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THE NECESSITY FOR AND PRACTICABILITY OF A FEDERAL AUSTRALIAN ARMY.

*By Lieutenant CECIL LAMB,
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IN dealing with this national question on a somewhat difficult subject I shall divide my paper into two parts, viz. :—

1. The Necessity for a Federal Force.
2. The Practicability of a Federal Force.

As I am essentially a soldier, I consider it my duty to avoid the political aspect of the situation as much as possible.

THE NECESSITY FOR A FEDERAL FORCE.

I think all patriotic soldiers and sailors of our Great British Empire will admit that a federal force would be of vast importance to these great Australian Colonies.

We doubtless all remember the little story told to us in our childhood days of the "young man" trying to break, for firewood, a bundle of sticks which were tied together; and how an "older and wiser man," seeing what he was trying to do, told him that "union was strength," and, taking the bundle of sticks out of the young man's hand, he extracted them singly, and broke them up in detail. Our different Australian forces of the several colonies are like these single sticks, and could be broken up by a strong and resolute enemy; nothing being more certain than that the small isolated armies of Australia would fall an easy prey to an enterprising foreign Power intent on territorial aggression, as pointed out by the late Sir H. Parkes, K.C.M.G., in his book "Fifty Years in the Making of Australian History." We are taught that the geographical position of the Colony of New South Wales renders it little liable to aggression from a foreign Power, except raiding attacks of cruisers on our coast-line of approximately 600 miles; but in dealing with the question of federal defence there is to be reckoned the very large coast-line of Australasia (8,500 miles), and if a force of an enemy was established on any portion of Her Majesty's Australasian

soil it would be our sacred duty—nay, of paramount importance to ourselves—to oust the enemy out of any position that he might take up.

We must look on the subject of military federation from a broad and patriotic point of view, and not from a narrow or purely local point. Even if our worthy and enterprising capitalists, merchants, and shopkeepers cannot see their way clear to amalgamate their finances and commerce, and have one tariff and one set of laws for Australia, on the ground of there being too many pressing local requirements to consider, still it is the duty of our naval and military authorities, with the sanction of their respective governments, to consider how they can overcome the difficulty of using a small portion of the finances accruing from the revenues of these great Colonies for creating an efficient federal army; for it is undoubtedly a matter of vital importance that the defence of Australia should be very complete in case the mother country were involved in war, and the capital invested in these colonies should be safe from foreign aggression.

At the United Service Institution of Victoria a paper was read, 3rd October, 1895, entitled "Australia's Military Duty to the Empire," by Lieut.-Colonel Hall, Commanding Metropolitan Brigade Victorian Garrison Artillery, and in the discussion which followed—Major-General Sir C. H. Smith being in the chair—the secretary of the Imperial Federation League, Mr. H. D'Esterre Taylor, pointed out that "the seaboard commerce of Australia was valued at £35,000,000, and if this commerce were subject to a raid by a foreign Power without protection, we would be at the mercy of that Power at once, and Australia might be reduced at a very short time to a state of national insolvency."

We all know that history repeats itself, and the British race may be drawn into a struggle practically to fight for its supremacy against the world, like the British have done before, and as they had to do in the war against the Great Napoleon in 1807, when he declared the British Isles blockaded. It is well known how jealous some foreign Powers are of the British Empire's commercial supremacy, independence, and power, and what great efforts they make yearly to increase their Navies and Armies, and push their trade, and how they consider what a splendid prize some parts of the Australian Colonies would make. For an enemy to engage in operations on our soil a large expeditionary force of all arms, fully equipped, would be required. But might not Russia and France combine, and, with their vast hordes of armed men and their powerful Navies, try and break the power and wealth of our glorious Empire?

Russia has 24 army corps (about 4,000,000 armed men), and Japan possibly, with its 45,000,000 of people and her powerful and well-organised Army and Navy, might throw in its lot with Russia and France, and have a try to get a slice of Great Britain's rich Australian Colonies. Japan in the late war against China placed on the Chinese territory 70,000 men completely equipped and thoroughly trained and organised; and she has now the war indemnity of £12,000,000 which she exacted, to

spend in further developing her resources; £8,000,000 of this money are already being spent upon increasing her Navy. Might not a combination of any two of the above Powers, in these days of large and quick transports, spare a powerful naval and military force which, fitted out at Vladivostock,¹ Saigon,² and Hiroshima, and sailing by different routes so as to avoid the British fleets, might concentrate off the West Coast of Australia, elude the Australian Squadron, or, beating the Australian Squadron off, seize Fremantle and Albany? Perth and Fremantle would be knocked to pieces unless the mineral wealth of the Coolgardie goldfields lying in the banks³ were deposited in the holds of the enemy's vessels; and then, provided the British fleets could be eluded, their gold might be taken away to pay the Armies and Navies of Russia and Japan, and to recoup their treasuries, exhausted by carrying on the war against the British Empire. The fort at Albany could be overpowered by the superiority of fire that could be brought to bear on it, and the port seized, the coal taken, and the mail steamers holding our people's wealth sunk or captured. The trade converging upon Albany is estimated at £67,000,000 per annum.

