ON TRUTH.¹

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I. THE MEANING OF CORRECTNESS.

Our discussion of truth may be considerably abbreviated in view of the preceding genetic discussions;² for the lines of progression converge very plainly to a consistent point of view. It has become evident that the progress of mind is marked by the differentiation of control spheres into which the classified and dependable and typical modes of experience fall. All this has been traced in terms of the development of 'dualisms.' We find certain great psychic dualisms developing and undergoing constant transformation and restatement with the development of the mental life as a whole.

Further, it is simply a necessity of this development of dualism, as between the inner and outer control factors, that there should arise modes of what we have called 'conversion.'³ This is necessary since the progress of consciousness is toward setting up its constructions as under mediate control, that is as relatively remote from the original experiences with their direct coefficients. The entire development of inner control is, as we have seen, toward the more and more independent construction of a content of presentation and thought, which has its reference however back through some process of mediation to the sphere in which it is to find its direct confirmation again. Images are read as memories, and not fancies, according as they are convertible into experiences of the perceptual type. Private experiences make good only as they are convertible in turn into the corresponding experiences of other persons besides. Thoughts are

¹ Being part of Chap. XIII. of *Thought and Things or Genetic Logic*, vol. I., 'Experimental Logic', somewhat modified to make reference to criticisms of vol. I., by Dewey and Moore (see the 'Comment' below in this issue, p. 297).

² See Chap. XI. of vol. I. of *Thought and Things*.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. I., Chap. IV., §§ 3, 4.

true and valid when they find confirmation in some more direct mode of experience that they are true to.

We have, therefore, the rise of two modes of meaning — one that of mediation, and the other that of lack or failure of mediation. The fact of mediation is just that of relative reference to the further and more direct control which the given construction mediates. The lack or failure of mediation, while not a negative thing in itself, yet arises from the same motive as that whose positive requirement is mediation.

Now we have found it necessary to recognize at least two great cases of outright mediation — cases in which the evident value and rôle of a construction is to present an original control and conserve its force, at the same time that it is made relatively remote and mediate. These typical cases are those to which we have already given the character of 'mediate control'; namely, memory, taken in the broad sense of reproductive imagery, and thought. Memory is a context that mediates perceptual control by possible conversion into it; this we have shown in the three great cases of the physical, the social or personal, and the merely temporal (the memory of events).¹ Thought, too, is a context set up in a way that mediates the control of the spheres from which its materials come, whatever that may be.

Here we may add, that to deny this character to these two modes of construction — whatever else we may deny of them — is to destroy them, as the modes of psychic meaning that they are. To make a memory inconvertible into direct experience is to make it no longer a memory, but a fugitive or fanciful image, an illusion, a dream; for such states are differentiated from memories just in that they lack this mediation of the coefficients of perceptual or other simpler control. The character of memory, then, that makes it what it is in the actual progression of cognition, is its *correctness*, its accuracy, its way of 'matching up' with the experiences whose control the memory mediates.

So it is with thoughts. Their first and essential character, as a system of meanings set up in a mind, is this: they have a content that is not capricious, fugitive, disconnected, but one

¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. I., Chap. IV.

that mediates the sphere of control from which the contents were drawn. Thoughts are correct or incorrect, according as they are referable or not to something or other in a world in which there is a matching with the simpler contents whose control is thus mediated. The correctness or incorrectness of memories we call their 'accuracy' or inaccuracy; that of thoughts we call their 'truth' or falsity.

I use the word 'match' deliberately, only to discard it later on for the case of truth, since it is actually applicable to memory, and has suggestions that are valuable throughout. In memory there is an actual image, a sort of visual or other picture, constructed on the lines of the original perceptual content, and we can often bring it up in mind so definitely that the real thing can be compared with it, and the details actually matched one upon the other. I know when my memory leaves out a note, when my visual image leaves out a feature, so soon as I have the actual tune or shape reproduced for me, so that I can directly match the two.

In memory, the need of correctness is evident enough. Action in the larger sense, on the part of the knower, depends upon the accuracy of the image that stands for the actual thing. The individual acts upon the thing; then he acts similarly on the memory of the thing; this he can do because the memory has this prime character of *mediating the thing*.

Admitting the analogy between the cases of memory and thought, we may then suggest for memory a pair of questions that are much discussed with reference to thought. Are the memories, we may ask, correct *because we can act on them* instead of on the things, or is the proper account the reverse—that we can act on memories instead of the things *because they are correct*? In reply, I should say that the latter is the proper way to put the case; since, while we cannot act successfully on what is not correct, we can establish correctness without implicating the motive to the specific sort of action. That is to say, granted that action is implicated, and that it is necessarily carried out in actually securing the matching that confirms the correctness, still it is not genetically the motive to the acceptance of the memory item as correct. The same is true of truth, in my

opinion, and so it may be well to examine the case of memory more fully here.

Suppose we take a case recently used by others¹ in advocating the opposite view. One is lost in the woods, and has a 'thought'—in this case it would be largely a memory—of the way to get out. Of all the possible plans of direction, turnings, etc., he acts on the one that seems 'right.' He comes out at his home. Now what has constituted the correctness, or truth, of his plan?—why is the thought of the situation on which he has acted to be labelled 'correct'?

