('fallen nature', p. 64) or *σάφξ*. But this is not the whole truth. Elsewhere (G pp. 161-163) sin is said to consist in undue indulgence of *ἐπιθυμίαι*, which are not themselves sinful, though they are the avenues of temptation. Environment by itself never produces sin in an individual. On the contrary, sin and holiness consist in opposite reactions on the same environment.

'Saints and sinners are made by opposite processes out of the same material. . . . Different personalities are not produced by different circumstances or conditions, but by different attitudes and actions under identical conditions. . . . Sin is something not ourselves in relation with which, in reaction with or against which, we ourselves become sinful, or else holy' (P p. 266, G p. 144, P p. 212).

The old distinction of Form and Matter is here applied; and

sin, to be really sin, must be so not only in its matter but in its form.

‘An animal or an infant might perform an act materially identical with what would be in a responsible person the worst of crimes. But there would be no guilt or sin, because that is lacking which not only defines, but constitutes these, viz.: consciousness and purpose or choice’ (G p. 143).

Sin, then, is personal, and

‘originates not in our nature, or in our body, but in ourselves’ (P p. 272).

This distinction in a man between ‘an act of himself’ and ‘a fact of his nature’ is precisely the differentia of personality.

‘Personality comes only by self-generation; that which is not of the self in the man is not personal to himself. . . . It may be impossible in much that we are and do to separate between what is our nature and what is ourself, since the nature acts largely through the person and the person can only act with the nature; but we would not distinguish as we do, in consciousness and in our consciences, between what is of necessity and what is of freedom if both did not co-exist within us’ (P p. 51, S p. 41).

But, though, for sin to be really a man’s own and to be rightly imputed to him, it must be the choice of his own personality, there is a profound truth in the doctrine of Original Sin, i.e.

‘such an inherited weakness for good and disposition to evil, not in ourselves properly but in our nature, as renders it practically¹ impossible for us, in it as it is, to overcome evil and do good’. ‘Sin and death are not individual but race facts.’ Sin ‘is in its actual operation certainly not an individual but a collective thing; it is in us as one man, in our solidarity as a race. . . . In the matter or material of it it is in us prior to any consciousness or knowledge of it, and therefore prior to any personal part in it of our own’ (S p. 41, P pp. 158, 208).

¹ The word ‘practically’ tends to conceal the great difficulty. If it means less than ‘wholly’, is it necessarily impossible for the individual to save himself? But, if it does mean ‘wholly’, we seem to have passed to a different and inconsistent train of thought, in which the true self is wholly for good, in which sin consists not at all in the act but only in the subjection of the self, and in which the insistence on personal responsibility for sin disappears. Does not the solution lie in the separation of the *experience* of personal spontaneity from the *theory* of individual independence? If we make this separation, we need not fear a denial of our experience of what personal action means in an admission that the individual does not start with a clean sheet.

Sin is, in a sense, already existent in the individual, before it is conscious and personal.

'We have been sinning materially, long before we have been doing so formally. That is, we have contradicted the spirit and transgressed the law of true and right being and living, long before the doing so was our own, or the sin of it was our own sin' (P p. 211).

It is this universality of the sway of sin, and the impossibility of finding any individual or region of life in ordinary humanity which is sufficiently free from it to allow of a fresh start, that is, for Dr Du Bose as for St Paul, the crux of the difficulty.

Sin, then, is universal; and it is also fatal to the very being of man. Sin and death are so intertwined, that it is less true to say that sin deserves or causes death than that sin *is* death.

'There are no consequences for us here or hereafter except such as not merely flow from but actually consist in what we ourselves are. . . . Just because life accepted is salvation, life rejected is damnation. Judgement executes itself or is self-inflicted. . . . The penalty of sin is sin itself; its curse is that it breeds more and more of itself,¹ and the death and hell to which it is condemned are nothing but itself multiplied and left to itself' (G pp. 148, 237, P p. 153).

Spiritual life is the only real or true life, and moral corruption is spiritual death.

Sin, then, is one of the basal facts of the universe, to which Christianity must have an application. But it is not sin by itself that constitutes the problem of life, but rather the fact that, though sin is inwound in the very fibres of man's being, yet he is conscious of it *as sin*, and is capable of passionate loathing and repudiation of it, even while he is being mastered by it; 'Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor'. 'The good that I would that I do not; but the evil which I would not that I do.' At the stage of 'Law', the will protests even while it surrenders. And the protest, though in a sense enhancing the

¹ Cf. James *Principles of Psychology* i p. 117: 'We are spinning our own fates, good and evil, and never to be undone. Every stroke of virtue or of vice leaves its never so little scar. The drunken Rip Van Winkle, in Jefferson's play, excuses himself for every fresh dereliction by saying, "I won't count this time". Well he may not count it, and a kind Heaven may not count it, but it is being counted none the less. Down among the nerve-cells and fibres the molecules are counting it, registering and storing it up, to be used against him when the next temptation comes. Nothing we ever do is in strict literalness wiped out.'

guilt, has its own significance and hope. It is this division within the personality which is the most striking feature of man's present existence.

