II.—HEGEL'S TREATMENT OF THE CATEGORIES OF THE SUBJECTIVE NOTION.¹ (I.)

BY J. ELLIS McTAGGART.

THE object of this paper is to consider that part of the dialectic process which Hegel calls the Subjective Notion. The views which I shall put before you are, I believe, substantially the same as those of Hegel, except on a few special points, which I shall notice as I come to them.² But the question which I wish to raise is not whether they are a faithful representation of Hegel, but whether they are intrinsically true. To discuss the former would be a comparatively unprofitable task, for many of the transitions from category to category are left by Hegel in almost hopeless obscurity. This is, I think, to be mainly attributed to two causes. The first is the excessive condensation—especially of the *Smaller Logic*—which at places gives room for little more than the mere naming of the categories, without any attempt to deduce them. This is specially noticeable in the Subjective Notion, from the great extent to which it is subdivided. The second cause is to be found in Hegel's tendency to let the polemic side of the dialectic sink out of notice. He was much more inclined to show that the higher category is suggested by the lower than to point out that the lower is contradictory without the higher. Unless this too is demonstrated, however, the dialectic loses all its cogency. And how it is to be demonstrated, in certain cases, Hegel leaves us to discover for ourselves, almost unaided.

Our best course will thus be to attack Hegel's problem, aiding ourselves by his treatment of it, but not confining ourselves to his arguments. What, then, is the problem of the Subjective Notion?

The Subjective Notion forms, in the first place, the first

¹ Read before the Aristotelian Society.

² The notes in which I defended my divergence on these points are here omitted for want of space.

division of the Doctrine of the Notion, which is the last of the three parts into which the logic is divided. The last category preceding it is Reciprocity. This, for the purpose of our present paper, we must assume to be valid, and it will form the postulate from which our arguments must start. Reciprocity is the last category of Actuality, the final division of the Doctrine of Essence.¹

Since our argument is to start from the admission that Reciprocity is valid, we must begin by defining the significance of this category. By asserting the validity of Reciprocity, Hegel means, in the first place, that everything is so connected with other things, that the existence and nature of the one is dependent on the existence and nature of the other, and *vice versâ*. Secondly, everything in the universe is connected in this way, directly or indirectly, with everything else, so that the universe forms a connected whole. And, thirdly, the whole nature of everything consists of nothing else but these relations of reciprocal dependence with other things.

Starting with this, we have to reach the highest stage of the Subjective Notion—that to which Hegel gives the name of the Disjunctive Syllogism. We may provisionally define this category as asserting that the nature of everything is determined by a hierarchy of general laws, which are themselves ultimate and cannot be reduced to anything else. These laws form a series, the lower subordinated to the higher, such that the highest law embraces the whole extent of reality, while the lowest completely define the nature of the objects to which they apply.

We may therefore say that the advance made by the dialectic in the Subjective Notion is from the idea of complete determination in general, to the idea of complete determination by a symmetrical structure of general laws. We are apt to confuse these two ideas in general language, but they are in fact distinct. The admission that A is always determined by something outside itself does not assert that determination is by general laws. It still leaves the possibility open that each determination is unique and individual, and that the supposed existence of general laws is due to a mistake in our observation of the facts. If the dialectic succeeds in proving that determination does involve general laws it will therefore have made a real advance.

The Subjective Notion is divided with a greater minute-

¹ This applies to the *Smaller Logic*. In the *Greater Logic* the arrangement is rather different, but the difference is here unimportant.

ness than can be found in any other part of the Logic. It is, in the first place, divided into three stages, entitled by Hegel the Notion as Such, the Judgment, and the Syllogism. The Notion as Such is subdivided into the Universal, the Particular, and the Individual. The Judgment has four subdivisions—Judgment of Existence, of Reflexion, of Necessity, and of the Notion. Syllogism, again, is subdivided into Syllogisms of Existence, of Reflexion, and of Necessity. Each of the subdivisions of Judgment and Syllogism is again divided into three yet more minute stages. One or two of these divisions I shall venture to suggest ought to be discarded as superfluous or worse, but even then this part of the dialectic will remain exceptionally elaborate.

