The Classical Review

<http://journals.cambridge.org/CAR>

Additional services for *The Classical Review*:

Email alerts: [Click here](#)

Subscriptions: [Click here](#)

Commercial reprints: [Click here](#)

Terms of use : [Click here](#)

The Socrates of Xenophon—Studies by Joel and Richter *Der echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates* von Karl Joel. Erster Band. Berlin: R. Gaertner. 1893. xii. 554. 8vo. 14 M.

H. G. Dakyns

The Classical Review / Volume 7 / Issue 06 / June 1893, pp 258 - 263

DOI: 10.1017/S0009840X00197926, Published online: 27 October 2009

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0009840X00197926

How to cite this article:

H. G. Dakyns (1893). The Classical Review, 7, pp 258-263 doi:10.1017/S0009840X00197926

Request Permissions : [Click here](#)

ἐστὶν into ὅστις γὰρ εὖ βουλεύεται, πρὸς τοὺς ἐ. κρείσσων ἐ. This simple change of punctuation is a fine example of the editor's acuteness, which, generally applied to good purpose, has led to so many improvements in the edition. There is, I believe a similar misplacement in vii. 21, where in a much debated passage we should perhaps read ξυνανέπειθε δὲ ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης οὐχ ἥκιστα, τοῦ ταῖς ναυσὶ μὴ ἀθυμεῖν ἐπιχειρήσαι, πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους λέγων κ.τ.λ., 'saying with reference to the A.'

Unfounded suspicions are cast on the text at c. 67, 1 καὶ ταῦτα, ὧ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τοῦτου ἕνεκα ἐπιξήλομεν καὶ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ ἡμῶν, ἵνα ὑμεῖς μὲν εἰδῆτε δικαίως αὐτῶν καταγνωσόμενοι, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔτι ὀσιώτερον τετιμωρημένοι. To supply εἰδόμεν with ἡμεῖς is, in this edition as often, said to produce bad logic; and various emendations are proposed. But the sense is 'that you may know that you will be acting justly in condemning them, and that we as well may know (by your condemnation) that we have acted in accordance with right in punishing them.' τετιμωρημένοι is postponed in time to καταγνωσόμενοι, and it alludes to the siege and capture of Plataea quite as much as to the penalty which the Thebans are now seeking. ὀσιώτερον means, as so often, that which is in accordance with the rights of states; and the Thebans here naturally represent the Lacedaemonians as the arbiters of their action. Not until the verdict is pronounced can the Thebans know whether they have acted ὀσίως.

It is not so certain either as Steup and most editors think that the text of c. 67, 5 is corrupt. The vulgate is παρηνόμησάν τε οὐ προπαθόντες ὑφ' ἡμῶν, μίσει δὲ πλέον ἢ δίκην κρίναντες καὶ οὐκ ἀνταποδόντες νῦν τὴν ἴσιν τιμωρίαν ἔννομα γὰρ πείσσονται κ.τ.λ. Unable either to find an explanation of the

words as they stand or to approve of any of the suggested alterations, Steup places a full stop after κρίναντες, and marks οὐκ ἀνταποδόντες as corrupt, thinking that something like οὐ δόξουσιν is lost before it. But may there not again here be an allusion to the fact that the Plataeans have paid already some sort of penalty? They admit, say the Thebans in effect, that the penalty they have paid hitherto is insufficient; ἔννομα γὰρ πείσσονται... ἐς δίκην σφᾶς αὐτοὺς παραδόντες. Hence the version which Fr. Müller gives—'ohne doch überhaupt bis zu dieser Stunde die ihnen dafür gebührende Strafe erfahren zu haben'—may well be correct.

In c. 83, 2 one naturally looks to see how Steup will explain the well-known sentence κρείσσους δὲ ὄντες ἅπαντες λογισμῷ ἐς τὸ ἀνέλπιστον τοῦ βεβαίου μὴ παθεῖν μᾶλλον προσεκόπουν ἢ πιστεύσαι ἐδύναντο. It is likely that his rendering of this difficult passage will find general acceptance. His rendering is: 'Vielmehr trafen alle, wenn sie stärker waren (als die Gegner), in ihren Ueberlegung mehr für die (oder im Hinblick auf die) Aussichtlosigkeit des festen Bestandes von Wort und Eidschwur Vorsorge, nicht zu Schaden zu kommen, als dass sie...' This rendering has the great advantage over all others that it does no violence to the Greek. Thus λογισμῷ is equivalent to λογιζόμενοι.