'The duality more or less latent or patent in every moral personality . . . is neither an invention nor a discovery of St Paul. It has been in one way or another taken into account by every deepest thinker upon human nature and human life. It exists in us in natural potentiality, prior to any fact or experience of sin. So far therefore from being sin in itself, it is the ground and condition, as of sin too, so no less of holiness; for it is the ground of the possibility of any personal or moral activity and character in us at all. . . . The knowledge of sin is the only beginning of salvation. The knowledge of sin as sin is a moral and not only an intellectual conception; . . . it is a hatred of sin' (P pp. 189, 194).

The same idea is slightly expanded two pages further on.

'Suppose that the law, while it has failed to secure obedience and so to confer life, has nevertheless in the very act and by the very fact of convincing and convicting us of sin, taught us the meaning and obligation of holiness; suppose it has so brought us into the foretaste and experience of sin and its consequences as to impart at least a suggestion and prevision of holiness with its immunities and rewards; suppose it has gone yet further and has nursed and nurtured in us the sense of need and the ardent longing for holiness and life—if the law should go no further, will it not have already put us upon the road and created in us the necessary condition of salvation?' (P p. 196).

Owing to this internal division in our personalities, we are capable of identifying ourselves either with sin or with holiness. It is true that, 'what we need to be saved from is ourselves' (S p. 25). But it is still more true that,

'In my divided self, the true real I is in and with the self that hates, not in that which lusts after and does sin' (P p. 215).

What is needed for salvation, then, is simply restoration to our true selves. Yet sin is not merely natural, but personal. It is not only an enemy that beleaguers; it has its foothold within the fort, the garrison is untrustworthy. Thus it is that we are utterly impotent of ourselves to help ourselves. In ourselves we find—at least suggested—a standard, without the attainment of which we cannot be ourselves, yet which ourselves prevent us reaching. Hence a paradox. On the one hand, nothing can save us but a revolution, of which the self is not only

the theatre, but, in some sense, the cause; the demands of the law are inexorable. But, on the other hand, those demands are, by us, certainly unattainable.

'It would be a very low law that we could obey. . . . It is not a spiritual impossibility or even difficulty to know this much; that the change from spiritual death to spiritual life has got to take place in ourselves and to be an act of ourselves. . . . I am the furthest in the world from saying that we are sufficient of ourselves to put away our sin. But I am equally certain that it is only ourselves that can put it away. . . . We are made not for sin but for holiness, and not for death but for life. We are constituted by our nature not only capable of conceiving perfect holiness and eternal life, but under a necessity of recognizing these, if we reflect upon ourselves at all, as the true expression of our nature and the true exercise of our powers. And that which thus cannot but be a law to us we can know only as an impossibility' (G p. 95, P p. 252, G pp. 150, 169).

¹ This is the contradiction in experience, and it is this that the Christian scheme of redemption must solve.

'Now this paradox or antinomy within us, that only a completed holiness can be the meaning from the beginning or the full expression in the end of ourselves, and yet that such a holiness is something hopelessly unattainable by us, finds its perfect solution and reconciliation only in Jesus Christ' (G p. 171).

It is thus that the fundamental problem for Christian philosophy shapes itself: what must be the qualities of a Salvation which is really to save?

II

There is a familiar classification of modern theories of the Atonement as Objective and Subjective,—according as they lay stress upon the work accomplished for us by Christ, or the work that we accomplish for ourselves. The whole point of Dr Du Bose's argument is to shew that these are mutually necessary; and that either by itself is one-sided and unintelligible. In short Co-operation, the co-operation of God and man, is his watch-word. At the same time it is true that it is on the 'subjective' side, on the necessity of our share, that his accent falls most sharply. But this feature of the exposition does not appear to belong to any disproportion in the thought, but merely to the

fact that it is the side which seems to Dr Du Bose most to need emphasis at the present moment.

This two-sidedness is necessitated by the paradox of experience. A salvation that was not personal would not be salvation; yet the very fact that *we* need salvation makes it impossible for us to save ourselves. The efficacy of Christianity consists in this:—that it offers a salvation which is at once our own, and not our own; which is the joint work of God and man.

‘What the Gospel of Jesus Christ reveals to us is this: that an obedience may be all ours and only ours, and yet be incapable of becoming ours in isolation or apart from that without which we are not even ourselves’ (G p. 168).

It is in the unfailing sureness of touch with which he develops this position, that the most characteristic feature of Dr Du Bose’s work consists.

Let me quote some of the many passages in which the necessity of our share in the work of our own redemption is pushed home.

‘Nothing can be done merely to us or for us that will save us. To be loved, to be sympathized with and helped, to be shewn mercy and forgiven, to be the objects of the most unconditional divine grace are a very great deal. But these are the merest circumstances of human salvation, they are not salvation itself. . . . We can be recipients only as we are sharers and dispensers of the grace of God. . . . So far from God’s purpose in Christ being to do anything for us or instead of us which therefore we are not to do ourselves, it is a call to us to be all, to do all, and to suffer all that Jesus Christ Himself is, did, or suffered’ (G pp. 66, 67, 70).

The righteousness of Christ avails,

‘not because it is an equivalent instead of, but because it is a guarantee for, our own personal righteousness in Christ’ (S p. 117).

In St Paul,

‘there is no hint or suggestion that the earthly experiences, the cross, of Christ are something instead of their own and not also their own. . . . The promise is not exemption from His experiences, but salvation and exaltation through His experiences’ (P pp. 288–289).