What is the significance of these names? They seem at first sight to mean that this part of the dialectic deals only with the workings of our minds, and not with all reality. This might account, it would appear, for its being called Subjective, and for the choice of such names as Judgment and Syllogism for its divisions.

But such a use of Subjective would not be Hegelian. For him Subjective does not mean the inner as opposed to the outer. It means rather the particular, contingent, and capricious, as opposed to the universal, necessary, and reasonable.¹ And thus our hypothesis would fail to explain the choice of Subjective as the title of the division.

Moreover, our hypothesis is untenable. For on examining the categories which have the titles of Notion as Such, Judgment and Syllogism, it becomes evident that, in spite of their names, they do not apply only to the states of our mind, but to all reality. They grow, by the dialectic process, out of the categories of Essence, and the categories of the Objective Notion, in turn, grow out of them. There is no doubt that the categories of Essence and of the Objective Notion refer to all reality, and so, therefore, must the categories of the Subjective Notion. Otherwise they could never solve the contradictions which arise in Essence, nor, from their contradictions, could we be entitled to proceed to the Objective Notion.

Hegel's own language, too, renders it clear that these categories are meant to apply to all reality. He says, for

¹ The only case, so far as I know, in which Hegel uses Subjective in any other way, is in the *Greater Logic*, when he calls the doctrines of Being and Essence by the name of Objective, and the doctrine of the Notion by the name of Subjective. But this is not repeated in the *Smaller Logic*, and he says that he considers this use of the names as unsatisfactory, though usual. Cf. *Werke*, iii., p. 51.

example, "all things are a categorical judgment";¹ and again, "everything is a syllogism".²

We must look, then, for another explanation of the terminology. We can find it, I think, in the connexion of this part of the dialectic with formal logic. Formal logic, of course, owes its existence to abstraction. When we take its standpoint we make abstraction of all but certain qualities of reality. Now these qualities, we shall find, are those which are demonstrated as valid at that part of the dialectic which we are considering in this paper, so that at this stage, and not before, formal logic could be metaphysically justified.

We find that formal logic assumes that we have the power of ascribing general notions as predicates to subjects, and in this way arriving at truth with regard to those subjects. And it also assumes that we are in possession, in some manner or the other, of various general truths, such as are expressed in the statements All A is B, No A is C.

On the other hand, we find that there are other characteristics of reality of which formal logic takes no account. It makes no distinction between trivial and important propositions. "No man is wholly evil," and "no man has green hair," are assertions which are for formal logic of precisely the same rank. And, in the second place, it does not inquire how, in the first instance, we ever came to know the truth of any proposition. It always assumes that something is known, as a *datum*, and only occupies itself with considering how other knowledge can be deduced from this.

Now we shall see that the Subjective Notion of the dialectic begins with the idea of universal notions, and that it soon is led on to the further idea of the existence of valid generalisations—the two assumptions of formal logic. And we shall also see that the characteristic defects of the Subjective Notion are the inability to give any account of the existence of these generalisations which shall be free from contradiction, and the inability to distinguish between the relative importance of such generalisations. These defects are not overcome till we reach the Syllogism of Necessity, which is the last stage in the Subjective Notion, and forms the transition to a higher idea.

This will enable us to explain why the divisions of the Subjective Notion draw their names from formal logic. It is not that these categories apply only to the subject-matter of formal logic, but that the procedure of formal logic is

¹ *Enc.*, Section 177. Lecture Note.

² *Ibid.*, Section 181.

such that it makes especial use of these categories, which are therefore named from the subject-matter on which they are most often employed.

Analogies to this may be found in the Objective Notion. Two of the divisions are here named Mechanism and Chemism. It is clear, however, that these categories are not meant to apply solely in the ordinary sciences of Mechanics and Chemistry. They are ideas applicable to all reality, but the most striking instances of their use can be found in those sciences, from which, therefore, they take their names.

It must be admitted that this principle of nomenclature is not only perplexing to the reader, but in some cases misleading to the author. In dealing with the categories of Judgment and Syllogism, Hegel seems at several points to be led into unnecessary complexity by the desire of carrying the analogy with formal logic as far as possible. But to this question we shall return.