The 'action theory'—so to call it briefly—says the plan is true or correct because it has led to successful action: but for his success in getting out, his plan would have been false. The essence of the correctness or truth of the thought or memory is to be found, then, in its being a plan of successful action.

But certain difficulties with this are so evident that they 'fly up and strike one in the face.' Suppose we ask, how the case would have differed if the man had not got home; would he not still have used the thought as a plan of action? Yes, it is said, but not successfully. Then the critical point is not merely the action, but the success of the action. Now what is *the mark of success* of the action?—how does the man know his action is successful? The only answer is, *by what he sees* or otherwise finds before him when he recognizes the familiar surroundings; that is, by *the perceptual experiences* found to be what the thought or memory presented in image. Without this recognition or identification, *action is vain*. The test then is a *perceptual experience fulfilling² the details of the plan that guided his action*. Instead then of the action establishing or guaranteeing the correctness, it is the correctness alone that justifies the specific form of action. In other words, we are correct in our first proposition made just above, namely, that action cannot get to its appropriate goal without the preliminary presumption that the thought that guides it is correct. Accuracy of imagery and truthfulness of thought are the conditions

¹ Russell and Dewey, *Journ. of Philos.*, III., 599, and IV., 201.

² That is, establishing, confirming, realizing, in the sense of giving the same contents *with the perceptual coefficients*.

of the substitution of these constructions for the original things, which as guides to action they mediate. If the man fails to recognize his home when he sees it, the plan may still be true though to him his action has not been successful.

The 'success' necessary, therefore, does not attach to acting thus or so, but to the mediating of the original physical control for the individual's experience, or for a larger social experience with which the individual's normally agrees.

Now let us take up the second statement, to wit, that correctness may be established without the motive to specific action. Suppose a school boy is put to drawing a map, and draws one that the teacher pronounces correct or truthful, using only the data of his history and geography books, together with verbal hints and instructions from others. Wherein consists the 'correctness' of the map? We are told by the action theory that it is correct or true because one might well act upon such a map, in going say from Baltimore to Washington. Very good, but is this the reason the boy made this map just what it is in its details; is this his motive for accepting the details as correct? Suppose instead of doing what his teacher told him to, he had placed Washington north of Baltimore instead of south. Apart from any experience he has had, any promptings to action on his part, that would do just as well. What then has determined him, what has motivated his actual construction in respect to correctness, what has guided and controlled the making of the map? Evidently the fact that *he did what he was told to do, what all his copies required*, getting what, in other words, *could be converted into experience of a different cognitive order* — in this case into the reported experience of other persons. All this is what we have called 'secondary conversion.' It accepts the personal control of another person's thought as mediated by one's own present thought. This makes the thing accurate for oneself.

Here the successful mediation of a socially common control has established the correctness of the personal thought, apart from any further mediation of the actual physical control in the country represented in the map.

Suppose again, instead of making a map, the boy is to give

an account of a historical scene, or to narrate a series of past events. Here, as we have seen, the events, the transitive parts of the thought context, are *per se* subject to no further confirmation than that given by concurrent testimony.¹ It is the larger social control that mediates the by-gone events as true. The truth is tested by its social acceptability — its corroboration by testimony, written records, etc. — the process of verification being that of secondary conversion into a recondite context of original testimony. In some vague sense, we might say that this could be tested by action; it does have, as all knowledge has, its following, its dynamogeny of active impulses, always proper to the thought; but the motive to the acceptance of the result as correct is not that of doing something or going somewhere, but that of matching the details of one person's thought with those of another's.

We may put this a little differently in order to sharpen the essential issue. To act on a plan is to set up the plan as an end for realization. The action is merely a means to this end. Successful action is action that *gets the end* thus set up — no longer as mere presentation but as fact. Now how is one to know when he gets it? — certainly this confidence is not given in the mere action, in the means. It comes only in the realization of the thing, the something of fact that the construction represented, the fulfilment that the end prophesied. The correctness, the truth, then, is the *end-realizing character of the presentation set up*.

These points seem to me very plain in the case of the control mediated by memory. I say to you that your memory of this or that is correct or incorrect. Or course, you can use it for practical purposes, to get the original things, if it is correct; and you can take the risk if it is not correct. Your justification in either case resides in your acceptance of its right to mediate a sort of experience called fact, reality, or existence.²

¹ Apart from the remote possibility of tracing out physical effects — substantive changes — following upon the event.

² It may be said in objection that by action is not meant alone the gross activity of going to or handling things, but also those functional processes of attention, etc., by which the presentation is constituted what it is. 'What is true' is only another name, it may be said, for 'what is,' under these determin-

We may observe too, before going further with the discussion of truth, that correctness is independent of the mode of origin, and the degree of validity for theory, of the original control meanings thus mediated by conversion processes. However consciousness got the meaning 'physical control,' and however there arose the secondary or mediate controls by which this and others are mediated, still the relative modes remain what they are in their respective progressions. Given a process that has memories, then the entire place and rôle of that mode would be destroyed if there were no conversion of it — no mediation into it of the coefficients already made up in the earlier processes. There are in the progress of consciousness ways of returning to a relative immediacy; this appears in the play and semblant modes; but the character of such modes is shown just in this to be different from that of memory: their differentia *does not consist in relative correctness and incorrectness*. They are not held to the original dualisms as memory is. Memory has its justification just in the relative correctness with which it mediates the coefficients belonging to the worlds of fact or existence.