When I consider Steup's work as a whole, it still appears to me that his real strength lies rather in exegesis than in textual criticism. It is not by any means true to say that he has done nothing for the text of Thuc., but he is certainly less uniformly happy in weighing the claims of the vulgate to our acceptance than in explaining it.

E. C. MARCHANT.

THE SOCRATES OF XENOPHON—STUDIES BY JOEL AND RICHTER.

Der echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates, von KARL JOEL. Erster Band. Berlin: R. Gaertner. 1893. xii. 554. 8vo. 14 M.

THE author deserves to be congratulated on a solid piece of work. His aim has been to establish a truer conception both of Socrates and of the *Memorabilia*, and at the same time to throw light on the literary Socratics, Xenophon, Plato and Antisthenes. Much

importance is attached (1) to the testimony of 'Aristotle' (i.e. Aristotle and his school) concerning Socrates, (2) to the literary element of the *Memorabilia*, and (3) to the influence of Antisthenes and the Cynics on the writings of Plato and Xenophon. The author's supreme interest is philosophical, not to say metaphysical, but he is well able to conduct a 'philological' argument. An immense number of questions are discussed.

Indeed the pains taken to collect material, to grapple with details and, where necessary, to face the duty of polemic, reveal a thoroughness remarkable even in a German.

The volume was commenced seven or eight years ago and bears the marks of modifications due to Krohn's *Sokrates und Xenophon*, to current Socratic literature of all sorts (and in particular to the 'athetizing' school), to the development of the author's own views,¹ and lastly to Dümmler's *Akademika*, which appeared when Part A was finished, and which is dealt with in an Appendix (p. 545—554).

It consists of an Introduction (—p. 68) and two main divisions: A. *Religious Views* (—p. 170), and B. *Private Ethics* (*Die Individualethik*) of Socrates (—p. 545), discussed under heads and subdivisions. The next volume will contain, (1) *The Private Ethics of Xenophon*, (2) *The Social Ethics of the Memorabilia*.

The Introduction reveals the author's attitude to what he speaks of as 'tradition' and to its rival 'the newer criticism' (the value of which he does not underestimate). It leaves no doubt as to the solution which he himself offers of the debatable questions—What was Socrates? and What the essence of his Philosophy? Joel does not regard Zeller's solution as final. He denies the so-called 'harmony' of the three sources, and dissents from Z.'s dependence on Xenophon for his special 'Entwicklung' of the Socratic doctrine. From Joel's point of view the basis of the traditional view has been so shattered by the modern criticism that it is no longer tenable. But the hobby of ἀθέτησις has, he thinks, been ridden to death. A graphic description is given of the torture bed of Procrustes on which the unhappy *Memorabilia* has been laid, until through the tender mercies of Krohn and Lincke a bare torso of seven or even fewer chapters has been left as representing this particular 'original source' for Socrates.

Joel has a more excellent way of dealing with the *Memorabilia*. It is simply to treat it as a literary work, the product of a writer whose mental characteristics are well marked and exemplified in every one of his writings. It is a mistake to suppose that, because Xenophon is no philosopher, he would necessarily confine himself to matter of fact. That was the old mistake. A