We can now understand, too, why the whole section is called Subjective. It is called Subjective because it is contingent, and its contingency is the same which we find in formal logic—that the principle of classifying which is adopted is entirely indifferent. For formal logic all universals are of the same importance, and it sees no difference between a classification which, *e.g.*, classes pictures by their painters, and one which classes them by the size of their frames. From this contingency we do not begin to escape till we reach the Syllogism of Necessity.

THE NOTION AS SUCH.

THE UNIVERSAL NOTION AS SUCH.

The last point which Hegel reaches, before the Subjective Notion, is, as I have said, the category of Reciprocity. For the purpose of this paper we must assume the validity of Reciprocity, and we have now to consider the transition from this to the first stage of the Subjective Notion. This is the Notion as Such, which appears first in the form of the Universal Notion.

With regard to this transition we must notice, in the first place, that we have here attained to the idea of completely necessary determination. In Causality, while the effect is determined, the cause is free, and, however far we may push back the chain of causation, the last link to which we have at any moment attained will be a cause only, and not an

effect. But in Reciprocity the cause is the effect of its own effect, and the necessary determination is complete.

To say that it is in this necessity that we first reach freedom can only appear a paradox till it is examined. We must remember that for Hegel freedom never means the power to act without motives, or with an unmotivated choice of motives. For him freedom always means absence of external restraint. That is free which is what its own nature prompts it to be, however little choice it may have had about the matter.

If we say, then, that a thing is deficient in freedom, we must mean that, while its inner nature, if unthwarted, would lead it to be A B C, it is compelled by external influences to be A B D instead. Now this appeared possible in the categories of Essence. For there we conceived everything as having an inner nature, which was connected indeed with its external relations, but was not identical with them, which could be either in or out of harmony with them, and, in the latter case, would be constrained. But by the time we have reached Reciprocity we see that this is a mistake. The thing has no nature at all, except as it is determined by, and in turn determines, other things. These external determinations are its inner nature. And thus it reaches freedom. If it has no inner nature but its external determinations, it is clear that its external determinations can never make it do anything against its inner nature. This is indeed only a negative freedom. But any more positive freedom requires higher categories than we have yet reached. In necessity we have gained all the freedom which is possible until the idea of End has been developed.

This point is so important that, to prevent ambiguity, it may be well to anticipate some considerations which belong more properly to the Objective Notion and to the Idea. Directly we introduce the ideas of End, of Life, or of Self-consciousness, we begin to distinguish between a free and a constrained state, even while we recognise that both states were equally determined from outside. We talk of a healthy tree as developing freely, in opposition to one which is struck by lightning or withered by drought. And yet it is as completely determined by external circumstances in the one case as it is in the other. A man feels himself free if he can do what he wants, and feels himself constrained if he cannot. And yet his desire and its gratification are as completely determined in the one case as his desire and its disappointment are in the other.

This, however, does not contradict our previous result.

We removed the idea of constraint, when we reached the category of Reciprocity, by removing the idea of an inner nature as distinct from external relations. But, by the time that we have reached the category of End, the idea of an inner nature has come back again, though in a different and higher form. It is not now conceived, as it was in Essence, as something existing side by side with the external relations, connected with them, but distinct from them. It now takes the form of a Purpose or Ideal, which we conceive should be or ought to be realised by means of the external relations.

It is clear that the possibility of conflict and constraint has returned here, though in a different form. It is not now, as before, a conflict between two existent factors or elements of the thing's existence. It is now a conflict between that which is and that which ought to be, but is not. When such a conflict exists, we call the thing constrained. When the real and the ideal harmonise, we call it free.

This reaches its most striking form when we come to a self-conscious individual, who is conscious (in a more or less adequate form) of his ideal, and who pronounces himself free or constrained in proportion as he has or has not realised it. He is thus able to pass judgments of moral condemnation on that very system of complete determination of which his judgments of condemnation are themselves a part.

This conflict will require a deeper reconciliation than the one which proved effectual in Reciprocity. It cannot be brought about, as before, by reducing the inner nature to another name for the outside circumstances. For, although a separate inner nature, as Essence, was a delusion, a separate inner nature, as Ideal, is a reality. And, therefore, the reconciliation will have to be reached, not by eliminating the inner nature, but by demonstrating it to be in harmony with the external relations.