In an important sense this is true also for thought; it mediates but does not banish dualisms. Yet the processes whereby the mediating control of thought or reflection arises are so complex and their subsequent meanings so legislative and seemingly independent, that the discussion becomes very much more complicated.

Before going on, however, I may point out a distinction that sums up the opposing interpretations suggested above, and shows itself sharply in the two current uses of the term 'control.' As in the processes. This recurs below where we find the 'truth' to be just the 'what is' when the 'is' is the control in which 'the what' is acknowledged. But there our analysis is the same as here (as is anticipated in Vol. I., Chap. III.), *i. e.*, we find that the control sphere is determined by coefficients of various sorts of existence and is not resolvable into the motor processes that operate with and upon them. As soon as there is a control meaning at all it is a dualistic or pluralistic control meaning. There is no valid sense in which these coefficients can be called 'habits' or 'motor complexes'; for habit belongs at the pole of 'inner' as over against external control; and conflict of habits or of habitual selves is within the entire inner sphere that encompasses them (as in the larger synergetic process of attention).

used in my work it means any coefficient or character of a content that classifies and delimits it, giving it a sphere in which it *is or might be present as itself*. We may say of any presentation that it is or might be present in its proper class or sphere of presence or existence. Now on this view the development of knowledge is by the formation and development of these spheres of control; and however far away from the original control coefficients a representative or ideal content may be, it still has the meaning that gives it its assignment to that and no other control. From this point of view knowledge develops within the distinctions of control; there is development of knowledge in idea or thought only through the original controls mediated by these modes — as we have just seen to hold of memory.

Calling this the theory of *knowledge through control* there is a variant upon it that may be called the theory of *control through knowledge* — the ‘control’ of action, and through it of experience, by means of the mediating context of thought. This is, as I understand it, the ‘control’ of the *Studies in Logical Theory* and other works of the so-called Chicago school.¹ It is control of a personal sort, management — considered actively — or effective handling of the details of experience through knowledge, reflection, etc. This distinction is, in the sequel, important.² Both phenomena are real, ‘knowledge through control’ and ‘control through knowledge’; but here it may be easily seen that to the latter theory control is what is to the former ‘inner’ or personal control, one of the sorts of control in general found actual by the former. The ‘control through knowledge’ is a concept of this active functional relation between self and its world of experience; that of ‘knowledge through control’ is one of logical or content relation between different modes of experience.

It is of the utmost importance, in my opinion, that this distinction should be clearly understood. We may, therefore,

¹ I hope here and below I am not again misrepresenting Professor Dewey. On the whole, though unfortunate, such experiences are frequent, generally mutual. The writers mentioned accept so much that I also hold to, that it is desirable that we keep on ‘discussing.’ My use of ‘control’ goes back to my address on ‘Selective Thinking’ given in December, 1897.

² It is developed in detail in a later chapter of Vol. II. of *Thought and Things*.

seek to sharpen the line of cleavage between the two conceptions — 'control of knowledge by facts,' and 'control of facts or experience through knowledge' — by showing the fundamental way in which the present day distinctions are really based upon their implicit recognition.¹

Let us take a detached point of view for the consideration of the context of thought or ideas. Here is a set of presentations hanging before us for interpretation. We may consider it in the greatest detachment simply for itself, as having its own organization and relationships; so considered it is the content of formal logic. Formal logic strips thought of its references, its implications, both of material truthfulness and also of worth for appreciation. For it, inference is purely a matter of relation, whether or not it be *about* something true or something good. There is then a neutrality as to further intent in both aspects; the ideal of such a discipline is pure validity. For it thoughts are subjects and predicates and nothing more.

Now it is evident that there are two ways of leaving formal logic behind. So soon as we ask what further meaning may attach to such a system of thoughts, we come upon the two conceptions just distinguished: either the thoughts represent and so mediate a control in which they are true, or they represent and mediate a mode of appreciation which they fulfil. In the one case, there is a recognition of a world of facts to be acknowledged or extended; in the other, there is the intent to find worth or value in experience in and through the thoughts. By the mediation of control we have the development of the world of facts, for which the thought is instrumental. Here we

¹I give this of course as my way of describing the difference of view between the two conceptions, not 'saddling' it on anyone else. I cannot accept Dewey's account of our difference without modification — an account that makes my point of view 'epistemological' and his own 'logical' (*Journ. of Philos.*, May 9, '07, p. 255). For while my own is epistemological, recognizing a dualism of self and not-self meanings, his view, while, as having only the dualism of idea and fact in view, it can be called logical, yet as theory of control and reconciliation of the terms of the dualism, it is in its implications more epistemological; for it implicates control entirely of the inner or active sort. It postulates in other words a closed inner process, thus making the entire movement of experience 'inner.' To do this is I think to mutilate thought by banishing the 'outer' control while clinging to the 'inner'; but the position is still epistemological.

have *experimental or instrumental logic* — the science of the *control of thought through facts, or the extension of knowledge as truth*.