Then the cry of the people of these Colonies would be:—"The enemy must be ousted and our commerce and home protected." But which individual colony is going to weaken her own defence to do it? Could Great Britain do it? Hardly, as her troops would be absorbed in protecting the frontiers of India against Russia, and other of her Crown possessions against the aggression of the French; therefore the matter would rest with the Australian forces. With our little separate armies it may take time to settle about the finances and organisation of those troops—probably too long—and thus give sufficient time to the enemy to get away with part of our wealth, and cause a great loss of confidence in ourselves as an independent and free people. Let us pause to consider deeply and seriously about the fall of one nation's prestige in 1870; and let it be remembered that troops raised in a hurry and untrained, and commanded by unprofessional leaders, are almost useless under conditions of modern warfare when matched against trained soldiers.

If the above picture that I have drawn is too imaginative, let me direct attention to the position of Tasmania, with her undefended harbours and financially starved defence force, which is a menace to the whole continent of Australia. If a combination of two of the great Powers fitted out an expedition, and the Australian Squadron was eluded, and Hobart⁴ taken, as a base of future operations against this continent, what colony at the present moment would be prepared to send her own troops, paid with her own money, to fight for the advantage or security of

¹ 5,200 miles.

² 4,000 miles from Sydney; Saigon 3,700 miles from Brisbane; 4,800 miles from Auckland. New Caledonia is 800 miles from Brisbane; 1,100 miles from Auckland.

³ £500,000 (half a million).

⁴ It is contemplated that fortifications will be commenced in the near future.

the other colony, and hunt the enemy out? The people of New South Wales and Victoria will say a combined force of these two colonies. What combined force? Organisation of military units, to be of sufficient strength and striking power, cannot be built up in a few days or hours. It must be a properly organised force to work harmoniously under one controlling head, and the machinery will have to be well oiled and greased before it is started off at the word "Mobilise."

These foreign aggressions, that may occur in the next great war, will have to be destroyed by a Federal Force of Australia, apportioned to each Colony in proportion to its expenditure. On the discussion which followed on the paper read by Major-General Owen, R.A., entitled the "Military Defence Forces of Australia," at the Royal Colonial Institute, in May, 1890, Lieut.-General H. Brackenbury, C.B., said:—"We wish the Australian Colonies to understand that the only attack to which their seaports can reasonably be considered liable is the attack of a *small force of cruisers* which may escape the vigilance of our fleet. We want them not to be milch cows for gunmakers and inventors—not to waste their money on Zelinski guns and Brennan torpedoes and torpedo-boats, and ironclad fleets, but to confine themselves to such moderate defence as is necessary against such attack as is reasonably probable." "It is necessary, we say, that in the organisation of our forces Australia should go forward in the path she has been pursuing, and in which she has done right good work. And what we are most anxious to see is that she should bring, as far as possible, the whole of these forces under one uniform organisation. . . . So that, should need arise for one colony to reinforce the other, they should readily fit together as one system. As an Englishman, I believe it is the future of Australia to dominate the Pacific, and I say that Australia never will do this by merely looking to her own defence. War is not brought to an end by simply acting on the defensive—'the counter-blow must be struck.' Is Australia simply to act on the defensive and leave others to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for her? No! And I do not believe that it is her wish. . . ."

No matter how sincere and patriotic each of the Governments of these great Australian Colonies may be to have their own Colony's system of defence complete, these Governments are controlled by the electors of the Colony and the democracy at large, who mostly consider the military department an expensive luxury, where all money goes out and nothing comes in; consequently, what do we see—cheeseparing of military estimates, which necessarily pulls down any previous building-up of efficiency and organisation, while the Government and military authorities are unable to carry out any continuous military policy of any duration. Colonel E. T. Hutton, late Commandant of our New South Wales Army, in his lecture on "Our Comrades of Greater Britain," points this out. He says:—"I place the want of a continuous or fixed policy of defence as the first and most serious of the difficulties under which the military of Greater Britain labour." "Governments change far more rapidly in our self-governing Colonies than at home, and the fluctuating changes of policy and the

vicissitudes experienced in passing the military estimates through Parliament render it impossible to look forward from one year to another with any degree of certainty. It requires no demonstration to show how difficult it is to inspire enthusiasm and maintain military efficiency when not only the maintenance of each and every member of the force, but even of the force itself, is a subject of yearly uncertainty when the military estimates are submitted to Parliament. . . . The military forces of our Colonies which will have to take the field must possess a complete military system and organisation, and cannot rest content with a number of disconnected fragments. . . . With the exception of one of the Australian Colonies, and perhaps two, a military force as a complete military unit of organisation does not exist."