The freedom which is attained by the establishment of complete necessity is thus only negative and imperfect freedom, but it is all that can be obtained at the point of the dialectic where it is introduced, and it is also all that is required, since it removes all the constraint which can be conceived as existing before the introduction of the idea of End.

We must return from this digression to the question how we are to proceed from Reciprocity—now recognised as Freedom—to the Universal Notion as Such. The Universal Notion as Such is clearly, whatever else it is, a common quality to be found in two or more things, which are united

by their participation in it. Things, again, are united by the reciprocal determinations which we have established among them. But these are clearly not Universal Notions. If A is the cause of B, and B the cause of A, they have not in so far the same quality, though they have closely analogous qualities, and qualities which we are now entitled to regard as inseparable. The relation of things which have the same Notion is not that of mutual determination, but of similarity. Any common quality—such as whiteness, squareness, sweetness—is a Universal Notion. (We are here, it must be remembered, at the very beginning of the Notion: In the later categories the meaning of the word becomes much deeper.)

The category of Reciprocity informed us that all the qualities of every object could be accounted for by the mutual determinations which existed between it and other objects. Now of these qualities we knew previously that every object had some qualities in common with every other, and that no object had precisely the same qualities as any other. This was established, early in the Doctrine of Essence, by the category of Likeness and Unlikeness. It falls beyond the scope of this paper, but in passing we may point out that if two objects had no qualities in common, they could not be counted, or brought into any relation, which is incompatible with the hypothesis that they were two, and that they were different. On the other hand, if two different objects had precisely the same qualities, it would follow that the difference between them could only be in their essence. But this difference in their essence would, on the hypothesis, have no effect on their appearance, which obviously destroys all meaning in the terms essence and appearance. From Likeness and Unlikeness to Reciprocity there are many categories, but none of them transcend this particular characteristic of the former. And so we reach our present point in the dialectic with the conclusion that the various qualities in the reciprocally determined things must be such that no thing is entirely like or entirely unlike any other thing.

The result is that things are doubly connected—by similarity and by causation. And it is obvious that a thing may be, and generally is, connected by the one tie to things very different to those to which it is connected by the other. A sparrow in England resembles very closely a sparrow in Australia, though the influence exerted by one on the other may be as slight as can possibly exist between any two beings on the same planet. On the other hand the English sparrow's

state is largely determined by his relations—positive and negative—to worms and to cats, although their resemblance to him is not close.

Both these connexions have to be worked out further. This the dialectic proceeds to do. It first takes up the relation of similarity, and works it out through the course of the Subjective Notion. Then, in the Objective Notion, it proceeds to work out the relation of determination—not going back arbitrarily to pick it up, but led on to it again by dialectical necessity, since the Subjective Notion, when fully worked out, shows itself to have a defect which can only be remedied by the further development of the idea of determination. Finally, the two are united in the synthesis which Hegel calls the Idea.

I am aware that this is not the way in which Hegel himself makes the transition.¹ But it seems to me to be a valid way of making it, and I cannot see any other. It may, however, possibly be objected that, whether this result be true or not, it breaks down all dialectic process, in the sense in which dialectic is understood by Hegel. The dialectic is unquestionably continuous. Each result must come from the one before it. And here, the critic might say, we have dropped the result gained in Reciprocity, put it aside till we come to the Objective Notion, and, in order to get started in the Subjective Notion, gone back to a result which had been gained at the very beginning of the Doctrine of Essence.

This, however, is a mistake. For if, in one sense, we start here with the idea gained in Likeness and Unlikeness, that idea has been transformed, or we could not start with it. And it only can be transformed by the application of the conception of complete determination, which came for the first time with the category of Reciprocity. Thus both accusations of want of continuity are answered. We have not gone back to take up a long past result, but are taking it the moment it becomes available for our purpose. We have not dropped our result last obtained, since it is through this alone that the previous conclusions have enabled us to take the next step.

The fact that, at the beginning of the Objective Notion, the idea of reciprocal determination comes again into prominence, is by no means unsuited to the dialectic process. We have seen that, in the synthesis of Reciprocity, the two sides—of qualities similar and dissimilar, and of reciprocal deter-

¹ See Note A.

minations—are balanced. We might then expect exactly what happens—that in the following triad one of these two sides is developed in the thesis, and that this, being imperfect and contradictory when taken by itself, requires the further development of the other side in the antithesis. (The Subjective Notion is, of course, the thesis, and the Objective Notion the antithesis, in the Doctrine of the Notion.)