more modern one has been to try to discover an element of logic in his account of Socrates, of which he is incapable. The order of topics is not logical: it is, if you like, psychological, 'associative.' The writing begins with an apology in answer to the indictment, and also to the sophist Polycrates. It presently ceases to be forensic—the writer indulges his literary vein. The defence becomes a panegyric of Socrates, like that of Cyrus or of Agesilaus or of himself in the *Anabasis*. The familiar 'motifs' of εὐσέβεια, δίκαιον, ἐγκράτεια, φιλία, begin to haunt his brain and to inform his matter. At a certain point (i. 4, 1) the secret is out—it is a 'Concurrenzschrift,' written to correct certain one-sided views of Antisthenes, who will have it that Socrates was simply a master of castigatory *Protreptic* (κολαστηρίον ἔνεκα). Xenophon is sure that the influence of Socrates in his dealings with his associates was more edifying—he gently led them on to virtue. It is a great question whether this view of Socrates can be established. Unconsciously no doubt, and as it were by accident, Socrates through the moral force of his personality did lead his friends on to virtue. Xenophon's own testimony is sufficient. But that Socrates moralized is scarcely credible. Indeed Xenophon himself tells us that he did not set up as a teacher of virtue. How are we to discover the real Socrates (Σ.) and separate him from his admirer Xenophon (Ξ.) in that compound (ΞΣ.) presented to us in the *Memorabilia*? The criterion is ready to hand. Independently of Xenophon for the moment, we can get at Σ. through Plato, the Socratic Schools and 'Aristotle.' Whatever these several witnesses attest *in common*, may be accepted as genuine for Σ. Xenophon too we know well enough, as has already been said, from his various writings. With the criterion in particular of the Aristotelian Socrates, we can approach the *Memorabilia*, and so separate the gold from the dross of Xenophon.

Joel follows the order of topic suggested by Xenophon. There is a certain accordance between Σ. and Ξ. in religious views in so far as both are ethical, i.e. neither physicists nor revolutionaries. 'Σ. asks τί ἐστίν; the revolutionary seeks the ὅτι and the διὰ τί (the fact and the why).' Yet even here, where their circles touch, the differences between Σ. and Ξ. are obvious. This is illustrated by comparing the views ascribed to Socrates by his panegyrist (an eminently orthodox man) and those which the philosopher (an eminently spiritualizing man)

¹ If the view now taken of the Platonic dialogues differs from that expressed in his earlier work *Zur Erkenntnis*... (noticed in the *Classical Review* ii. 206), that shows he is open to learning.

really held, on (1) the *δαιμόνιον* and *μαντική*, (2) on Piety and Worship, (3) on the Nature and Operation of the Gods. Joel's analysis of the Socratic *δαιμόνιον* seems to me especially happy: 'It was the revenge of the *ἄλογον μέρος ψυχῆς* (Ar. *M. M.* 1182 a¹⁰) which driven back by this rationalist into the darkest corners of the soul thence exercised its sway all the more imposingly.' The ideas expressed by the terms *δαιμόνιον*, *γνώθι σεαυτόν* (explained later on more fully as an *intellectual* appeal) *ἀρετὴ ἐπιστήμη*—all imply 'Man is master of his destiny,' whereas to *Ξ.* it is the gods who are the masters of destiny in the widest sense. This contrast between *Ξ.* and *Σ.* is amply illustrated, and on the whole I think convincingly, though possibly Xenophon would have assented to some of Joel's propositions concerning his friend which he is held to contradict. It must not be forgotten that he is 'apologetic,' and that the distinctions between objective and subjective, between the conscious moralist and 'ethiker im stofflichen Sinne,' are somewhat beyond his range of thought; which indeed may be the gist of the whole matter.

Hitherto we have been looking at Socrates somewhat in profile. In the delineation of his *Private Ethics* we shall look him in full face. Here what is vital to this mighty personality concentrates itself, and we not only may but we must ask, What is the Essence of his Philosophy (p. 171—312)? It is explained under three aspects: (1) in its general import as *Rationalism*, (2) in its external conditions as *Attic Philosophy of Mind*, (3) it is shown that the earliest philosophy of mind must needs be rationalistic. (1) Under the first head perhaps the most interesting topic is the analogy of Hegel (*not* of Kant) to Socrates. 'Socrates and Hegel are the A and Ω of pure Rationalism.' Only Socrates, if the founder of Ontology, is no Ontologist himself, since he did not set foot within the wide Being of the macrocosm: he rationalized within the narrow circle of human life. Pregnantly expressed, the original principle of Socrates means 'Life is Thought.' His negative relation to practical life and to empiricism, the interminable application of the 'dialogic' method to youths, the passionate opposition of his contemporaries, the powerful school-creating might of his doctrine, the splits among his scholars, all bear witness to the 'formalism of his rationalistic principle.' (2) The study of this matter in the concrete: the set of philosophy from 'the periphery' till it reached Athens in the fifth