It might be, God forbid! that these disconnected fragments, if they continue to exist for years to come, might be used by rival Governments of Colonies to be turned at one another's throats to enforce duties being paid by one Colony to another in that bitter, vexed question—the war of the tariff, or some other political or local question of the masses. It is not so many years back that Victoria claimed half the flow of the River Murray, and to enforce that claim placed a police officer in a boat loaded with tobacco, rum, etc., etc., challenging the New South Wales Government to levy duty upon it. That officer (since dead) told a friend of mine that the crew were armed, and that the Victorian officer had instructions to resist any interference on the part of the New South Wales revenue officer. Owing to the forbearance of the New South Wales Government, greater force was not resorted to. The Imperial authorities eventually decided that Victoria's boundary did not extend beyond the southern bank of the river. But if we had one military service for the whole of these great Colonies, under one law and system, and one wise controlling power, with the force actuated by one grand patriotic spirit, *e.g.*, the integrity of Australia and defence of our soil from foreign aggression, the military would then probably remain "United" until the rival people who wished to employ them against their comrades saw that such an awful calamity as a civil war could not exist as long as there was a United Force for Australia.

In concluding the first part of this paper, I would like to quote some remarks on Major-General J. Bevan Edwards' report by the Colonial Defence Committee:—

"Australia and New Zealand possess an enormous coast-line, with numerous points against which such raids as have been referred to might possibly be directed. In the absence of any organised force on shore even a small number of men landed for a short time would be enabled to inflict grave damage. To meet these requirements it appears essential to provide an adequate force, well organised and capable of being rapidly mobilised, since it is at the outset of the war that the probability of a raid is greatest. . . . In the event of a great war the military resources of the Empire will be heavily tested, and the responsibility for land defence must necessarily rest with the Colonies."

"It would be of great importance to interfere with the industrial machinery as little as possible. Relief of garrisons or posts would doubtless be required, entailing the maintenance of a higher total strength than would be necessary in the case of a Standing Army."

Finance and Controlling Power.—Having shown a few of the necessities for a United Australian Army, let us now deal with the solution of the practicability of a Federal Force.

We will take the most difficult subject first, and the most interesting to the taxpayer and vexatious to us soldiers—that of £ s. d. Quoting again from Colonel Hutton's lecture on "Our Comrades of Greater Britain," at Aldershot, when dealing with Australian Federal Defence, he concluded his remarks on this subject by saying :—"This offensive-defensive force becomes the federal force of Australia, and is apportioned to each colony in proportion to its population. The federal force thus created by joint co-operation of the Australian Colonies comprises a complete¹ mounted brigade and a complete infantry² division, each being provided with the proper proportion of administrative and departmental troops, so as to be able to take the field at the shortest notice. . . . This military system can be formed without the addition of a single penny to the military estimates of each Colony, and by merely utilising the existing military establishments." No doubt there is a well-thought-out scheme of military federation which has been carefully and practically considered by the different commandants of these Colonies at their conferences held from time to time; but, not knowing anything of what has taken place, I cannot discuss their propositions. If I had any idea of the matter discussed at these conferences I would not give my ideas on this subject, which might probably not be in accord with the views of older and more experienced officers than myself.

On the assumption that the Imperial Government will not help us financially (which seems only fair when we consider the average expenditure approximately per head of the Australian Colonies for defence is only 2s. 9d., while Great Britain is spending for defence approximately per head 17s. 4d.), Great Britain would utilise a portion of the auxiliary squadron subsidised by these Colonies of Australia to protect the transporting of our offensive-defensive federal force to any portion of Australia's waters that the general in command, with the sanction of the Federal Council, might desire it to. I do not see how we can avoid additional outlay. The difficulty might be overcome to a certain extent if we base our argument on the following proposition, viz., by simply uniting the sums together at the disposal of the six Australian Colonies for military expenditure.

¹ Brigade of Cavalry (Lord Wolseley): 3 regiments, 1,986; 1 battery R.H.A., 100; department's total, 2,537.

² Division of Infantry (Lord Wolseley): 2 brigades of infantry, 6 battalions, 6,646; 1 battalion of rifles, 1,000; 1 regiment of cavalry, 661; 3 batteries of F.A., 549; department's total, 9,607.

The consolidated revenue for defence purposes during 1894-95; according to Mr. T. A. Coghlan, is as follows :—

<i>Colony.</i>	<i>Amount.</i>	<i>Per head.</i>		<i>Naval.</i>
		<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>	
N. S. Wales ..	£272,358 ¹	4	5	£37,961
Victoria ..	194,020	3	3	35,767
Queensland ..	63,068	2	10	13,503
South Australia ..	34,236	1	11	10,690
West Australia ..	16,128	3	11	2,490
Tasmania ..	12,425	1	7	4,776
	£592,235			£105,187
Deduct Naval subsidy	£105,187			
	£487,048			left for military expenditure.

Here we have our Colony of New South Wales at the top of the list, and we spend £78,383 more than Victoria; this can be accounted for to a certain extent by our having a large coast-line to defend, and our forces are distributed over a larger area of land. Taking the strength of the Australian military forces at the end of 1894, of these six Colonies, and reckoning staff, Regulars, Militia, partially paid, and Volunteers, we have, according to Mr. T. A. Coghlan's Statistical Account :—

N. S. Wales ³ ..	..	..	..	5,564
Victoria.. ..	..	..	..	6,901
Queensland ..	..	..	..	3,440
South Australia ..	..	..	..	2,033
West Australia ..	..	..	..	776
Tasmania ..	..	..	..	1,411 B
Total	..	..	..	20,125

<i>Colony.</i>	<i>Military expenditure.</i>		<i>Cost per head.</i>	
	<i>1869</i>	<i>1894-</i>	<i>1869</i>	<i>1894</i>
			<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
N. S. Wales ...	£32,343	£272,358	1	3
Victoria	37,422	199,722	1	0
Queensland ...	3,940	63,067	0	8
South Australia	13,580	36,561	1	6
West Australia	184	9,621	—	2
Tasmania ...	1,454	12,424	0	2
	£88,923	£593,753		

¹ Exclusive of £48,979 loan expenditure on military works.