The reason that the Universal Notion as such can be introduced here and not before is as follows. In Likeness and Unlikeness we found that it might be said of everything that it was like everything else in some respects and unlike it in others. But what we did not say there was that by these likenesses and unlikenesses its whole nature could be expressed. For in that category—one of the earliest in the Doctrine of Essence—the distinction between essence and appearance was not removed. And these distinctions of similarity and dissimilarity, like all other relations, belonged to appearance only. Behind them was the essence, a *Ding an sich*, which was neither like or unlike anything else, but entered into no relations at all.

Now the conception of the Notion as such is that the whole nature of things can be expressed by means of general qualities. And this cannot be the case so long as the qualities are looked on as mere appearances, dependent on an essence whose nature they do not express. It is for this reason that Hegel does not speak of Universals till we reach the Doctrine of the Notion. Before that things were seen to have common qualities, but this was only an external, though necessary characteristic, not the expression of the thing's own nature. Now, however, this is changed. We saw in Reciprocity that a thing has no inner nature, except its outside nature, which had been previously determined to consist of general qualities. If this result is itself imperfect, and some sort of inner nature will have eventually to be admitted, yet as against the mere *Ding an sich* of the Doctrine of Essence the result is final and conclusive. And so we come to the conclusion that we can know a thing thoroughly by predicating a sufficient number of qualities of it—which is the assumption of formal logic.

The transition may then be summed as follows—the whole nature of everything consists in its qualities, by which it stands in reciprocal determination with everything else. And as everything has some qualities in common with everything else, the nature of everything may always be expressed in part by pointing out some common quality, which it shares with something else. This common quality, now that it is

realised to be the real nature of the thing, and not merely an external appendage, is the Universal Notion *as Such*.

THE PARTICULAR NOTION *AS SUCH*.

It is, however, obvious, that this is only one side of the truth. If we found that everything must have some quality in common with everything else, we also found that no two things could have exactly the same qualities. And so, if we express the nature of A and B, in part, by pointing out that they have the common quality X, we are able to assert that it must also be the case that A possesses some quality M, not shared by B, and that B possesses some quality N, not shared by A. These qualities which distinguish the two things united in their possession of X, are what Hegel calls Particular Notions *as Such*.

We see from this that no Notions are in themselves (at this stage) either Universal or Particular. The qualities M will be shared by A with other things, for example, C and D, and could have been made a Universal, with X under it as a Particular. For example, if we decide to classify a gallery of pictures by their painters, we may bring two pictures together as both painted by Raphael. They may be distinguished from one another, again, by one having a good frame and the other a bad one. Here "painted by Raphael" is the Universal, "having a good frame," and "having a bad frame," are the Particulars. But it would be possible, from caprice, or in preparing instructions for a frame-maker, to class pictures primarily by the condition of their frames. The first Raphael might then find itself separated from its companion and classed with a Velasquez. The Universal would here be "having a good frame," and the Particulars "painted by Raphael," and "painted by Velasquez".

This brings out the contingency which earns this part of the dialectic the name of Subjective. According to this category, any one classification, of the innumerable classifications possible, is as good as another. Any two things can be brought into the same class—for no two things are destitute of some common quality. Any two things can be separated—for no two things are without some difference in their qualities. There is no distinction made here between a classification based on deep and permanent similarities, and one based on trivial and temporary similarities. There is no criterion even of the fitness or unfitness of the classification for any special purpose we may have in hand. Our choice of a Universal must be purely capricious.

Another way in which the classification is contingent is the relation of the Particulars to the Universal, when the latter is determined. Any difference which will divide the Individuals brought under the Universal is sufficient. No account is taken of whether it is a difference specially connected with that Universal. For example, in the first case above, the distinction of good and bad frames is not a speciality of Raphael's pictures, but may be found among the pictures of all painters. Nor do we inquire whether between them the Particulars exhaust all possible cases of the Universal. For although the two Raphaels which we supposed under discussion were sufficiently discriminated by their good and bad frames, it would be possible for a Raphael to exist without a frame at all.