century; the conditions of city life, unfolding in every form of mental culture; the apprehension of creative intelligence behind the works of culture, of spirit behind things of sense, in the mind of the Attic philosopher, himself an artist born and of the guild of Daedalus—all this is for the most part admirable. Mastery won by *τέχνη* became the ideal of his life; skill is knowledge, 'Können ist Wissen,' the basis of his teaching. Socrates tried to extend the domain of *τέχνη* over the whole of life. That was his idealism, that also his tragical oneness. (3) Hardly less admirable is Joel's development of his third thesis 'Am Areadnefaden des Satzes vom Grunde bewegt sich die Erkenntnis von der helleren äusseren Erscheinungen zu den dunkleren inneren vorwärts' ... The objects of cognition trace this curve of ascent: Physical Nature is cognized by the Presocratics (except the Sophists): Natural man, by the elder Sophists: Social man, as gifted with *speech*, by Gorgias in part (in his rhetoric), Hippias (in his grammar) and Prodicus: Social man, as gifted with *thought*, by Socrates.

Under the title *The Socrates of 'Aristotle'* (p. 203—312) these views are justified. The notices of Aristotle or of his school (and there is no reason to mistrust the authority of the *Great* or of the *Eudemian Ethics* for our purpose), however curt and sparse, combine to form a strongly marked and coherent picture of Socrates. In a few strokes the main features of Socraticism are defined. These can be filled out by help of Plato and Xenophon afterwards. Under the heads (1) the *Psychical function of Virtue* (p. 210—239), (2) the *Principle of Virtue* (p. 239—307) now (α) as the *essence*, and again (β) as the *value of Virtue*, come to be discussed. (1) The cardinal proposition of Socratic ethics, *ἀρετὴ ἐπιστήμη*, is established. The passage in *M. M.* i. 1, 1182 a¹⁵ beginning *μετὰ τούτων* (sc. Pythagoras) is taken as a text to prove that Socrates *ἀγῆρει* ('neglected') τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς, τούτο δὲ ποιῶν ἀναρπεί καὶ πάθος καὶ ἥθος. But given 'scio ergo ago' it follows *ἀκρασία* may be neglected, *M. M.* ii. 6, etc. So too the Determinism of *Σ.*, as another consequence of 'monistic Rationalism,' is plain and intelligible enough, *versus* the pathologic colouring given to Socraticism by modern critics. (2) α. The Aristotelian evidence for the absolute Socratic 'logism' (i.e. *τί ἐστι*) is contained in two critical passages, *M. M.* i. 1, 1183 b⁸ and *Eth. Eud.* i. 5, 1216, b, which with others bearing on the 'search for concepts' are fully dis-

cussed. It is clear that, whatever Cicero and Diog. L. may say to the contrary, in Aristotle's view Logic, not Ethic, is the deuteragonist in the Socratic system. That does not mean that the Ethical 'moment' is to be left out (see Zeller). Not only is the unconscious personality of Socrates ethical (moral), but the Socratic reflection plays especially in the province of Ethics.

The *ἀγνοια* of Socrates is grounded on his pure 'logism.' But logic is the weightiest 'Polizei-wissenschaft' of the soul, and hence the Socratic *Elenchtic*, and, as a sort of intellectual mannerism in conducting it, his *εἰσωνεία*. The Socratic *Identities* or *Parallel Concepts* (see p. 284 foll.) are well discussed: and in connexion with this topic *παραβολή*. And (2) β, as to the value of Virtue, what holds good of virtue in reference to the individual, in reference to the single virtues, and in reference to the collective practicality (*Gesamtmpraxis*) of life, holds good finally of virtue relatively to the *good*, the *useful*, and the *pleasant*. Socrates could have no *parti pris* in favour of idealism or utilitarianism: though as part of the 'irony' of the situation (see pp. 436—441) he might appear as supporting one or other, and indeed an 'utilitarisch-relativistische Argumentationsstufe' does appear to be necessary for the Socratic Rationalism. How, is clearly shown in reference to *Mem.* iii. 8, 4—7; iv. 6, 9. All 'good and beautiful' is relative to use and utility, say ΞΣ. Very good! but, according to Σ., 'use and utility depend on knowledge.' 'Even virtue has no use apart from knowledge,' Ar. *M. M.* 1198 α οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄφελος.