² Includes contribution to Australian Squadron.

³ The figures relating to N. S. Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, and Queensland include members of Australian Rifle Clubs, who are all trained to the use of the rifle and do certain amount of drill, thus making them in time of need available to fill the ranks of the Militia forces—about 4,500 men. The members of Rifle Clubs of N. S. Wales, numbering 650 men, were enrolled as a *Volunteer Reserve Force* in 1895.

Since these figures were quoted at the end of 1894, changes may have taken place in the organisation and strength of Australia's forces. The six Colonies above-mentioned possessed a force of 20,125 troops, while it will be seen at that time New Zealand owned 4,387. Before we go on to the working of these troops together as a united force, we must consider how, where, and by whom the sum of £487,084, left for military expenditure authorised by the six Australian Colonies, is to be controlled.

As New South Wales is paying per head on her naval and military expenditure 1s. 2d. more than Victoria, 6d. more than West Australia, 1s. 7d. more than Queensland, 2s. 6d. more than South Australia, and 2s. 10d. more than Tasmania, it would seem fair to the other Australian Colonies that the headquarters of the Australian Army should be Sydney. Sydney, the other Colonies must remember, is the strategical naval base of the Southern Seas, which renders the security of the Colony, and this port in particular, of vital importance not only to the well-being of the Colony itself, but to the supremacy and maintenance of the British Navy charged with the protection of the whole of Australasia's interest in Australian waters. Sydney would probably be the base of any combined operations of the Australian troops to seize New Caledonia, German New Guinea, or to oust the enemy from Thursday Island, Port Darwin, Tasmania, or some of the numerous coastal towns on the New Zealand coast, which he may have temporarily seized. Sydney is in a good central position, geographically speaking, for the concentration of an expedition to set sail from a good port under the protection of the British squadron in those seas. Presuming it is a foregone conclusion that these great Australian Colonies must federate for a system of intercolonial free trade, lighthouse, quarantine, etc., surely we could come to some amicable arrangement for the controlling of the military expenditure.

To have one organised force properly equipped and capable of overcoming any resistance that it may meet with, there must be one military tariff or system of military expenditure or payment of the force. Therefore, the General in supreme command, the Chief of the Staff, the Quartermaster-General, the Chief Paymaster, and their staff should have their headquarters in Sydney. The money for military expenditure would be remitted to the charge of the Federal Council for deposit in the Treasury of Sydney from the different States or Colonies by the 20th of each month, and this in return would be distributed to the Major-Generals commanding in the different Colonies to distribute in the usual manner for payment of troops and for such military works and establishments as might be directed by the Commander-in-Chief through the Federal Council.

An objection might be made to this system, as it would create an extra military department, in fact an Australian War Office, and necessarily cause extra expense. If it could not be amicably arranged for the war office to be situated at Sydney, then let the war office follow the Federal Council, say, two years in each of the capitals of the six Colonies. Obviously the objection to this would be the expense of shifting the Army headquarters. But it would have this good result, that

the Commander-in-Chief and his staff would have under their eyes any slack body of troops which might have got lethargic from being away in some remote capital or town. Tasmania would pay into the military treasury £12,425 as already shown; and Tasmania, which in the present position of her starved system of defence and badly defended coast is a menace to the other Colonies, would therefore do better to partially disband her present force and the Federal Council or Government utilise this contribution, or nearly all of it, for the payment of the brain of their Army, *i.e.*, the Commander-in-Chief and his staff, and leave Tasmania with a small number of permanent artillerymen to look after the forts and a small force of Volunteer infantry and artillery with the necessary departmental and administrative troops and submarine miners. Such a force as I speak of to be merely a nucleus to a larger force should cost a very small sum to maintain, as the troops would be all purely volunteer, except the small number of permanent artillerymen drawing regular pay, the other portion no pay at all. It would be to the interest of the other Colonies in the event of war and a threatened attack on Tasmania to send a force of federal troops over there, but if the Tasmanian tax-payers would not give up their local force, then the Colonies would have to subscribe the amount among themselves for the controlling government of the Army.¹

The different Colonies would be asked by the Federal Government on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, to vote a certain sum for a federal camp of instruction, which sum, levied in proportion to population, would not amount to as much as under the present system, when each Colony has its own isolated camp. The Commander-in-Chief and his staff would decide as to the locality, which could be arranged for strategical purposes, bearing in mind favourable ground for manœuvring. The advantage of a federal camp is this: up to the present there has been merely a meeting of the commandants to arrange the federation; but by the federal camp being held it would give the troops an opportunity of showing how the federal military machinery would work, and of putting into practice the idea and plans originated from time to time. By placing £2,400 annually for Tasmanian defences, this would leave a