It is fundamental to the understanding of the Gospel that we

should realize this, and Dr Du Bose never tires of emphasizing it. In salvation,

'our part, however secondary and subordinate to the divine part, is nevertheless the determining factor. . . . That Christ died for us is everything to us if it means our dying with Him ; it is less than nothing at all to us if His death and ours, He and we, are not, or are not to be, so conjoined. . . . The fatal misconception that the Gospel is something done for us or instead of us, and not something to be done in us and by us ; or, again, that it is something to be done only in us and not by us, is an error so great as practically to contradict the nature and neutralize the effects of Christianity' (P pp. 281, 171, 53).

These assertions are strong ; but they are justified by a consideration of the nature of salvation. If redemption through Christ is to answer to our need, then, to some extent at least, we can argue *a priori* from the nature of that need to the nature of redemption. If Salvation is to be salvation, it must be, negatively, the elimination of sin, and, positively, the production of holiness. If it is to be complete, it must be nothing less than complete holiness.¹ If it is to be *our* salvation, it must be a personal holiness, and, as such, conditioned by the nature of personal life. No declaration of pardon can suffice for us, which does not remove the necessity for pardon. The wonder of Christian salvation consists in no waiving or lowering of the standard of holiness to meet our weakness, but in such a succouring of that weakness as will enable it to rise to the full height of the ideal.

'He was not to lower the standard of personal perfection, but to raise it to its limit in infinity. . . . There are no allowances needed and there are no allowances whatsoever made for us under the Gospel of Jesus Christ. There was all the allowance in the world needed, and all made, in nature and under the law. Where that was demanded of us which we had not to give, and that required of us which we were unable to perform, there was need of overlooking, and passing by and condoning. But Christianity demands nothing of us that it does not give, and what it gives it cannot but demand. . . . It does not require an exercise of divine power to extend pardon ; it does require it to endow and enable us with all the qualities, energies, and activities that make for and that make holiness and life' (G pp. 68-69, 111, 175).

¹ 'There is no other possible Salvation from sickness but health, or from sin but holiness. . . . Certainly the full action of Salvation would be unrealized so long as there remains in man or man's condition anything to be delivered from which would be a Salvation' (S 10).

Now, when we bear in mind the nature of personality, and the distinction within a man of the 'natural' which comes to him from causes beyond his control, and the 'personal' in the production of which he himself has a share,¹ we must admit that such holiness can only be personal and gradual.

'Salvation can operate in us only through the natural and spiritual organs and activities of ourselves, our reason or intelligence, our affections or desires, our will, our acts and habits and character and life. The law of the action of all these requires all that time and environment have actually to offer to human experience in human life as it is. . . . It is the very condition and nature of the human spirit that it can come about only through itself. And it can come about through itself only by an act of original, self-determined, and permanent choice. . . . God cannot be the author of holiness or righteousness in persons in the same way in which He is the author of motion in things or of instincts in animals. They are caused immediately or without themselves, persons are caused (personally or spiritually) only through themselves, through their own self-causation. God can only cause my holiness so that I also shall be the cause of it. Otherwise it is not holiness, for holiness is a *personal* quality or character, i. e. one which is *self-caused*' (P p. 285, G p. 156, S p. 128).

These conditions must regulate our interpretation of salvation through Christ. It follows that,

'God cannot bless us with the spiritual and moral blessedness which our own nature demands, with which alone law and Gospel have to do, in which our very personality consists, apart from or without our own consciousness and co-operation in the matter. . . . To make sin not

¹ We do, as matter of familiar experience, distinguish different kinds of causation and different degrees of responsibility. There is a physical causation, such as the impact of one material body upon another, which is altogether below the level of conscious life. There is physical compulsion applied to a person, under which he acts consciously, but without volition. There is action in madness or under hypnotism, when a man acts with volition, but the action is not the result of real personal choice. And, clearly distinguished from all these, are those actions which we do attribute, in ourselves or in others, to such deliberate personal choice. Now in all these cases there is a *Because*. But not only does the particular cause differ in each case; the very meaning of causation varies. And in the last case, the *Because* which answers the question *Why*, must, at least partly, be the man himself. Now holiness must have this mark of personality or it would not be holiness. It does not however necessarily follow that, in some remoter sense, in the deepest truth of things, we should not, in order really to answer the *Why*, really to understand the *Because*, have to go further afield than the individual person of the agent. Our ordinary distinction in experience between personal and impersonal remains, whatever its metaphysical explanation.

death, if holiness is life, or to intervene between the sin and the death which it is, is no less a natural impossibility than a spiritual contradiction' (P pp. 114, 220).

To limit the possibilities of God by our own conceptions may seem to be very dangerous,¹ but it is in a sense necessary, if we are to reason about Him at all.

'When I say that God cannot do a thing, I mean simply that He cannot contradict Himself; He cannot, for example, do what is absurd or immoral. . . . God Himself cannot, by power working necessarily and immediately, work a righteousness in us, for then it would be no more a righteousness than the straightness of a stick or the movement of a falling body is righteousness' (P p. 176, S p. 85).

But all this is only one side of Christian truth. Nothing can satisfy our sore need that does not work a revolution in our inmost being. Yet we must ask, not only what is the nature of salvation, but what it is that makes salvation possible; since our own inability, unaided, to change ourselves is matter of universal experience. And however Christian thinkers may differ as to their interpretation of that work, they will all agree in answering that it is the work of Jesus Christ. Not Works but Faith, is the keynote of the Pauline teaching, and it is involved in the transition from Morality to Religion.