THE INDIVIDUAL NOTION AS SUCH.

This is the synthesis of the Universal and the Particular. The transition is a simple one, and as often happens in the Doctrine of the Notion, has almost intruded itself when we were considering the thesis and antithesis. We have seen, on the one hand, that the Universal has no meaning without Particulars. For, if the various things to which the Universal is common were not discriminated, they would be only one thing; and if the Universal were only in one thing, it would cease to be a Universal. On the other hand, we have seen that the Particulars have no meaning without the Universal, since they are not Particulars except in so far as they are subordinated to a Universal. And thus the reality of each thing is only expressible by such a combination of Notions as at once unites it with and separates it from everything else.

THE JUDGMENT.

JUDGMENT OF INHERENCE.

Positive Judgment.

This first and simplest form of the Judgment relates itself to the last form of the Notion as Such, not as an advance, but as a mere restatement. This is, of course, the typical and customary relation between a synthesis and the thesis of the next triad. The reality of a thing, we have seen, was expressible only by a combination of Notions. It must therefore be possible to assert some relation between the

thing and each of its Universals. And this is what we do in Judgment. The question of how a thing and a Universal can be connected with one another, which was implicit in the Notion, becomes explicit in Judgment.

This problem, to begin with, takes the form of starting from the thing, and endeavouring to adjust a Universal to it. This is called a Judgment of Inherence, as distinguished from a Judgment of Subsumption, in which we start with the Universal and endeavour to connect the thing with it.¹ (From this point onwards the thing defined by the Universal gets a special name, and is called the Individual.) That Judgment should commence as Judgment of Inherence is due to the form in which it receives the problem. Ever since the Thing first received some degree of definiteness, early in the Doctrine of Essence, the problem has been to define and explain it. And so we start here with the Individual as the *datum*, to which the Universal has to be related. The only relation we have had so far between the thing and its Universal has been an affirmative one, and so we start with a positive Judgment of Inherence—I is U.

The Particular has fallen out here, because, as we have seen, a Particular is only a Universal which has been subordinated to another Universal. When, as in the Judgment of Inherence, we are considering only one Universal at a time, there can be no Particular. (Of course Universal and Particular Notions—which may be terms in Judgments—must be carefully distinguished from Universal and Particular Judgments, which we shall find among Judgments of Subsumption.)

In formal logic two other varieties of Judgment are possible. I is I—*e.g.*, "Beaconsfield is Disraeli"; and U is U—*e.g.*, "Man is mortal". But the first of these would be no help to us here, since it would not help us to develop the nature of the Individual, and the second we have as yet no right to use, until we have established the validity of general propositions.

The I here must be taken strictly as a mere Individual, not as yet qualified by a Universal. We must not say, for example, "This rose is red," but simply "*This* is red". We may, indeed, say "this rose," as Hegel does, to avoid the ambiguities which arise from the use of the simple demonstrative in writing, but we must consider the subject indicated

¹ The names which Hegel gives to these two divisions are Qualitative Judgment and Judgment of Reflexion. I have ventured to change them for the more significant titles which he suggests in the *Greater Logic* (*Werke*, v., p. 94).

as a mere individual, and so not yet explicitly qualified by the Universal of being a rose. For this would be to beg the whole question of Judgment,—i.e., how can an Individual be qualified by a Universal?

Negative Judgment.

How, we must now inquire, does this Positive Judgment break down, and compel us to continue the dialectic process? Hegel says that all statements of the form I is U are necessarily false. If, for example, we point to a rose and say "This is red," there is a double falsity. Red is not identical with the rose at which we point, for, in the first place, there are many other red things in the world besides this rose. And, in the second place, it is not identical with it, because the rose has many other qualities besides redness. Even if we have not identified it as a rose, but merely point to it, we shall know that it must have other qualities besides the redness, though we do not know what. An object could not exist with only one quality, for then it could in no way be distinguished from other objects which it in any way resembled.

It seems at first sight as if this was a mere quibble. "Of course," it might be answered, "no one supposed that the *is* here was to be taken in the sense of absolute equivalence, as when we say the sum of three and two is five. A change of language will remove the difficulty. Say that the subject *has* redness, or the quality of being red, and the criticism ceases to have any force." But the defect is in reality too deeply rooted to be removed in this simple fashion.