¹ *Proposed Troops—*

2 Regular Submarine Miners	...	} Cost about	£1,000
15 Regular Artillery			
250 Volunteer			
200 „ Infantry			
33 Departl. troops & Submarine Miners	...	}	
			900
			500
500			£2,400

Distribution of Tasmanian Force, 1892—

Staff		7
Permanent Artillery	...	} 33
„ Submarine Miners	...	
Militia and partially paid		535
Volunteers		1,272
		1,847

balance of £10,000 per annum for the payment of the headquarters staff and travelling expenses of the staff while going round to periodically inspect the different troops and defence works and establishments of the Army.¹ Though the headquarters staff might be slightly lower paid than the different staffs of the general officers commanding in the other Colonies, the headquarters staff would be acting under the Commander-in-Chief's authority, and the officers would, of course, be personally responsible to him for their different departments. When the system, utility, and practice of the "brain of the Army" was gradually worked in and thoroughly understood, and jealousies of the staff of the other States became less, then these staffs could be slightly reduced, and the headquarters staff increased in rank, pay, and number.

UNIFORM PAYMENT OF TROOPS AND ACT UNDER WHICH THEY WOULD SERVE.

The late grand old statesman of Australia, Sir H. Parkes, writes, in his book "Fifty Years in the Making of Australian History," when dealing with Federation for Defence:—"No doubt the Imperial Parliament, on application of the Colonies, could pass an Act to constitute the Federal Army under one command and to authorise its movement to any part of Australia or Australasian waters." The Regular forces of New South Wales are bound by the Army Act, Queen's Regulations, and other regulations common to the Imperial Army (by Act of N.S.W. Legislature²), which answer exceedingly well here for the government of the Regular troops in that Colony, with certain local modifications. The Regular forces of the other Colonies are more or less under the Army Act, and it would be a very simple matter at the present time for the different Parliaments of the Colonies to pass a law that the Regular forces come under Military Law the same as the New South Wales Regulars.

The Regular troops must have the same system of payment. Instead of paying them at the same rate, as at present, it could be slightly under that amount, and arrangements made with the money saved, with a little

¹ *Proposed Controlling Government of the Army—*

Commander-in-Chief	£2,250	Lieut.-General
Adjutant-General	1,250	Major-General
Quartermaster-General	900	Colonel
Military Secretary	900	Colonel
Inspector-General of Fortifications and of Engineers	900	Colonel
Director of Military Intelligence	850	Colonel
Director of Artillery	800	Colonel
Aide-de-Camp to the Commander-in-Chief	450	Captain
	8,300	
Staff clerks and travelling expenses ...	1,700	
	£10,000	

² *Title—*

"An Act to provide for the Regulation and Discipline of the Military and Naval Forces in the service of Her Majesty's Government of New South Wales." (May, 1871.) 34 Vic., No. 19.

added to it, for a proper retiring allowance for the officers when the limit of age was reached and a small pension to those non-commissioned officers and men who earned it, with facilities thrown out for employment in a civil capacity for those officers and men who were capable of work. The efficiency of troops must necessarily become hindered unless the older officers and non-commissioned officers and men know there is something besides the actual wages for good, long, honourable, and gallant service, and they cannot retire with a good feeling to the Service at the proper time and allow the younger officers to try and follow in their footsteps. If provision is not made for the promotion of the younger officers at the proper time they naturally become disheartened, and the progressive military machinery becomes clogged. In fact, as the Regular forces would be serving under the Army Act of 1881, they should also have the advantages of the "Royal Warrant for the Pay, Appointment, Promotion, and Non-Effective Pay of the British Army" on a scale suitable to the Federal military expenditure consistent with economy.

But we must start gradually, and not rush at the obstruction of finance. Later on the Federal Government might see their way clear to put a proper system of retirement in force, the details of which would be, of course, worked out by the headquarters staff. The Regular Artillery and Engineers would be enlisted for seven years' Army service and five with the Reserve, or eight years' Army service and four in the Reserve. So as not to lose the men entirely after the expense of teaching them their work, an Army Reserve should be established under similar lines as the Reserve Forces Act of 1882 of the British Army. So as to avoid expense, the adjutants of the Regular corps would keep touch with the men by certificates being sent periodically that the men were in a certain part of Australia, and thus it would be known where they were to be found if wanted. The Reserves would be paid when called out for service. When the military authorities had more funds at their disposal, arrangements could be made to keep completely in touch with the men, and they could be paid a small retaining fee at 4d. per day issued quarterly in arrear.¹

The partially-paid troops of Australia should be unreservedly a "Militia," governed by the Militia Act, 1882, with certain local conditions to suit Australian life and customs of the country, but any conditions common to one Colony must be distinctly common to the whole of the other Colonies. For instance, a Militiaman desiring to go away from a certain district in which his military unit is situated must either obtain leave to do so, or must purchase his discharge, or join the same branch of the Service in another part of the country where his work has taken him.