This science may be looked at in two ways according as facts or thoughts are made primary. We may consider the motive to be the *establishment of thought* by appeal to fact, giving 'experimental logic,' as a method of the proving of thoughts; or we may consider the motive to be the *establishment of facts* in thought, when we have the science of the development of knowledge as controlled by facts: this is epistemology. We may with confidence write down both instrumental logic and epistemology as sciences of 'truth' — the sciences of the control of thought through facts. Facts of any world, is meant, of course; and facts are experiences of an original order of control coefficient.

But now in contrast to this set of motives and the sciences that issue from them, there is the other great way in which the context of thought has meaning. The neutrality of purely formal logic may be departed from not alone in the way of establishing truth by the control of thought by facts; there is the other departure from neutrality found in the intent to fulfil personal purpose and interest. The system of thoughts is now set up not merely for discovery or confirmation; it is made *means of the fulfilment of ends*. All the selective and purposive motives to individuation come up in the further reading of the context preferentially and so to speak 'axiologically.'¹ The mediation of thought is now not the control by fact and the embodiment of truth, but the acknowledgment of worth. Truth is now means to satisfaction. All the interests besides the theoretical come into their own; and the theoretical interest itself appears as a personal and selective motive.

This is what, I take it, such phrases of current discussion as 'control of experience,' 'control of a situation,' 'dealing with things profitably,' 'readjusting conflicting habits' — phrases used by the new school of theorists of the instrumental order — really come to. Their emphasis is on the *management* of situa-

¹The term 'axiology' was suggested, I think, by W. M. Urban for the science of *worth-predicates* as contrasted with predicates of fact.

tions, the *manipulation* of experience, through the use of a context of knowledge. Knowledge enables us to cope with the worlds of things, facts, experiences, situations, *to get good*;¹ and we use knowledge as means to an end. The inner control factors—habit, attention, disposition, interest, constituting the self—by which the whole movement is motived, are left strangely unexplained. These are not logical terms; they are affective-conative contents.

This it is evident is the sort of mediation supplied to the factor of inner control by the context set up. The ideas are said to guide conduct, the knowledge to become practical insight, the concrete situation to yield to the interpretation and use that thought suggests. All these expressions deal with the relation of the reflective to the concrete, of the idea to the fact; but as soon as we use the word control with reference to it, we see that the 'self' of judgment—the selective, purposive, set of factors—is the control that is mediated. By the knowledge, the insight, the facts are interpreted, the judgment guided, the self factor, whatever its constitution, determined and advanced. There is then the control of facts through knowledge, by the inner synergetic process that counts as 'self.'² The motive is the personal one of reaching an end; a meaning is set up as a desire, a remote worth, and the ideas are accepted as means.

Even the phrase 'solving a problem' used most often by these writers invites this criticism; for the 'solution' of the problem is in terms of 'readjusted habit,' 'successful action,' etc., all factors of just what I recognize as advancement of 'inner control' or 'self.' Such a 'solution' actually gives an expansion of self-feeling, and a sharpened objective plan of the *truthful facts*; *it is dualistic to the core*.

2. WHAT TRUTH IS.

We may introduce the discussion of the mode of truth as such by asking what would be necessary to constitute an active con-

¹This is the suppressed premise of the whole theory. It substitutes 'good' for 'true,' and fails to recognize the nature of the inner control, for which the good is 'good.' As soon as this is allowed, the correlative dualistic term, the 'external' control, returns also, and the problem is the epistemological one of truth—of 'knowledge through control.'

²The organized self over against impulse, partial habit, etc.

trol process — a mode of action — as the sole criterion or mark of truth, and then ask whether thought or reflection realizes such a requirement. In this way, we throw into relief the differences between the two points of view already spoken of and secure the added interest that comes from having current theories in mind.

If then we ask what would be necessary to banish the requirement of correctness, considered as agreement or correspondence with some control read as external or foreign to the process, our answer would be — simply the banishing of the coefficients of externality. The question then would come back to one which we asked and answered in the first volume of our work — the question as to whether the active dispositional processes could be conceived as entirely making up, and hence as fully fulfilled in, the psychic object, apart from data having coefficients requiring reading as 'external.' This we found to be unrealizable for consciousness such as it is; for the existence both of things of the physical order, and of persons apart from oneself, requires the operation of the motives that mature in the mind-body dualism. In other words, the dualism of existences, as meanings of separate control, forbids a purely active determination of things; and replica of the things — the image-objects — together with the variations in the correctness of these latter, are meanings that testify to the truth of this. Now, how is it with the higher mediation, that of truth, in which the terms of the dualism are those of reflection or thought?

It must be admitted that we find here remarkable progress in the sort of mediation which would banish the external control factor, and so tend to reduce all controls finally to one, and that the control of active inner process. This aspect of the development may be spoken of first, before other motives are taken up.

Two great movements are to be noted: one that whereby the control of reflection as mode of inner experience is constituted, and the other that whereby the individual judgment becomes 'synnomic,' that is, competent without further control from that of other persons. Let us look at these two movements in turn.