'The Socratic Private Ethics in the *Mem.*' are discussed (pp. 313—545) under two heads: (i.) the Socratic theory of virtue (—p. 449), (ii.) the effects of Socratic teaching (—p. 545). As bearing on the first of these topics, the *Mem.* is shown to fall into two groups of chapters concerning Private and Social Ethics respectively; the former again split into groups developing a Socratic 'intellectualistic' and a Xenophontic 'will' theory of morality. Four chapters, iii. 8, iii. 9, iv. 2, and iv. 6, are of immediate importance and are examined in reference once more to (a) *Virtue-Knowledge* (pp. 314—321), (b) the search for concepts either as positive definitions (—p. 365) or negatively as *Elenchtic* (—p. 424), (c) the principle of value (πρὸς τί ἀγαθόν;) (—p. 449). As points of exceptional interest, where all is good, I would draw attention to what the author says in reference to the weighty concept of *πανία* (iii.

9, 6) as a part of Socratic Rationalism (p. 337 f.) and to a discussion of the 'dialogic' *Eristic*, for which he claims an Attic and Socratic rather than a Sophistic origin (p. 367 f.).

Particularly noticeable as regards the effects of Socratic teaching is the discussion of Socrates as ὀφελῶν and βελτίους ποιῶν (p. 450 f.) and again of the *hortative Protreptic* for which Xenophon rather than Socrates is responsible. See an important quotation from Demetr. *de Eloc.* § 296, in which the types of argument peculiar to Aristippus, Xenophon, and Socrates, as copied by Aeschines and Plato, are illustrated in reference to a single proposition. Socrates questions. Xenophon lays down the law beginning with δέ.

But the most novel feature of this portion of Joel's volume is the elaborate and well argued attempt to trace the influence of Antisthenes and of Cynic ideas upon Xenophon and also upon Plato. Of the last 200 pages 125 are devoted to illustrating this point, and it is certainly one merit of the author to have raised the question so emphatically. Thus the half definitions (analogical and etymological) of iii. 9, iii. 14, 2, and the faculty of ΞΣ. διαλέγειν κατὰ γένη iv. 5. 12, and διορίσασθαι iv. 2. 11, are traced to Antisthenes. Cynic influence manifests itself in various ways in iii. 9 and iv. 6, e.g. *re* the Antisthenic theory that ἀνδρεία can be taught, cf. *Symp.* ii. 12. (It will be recollected that Antisthenes as the pattern of a cross-examiner figures in *Symp.* iv. 2, 3, 4; vi. 5.)

A more startling idea is that Plato's *Protagoras* is a masked attack on Antisthenes (p. 357 f.). Joel is at pains to separate the Antisthenic from the Socratic and the Xenophontic strain of the great *elenchtic* chapter iv. 2, and regards Euthydemus as a persona invented by Antisthenes, and used by Xenophon and Plato in common (see p. 370 f.). In this connexion, Plat. *Rep.* 1 is a critique of Antisthenes. The third of the anonymous διαλέξεις¹ (written by some one connected with the Socratic circle, Joel imagines) and the Ps. Plat. *περὶ δικαίου* are partly in reference to, and partly dependent on, Antisthenes. Particularly interesting is the theory that the utilitarian discussions in the *Memorabilia* have their root in Antisthenes and his theory of Relativity—the principle of οἰκείων-ἀρμόδιον-ποικίλον. See *Fr. Antisth.* 8. 25, Winckelmann: cf. *Protag.* 334 A—C, *Mem.*

¹ See page 398, and 398 note 2 for various hypotheses concerning these writings.

iii. 8; iv. 2; iv. 6, 8. Was the appendix 'on the utility of a house,' iii. 8, 8, which comes in so oddly as a corollary to the discussion between Aristippus and Socrates, suggested by the Antisthenic ἀγαθόν = οἰκεῖον (p. 448)? Joel asks.