The Regular troops of Australia would, of course, be liable to serve wherever the Federal Government desired them to go, and as obviously

¹ *Training of Army Reserves—*

These men would be liable to be called out annually for twelve days, or twenty drills, and may be attached to a body of the Regular forces, or to the Militia, Yeomanry, or Volunteers.

the Militia of Australia, being so much in the majority, are the backbone of the military system in these Colonies, it would be absolutely essential that the Militia be liable to serve in case of imminent national danger when embodied anywhere the Federal Council might consider necessary.

Why I urge the claims of a Militia is that I consider it the easiest method of getting out of the difficulty of the question, "Which of the Colonies is going to abandon its Military Act and take up the other?" As there are different Acts more or less in the different Colonies, it would greatly help to destroy jealousy if the British Army Militia Act was adopted—of course, as before stated, with certain modifications as to period—for enlistment for the different branches of the Service. These details, though absolutely necessary, I am afraid I cannot put forth here.¹ However, I can add that when we have our controlling headquarters it will be their duty to thoroughly thrash all these questions out, and for the Federal Government to give the legal sanction.

The different Volunteer Regulation Acts of the different Colonies concerned would have to be repealed, and the necessary Act passed, so as to secure uniformity of administration throughout all branches when subject to Military Law, and provision made for billeting of troops and impressment of carriages, etc., in time of war. Such an Act should state a General Discipline Act in which provision could be made for the troops of one Colony serving in another Colony, and setting out the circumstances under which the troops could be sent or withdrawn (*vide* letter from Mr. Duncan Gillies, Premier of Victoria, to Sir H. Parkes, in November, 1889). Besides our Active Militia, we should have to provide a Militia Reserve. The Reserves should be divided into two classes, viz.:—1st Class, after serving the prescribed time in the Active Militia; and, 2nd Class, the present Reservists system of N. S. Wales—men furnished by the different civilian rifle clubs, the other Colonies to adopt the same system. In time of national danger the 2nd Class Army Reserve would be brought under the Army Act.

The 1st Class Militia Reserve would go to complete the war strength of battalion and regiments, while the 2nd Class—those furnished by the C.R.C.—would go to the depôts of their respective corps and learn a little more of military customs before they were drafted out to their respective

¹ *Militia Act of 1832.*

Enlistment for a term not exceeding six years, re-engagement allowed up to 45 years for successive further terms not exceeding six years each.

Militia Recruits liable to preliminary training not exceeding six months.

Annual training of Militia, usually not less than 21 days and not more than 28 days, may be extended to 56 days.

When subject to Military Law:—

1. During training.
2. When attached to the Regular forces.
3. When embodied.
4. Officers subject to Military Law at all times.

Proposed Length of Service Militia:—

Army Service	...	Artillery, 5 years	...	Reserve Service, 3 years.
Army Service	...	Engineers, 5 years	...	Reserve Service, 3 years.
Army Service	...	Other branches, 3 years		Reserve Service, 3 years

corps to furnish casualties, etc. It would not take long to steady down the 2nd Class Reserves, as it must be remembered at the present time they are learning a certain amount of drill, and all of them are good shots.

With regard to training of the 1st Class Militia Reserves, Major Brereton's suggestion, in his lecture on the "Advantage of a Militia," 27th April, 1892, seems to be a good one, viz. :—"One day's training in each half-year for imparting instruction in changes of drill and armament if necessary." Pay at the rate of 8s. per day to all men attending, which would put the cost of each 1st Class Militia Reservist at 16s. per annum. Reserve of officers paid at the present scale for their attendance. The Reserve of officers would be on the war establishment of their depôts, and when called out each officer would be placed at the bottom of his rank in the regiment to which he is appointed.

There would be no additional expense to N.S. Wales for the 2nd Class Reservists, as they would continue to get the Government grant of ammunition when earned for efficiency, as at present, and only be paid if put under Military Law on an emergency. The payment of the Active Militia would be on the same scale as is adopted in N.S. Wales at present for her partially-paid troops, *i.e.*, payment for actual work done, or one of the systems adopted by some of the other Colonies; but whatever system of pay is adopted, it must be the same throughout in the Australian Militia, otherwise on mobilisation we should be liable to have confusion and jealousies.

ORGANISATION AND ALLOTMENT OF TROOPS.

Now it is the opinion of Colonel Hutton and other officers who have commanded in Australia, that we must have sufficient troops to protect the strategical centres, and at the same time have enough strength to strike at any enemy and send him out of Australia or Australian waters, or occupy any important key or position that he may have designs on. Basing our disposition of troops on the supposition that the offensive-defensive force of Australia will be a complete mounted brigade and infantry division, the Colonies would have to find the following troops, broadly speaking, viz. :—

Mounted Brigade¹: 3 regiments of mounted troops and 1 battery of horse artillery, and necessary administrative and departmental troops :—

<i>Colony.</i>	<i>Description of Troops.</i>		<i>Numbers.</i>
N.S. Wales	..	1 regiment, 6 squadrons	.. 360
"	..	Army Ser. Corps and M.S. Corps	.. 110
Victoria	..	1 batt. Mounted Infantry, 6 cos.	.. 360
"	..	1 battery Horse Artillery, 6 guns	.. 90
South Australia	..	Mounted Infantry, 3 companies	.. 180
Queensland	..	Mounted Infantry, 3 companies	.. 180
Total officers and men			.. 1,280

¹ *Vide* Lord Wolseley.