'Our righteousness is not to be made by us through obedience, but to be received by us through faith. . . . It makes a great difference whether we make our obedience the cause or the consequence of what we are; even all the difference of whether what we are to be is to be of ourselves or of God' (S pp. 80, 69).

The objective fact of the conquest of sin in Christ is logically prior to any subjective effect of that fact in us.

'The objective fact would create the subjective spirit. . . . Our obedience is not God's but ours; but though it be not God's, yet it is God Himself in us, enabling us to be ourselves and to render to Him what is ours. . . . We are not accepted as sons and righteous

¹ Cf. Dr. Sanday, l. c. p. 238: 'I have the greatest reluctance even upon what seem to be obvious propositions of morality, to lay down laws for the Almighty. "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" is no doubt an axiom that stands absolutely fast. But it is another thing to say that we shall always be able to see what is right. The lines meet no doubt somewhere, but that meeting point may be beyond our ken.'

through being so, but are enabled to become sons and righteous through being made and treated as such' (G pp. 73, 168, P p. 284).

Thus much is involved in the very nature of Faith.

'If Christ were not first objectively our Salvation, He could never become subjectively our Salvation. The objective divine gift must precede the subjective human reception of it. . . . Faith does not create a fact, it only accepts one; the effecting or creative cause in our salvation is in God's act, which comes first and consists in His placing us in Christ for salvation. Our act of faith is only the apprehending or realizing cause, and could not take place at all if there were not already in God's act the thing to be apprehended and realized' (S p. 56, P p. 233).

Though, then, personal holiness is the ideal at which we must aim, our part in such holiness can only consist in a personal response to a stimulus from without; and that stimulus we find in the victorious Life and Death of Jesus Christ. And so, our very insistence on the subjective and personal character of our salvation leads us to postulate, as its presupposition, an objective salvation, which is the work of Another and not of ourselves.

In the *Soteriology*, Dr Du Bose brings out this point in another way. The necessity of an objective Incarnation as example is, apart from the fact of sin, deduced from the very distinction between 'persons' and 'nature', which was the basis of the argument for the subjective element.

'The very and sole principle of all acting upon the spiritual is through example, or objective standards. How can it be otherwise? If one is, through his own understanding, will, and free activity, i. e. through himself, to be made other than he is, he must be *shewn* that other which he is to become. It must be made to him an object and end of obligation, aspiration, imitation. It must appeal to, move, influence, and transform him through, his reason, his affections, his conscience, his will. Why or how otherwise shall he set himself to become, or how can he be made, what *it* is? The thing which lifts man above all other beings of our experience, which makes him a rational being . . . is that he is a being capable of conceiving and being wrought upon by *ideals*' (S p. 131).

Neither objective without subjective, nor subjective without objective; neither grace without faith, nor faith without grace; neither God without man, nor man without God; avail unto human

salvation. The solution is found in co-operation and correspondence. So in the parable of the Prodigal Son; if reformation 'is to be accomplished, it must be by father and son in co-operation.' And that co-operation must depend upon a personal attitude or disposition towards it on both sides. . . . The real and effectual treatment of sin is by its very nature a joint act or activity of God and man' (G p. 71, P p. 219).

This two-sided truth is further illuminated by, and is itself used to illuminate, the Pauline doctrine of Justification by Faith. The difficulty here is that the two parts, which are mutually necessary, seem to be divided in time, as Before and After. The one is accomplished before the other is begun. And not only so: owing to the formal freedom which includes the possibility of sin, it is uncertain whether the subjective response will ever take place. This difficulty is treated very fully by Dr Du Bose. Though nothing short of complete holiness is really salvation, the believer starts with a present peace, a status, to which his own character does not as yet completely correspond.

'Remission, or the putting away of sin, includes two ideas, or perhaps more correctly two stages of the same idea. It means a real putting away by the New Testament process of sanctification. But it also means the provisional putting away by the equally New Testament act of divine pardon or forgiveness' (G p. 132).

In the case of the prodigal son:—

'if the external status of father and son had not been restored first, there could not have come about the gradual healing and growth of internal and real unity. . . . (So) God has first in Jesus Christ established an objective status or relation of sons. Into this He receives us by an act of grace on His part and through no act of ours' (G p. 176).

Our appropriation of this relation and its results is in a sense subsequent and logically secondary.

'We are not accepted as sons or righteous through being so, but are enabled to become sons and righteous through being made and treated as such. . . . It is this being *treated as*, not on the ground of being righteous, but on the ground of a certain relation of faith to Christ's righteousness, upon which is laid the chief stress in St Paul's system' (P pp. 284, 71).

But, though this is true, it is by itself only a half truth, and is unintelligible and unjustifiable apart from the other half. In the

first place, as the last quotation suggests, the work of Christ is nothing at all to us without some dim, germinal effort of response on our side, which we call Faith; and which, though not itself complete holiness, is in some vital relation to complete holiness. The justification of the publican

'must of course be, not on the ground of his actually being so (sc. righteous) in life and character, but on the ground of his, at the time, occupying the right posture or attitude, the only right attitude possible for him, towards righteousness and at the same time towards his own conscious unrighteousness. . . . Where this exists in truth and sincerity, even though it be but the beginning of what is an infinite process, it is possible and right to accept and treat already as right that which as yet is only a first turning to and direction towards the right' (P pp. 72, 73).