The process whereby thought, functioning in acts of judgment, becomes a mode of mediate control, has already been described. It establishes a heightened and unified consciousness of self, as inner control function, which is in a dualism with all the objects of thought. These objects mediate the inner control which the self in judging exercises over the material it deals with. On the other hand, this inner control process arises by a unification of those more partial factors which represent the inner aspects of prelogical meanings. There is, therefore, a redistribution of the objective meanings also, their resetting as outer pole of the dualism of subject-object. The question now urgent is as to whether the original controls by which the objects of thought were set up and recognized as outer, etc., are now in any sense still operative, when the whole context is made one of thought.

There is, in fact, from the point of view of the personal life-process, no motive that arrests the original control factors, so that we can say that they are banished. The objects of thought, like those of memory, seem to require the sort of fulfilment, in fact of some kind, that the objects of memory do. Yet we find certain complications now for the first time present. For whereas the objects of memory were in a sense 'liftable' from the original things they reported, and also on occasion actually lifted from them; yet this was merely an incident to the essential fact that whether thus separated or not, the two series dovetail together, submitting, on occasion, to all sorts of vicariousnesses and substitutions without confusion.

In the redistribution found in reflection there is no such continuity with fact. The mode of inner control through thoughts establishes itself in a much more radical way. The contents are not only 'lifted' from things and constituted as a different mode of meanings, having a way of mediating the original control, but this is done by a mode in which the whole dualism is established in the inner world. The dualism is one of conscious reflection. In its mediation of the original existence spheres it sets its own form of dualism — a new and characteristic one. The question at issue now is whether, by becoming a system both of whose terms are within the one inner control,

thought loses the intent to refer to spheres of control other than itself. Put in terms of action this would read: granting that the control processes of the inner world are active — motivated by purposes, ends, satisfactions, efforts, etc. — can this set of control processes find fulfilment in the mere contents it sets up, or must there be still a recognition of the external? If the former, then any 'truth' attaching to these contents would be derived from their relative worth as fulfilling personal purposes and interests. That is, there would be no necessity of going to a sphere of fact, to any sphere of simpler perceptual or memory process, to secure further fulfilment.

Only on such a supposition, I conceive, can an action theory of truth be put through — or any theory distinctively pragmatic. It would require the elimination of transcendence *as meaning*, the loss of the external meaning of objects, that is, of any control-reference beyond the set of ideas themselves. Only if ends were fully fulfilled in thoughts and thoughts had no further meaning than to serve as ends — only in such complete coincidence of thoughts and ends would further reference be unnecessary as corrective or control of either.

Now thought does not accomplish this — no more than does memory. Thoughts do not satisfy purpose; purpose runs up against hard facts foreign to it. "If wishes were horses the beggars would ride." Interest does not stay with thoughts; it seeks fulfilments in various external-seeming modes. The thought system mediates these remote controls; it does not banish them.

The struggle of mind, however, to do what the pragmatists attribute to it, is interesting and pathetic. It develops a system of meanings that approximate and personate the completely 'lifted' and self-contained.

Yet it cannot finally absorb all contents as only ends of action, completely dominated by processes of inner control, and rest with that. Not so. It marks its failure indeed by falling into *the diametrically opposite extreme*. It aims to banish dualism of controls and so suggests the effacement of 'self.' For it develops the neutrality of a purely *theoretical interest*, and *sets up a theoretically valid system of thoughts* — a system that is

valid not because it can be acted upon, nor because it is true to anything else, but because, simply and only because, it is reasonable and self-consistent.

We have seen this motive in operation, and have described it as the prime and only progression proper to thought.¹ It is all the while recognizing the necessity of control from fact. It is inductive, tentative, experimental, schematic, quantitative, existential. But in the very bosom of this recognition of foreign controls, it hits upon the contradictions and limitations in the body of its data that motive the validity of thought proper. The whole, set up as identical and self-consistent, then floats off in the ocean of logical form as such. Its validities take the place of former inductive confirmations; its relevancies establish themselves within its own body; its beliefs propagate themselves in the form of syllogistic conclusions; and a body of implications is born that dispenses with any further control than just its own constitution as a system of related meanings.

Now what has happened? It is clear that something important enough has happened. It would seem that thought, the system of implications, has won a victory. The flow of valid relation would seem to take the place both of the concrete appeal to action, and of its dualistic mess-mate, the matching of thought by fact in a world of foreign control. Personal interest has become theoretical, and a body of logical validities has arisen to fulfil this personal interest.

This movement is analogous to the similar swing of the pendulum—just where we should expect it—in the mode of imagery, where the same two factors work out their respective places on a lower plane. Mere memory is everything, fancy is worthless; memory is the thing to be interested in, it guarantees correctness and action; it reports what actually is and must be. Therefore let us rule out preference, personal interest, the vagaries of desire; let us recognize the ‘is,’ and banish the vain ‘might be.’ So here also; thought sets up a system of relations that become for it the valid *simply by being linked up together as they are.*

But this of course is not final. Personal desire, purpose,

¹ In chapters before this (*Thought and Things*, Vol. II., Part III., Chaps. X. ff.).

action, 'find themselves' in the very process by which theoretical interest asserts its exclusiveness. A new dualism arises, one of a self that thinks over against the system it thinks about. The selections for action are not annulled even when the dictations of fact seem to be. Thought even when most abstract is after all a system of acceptances, beliefs, personal satisfactions; and the demands of such intent are charged into the abstract forms of the syllogism. A whole world of valuation comes to find its embodiment in the system of thoughts. Thoughts are thus made ends in turn, just as before, and the external controls, the things of fact, are reëstablished for the 'realization' of those ends.