	Officers and men.	Mules and horses.	Carriages.
Infantry Division...	9,607	2,649	403
Brigade of Cavalry	2,557	2,405	158

When mobilised for war, such a force should expand to 2,280 officers and men.

COMPLETE INFANTRY DIVISION.

Two Infantry Brigades (each brigade 3 battalions infantry), 1 regiment cavalry, 3 batteries artillery, and necessary departmental and administrative troops, viz. :—

<i>Colony.</i>	<i>Description of Troops.</i>	<i>Numbers.</i>
N.S. Wales ..	2 bns. Infantry, each bn. 4 cos. 75 men ..	600
„ ..	1 battery F.A., 6 guns	90
„ ..	1 company Engineers	100
Victoria ..	2 bns. Infantry, each bn. 4 cos. 75 men ..	600
„ ..	1 regiment Cavalry, 4 squads, 90 men ..	360
„ ..	1 battery F.A., 6 guns	90
Queensland ..	1 battalion Infantry, 4 cos. 75 men ..	300
„ ..	1 division Reserve Amnt. column ..	100
„ ..	$\frac{1}{2}$ battery F.A., 3 guns	45
South Australia ..	1 battalion Infantry, 4 cos. 75 men ..	300
„ ..	1 company A.S. Corps, Medical Staff, and 3 field hospitals	150
„ ..	$\frac{1}{2}$ battery F.A., 3 guns	45
Total		2,780

When mobilised for war, about 3,780 men and horses, and 18 guns. Thus, if we reckon our complete mounted brigade on its war strength 2,280 officers and men, and complete infantry division 3,780 officers and men, we should have a force of 6,060 officers, men, and horses, and 24 guns, including the necessary administrative and departmental troops, without which no body of troops can be properly organised and equipped.¹

¹ This Mounted Brigade and Infantry Division would still leave the Colonies for defence of harbours and strategical centres, roughly speaking, the following:—

Showing what Forces could remain in Australia if mobile troops required elsewhere.	New South Wales ...	3 batteries of Artillery
		2 regiments of Infantry
		1 regiment of Cavalry
		1 battalion of Mounted Infantry
		9 companies of Garrison Artillery
	Engineers, Staff, and necessary Departmental and Administrative Troops, about 4 battalions of Volunteers, and if necessary the Reserves.	
	Victoria	2 batteries of Artillery
		2 regiments of Infantry
		1 regiment of Mounted Infantry
		1 regiment of Cavalry
		9 companies of Garrison Artillery
	Engineers, Staff, and necessary Departmental and Administrative Troops, and Volunteers, with Reserves, if necessary.	
	South Australia ...	1 battalion of Artillery
		2 regiments of Infantry
		$\frac{1}{2}$ battalion of Mounted Infantry
		3 battalions Garrison Artillery
		Engineers, Staff, and necessary Departmental and Administrative Troops, Volunteers, and Reserves.
	Queensland	A little more than South Australia.

These troops would become the mobile force of Australia. It does not follow that all these troops would be taken for operations against an enemy; that would be a matter for the Commander-in-Chief to settle. This mounted brigade and infantry division would have to work together at a Federal Camp of Instruction, as before mentioned; and in order to give the remainder of the Militia the distinction and experience for being told off for this important service, and to get the whole system of Federal Defence to work together, the different troops of the mounted brigade and infantry division could be changed from time to time as thought fit by the Commander-in-Chief.

Mobilisation of the Army.—We should have our War Office, with the Commander-in-Chief and his well-trained and highly efficient staff, and the War Office would get their general instructions from the Federal Council depending on the political aspect of the situation. We should have under one uniform organisation one Regular Militia with their Reserves (1st and 2nd Class), and last, but by no means least, that patriotic body of officers and men, the Volunteers. The whole of these troops would be at the disposal of the Federal Council and the War Office authorities. Detailed instructions and carefully thought-out schemes of defence would have been previously issued to the major-generals in command at the different Colonies, based on a defence scheme to suit local requirements. The mounted brigade and infantry division would be concentrated on the nearest point available, if an enemy had seized certain portions of Australia, or if required to seize New Caledonia, accordingly as political events showed themselves in Australian waters, or that part of the Pacific and seas immediately to the north of Australia that we Anglo-Australians have an interest in in common with Great Britain. Even if all the mobile troops were sent away, the remainder of the Army should be sufficient to protect the important commercial and strategical centres. But we must have a mounted brigade and infantry division ready to strike at the enemy before he comes hammering at our back doors, approximately near our commercial centres, and to prevent him getting a base of operations on some strategical point.

AMALGAMATED PERMANENT FORCES OF GARRISON ARTILLERY AND SUBMARINE MINERS.

This would be a fortress corps consisting of the permanent forces of garrison artillery and submarine miners (engineers), and with some slight increase to its numbers. When the Federal Military Vote became larger the corps could be utilised to garrison King George's Sound, Thursday Island, and other strategical keys; and, in case of war, the nearest Colony which could spare the troops would be ordered by the Australian War Office authorities to send a proportion of infantry to those points. The Regular artillery and submarine miners would be systematically relieved all round the different parts of Australia every three years in lethargic climates, and every seven years elsewhere. Promotion would be facilitated and *esprit de corps* would be generated, and the officers and N.C.O.'s would get the necessary local knowledge about the different important garrisons, which would stand this country in useful knowledge

when, after a certain regimental experience, they might be selected for the staff of the different Colonies for a portion of their service on the same lines as the Imperial Army.