And this is the only possible beginning of the gradual progress towards complete holiness; hence to treat this first step as standing for the whole process is not merely make-believe.

'Faith is therefore with a divine truth and propriety reckoned or imputed to us as being righteousness, for it is a necessary moment or stage in our righteousness. . . . To one who is ill or about to die, it would bring great present peace to know that he was brought into possession of certain cure and so of assured recovery and health. But the real peace to the sick man is health itself, and the wonderful comfort and peace brought to him by a sure faith in it and a certain hope of it is, in a large measure at least, only proleptic and anticipatory. In a large measure but not wholly so. The patient may find in his very anticipation and hope a real beginning and progress of the return of actual health, and so his possession and enjoyment may not be all wholly future; and the believer not only looks forward in faith and hope to the actual fruition of God and holiness and life, but has an ever increasing foretaste of them now' (P pp. 74, 129-130).

And secondly, we cannot understand the establishment of this objective status with our preliminary response apart from the ideal, the attainment of complete personal holiness to which it points. There is a sort of acquittal and removal of disability before our progress in holiness begins. But no removal of penalty which does not remove the sin itself can ultimately be of any use to us. Acquittal cannot, ultimately, be separated from real reformation.

'There is a vital and necessary connexion between the two things which has to be taken into the fullest account' (P p. 75).

Faith, as toward God, and Repentance, as towards our sin, are the characteristics of our earliest response, conditions without which Salvation cannot affect us at all. But what is involved in these?

'Repentance means nothing if it does not intend the whole of holiness, the complete putting away of sin; and it is ineffectual, it comes to nothing, if it is never to attain or accomplish that end. . . . Let us beware of stopping short with the Gospel of being accepted, and not going on to the real Gospel of being good. . . . We have heard it said, I am content to be a sinner saved by grace. In its truest and highest sense, to be a sinner saved by grace is to be one who having been a sinner is one no longer; to be content to be saved in and not from sin, to be saved and still a sinner, is no true contentment. . . . The response of the Gospel to the human sense of actual sin and unattainable holiness is not the half-grace of forgiveness but the whole-grace of redemption and deliverance' (G p. 150, P pp. 78, 102).

Mistakes here arise from partial and abstract views. It is essential, if we are to understand, that we should keep the whole process and its goal in mind.

'St Paul has ever in his own mind the whole undismembered conception of salvation in Christ' (P p. 79).

And it is only in so far as we bear in mind this whole conception, that it is possible for us, as for him, to see at all the justice of the preliminary status. Dr Du Bose is never tired of insisting upon the necessity of the Aristotelian principle of explanation through the End. A God-governed universe is a universe of rational purpose. The 'one, far-off, divine event' does, in a real sense, determine every stage of the process; i.e. not only is the true nature of anything that which it becomes when perfected, but the earlier stages are really determined by the End, and can only be interpreted in the light of it. The Final Cause is both the end to be attained, and the purpose present in the mind of God from the beginning. Dr Du Bose finds the great principle that the ideal is the real, the final cause is the first cause, in the New Testament doctrine of Jesus Christ (cf. G p. 226, P pp. 297-298). On the one hand, development in Time, the gradual process of sanctification, is essential: on the other hand, there is a real sense in which the distinction of Before and After is transcended,

and that which we shall be determines our present status. Justification and Sanctification, though separated in Time, are vitally connected and interdependent.

'Justification and sanctification are not two things in themselves, they are one and the same thing viewed in different relations on our part to it. The thing is Jesus Christ our Righteousness. . . . The different relations to it on our part are, (1) that righteousness apprehended and appropriated to ourselves by faith, in all its completeness; upon which God treats us as actually possessing it; this is what is meant by our justification, or our status of present peace and fellowship with God; and (2) that righteousness, which is Jesus Christ Himself, through the constant association and participation of faith with Him, gradually but actually imparting Himself to us so as to become to us not only a righteousness in which we believe, but one which at least we begin to possess' (P pp. 150-151).

III

So far then the solution of the paradox with which we started is in terms of Co-operation. Holiness must, and yet cannot, be our own: it is therefore to be in part our own and in part Another's. And such a solution seems to harmonize with our ordinary experience and our familiar psychological distinctions. But, taken by itself, it is inadequate. That crippling which is the result of sin, and which makes it impossible for us to save ourselves completely, makes it just as impossible that we should, unaided, make one step on the way. That, after a small beginning by ourselves, we should be wonderfully helped and sustained by contact with the work of Christ, is only a mockery, seeing that it remains out of our reach. We cannot grow into the likeness of God, except in so far as there is something within us and on our side which is already godlike.

'There is no knowledge of God in Himself only, there is no knowledge of God in creation only, without the answering knowledge of God in ourselves also. The deep that answers to deep must be the same deep' (G p. 280).

And so, though Grace and Faith are both necessary for a man's salvation, we cannot treat them as two parallel but independent factors which may converge. In the first place, of course, they are not upon a level.

“While faith is the condition and *sine qua non* of any actual operation of grace, grace on the other hand is the ground or cause and presupposition of faith. Grace is therefore the *prius* of faith; that which is to be believed must *be* before it can be believed; the gift and the giving must precede the receiving and the reception’ (S p. 83).

