from curiosity. There were, however, a number of interesting things among them, which he intended to put in order, as they would be useful to his sons.

As far as I know, these details have never been fully made known. It is clear from the above account that Bertrand rather than Montholon was the confidant of the ex-emperor in these interesting tactical experiments, which were carried on apparently in the early part of 1820. At that time the British officer on duty reported (1 Feb. 1820), 'I saw General Bonaparte to-day often at his favourite amusement, viz. gardening. He was himself employed placing sods on a bank. In short, his sole amusement at present seems to be building sod walls, making reservoirs to hold water, &c., and pulling down to-day that which he had reared the day before.'⁴

In view of Bertrand's statement to Gorrequer, cited above, we may doubt whether this piling up of sods had anything to do with gardening, and whether the construction of 'reservoirs' was not really the heaping up of banks to show how a squad of infantry might be arranged so as to double its gun power.

The reference to the campaign of 1813 is also curious. I have always considered the latter half of the Saxon campaign to be the most defective of all the great captain's enterprises; and his refusal to enter into any explanation respecting his plans at that time seems to show that he himself was aware that they were faulty. On none other of his campaigns was he so reticent as on that of 1813.

J. HOLLAND ROSE.

The Convention of September 1864.

A good deal of matter has been recently published on the September convention. Minghetti's memoir on it, which has long been known to exist, but which apparently he stipulated should not be published till some years after his death, has now appeared.¹ In addition to his statement of his own position, given here much more fully than in his address *Ai suoi elettori*, published in 1865, we have a most valuable collection of documents, most of which had not seen the light before. In the *Nuova Antologia* for 1 March 1899 we have further extracts from Minghetti's correspondence with La Marmora, some of which Minghetti, for good reasons of his own, had omitted. Lastly we have in the second volume of Signor Chiala's life of Dina² the greater part of Pepoli's report on the negotiations (of which only short extracts have previously appeared), extracts from the

⁴ Forsyth, iii. 210.

¹ Minghetti, *La Convenzione di Settembre*. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1899.

² *Giacomo Dina e l'opera sua nelle vicende del Risorgimento Italiano*. Turin Roux, 1899.

unpublished correspondence between La Marmora and Petitti, and notes taken from La Marmora's own mouth by the author. It cannot be said that these new documents change earlier conclusions on the convention in any material particular, but they throw a great deal of light on it, and they give certainty to several details which before had been matter of conjecture.

The position of the Roman question in the spring of 1864 was this: The French were still in occupation of the small bit of papal territory which the Italians had not been allowed to annex in 1860. The Italians were as determined as ever that Rome should sooner or later be their capital, but they were divided as to the means of gaining it. The more impatient section, of whom Garibaldi was a not very willing leader, wished to defy the French and occupy Rome by force. The Moderates, who realised the perils of a conflict with France, hoped to persuade the French to withdraw their army of occupation, believing that sooner or later European complications or a rising of the Romans against the pope would enable them to go to Rome without a war. Meanwhile, even should Venetia be won, it was impossible for Italy to settle down or reduce her army. At any moment the Garibaldians might make a raid into papal territory and force the government into civil war or a conflict with France. These documents bring out very clearly how imminent this seemed in 1864. Pio Nono was very ill, and nobody expected that he could live many months. His death would precipitate the crisis, and it was natural that the Minghetti ministry should try to find some solution which would anticipate the danger. They picked up the last of Cavour's schemes, which only his death had prevented from being carried out in 1861. Under it the French had promised to evacuate at once, on condition that the Italian government guaranteed the pope's existing territory from attack. It was understood that if after a few months' interval the Romans could overthrow the papal government, and annex themselves to Italy by *plébiscite*, the French would not object to an Italian occupation of the city.

Even in Cavour's time there were serious objections to the scheme, and when it reappeared in 1864 it was altered for the worse by the proposal to couple with it a stipulation that the Italians should move their capital from Turin to Florence or Naples. This was partly to satisfy the animus of the central and southern Italians against Piedmont, partly to smooth the way for Louis Napoleon's acceptance of the scheme by enabling him to represent the change of capital as proof that the Italians had abandoned their claims to Rome, and thus reconcile the French catholics to the withdrawal of the garrison. It is now, however, quite clear (if indeed additional evidence were required) that the suggestion did not come from the emperor, however readily he

caught at it when made. At Pepoli's first interview with him it is shown that he was hoping to persuade the pope to allow the Italians to annex Rome 'by administrative bonds,' if they on their part would acknowledge papal suzerainty over not only his existing territory but Umbria.³ The unhappy idea of moving the capital came from Marquis Pepoli, then Italian minister at St. Petersburg, a vain, restless man, who hated the Piedmontese and thought that his relationship to the emperor made him the natural go-between for France and Italy.⁴ It is not quite clear whether Minghetti knew of the suggestion before it was made to the emperor. Minghetti himself says that the change of capital was inevitable, but does not state whether he had thought of it in connexion with the French treaty. According to Signor Chiala, who generally has chapter and verse for his statements, Minghetti was distressed that it was suggested to and approved by the emperor. But at a very early stage of the negotiations Nigra quoted Minghetti to the emperor as desiring the change of capital,⁵ and unluckily we can never be sure that Minghetti has told the whole truth.