Some such system as changing periodically the permanent troops without partiality, favour, or affection, should be initiated for the officers and N.C.O.'s of the general staff, adjutants of Militia and Volunteer regiments, and the staff of the major-generals in command of the different Colonies. Promotion of officers and N.C.O.'s should take place on any position becoming vacant by the War Office authorities filling up the vacancy with the best men. The additional outlay should be small, as the railways are Government property, and any small expense of travelling that the Federal Military Treasury was put to would be money well laid out, as this system would give officers experience of the Federal Army and localities, and assist to work the whole Australian forces together as one large well-built and oiled military machine.

EDUCATION OF OFFICERS AND N.C. OFFICERS, MILITARY COLLEGE, UNIFORM SYSTEM OF ARMAMENT, GUN WHARF AND ORDNANCE STORE, SMALL-ARM MANUFACTORY, RAILWAYS, AND AN AUSTRALIAN UNIFORM.

I will now end this somewhat lengthy paper with a few brief remarks on these subjects.

Education of Officers, and Federal Military College.—Let the Australian troops first continue rigorously the system in the whole Army as adopted in New South Wales by strictly adhering to the "Rules for Schools of Instructions," and give no officer or senior N.C.O. his promotion either on the Staff or in his regiment, till he has passed through the school and obtained the necessary certificates. Let the system of examining majors before promotion to lieutenant-colonel be adopted for their tactical fitness for command in the field. The Adjutant-General at the War Office would be responsible in addition to his other duties to the Commander-in-Chief that the instruction imparted in these schools was enforced by the major-generals in command in the different Colonies as one uniform system common to the different branches of the Service, so that the natural mutual cohesion should follow when the federated troops were called on to work together. When there is enough money let a Federal Staff College be established in a part of Australia away from disturbing influences and in a climate conducive to study. Senior officers in addition to this could be sent out to India to be present at the manœuvres, and to England to undergo training at the colleges.

Uniform System of Armament.—The Director of Artillery would be responsible to the Commander-in-Chief that the Colonies were endeavouring to adopt one uniform system of armament suitable to local requirements; changes in armament should take place gradually so as not to cause too much expense to the Federal Military Treasury.

Artillery workshops, gun-wharves, and ordnance should be established at the headquarters with necessary local branches. All guns and artillery appliances obtained from Great Britain.

Small-arms Manufactory and Powder Manufactory to be established, or any present one thoroughly initiated, so we could turn out our small-arms, ammunition, and our powder for the common use of the Federated Army.

Railways.—Volunteer railway corps established in all the Colonies on the same lines as the present one being organised in New South Wales, and in time of war these corps would have the responsibility of assisting the civilian railway authorities with their military knowledge for transport of troops. Armed trains should be initiated for coastal defence, especially near coaling ports and jetties where the railway runs close to the sea-board.

It would not be necessary to alter the gauge, which alteration would involve a large additional outlay. When part of the infantry division and mounted brigade came from Sydney and Melbourne to concentrate on Brisbane, or *vice versa*, a break in the journey at the Queensland border would considerably refresh the troops, and the trucks with the stores and equipment and other *impedimenta* could be lifted by cranes bodily off their wheels on the Queensland gauge, and placed on wheels on the New South Wales gauge. Little delay should take place, and, if the Federal Railway Volunteers were properly organised, no confusion.

Dress for the Federal Army.—There should be one system of uniform respectively for engineers, artillery, cavalry, infantry, departmental and administrative troops, suitable to Australian climate and surroundings, consistent with smartness, soldier-like appearance, utility, and economy. As the Australian soldiery undoubtedly are part of the British Army, could not some of the minor distinctions of dress, carrying with them deeds of renown of the fighters of the British Army, be worked in? *e.g.* :—The Regular artillery and engineers adopt in Australia the same dress as the R.A. and R.E. in India in the summer, and the dress of the artillery and engineers in Great Britain in the winter. Later on, an Army clothing manufactory might be started in Victoria or New South Wales, to make the sealed patterns of dress, and clothe the Regulars, and sublet contracts out to private firms for Militia and Volunteers.

CONCLUSION.

I have merely touched on the most difficult part of this subject, *i.e.*, the practicability of a Federal Army, as space will not admit of my going into the wearying details, much as I should like to do so, which is so absolutely necessary to put the subject into thorough working order.

At the same time, it must be remembered I have urged that the controlling power, or Australian War Office, should be the proper authorities to work out the necessary details so essential to a well-governed military machine. Detail is everything in military operations, and unless we can thoroughly grasp the details of our noble profession we can never properly master the more intricate and scientific subjects connected with military organisation. Finally, I have an honest conviction that if we ever want to be a useful military body, and defend our Australian Colonies adequately, WE MUST BE ONE AND UNITED.