But, beyond this, our very subjective response, though it must fulfil the conditions which distinguish personal from all other action, is the work of the Holy Spirit.

“Subjective response” as well as “objective communication” is needed as *coequal and co-ordinate part of the gift or grace of God*¹ (G p. 244). ‘As it is the part and function of the Word to reveal to us the whole truth of God and ourselves, so it is the part of the Spirit to reveal to us from within, to open our eyes to see, the meaning and truth of the divine Word. The Word . . . is the principle and medium of objective revelation. The Spirit is that of subjective apprehension, comprehension, and appropriation. . . . There is no gospel or salvation for us which does not come by the Word through the Spirit. In a way we may say that that means, by God through ourselves; but, in a more true way, it means that while our salvation must be of ourselves as well as of God, we owe the *ourselves* in the matter, as well as the divine part of it to God, Who there as everywhere else is All in all. . . . While we can be ourselves or moral or personal at all, only through our own wills, yet we can be any of these in the truest or highest or best sense only through something infinitely other and more than our own wills. . . . The holier one becomes the more one passes out of all dependence upon mere nature and all conceit of mere self. These are left behind in the growing experience of that which, while it is our ever growing selves, is ever more and more consciously not of ourselves’ (G pp. 246–247, P p. 190, S p. 141).

Now if this, and no less, is the Work of Christ,² much is implied about His Person. He is not merely an individual man amongst other men, and separate from each of us in the sense in which we are separate from one another; but in Him, in some deep mysterious sense, all humanity is summed up. To use the expression of another writer, He is not generically but inclusively Man. If His human life were simply an individual life, He could be to us

‘only a historical example and an objective and remote influence. . . .

¹ Italics mine.

² The work of the Spirit is the work of Christ. ‘The Spirit coming after Him was not to supply His absence but to effect His presence’ (G p. 246).

No individual human being can be all that He is to all men (G p. 230, P p. 295).

But the opposite view is stated by Dr Du Bose with ringing clearness.

‘The human self in Him was not that of only one of us, but of us all. It was not one man, but humanity that He was. . . . He was not a man, but man, all men and every man, the common humanity in which all are one and of which He is the essence and unity. . . . I would venture to affirm that no one who rises to this¹ height of the conception of Jesus Christ can for an instant tolerate the idea that His humanity was but that of an individual human person in whom God exceptionally revealed His presence and power. The Lord of glory was not an individual man in God; He was all humanity in God, because He was God Himself in humanity. The humanity in which God was manifest in the flesh was our common, our universal humanity. . . . (Hence) whatever He was or did in the name or on behalf of humanity, humanity itself did or became in His person’ (G pp. 216, 219, 227, 260).

He, then, is not separate from us as we are from one another; and so it is that, both for us and in us, He wrought our salvation. And Dr Du Bose does not scruple to use language of identification. Christ *is* the true self of each of us. He speaks of Him as, ‘the universal truth and reality of ourselves’ (G p. 279).

‘Christ is not another instead of myself, but is only my true, divine, selfhood and self. . . . Jesus Christ is not only the divine truth of every man but is the higher and diviner self of every man’ (P pp. 179, 296).

This identification of Christ with the higher self of every man may recall some of the language of Mr Campbell against which Bishop Gore protests as pantheistic. But there is a very important difference of emphasis. Are we to say, Christ is nothing but the higher self of one and all; and so to take our conception of our highest selves as a criterion by which to limit our conception of Christ? Or are we to say, Our highest selves are nothing less than Christ? Here there is all the difference between lowering our conception of Christ, and raising that of humanity. But this is not all. Dr Du Bose has his own way of meeting the difficulty, and he expressly notices an objection.

‘One says, “You lay great stress upon the view that our Lord was not a man, but man. I find this a difficult conception; does it not

¹ Sc. in the Epistle to the Colossians,

mean that humanity has a concrete real existence apart from the individual persons who are human, and that this Universal becomes visible in Christ? If this be so does it not lead us to a metaphysical Realism, not now generally held?"' (P p. 297).

The reply is that this universality of Christ's humanity is not to be understood except in the light of His Deity; and that it is indeed one of the best and most conclusive evidences of that Deity.

'The very universality as well as the very completeness and perfection of our Lord's humanity is the incontestable and conclusive proof to us of His coequal deity. . . . The concrete universal of humanity which may be found in Jesus Christ belongs to it not as humanity, but as God in humanity' (G p. 162, P p. 297).

Christ, then, is Man rather than *a* man, just because He is more than man. And the truth that Christ is our higher self is to be understood as part of the yet wider truth that God is the higher self of one and all. This is affirmed unequivocally by Dr Du Bose. He speaks of God,

'Who alone is our true or perfect self. . . . To come back to Him is to come back to ourselves. . . . I object to the words communion and fellowship simply as not going all the way of that unity of God and man in Christ which is the truth of the Holy Ghost. The truth of the spirit of God is the truth of the spirit of man. The *koinonia* is not real or complete so long as the spirits are two and not one. We have it in its completeness only as the eternal, personal Spirit of God is the actual personal spirit of man. . . . Nothing is more necessary for our Christianity than to make it clear that . . . God works in us to will and to do in the matter of our salvation *not in mere co-operation but only in actual identity*¹ with our own working out every jot and tittle of our own salvation' (G pp. 173, 73, P pp. 243, 244).