Some relation between the Individual and Universal must be found. Identity is obviously impossible. If the Universal was identical with the Individual, it could apply to no other Individuals but that one. That Individual would therefore not be connected by it with anything else, and therefore the Individual, since all connexion by Universals would be impossible to it, would be absolutely isolated, with no resemblance to anything else in the universe. Now, this state of isolation we have already seen to be impossible.

Can we then say that the Individual *has* the Universal? We have already used this method of relation in the Doctrine of Essence. There we were able to say that the Thing had its Properties.¹ But a difficulty has arisen since then.

¹ Hegel has appropriated almost every possible word expressive of reality as the name of some category. Among these "Thing" designates

Before anything can be said to have something else, it must itself be determined as being. Till it is real it cannot possess anything. And so if we are to say I has U, we must assign some reality to I other than U. Now, in the category of Thing and Properties this was possible. For the Thing was still conceived as an Essence to which the Properties were attached as appearance, but which had a reality in some way distinguishable from them. This distinction of Essence and Appearance, however, disappeared as we were dealing with Reciprocity. Our Individual is completely expressed by its Universals. It has nothing else in it. Where, then, are we to get the reality of which we can say that it has the Universal?

(We may notice in passing that, in the Doctrine of Being, things *were* their qualities, in the sense that the two were undistinguishable. In Essence they *had* their qualities. Now, at the beginning of the Notion we find both terms inapplicable, and must wait for a deeper category which will allow them both to be true.)

It is true that, although the Individual is completely expressed by Universals, it is never completely expressed by one Universal. Can we hope to find, in those Universals which we are not at that moment expressly predicating of the Individual, a reality which can be said to *have* the Universal which we are then expressly affirming?

Let the Individual before us, for example, be red, sweet, perishable, and beautiful. The Universal which we wish to predicate of it is red. We have seen that we may not say "This is red". Can we put, by means of the other Universals, sufficient meaning into the This to be able to say "This has redness"? Let us try to do so by considering the This as qualified by one more Universal—for example, sweet. We are then in a dilemma. Either we say, when we undertake to define the Individual which is to have the redness, "This is sweet," or "This has sweetness". The first we have already admitted we have no right to say. The second we can only say if the This which has sweetness is previously determined. And in this way we should be committed to an Infinite Regress before we should be able to determine the Individual.

a particular category in Essence. I have found it impossible to dispense with the use of "thing" in a more general sense, as indicating a centre of reality without regard to the particular category under which we may be contemplating it. I have therefore endeavoured to avoid ambiguity by always using a capital letter when referring to Hegel's category of Thing.

It may be objected that, although the additional Universal is not sufficient to constitute an Individual capable of having a Universal, yet that we should reach a sufficient degree of substantiality in the Individual if we regarded it as the meeting point of an indefinite number of other Universals—which it certainly is. Will not the fact that they all meet in that point give the point sufficient unity for us to be able to assert of each of them in turn that the Individual has that Universal? This looks plausible. For when we have reached to Judgments of Subsumption, and regard each Universal as having a different field of denotation, then, the more separate Universals you predicate of any Individual, the more completely do you define it and mark it off from all others. But we have not reached that point here. We are only dealing with Judgments of Inherence. We know nothing of fields of denotation. We have only the single Individual, and we have to relate the Universals to it, without taking any other Individuals into account.

And, therefore, at the present stage of the dialectic, to predicate overlapping Universals of the same Individual does not remove the contradiction, but only aggravates it. If we say "This is sweet and beautiful," we have a double absurdity instead of a single one. We cannot identify This with either sweet or beautiful, since they are Universals, and This is an Individual. And even if we could identify it with either, we certainly could not identify it with both, since they are not identical with one another, and it is quite possible to be sweet without being beautiful, or beautiful without being sweet.

To sum up, then, it appears impossible to affirm a Universal of an isolated Individual. If we say that the Individual *has* it, we are compelled to assert that the Individual *is* some other Universal. And by the very fact that one is an Individual and the other a Universal, we know that they cannot be identical. The only case where *is* can in this sense connect subject and predicate is the Identical Judgment—A is A. Even formal logic recognises this as the *reductio ad absurdum* of Judgment, and here, where it is essential that the predicate shall be a Universal, it is still more obvious that it is useless.