We have to recognize, therefore, two general movements in this progression of truth. First, there is the development of validity pure and simple taking the place of the inductive matching and conversion processes of external control. And second, there is the persistent return of the control of fact through the demands of action and appreciation in all the matters of concrete life. Both of these are in so far irreducible. The satisfaction of active tendencies reasserts fact, while the demands of abstract validity tend to mediate truth in a system of static relations.

In short, if things were different, if the life of purpose and action did find complete fulfilment in thought, so that thought had no further reference than just this fulfilment, then such a meaning as 'truth' would be impossible. The 'valid' too would have no meaning. The 'good' would take their place.¹ Thought fulfils desire and desire arouses and propagates thought. There would be no further question as to the existence of the desired in any realm other than or beyond thought. For to suppose such a realm would open just the question of a sphere other than that of purpose or action, giving something beyond *for the true to be true to*.

I think we may safely conclude, therefore, in this matter of the birth of personal judgment as a control mode, that while it seems to show the possibility of bringing all the objects of thought under a unifying principle of control by self, and so to subject the whole content of reflection to the rule of personal action and purpose; yet it works out differently when we con-

¹Opening James' *Pragmatism*, which has just come to my table, I find this heading in the Table of Contents "Truth is a good, like health, wealth, etc."

sider the actual result. Over against the self of control there is developed a system of implication which is universal, self-consistent, and relatively independent of the processes of individual control and judgment. With the growing personalizing of the knowing process comes the depersonalizing of the content of thought. And thereupon there arises the new mode of inner assertion through purpose and appreciation.

From another point of view, also, we reach results of some interest — the point of view of the ‘community,’ the common meaning, of thoughts. This introduces a somewhat neglected but withal important set of considerations.

We found it necessary, it will be remembered,¹ to recognize as attaching to all judgment two modes of intent both of which come under the general character of ‘community’; there is community in the two senses covered by the statement that the judgment is a content having both a ‘by whom’ and a ‘for whom’ force. Whatever is asserted is ‘synnomic’ in that *it intends to be true for everybody*; and it is also ‘syndoxic’ in that *it is actually held only by somebody*. And these two aspects of community are not coincident. One gives the force of the judgment as *fit for acceptance*; the other assigns the *degree of actual prevalence*. One indicates the universality and validity of the implication contained in the whole meaning; the other indicates the aggregate or catholic process that acknowledges this validity.

Now the question of truth is necessarily a question of truth-to-whom as well as of truth-for-whom; of acceptance in a social group, as well as of worth for acceptance by any single mind. And the interpretation of the nature of the truthfulness or falsity of a body of implications must not be one that mutilates the full two-fold intent of community.

First, then, looking at the synnomic force — the intent for-whom — of a logical content, we find the state of things just described allowing of certain further extensions. The solidification of the inner control, by which a self is determined over against the objects of thought, goes far to bring about the dominance of the selective and active control processes; especially

¹ Again alluding to a chapter not yet published.

in the pursuit of hypothetical and inductive research. For here the schematic meaning rendered as hypothesis is largely a matter of personal interest and active pursuit. Allowing this — despite the fact that in the result this tendency yields to that of setting up an independently valid relational content, as remarked just above — allowing, that is, that the processes of active control are thus greatly emphasized in the individual, still a further question arises as to the determination of the self in these active terms. Is the self that now judges, one of merely individual and private action and purpose; is the control of the self-of-reflection in any sense a private control?

No, it is not. All our work of analysis — and that of recent social psychology — goes to show that the self of judgment is the self of common function, of syndoxic control, of processes so interknit as among individuals that it is reached only by the elimination of personal and private factors. The self of judgment is not the private self of appreciation and valuation; that is expressly excluded in the terms whereby judgment is achieved. The factors of inner control are generalized inner data, read back and forth in the dialectic whereby the ‘socius’ arises. All the way along, the child’s self is not one that asserts his crude first preference or impression, but the disciplined and chastened self that has grown, by continuing processes of secondary conversion, into agreement with others. The opposite process also shows the same result: the self that judges legislates its own result, so far as now and here accepted, back into the minds of others, *being obliged to intend it to hold for everybody*.

The result for our theory of truth is clear. Truth is not a matter of individual interpretation at all, whether in terms of action or of cognition. Suppose we remove the factor of external control altogether and say that truth consists in availability of knowledge to minister to action; still the question comes up, whose action? Certainly not any individual’s action; this would reduce the ‘for-whom’ to the realm of private preference and impulse, making the true that which ministers to personal gratification in a narrow and private sense. This directly contradicts the requirement of synnomic community. The interpretation in terms of action would require the sort of common function or

action that would support and guarantee the intent of universal acceptance.