An attempt is made to trace the history of this influence. At the dispersion, Antisthenes stayed in Athens, where he held up the Socratic banner and defended the breach. Polycrates' attack was against the 'Socrates' of Antisthenes. Lysias, who wrote an apology *v.* Polycrates, was a friend of Antisthenes (p. 483). The *Charmides* is a critique of Antisthenic σωφροσύνη (p. 488). The Romanticism of Antisthenes (p. 502 *f.*) is opposed to the Rationalism of Socrates; as much so indeed as ἀρετὴ *plus* Σωκρατικὴ ἰσχύς is opposed to ἀρετὴ ἐπιστήμη. The 'Will' ideal of Antisthenes is derived from his hero-worship. Xenophon not unnaturally follows Antisthenes.

It is not of course pretended that Xenophon blindly followed the lead of the Cynics. He was no plagiarist (p. 397). On the contrary he argues against Antisthenes, at times; and some of his tenets. Others he emphasizes, because they are his own or so congenial to him that he readily uses the Cynic terminology, and sees the master through the glasses of this particular fellow worshipper and scholar.

Here this fragmentary notice must end. It has been impossible to render any sort of justice to the varied excellences of Herr Joel's book. If the attention of English scholars should have been roused, these notes will not have failed of their object.

H. G. DAKYNS.

Xenophon-Studien, von ERNST RICHTER,
Leipzig: Teubner. 1892. Mk. 2.40.

THIS work (reprinted from the 19th 'Supplementband' of the *Jahrbücher f. Cl. Phil.* (p. 61—154) represents yet another attempt to get at the truth about Socrates—his life and doctrine—through an examination of Xenophon's evidence. It falls into six parts.

I. (p. 61—96).—An analysis of the *Memorabilia* Bks. A. B. Γ. Δ. + the *Apologia* (which Herr Richter regards as genuine). These consist of a number of originally independent documents or pamphlets, composed at different dates and with divers objects, which were eventually linked together to form a whole either by Xenophon

himself or by his grandson executor (see p. 154). The pamphlets are thus tabulated:

(1) A *first* (positive) *Apologia* to be found in the first three chapters of the first book re-ordered thus:

A. i. § 1—19; iii. 1—4; i. 20; ii. 1—8; iii. 5—15; ii. 9—64. A closely connected whole with a definitely expressed aim—to defend Socrates against the charges of (a) impiety and (b) corruption of youth.

(2) A *second* (negative) *Apologia* marked by a similar unity and self-completeness. A. iv.; Δ. iii. v. vi. Its theme: Socrates made his hearers pious, self-controlled, dialectic.

[Why, I would ask, omit Δ. iv.? It treats of σωφροσύνη also—περί τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.]

(3) περί στρατηγίας Γ. i.—vii.

(4) A *third* *Apologia* or string of 'recollections' pure and simple *re* Σ. ἐγκράτεια. A. v. vi. vii.; B. i. + Γ. viii. ix.

[I do not follow R.'s remark as to this 'part representing an earlier stage,' p. 87.]

(5) περί φιλίας. B. ii.—x.

(6) Separate pamphlets or leaflets. Δ. ii.; Δ. iv.; Γ. x.—xiv.; Δ. i. ('introductory to some lost work'); Δ. vii.; and Δ. viii., which last was written as a conclusion to the whole compilation. It is based upon one of the original pamphlets, the mass of which was excluded from the compilation as unsuitable, but fortunately preserved as the ἀπολογία Σωκρ. Most of the original pieces were simply stitched together with the minimum of botching requisite.

[To test the merits of the above analysis one should read these several *Apologies* through in the order suggested. For my part I do not find the connexion in all cases convincingly logical. Nor again because we have discovered certain original treatises are we dispensed from the duty of explaining why and in what logical connexion they were eventually recast in their present form. Does Herr Richter pretend that the compilation is devoid of method altogether?]

II. (—p. 123).—A brief analysis of the remaining 'Socratic' writings and the 'opuscula' of Xenophon, showing that as regards matter, treatment, style and scope, these have all reached the same stage of completion (or non-completion) as the *Mem.* The 'opuscula' only differ from the 'Socratica' in that they do not concern Σ. The relation of *Cyrop.* to *Mem.* is also dwelt on.