There seems, however, to be a refuge open to us. Our Positive Judgments have broken down because the subject and the predicate could not be made to coincide. Now, in a Negative Judgment the assertion is precisely that they do not coincide. We reach here, then, the Negative Judgment.

*Transition to Subsumption.*¹

The Negative Judgment, however, cannot help us. We have adopted it as an escape from the Positive, and it will not work without the Positive. Of every Individual there is no doubt that many Universals can be denied. Otherwise, if all Universals could be affirmed of all Individuals, the Individuals would not be in the least unlike one another, which we have seen to be impossible. But, on the other hand, if all Universals could be denied of any Individual, that Individual would be completely dissimilar to every other Individual, which we have also seen to be impossible. Negative Judgments cannot exist without Positive, and cannot, therefore, take their place.

As Hegel points out, all the interest of a Judgment which denies a Universal, A, of an Individual, is dependent on a wider Judgment which affirms of the Individual some Universal, B, which is compatible with A. Thus the proposition "The elephant is not carnivorous" is interesting because the elephant is a mammal, and some mammals are carnivorous. The proposition "The oak is not carnivorous" is less interesting, and still less interesting, though equally true, is the proposition "The moral ideal is not carnivorous".

Hegel, however, seems to me to weaken his case by saying that such propositions as these—his example is "The mind is no elephant"—are examples of the Infinite Judgment, "in which we are presented with the total incompatibility of the subject and the predicate".² For in that case true, though trivial, Negative Judgments could exist independently of Positive Judgments. But no proposition can be a completely Infinite Judgment, since that would imply that there was no Universal in common between the Individual who is the subject of the Judgment, and those Individuals of whom the predicate could be affirmed. And this is an impossible supposition, for, as we have seen, nothing can be completely dissimilar to anything else. In Hegel's example, a mind resembles an elephant—though not closely. For example, they both exist in time.

As no Negative Judgment, except an Infinite Judgment,

¹ My difference from Hegel at this point I believe to be little more than verbal (see Note B). It has compelled me, however, to find a new name for the Synthesis. As this synthesis states, in a general form, the idea worked out in the next triad, I have called it "Transition to Subsumption" upon the analogy of the "Transition to Essence" in the *Greater Logic* (*Werke*, iii., p. 466).

² *Enc.*, section 173.

can be independent of Positive Judgments, and as an Infinite Judgment is impossible, we shall be compelled, if we have Judgments of Inherence at all, to have Positive Judgments among others. But Positive Judgments of Inherence we have seen to be impossible. We must therefore discover, if possible, some higher standpoint which will deliver us from Judgments of Inherence altogether.

Our difficulty has arisen from the inevitable incompatibility of the Subject and Predicate in Judgments of Inherence. How can this be changed? Obviously the predicate must remain a Universal. For if not, it could never connect the subject with anything else, and so could never assist in determining it. It is not, however, inevitable that the subject must be one Individual. It is possible that a predicate should be asserted of more than one Individual at once, whether these are simply enumerated, or defined by means of a second Universal. We must avail ourselves of this, therefore, and endeavour to determine some form of subject which is compatible with a Universal for a predicate.

This will introduce, for the first time, the conception of Quantity in Judgments. In Judgments of Inherence, the quantity is always Singular, or rather the distinction of Singular, Particular, and Universal is unknown. (Particular and Universal Judgments must not, of course, be confused with Particular and Universal Notions in Judgments. Thus Some men are good is a Particular Judgment with two Universal Notions in it.) But now we are going to take as our subject a varying number of Individuals, and the distinctions of quantity will consequently arise.

Another result of the advance is that the fixed point, if we may so call it, in the Judgment has been changed. In the Judgment of Inherence the subject was the *datum* and the problem was to provide it with a predicate. Here, on the contrary, the predicate is the *datum*. We have to find a subject to which it will apply. Instead of saying that a certain predicate is one of those which belong to a given subject, we say that a certain subject is one of those which possesses a given predicate. It is for this reason—because these Judgments are best expressed as bringing their subjects under their predicates—that they are called Judgments of Subsumption.