If all this be true, we have moved some way from the plain man's first unthinking conception of his personality, as something self-identical and self-complete. We have been led to a much more fluid conception, and to a much clearer assertion of the dependence of the human person upon others, and ultimately upon the Divine.

'Man is never from the first an individual but always a social being. He has his existence in, with, and through others. He lives and

¹ Italics mine.

becomes all that constitutes himself only in concrete relationships and in actual personal exchanges between himself and them. . . . Above all other being, spiritual being is a "being in relation", and in relations. . . . Christianity holds out to us the promise and the hope of a sympathy and a union with all things, with the mind and spirit and life of all things, which will make us infinitely more and greater than ourselves. . . . The task of realizing ourselves presupposes selves in us to realize, but we shall never be ourselves without the self-realization'¹ (G p. 26, P p. 20, G p. 93, P p. 277).

It is, then, most and last, with the Monistic Idealists that Dr Du Bose takes his stand.

'The Logos of our prologue justifies itself in this further respect that, whereas in the speculation of the world there had been more or less of dualism, this summarily and effectually excludes it. Dualism sees in the matter of the universe something independent of its form. Mind does not create or originate matter, but only shapes or forms, or informs, a matter existent independently of itself. Even Leibnitz could claim for the world only that it was the best possible out of the material available, a material independent apparently of God Himself. The Logos of Christianity is not only the formal or informing principle within things, but the things themselves exist only within it and are but the terms or the symbols of its self-expression' (G p. 251).

And yet it seems true to speak of his view as a 'reconciliation', because it seems to preserve most of that for which Ethical Individualists are, positively, striving. As the charge of Pantheism is that most commonly made by opponents against various forms of Monistic Idealism, and as it is certainly its characteristic danger and exaggeration, it is perhaps worth while to suggest a few points which clearly mark off Dr Du Bose's position from that of pantheists, or from that of those philosophers whose speculations seem to eliminate any other possible form of religion.

(1) If we have interpreted Dr Du Bose rightly, we see that, in its own sphere, he not only allows for, but actually insists upon, the distinction of 'persons' from the rest of nature, of personal and self-caused action from that which is in various degrees the result of causes beyond the agent's own control; and

¹ Cf. Dr Inge *Personal Idealism and Mysticism* ch. iv *passim*: 'Unification of the personality is a gradual process,' &c.

so, that he lays special stress upon individual responsibility. This is taken for granted; and a further examination of our ordinary consciousness can never simply contradict that which it sets out to explain.

(2) Dr Du Bose himself uses the doctrine of the *Logos*, i.e. the very doctrine which proves that a Christian philosophy must be fundamentally monistic, to mark the difference between Christian theism and pantheism.

'The propriety of the word *Logos* consists in the manner in which it distinguishes the principle of the Universe from God, while at the same time identifying it with Him. . . . The beginning of all distinction between a pantheistic and a theistic conception of the world lies in recognizing the world as the expression, not of God Himself—or, as we say, "of His substance"—but of His *Logos*, His Thought, Will, Word. The *Logos* of God, then, is not God (δ *θεός*); we distinguish Him. And yet certainly the *Logos* is God (*θεός*); we identify Him.' (G pp. 253, 283).

This is a fruitful principle, which it is not possible to develop here.

(3) The ideal of Dr Du Bose is expressly marked off, as from Individualism on the one hand; so from Nirvana on the other.

'It is necessary that we shall become ourselves; but it is then no less necessary that we shall transcend ourselves, for in fact we never become ourselves until we have grown up from ourselves into oneness with God' (P p. 265).

On the other hand,

'we do indeed discard or lose ourselves in and for God in Christ, but it is only to find ourselves in all God is in us and we in consequence are in Him. . . . We shall no longer be ourselves or men, if to be spiritual means to cease to be natural, and is not rather the spiritualizing or divinizing, and so the glorifying or spiritually perfecting of the natural which is ourselves' (P pp. 245, 272).

(4) Theories of the universe are sometimes, perhaps, not very happily, classified as 'static' and 'dynamic'. If for the moment we adopt these terms, we must certainly put Dr Du Bose's theory in the second class. He would, I fancy, unlike Dr Rashdall, identify God with the 'Absolute' of philosophy. But he is as far as possible from taking the view of the Absolute

which is that of some philosophers, to whom he may possibly appear to be perilously near.

A moment guess'd ; then back behind the fold
Immerst of Darkness round the Drama roll'd,
Which for the Pastime of Eternity
He doth Himself contrive, enact, behold.

On the contrary, nothing is more striking than his insistence on the necessity of the whole process of human redemption to the being of God Himself.

'It is only in Christ that God not merely manifests what He is, but in His activity and self-expression through creation *becomes* what He is. . . . We speak of the incredible self-lowering or self-emptying of God in becoming man or in undergoing the death of the cross. Is the act in which love becomes perfect a contradiction or a compromise of the divine nature? Is God not God or least God in the moment in which He is most love . . . where before Christ, or where now otherwise than in Christ and in the cross of the divine suffering together with and for man, where in all the story of the universe was or is love so love, or God so God?' (G pp. 265, 272-273).