[This seems to me a valuable piece of work in its way: though the cut and dried literary method of dealing with the matter

tends to make Xenophon appear duller and more limited in imagination than he actually is.]

III. (—p. 136).—Socrates and Xenophon. An attempt to prove that the intimacy between Σ. and Ξ. is mythical. Diog. L. and his authorities Dinarchus &c., invented it. There is nothing in Xenophon himself to convince us of its reality.

[There is something, I think, in the warmth of attachment shown by Ξ. to the memory of Σ. In any case R.'s disproofs of the tradition derived from Xenophon himself are negative. His discussion of *Mem.* I. v., the conversation between Σ. and Pericles (the younger), is very good: it is probably fictitious, though for myself I should fix some interval between B.C. 421—416 as its 'ideal' date. τοὺς γε νῦν πωρεύοντας would be a somewhat unhappy phrase surely for the Lacedaemonians after Leuctra. Again it is Herr Richter rather than Xenophon who is wrong about the generals at Arginusae (*Mem.* A, i. 18 v. *Hell.* i. 7, 30), p. 135 and p. 62, 'nur von neun.' Xenophon, by a slip of the tongue perhaps, says ἐννέα when he should strictly have said ὀκτώ, since Conon of course was not indicted and Archestratus was dead.]

IV. (—p. 149).—As to Xenophon's sources for his philosophical works. He is mainly indebted to Plato for the 'Socratica,' Herr Richter thinks, and next to him to Antisthenes (here R. follows Dümmler),

and also to Isocrates (see a comparison of *Hiero* i. vii. with the *de Pace* § 111 foll.).

[These parallelisms are interesting and set one thinking, but I do not think that Richter proves his point of plagiarism. He forgets what a large stock of common ideas were current concerning Socrates and other matters for writers of all sorts to draw upon, nor does he allow sufficiently for the subtle influence of mind upon mind.]

V. (—p. 152).—On the composition of Xenophon's writings. With the exception of *Anab.* and *Cyneg.* (which are outside the discussion) the collective works fall within B.C. 370—350 *circa*.

[This seems to me to crowd the works into too small a space or rather to curtail Xenophon's literary activity unduly. I should fix his literary *floruit* at least ten or fifteen years earlier.]

VI. (—p. 154).—[I am not satisfied by the suggestion that Xenophon was driven to literature by *aspera pauperies* after being ousted from Skillus, and that he 'stumped' the country reading his works and filling his pockets as a 'wandernder Sophist.' That there are signs of oral delivery in many of the compositions is certain: and that the original form of publication was oral is not improbable. Herr Richter's promised development of this section of his studies should be interesting. Thanks are due to him for this instalment.]

H. G. DAKYNS.

PATER'S PLATO AND PLATONISM.

Plato and Platonism: a Series of Lectures by WALTER PATER. London and New York. Macmillan and Co. 1893. 8s. 6d.

'*Nil tetigit quod non ornavit*' is the commonplace which rises to the lips on taking up this last and largest of Mr. Pater's 'Appreciations.' 'Last year he gave us Raphael in a comely guise and now he presents Plato to us, no doubt as suitably appared.' But as we read onward we are charmed and interested in a more serious manner than heretofore. The book is in fact a brilliant critical essay of the kind which, in Mr. Pater's view, is, ever since Montaigne employed it, the best vehicle for modern philosophic thought. Readers of *Marius the Epicurean*, who remember the subtle exposition there of Cyrenaicism will be

prepared for similar *tours de force*. Yet it is not without a feeling of pleased and exhilarating surprise that they will alight on such pages of the present volume as that in which the character and mind of Zeno the Eleatic are delineated (p. 23), or those which explain perhaps more luminously than has been done hitherto the value which Plato set on Dialectic (pp. 161—164). The following statement, one of cardinal import, deserves to be quoted at length, both for the felicity of its expression, and for its undeniable truth:—

'Platonism is not a formal theory or body of theories, but a tendency, a group of tendencies—a tendency to think or feel, and to speak, about certain things in a particular way, discernible in Plato's dialogues as reflecting the peculiarities, the marked peculiarities, of himself and his own mental complexion. Those tendencies combine and find their