something more than the discernible physiological elements. What more is not clearly stated. On the whole this intuitional psychology has reached about the same point as our now somewhat out-of-date intuitional ethics. It is simply anti-mechanical.

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A History of the Problems of Philosophy. PAUL JANET and GABRIEL SÉAILLES. Translated by ADA MONAHAN. Edited by HENRY JONES. Vol. I., pp. xviii + 380, Vol. II., pp. xii + 375. London, Macmillan and Co. 1902.

Almost all that need be said of this book in a short and somewhat belated notice is indicated in the authors' preface and in Professor Jones's admirable introduction. It is not a history of philosophy in the ordinary sense, but a history of philosophical problems; and it is, as the authors claim, 'conceived on an entirely new plan.' "We have taken, one after another, in their dogmatic order, the great problems of philosophy, and given their history, indicating their origin, their various aspects and forms, and the stage they have reached in our own day." Though Windelband's *History* will immediately occur to the reader, the authors' claim to originality of method is entirely valid, since, as Professor Jones remarks, Windelband's plan is essentially different. One point of difference may be mentioned: Windelband refers only occasionally to the philosophers' own expositions, while one of the characteristics of the work before us is the endeavor to introduce the student to the original sources through the medium of copious quotations in their best English renderings. Less valid than the claim to novelty of conception is the claim to have noted the present aspect of the great problems of philosophy. Thus in the sphere of psychology, the work of genetic and comparative psychologists like Romanes and Lloyd Morgan is not referred to, and the important contributions of social psychologists like Baldwin and Tarde are ignored. The chapter on Habit, for instance — to name no other — which closes with the views of Mill and Spencer, cannot be said to bring the various aspects of the problem down to date. And if it be true that the present *status* of psychological problems is imperfectly indicated, the same thing is true, as one would naturally expect, of ethics and metaphysics; since the present-day aspect of ethical and metaphysical questions has been largely determined by recent psychology. In illustration of this, I venture the assertion that one of the most marked characteristics of the two notable metaphysical works recently produced in this country — Royce's *Gifford Lectures* and

Ormond's *Foundations of Knowledge*—is the way in which their authors have worked the results of recent genetic psychology into the bone and fiber of their metaphysical thinking. This gratuitous comment is of course not meant as a criticism of the work before us. It is made merely for the purpose of pointing out that the 'aujourd'hui' in the sentence quoted, besides possessing more or less elasticity, must in any case refer to the date of the publication of the second French edition from which the present translation is made, viz., 1894. And moreover, it would be quite impossible in a work of modest compass, which traces the history of problems from Thales down, to include also a conspectus of current movements in philosophy.

As M. Séailles reminds us (XIX.) the book must be judged by what it pretends to be. It is designed as a text-book for students, with the object of introducing them to the study of philosophy and its history; but whether it is intended to be used by itself as an introduction to philosophy, or as a book for collateral reading and reference, is not stated, though we gather from the preface to the French edition that it is intended for use in connection with Janet's *Traité élémentaire de philosophie*. My own judgment is that for purposes of reference and collateral reading it may prove exceedingly useful, but that to employ it to advantage as a class-book would be difficult. As an introduction to the study of philosophy it can scarcely take the place of the old-fashioned histories or of theoretical introductions like those of Paulsen and Wundt. It will show the student how certain problems arose, what they are, and how they have been solved; but it will neither state nor attempt to solve some of the problems of contemporary philosophy, nor does its plan permit of that rounded presentation of an author's system which we expect to find in the general histories. It should be valuable to the student as affording a clear, scholarly and fairly objective historical account of certain problems; but in order to accomplish its full purpose, the chapters on the history of particular problems would have to be read in connection with discussions of these topics in standard works of recent date.

The contents of the book are as follows: Volume I. is devoted to psychology and contains chapters on 'What is Philosophy?', 'The Psychological Problem,' 'The Senses and External Perception,' 'Reason,' 'Memory,' 'The Association of Ideas,' 'Language,' 'The Feelings,' 'Freedom,' and 'Habit.' Volume II. is divided into three parts, dealing respectively with 'Ethics,' 'Metaphysics,' and 'Theodicy.' In Part III., 'Metaphysics,' the topics dealt with are 'Skepticism and Certitude,' 'Matter,' 'Mind,' and 'The Relations between

Matter and Mind.' But in Parts II. and IV. the topical arrangement is abandoned for an historical one. Thus Part II., 'Ethics,' treats of (1) 'The Ethical Problem in Ancient Times,' and (2) 'The Ethical Problem in Modern Times.' Part IV., in like manner, treats of 'The Religious Problem in Ancient and in Modern Times.'