IV

Such I believe to be the main outline of Dr Du Bose's interpretation of Christian Theology. Perhaps something ought to be said about difficulties still remaining. To pick out verbal inconsistencies would be an easy but unprofitable task; since they are generally due, not to confusions of thought, but to the fact that the thought is so rich and many-sided, and that, in individual passages, the writer often contents himself with emphasizing one side at a time. But perhaps this will not explain quite all the apparent discrepancies, more especially some of those in the *Soteriology*, where the contradiction seems more fundamental. Such passages as the following are difficult to reconcile with the general trend of the author's thought by the theory of 'levels'.

'What is natural to man is common to all men, because it belongs to the common nature. What is personal belongs to himself alone' (S p. 41). 'Things and their working are God, save in the case of the working of that one only thing which God has endowed with the awful

power of separating itself from Him in thought, will, and deed ; viz. personality' (S p. 48).

The fact is that Dr Du Bose has a fondness for verbal antitheses, which is rather dangerous, and perhaps this leads him sometimes to push differences a little further than they will go. But even if this be so, it does not really affect the coherence of the thought as a whole.

There is, however, a more serious difficulty, inherent in the thought itself, which I can only indicate here. There does not seem to be any necessary contradiction between the sense of individual self-identity in our moral experience and that ultimate inherence in Christ which seems to be postulated by philosophical considerations, as well as by much religious experience. They do not clash, for they belong to different spheres. But the antinomy, which for Dr Du Bose remains an antinomy, is that produced by the fact and nature of sin. The difficulty comes out in the discussion of the human sinlessness of Jesus Christ.¹ Dr Du Bose makes the very important distinction between *formal* freedom, the possibility of free choice between opposites, which characterizes imperfect human personality as we know it, and *real* freedom—'the freedom even from the possibility of disobedience', which is acquired in the end by the holy. But though real freedom is the goal, it can only be attained through formal freedom, i.e. through a genuine possibility of disobedience at a certain stage. The really free have '*obeyed away* the possibility of disobedience', but this possibility must once have been real, or the whole process becomes unmeaning. This difficulty, indeed, is seen in the consideration of our Lord's human sinlessness. This is a valid example on Dr Du Bose's view ; for 'He is unlike us in the *fact* alone of his sinlessness, not so in the *mode* of it' (S 199). Now, if we decline to put these two truths side by side, but, seeking a synthesis, merge the earlier in the later as less 'ultimate', do we not reduce the formal freedom to a mere illusion? What seems to be needed here is not simply the consciousness of freedom and suspense at the moment of action,

¹ The discussion of the true interpretation and significance of our Lord's human experience has a prominent place in these volumes, particularly in the *Soterology*. The thought is characteristically bold and has provoked considerable criticism, but its discussion does not fall within the limits of this paper.

but, in some sense, the real *fact* of independence. Was the possibility of sin in Christ a real possibility? Dr Du Bose simply admits the antinomy.

‘Construed from the divine side, I confess I see no place for any human formal freedom (*possibilitas peccandi*) in our Lord. The Logos incarnate in Him was, even as man, still the Divine Logos, and could neither have personally erred nor have miscarried nor failed in carrying out the divine work of human redemption and salvation’ (S p. 197).

On the other hand, he continues, from the human side it is equally necessary to insist on the *possibilitas peccandi*. Now, if our Lord in the mode of His sinlessness, though not in the fact of it, was a type of all men¹, this difficulty is transferred to ordinary humanity, and its force is redoubled. For here we have no abstract *possibilitas peccandi*, but a very concrete fact of sin. Yet how is this to be reconciled with the view that man owes not only his opportunity, but his very power of rising to that opportunity, to God? How is it that this power of God, working not only upon but through man, is effective only in some cases and upon some occasions? Why, we must ask with reverence, does not the same grace of God, which availed unto holiness in Christ as man, avail also in us; unless our personality is in some ultimate sense independent, so that, in that independence, we fail where He did not fail?

On this side even Dr Du Bose does not seem to pierce the impenetrable darkness of the mystery by which we are confronted. But this is only to say that he does not solve difficulties which he nowhere professes to solve. We should not undervalue the light which he has given us, because, in some regions, darkness still remains. Only to this extent is it relevant as a criticism: that, in so far as the thought derives its impressiveness from its close-knit, logical coherence, the discovery of gaps which it does not fill must needs detract from its cogency.

In any case, to end on a note of criticism would be to obscure

¹ Cf. G p. 160: ‘Our Lord in fact did not sin, not from necessity of His nature, but in the exercise of His human will’. And S p. 143: ‘Whatever of divine there was or is then in the knowledge, power, or any other function of Jesus Christ *as man*, it is the communicated divinity of the Third Person of the Trinity, and not the original or underived divinity of the Second Person’: i.e. His holiness, like that of all men, was through Grace.

the sense of admiration and gratitude which must be uppermost in the minds of most readers. For Dr Du Bose's achievement is certainly notable. The aim of the philosopher is to rationalize, to see all life and experience as instinct with reason. To the Christian philosopher, what is not moral is not rational, and his aim, therefore, is to see the facts of the Christian revelation, and all life and experience which they affect, as the direct expression of the character of God. No recent theologian has carried us further forward towards this ideal than Dr Du Bose ; and for that reason he has rightly been hailed as not only a philosopher but a prophet. Can there be higher praise ?

W. H. MOBERLY.