We have abundant evidence in these books that the Minghetti government, or rather those few members of it who were in the secret, foresaw how unpopular the removal of the capital would be, at least in Piedmont. The king was only told of the negotiations at a late stage; this was known before, but Minghetti's memoir shows us how bitterly he felt about leaving Turin, how it was only by dint of constant pressure that his consent to the treaty was obtained. Minghetti and Visconti-Venosta are seen making pitiful and futile attempts to make it appear that the transference of the capital was an administrative and strategic question, extraneous to the French treaty and not part of the bargain with France.⁶ 'The emperor, I hope, will understand,' wrote Minghetti to Nigra and Pepoli, 'the reasons of convenience which make us wish to defend this important step before parliament and the country on purely strategic grounds.'⁷ The fiction that it was advised by the Italian generals is finally exploded. Cialdini, it is true, was in its favour, but Menabrea and Della Rovere were opposed; and La Marmora's comparative indifference was due to other than military considerations. On 11 Sept., when the convention was practically settled, Pepoli writes—

I advised Minghetti to summon the military council, and make it appear as if the choice of Florence was a strategic necessity. Minghetti promised to carry out my idea.

It was intended to do this before the treaty was known to the public, but, owing to the news leaking out prematurely, the military council did not meet till 19 Sept., when everything was known.

³ *Giacomo Dina e l'opera sua nelle vicende del Risorgimento Italiano*, ii. 738.

⁴ Minghetti, p. 100; Chiala, ii. 264, note.

⁵ *Ibid.* ii. 738.

⁶ Minghetti, pp. 91, 177; Chiala, ii. 282.

⁷ Minghetti, p. 169.

Even then, as we knew already from Della Rocca's autobiography, a vote in favour of moving the capital was only extracted by putting the question in an unfair form.

These memoirs throw more light on the insincerity of the whole business. Louis Napoleon wanted the French catholics to think that it meant a renunciation of Italian claims to Rome; he knew, and let the Italian statesmen know, that it meant nothing of the kind.

You will end by going to Rome (he told Nigra); the force of circumstances will take you there; but I don't want to seem to be handing the pope over, tied hand and foot.⁸

'Forget Rome for two years,' he said to Pepoli.⁹ It is clear too now that Drouyn de Lhuys took the same view.

If the irregular bands succeed in crossing the frontier (he said), and if the papal troops are defeated, and for this or any other reason the pope leaves Rome, it would prove that *le bon Dieu* has had enough of the pope's temporal government, and *arrivera ce qui arrivera*.¹⁰

There was the same duplicity on the part of the Italians. The plain meaning of the treaty bound them to desist from any effort or connivance at any effort to bring about the annexation of Rome. But this was the last thing that they intended.

It was evident (writes Minghetti in his memoir) that on our side this convention was a step to the desired end that parliament had indicated by its vote [acclaiming Rome as the capital]. So far (he adds) was our idea from any renunciation of Rome that when we had loyally done what we could to prevent armed bands from entering papal territory we had done all that duty required, whatever the result might be. . . . There were all the contingencies that might occur in the pope's relations with his subjects; there was the inevitable influence that a great kingdom was bound to exercise on a little territory; everything, in short, pointed out that this was not a definite solution; so far from hindering the solution it helped it and smoothed the way for it in the future.

We may be allowed to doubt whether it was intended to carry out very strictly the proviso of the convention that required the Italian government to protect the pope's dominions from attack. We find La Marmora writing to Minghetti as late as May 1864—

If the pope dies everything is ready and organised by the care and with the money of the Italian government, and in the probable case that they have not told you everything I enclose a copy of the instructions sent by the Roman committee on both sides of the frontier. . . . I am assured too here [at Naples] that there are at the police office more than 2,000 names enrolled to invade the papal states at the first hint.¹¹

Minghetti, in quoting the same letter, omits this passage, but, alluding to it, says La Marmora's facts were 'inexact;' he owns

⁸ Chiala, ii. 233.

⁹ *Ibid.* ii. 750.

¹⁰ Minghetti, p. 113, and see *ibid.* p. 80.

¹¹ *Nuova Antologia*, ubi supra.

however that he was cognisant of a plan to encourage the Roman patriots to proclaim the annexation of papal territories to Italy on the pope's death, and this design was in the hands of the same men who three years later connected it with a scheme of invasion. Recognising what 'moral forces' meant at the time, it is suspicious to find Visconti-Venosta writing—

In order to strengthen the action of moral forces we want to move the seat of government to a place from which our influence will more easily radiate towards Rome.¹²

It was generally recognised that, whatever may have been the case in 1860, there was at this time no hope of a successful rising at Rome without help from outside. The Minghetti government stands in this dilemma: Either they meant to abide loyally by the convention, and prevent any irruption of troops, in which case they indefinitely postponed the winning of Rome and lost more than they gained by the treaty; or else they meant to connive at plots to upset the pope's authority and stand morally condemned.

One last word as to the light thrown by these documents on Minghetti's and La Marmora's personal character. Minghetti's fickleness and disingenuousness stand in unpleasant relief. The ease with which he abandoned his opinion of less than two years before that 'a nation cannot move its capital twice,' the want of courage which made him flinch from breaking the news to the king, the futility of his belief that he could blind the country to the fact that the move to Florence was a bribe to France, the downright falsity with which he assured Giacomo Dina 'on his word of honour' that no one thought of moving the capital—at a time when the negotiations with France were in full swing—all these condemn him as a man and as a statesman. La Marmora on the other hand gains from closer knowledge of his words and actions. His letters to Minghetti prove how hateful to him was a treaty that he knew could not be executed, how bitter the thought that Italy was changing her capital to please another power, how the disingenuousness of the whole business revolted him. And we have unexpected evidence of the warmth with which he shared the national aspirations for Rome. Other passages from his pen seemed to show that his sympathies were rather cold, but he could sometimes, at all events, feel as strongly as any patriot.

If the convention came to mean a real renunciation of Rome, and therefore an act of treachery towards Italy, I would blow my brains out rather than execute it.

A month later he was the only possible premier, and he had to choose between executing it or abandoning the country to something bordering on anarchy. Such was the evil heritage that Minghetti left to his successors.

BOLTON KING.

¹² Minghetti, p. 88.