But this it is evident would again, in the larger social whole of meaning, destroy the distinction between true and good. If the truth is to be the socially available, in a pragmatic or utilitarian sense, it is then identified with the social end or good. What is good in the larger social sphere of welfare is the social end; and this would then coincide with the thought, determined as fulfilment of that end. The same result is reached then on this construction, as on that stated above in individualistic terms, — the determination of truth in terms of good — except that now *both terms are socially controlled*.

This result does seem to be fairly reasonable and just. The derivation of ethical good from social usage and habit, the reflection of social utility in individual conscience, does seem to result in a correspondence, in the processes of natural history, between the accretions to truth and the accretions to good. But the further difficulty would seem to be precisely that which we found in the similar correspondence between individual good and truth; the difficulty of eliminating the factor of external control which appears in this case also in the realization of the ends. Social or common thought could not of itself *fulfil* the social end: that could only come from 'things' that realized the thought. Social welfare is not — just as individual purpose is not — *ipso facto* fulfilled in the setting up of ends, in this case of common ends. There is still here also the need of converting the social ends set up into actual conditions of social life; just as there is the corresponding need in the case of the individual's purpose. In other words, while the socially true is always that upon which *social action may go out*; still there is the *recognition of actual social fact, whether or not it is what is desirable for action*.

The conclusion, then, is that the recognition of the synnomic character of the judgment function, while broadening out the reference 'for-whom' to judgment process generally, does not remove the essential dualism between end and fact.¹ The

¹This is my line of answer to Professor Moore's attempt to restate the case in 'social' terms (see below in this issue, p. 294).

demands of action are not fulfilled, but only mediated, by the thought context. So too with the coefficients of fact; they are mediated, but not banished, in a socially available system of thoughts. The system, the entire accepted mass of social judgments, thus *mediates both controls*, the socially inner or synnomic and the external, physical and other,¹ in a new dualism, *that of fact and end*. Truth is still a relative conversion of the contents of social acceptance into the facts of a system of external controls. Socially considered, truth has an existential reference that is *not removed by the statement of social desiderata*. As of the individualistic formulation so of the 'social' — the criticism is the same — the *determination of the true is not entirely through the postulates of conduct*.

This result is further enforced from the point of view of the other aspect in which all judgment has an intent of 'community' — the aspect 'by whom,' the aspect of relative catholicity.

Catholicity means relative actual *prevalence of acceptance*, or quantity of aggregate belief. It is that aspect in which meaning is always for a hearer no less than for a speaker, for further propagation no less than for repeated statement. We have seen that in this aspect, as embodied in the linguistic forms of thought,² logical meaning never loses its hypothetical or schematic force; there are always in the social whole individuals still to instruct or convince, always a future of generations yet unborn to whom the linguistic is to be the mode of essential training into competent judgment. What shall we say, as to the interpretation of judgmental matter as true, from this point of view?

We have to recognize at once that in this intent of renewed 'proposal' to others the meaning is reduced from the logical — the fully accepted or 'synnomic' — to the prelogical, the schematic and personal. That which is not yet accepted is, to the intelligence not yet convinced, problematical and personal. The question then becomes, how can such meanings, set as suggestion or 'proposal,' become for that person truth. Evidently only

¹The other including the other persons who are read as the centers of active and appreciative process just as the one individual is.

²See the PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, May, 1907.

by the processes of confirmation essential in all such cases of the passing of hypothetical proposal into judgments of acceptance. The processes are those of material confirmation, of experiment and induction. But this means a direct resort to those coefficients of control by which fact is established. It is a resort to the sphere in which the hypothesis set up finds its relevant control. The whole affair, then, the possibility of advance in the matter of diffusion, propagation, gain in prevalence and catholicity—the process by which more individuals concur in a statement as true—is one that reasserts the external controls by which the judgment secures its classifications and limitations. I see no escape from this conclusion.¹

It means that the essential process by which relatively catholic acceptance, *by whom*, passes into 'synnomic' acceptance, *for whom*, a matter absolutely requisite to the availability of judgments for social use—that this process is one of *direct resort to the controls of fact*. It is, once for all, not a resort to the sphere of end or action. For the assertion at this stage of the individual's purpose or desire would only emphasize that divergence that would keep the meaning forever in the selective and a-synnomic stage of personal preference. Suppose I decided every matter placed before me in the line of my personal interest and preference; then the agreements by which common truth and value alike are reached would be impossible. There could be no truth, because there could be no judgment at all in the mode of 'synnomic community'—no judgment of that universal import which implicates general agreement.

The consideration of the community intent of judgment, therefore, reinforces, on both counts, our theory of truth. As synnomic meaning thought is available for action *in so far as it is true*—it is not *true because available for action, either social or individual or both*. Of judgment in the forming, of meaning

¹ It has been brought against me that in my address on 'Selective Thinking' (chap. XVII. of *Development and Evolution*), I made truth 'not what is selected because it is true, but what is true because it has been selected.' But this does not at all contradict what I now say; for in that address I explicitly made the 'test of fact'—the gauntlet of external coefficients—part of the process of selection, just as I do here. Truth is what is selected by the whole experimental judgmental process.

having a progressive intent 'by whom,' this is all the more true ; for the content not yet accepted could never be accepted, were the rule of determination anything else than confirmation in the sphere of control or fact in which the 'truth' is finally to be acknowledged as open to common inspection.