One need not quarrel with this distribution of material, which perhaps serves the authors' purpose as well as any other would; though it lacks consistency. There seems to be no clear conception of the mutual relations between the different philosophical disciplines, and the principle of distribution is neither a logical nor the traditional one. Where, *e. g.*, does the problem of knowledge belong? If under metaphysics, it is also true that the religious problem is metaphysical in character. Philosophy would then have two main divisions, psychology and metaphysics. (Cf. I., 25.) But then, where do ethics and logic come in, not to say æsthetics, of which there is no mention? In the French edition there is quite an extensive treatment of logic, which is omitted from the translation for lack of space and also because its place is already filled by other works accessible in English. The history of Ethics is included both on account of its excellence and of the poverty of the literature of the subject in our language. While I cannot agree with Professor Jones in regard to the exceptional poverty of our literature on this subject, I concur in his judgment that these chapters deserve a place in the English edition; and I may use the chapter on 'The Ethical Problem in Modern Times' to illustrate the scope, both by way of inclusion and omission, of the authors' accomplishment, since the chapters on Ethics may be taken as fairly typical of the character of the work as a whole.

The modern moralists, then, whose views are given, are Descartes, Malbranche, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Hobbes and Helvetius (brief treatment), Kant, Bentham, Adam Smith, Mill and Spencer. It is at once apparent that the list is very incomplete, no mention being made of Fichte, Hegel, or Schopenhauer among German moralists, nor, among British writers, of Bain, Sidgwick, Stephen, T. H. Green—to name only these, whose works appeared some twenty years ago. An account of post-Kantian ethics which jumps from Kant to Adam Smith and Bentham and then to Mill and Spencer, aside from its obvious incompleteness, is apt to give a false impression of current tendencies. One other example may be given to illustrate Professor Jones's generalization, to be mentioned presently. In the chapter on Freedom, in addition to the great names in philosophy, place is found for Bossuet, but there is no mention of the classic

treatises of Collins and Edwards; and while these names cannot be included among philosophers of the first rank, a history of the problem of human freedom is scarcely complete without them. In fact, the features most likely to be commented upon are some notable omissions and the relative emphasis laid upon the different systems and tendencies. As Professor Jones points out, the story of German philosophy since Kant is very imperfectly told (there is, *e. g.*, the barest reference to Schopenhauer and no mention at all of Lotze), while in England the whole idealistic movement is ignored. From the frequency with which the chapters close with Herbert Spencer, the French student would certainly conclude that Spencer is still not merely 'our great philosopher,' but our only philosopher since Mill. This imperfect presentation of British philosophy is a less serious defect for the English reader than for the students to whom the original work is addressed, since the former can more readily supply the deficiencies from his own knowledge, while the French student is in danger of receiving the impression that English philosophy is necessarily empirical. This edition, then, should be in some respects more valuable than the original, since it enables the English reader to view the development of philosophical problems through French spectacles, without the danger, to which the French student is exposed, of getting a false perspective. We are indebted to the editor and the translator for making it available in such excellent form to the English reader.

The chief merits of the book, as already implied, seem to me to be its novelty of conception and its clear, accurate and scholarly presentation of Greek philosophy, the Cartesian School and French philosophy generally, the English empiricists, and the Scottish School. Its principal defect is its incompleteness; though the reader will occasionally be disposed to criticise the author's expositions. Thus, *e. g.*, I think that the rationalistic element in Locke is overlooked and that his opposition to DesCartes is exaggerated and their affinities are ignored. Thus we are told (I., 112) that 'Locke begins by attacking DesCartes' doctrine of innate ideas.' But was it DesCartes' doctrine that Locke was attacking?

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ETHICS.

The Nature of Goodness. GEORGE HERBERT PALMER. Boston and New York, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1903. Pp. viii + 247.

This volume, which consists of lectures delivered before college audiences at several leading institutions, discusses in an effective and