There is, moreover, a further point to observe in this matter of community. It is a point that comes up in connection with catholicity considered as being a motive that recognizes the individuality of the single person. We say that it is impossible to construe thought entirely from the point of view of the community of synnomic intent, that is, as a body of completely established and once for all given truths. The reason is that there is always also the intent of further propagation and acceptance in a growing social whole. The other aspect or intent of community must come into its own as well, and this recognizes further judgment process not included in the generalization of the personal attitudes, 'for whom,' whereby the synnomic meaning was constituted. This brings up the singularity and separateness of individual judgment centers in a curious and interesting way. The reference of the meaning to the singular persons who do not believe is as real as that to the community of persons who do believe.

Of course, we are not concerned here with the implications of the acknowledgment of single individuals by others ; here we have to enquire only into the effect of such acknowledgment upon the theory of truth. This is shown in two ways that we may now point out.

In the first place, the process of conversion, whereby the proposed meaning passes over into judgment, is one of recognition of personalities. It consists in one's taking their thought as source of supply for one's own. The act of getting social confirmation proceeds always by such recognition of others as resourceful selves, whose knowledge is to be drawn upon. Thus the very process by which thought is accepted as true implicates the recognition of a set of judging selves reaching a common result. The inference is that no theory of truth can stand that does not involve a mode of consciousness having not only the subject-object dualism — myself and what I think

about — but also a plurality of subject individuals having a common body of acknowledged objects, or a common body of truths. There is then a *common presupposition* in the implication of *truth*, but an *individual presupposition* in the implication of *belief*. Truth is one; knowers of the truth are many. The commonness of any item of truth is achieved by the act of judgment; but the progress of judgment, and with it the extension of truth, implicates *a set of persons individuated as singular selves*.

The second point is that the individuals so implicated are, each for himself, a center of inner control process; and so are they all *in their meaning to each* — a set of objects having this character. The social selves are, therefore, truths in the same sense that any body of contents are. For me, it is true that you are Mr. Brown, just as it is true that my hat is white. The essential singularity of you, as Mr. Brown, resides in the meaning I must give you, of being a self which besides being a true meaning to me, *also has the common fund of true meanings with me*. The true context of thought as a whole for each then, includes in it all the others who are also reaching the same true context of thought.

Here is a snag upon which the current instrumentalist theories often strike (*e. g.*, Moore, in this issue of the REVIEW). The readjustment of 'conflicting habits' is depicted as a process of attention, a process of restoring equilibrium of action which, if more than a figure, must be *in the individual*. But when it is pointed out that this is individualistic, resort is made to the social force of the content and of the social character of the self (often quoting my 'social dialectic'¹). But this is not a reply; for there is no *social attention*, no process of reconciliation of *socially conflicting wills*, except by a *return to the individual* as a center of action and thought. This problem, whether set in terms of action (especially) or of thought (no less finally) must be solved in terms of the individual's experience, however fully

¹ My earlier work shows the common character of the self-content, but does not for a moment deny the later logical individuation of singular selves. In my present work I trace out this latter movement. Moreover I am disposed to agree (and in fact I argued for it in the paper on 'Selective Thinking') that the mechanism of subjective control is, as Mr. Moore claims, that of attention.

it may also implicate common meaning. Either all controls (other persons, as well as external things) *must be entirely and finally reflected in the common character* of individual judgment, or thought in the individual *will reassert itself* in a mode of self-notself dualism, which is *also one of personal pluralism*. This latter is the outcome in the mode of thought as such, the mode of truth. Any essential reconciliation by an act of judgment is impossible, since judgment sets up its own dualism of reflection. The position that objectivity arises only when conflict is not mediated by judgment, and that judgment brings a new immediacy, seems to me flagrantly untrue (see the exposition of Miss Adams, *The Æsthetic Experience*¹). For when I judge, I set up and acknowledge a content *as object* over against myself. The dualism of fact and idea is mediated, in the establishing of truth; but just this it is that also erects the further dualism of self acknowledging and things acknowledged, together with that other most pregnant dualism between fact and end.

The true, then, is simply the body of knowledge, *acknowledged* as belonging where it does in a consistently controlled context. The characters of truth are those attaching to the content of judgment as being under mediate control. The meaning of truth is its intent to mediate the original sphere of existence meaning in which it arose. It is possible and necessary, just as any other sort of relative correctness is, wherever there is an original experience having coefficients which the mediating later experience intends and invokes. It is strictly an experiential mode, since the controls which it mediates are those of developing psychic meaning.²

¹ I suppose Miss Adams' is as accredited exposition — and I should say a very clear and able one — of the position of the 'Chicago School.'

² Further paragraphs follow on 'How Truth is Made,' 'What Truth is True to,' 'Falsity and Error,' 'What Truth is Good For,' 'Relative and Absolute Truth,' etc. — topics for which space cannot be taken here. The solutions all depend, however, on these fundamental positions (1) that truth is a system of objective contents set up and acknowledged as under a variety of coefficients of control; (2) that this system is socially derived and socially valid, though rendered by acts of individual judgment; (3) that the whole movement issues in a dualism of self-acknowledging and objects-acknowledged, a dualism from which thought as such cannot free itself.