THE GREEKS AT PLATAIAI.

For the future any discussion of the problems connected with the Battle of Plataiai must take into account Mr. Grundy's careful survey of the field. In the map that accompanies his monograph we have at last reached finality. The satisfaction of this supreme requirement is his best contribution to the subject. His application of strategical principles to the narrative of Herodotos is only partial; and his result is not clear, because he has tried to realize the apocryphal portions of the ancient account. It is only after stripping off the husk of romantic accretion that we can proceed to examine the details by the light of military principles. It is such preliminary work and such subsequent recasting of the narrative that is here attempted.

Mr. Grundy hits the truth when he suggests that Herodotos obtained his information about the operations from an intelligent, but not highly placed, officer. Further, Herodotos himself was not primarily a military historian. His narrative therefore treats merely subordinate and intermediate steps as final ends; and while events are thus viewed only from the outside their presentation is moulded by the epic cast of the writer's genius. Of perhaps still greater moment is his strong Athenian bias. In the recognition of these three factors,—the epic character of the narrative, ignorance of the true strategical issues of the situation on the part of his informant, and the contamination produced by the sympathy of Herodotos with, or his sole reliance upon, the Athenian tradition,—we hold the key to the entire account of the campaign of 479 B.C. Some of the details may have been derived from Thersander of Orchomenos, e.g. the Phokian episode. It is also possible that Herodotos incorporated in his history local stories of the battle. Specimens of these may perhaps be seen in the description of the charger of Masistios, and of the spoil taken from the Persian camp: the three stories which represent the Aiginetans in so poor a light were

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1 See the Battle of Plataea, by G. B. Grundy; published among the Supplementary Papers of the Royal Geographical Society, 1894.
3 I find from Holm's Grk. Hist. ii. 75 (E.T.) that Delbrück 'explains the movements of both armies on the basis of correct military principles.' I have not seen Delbrück's book.
4 ix. 16 fol.
5 ix. 20.
6 ix. 80 fol. cf. c. 83.
7 ix. 78 fol., Lampen of Aigina urges Pausanias to maltreat the body of Mardonios; c. 80, Aiginetans buy golden spoil from Helots; on pretence that it is brass: c. 85, pretended tomb of Aiginetans at Plataiai.
perhaps also current at Plataiai. The contents of chaps. 71, 72, 76 probably come from a purely Spartan source. Not one of these supplements to the Attic core of the narrative has any bearing upon the operations preceding the battle.

1 Relating the fate of Amompharetos, Aristodemos, Kallikrates, etc. and the rescue of the concubine of Pharandates.
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The operations of the campaign resolve themselves into three strategic movements:—

(1) The occupation of the lines on the slope of Mount Kithairon (cc. 19–24).

(2) The advance to the Spring Gargaphia and the River Asopos (cc. 25–49).

(3) The retrograde movement to the 'Island' (cc. 50–70).

The key to these manoeuvres lies in the consideration of the roads running northwards across Mount Kithairon to the Boiotian capital. These roads and passes are clearly described by Mr. Grundy.¹

(1) In the east there is the road running through the pass of Dryoskephalai, familiar to all who have travelled from Athens to Thebes by diligence. It enters the range under the walls of Eleutherai, and debouches upon the plain just to the east of the modern village of Kriekúki.² The point at which it enters the plain marks the probable site of Erythrai.³

(2) The central road from Athens to Plataiai, with a branch to the right passing through Hysiai, the site of which, in the main, is occupied by Kriekúki.⁴

(3) The western road and pass, from Megara to Plataiai.

(4) Lastly, a road running from Plataiai to Thebes.⁵ This road probably, and the main Dryoskephalai road certainly, crossed the Asopos by a bridge.

On the eastern road lay the entrenched camp of the Persians, and the main body of their army, barring all advance northwards. The exact situation of the camp is a matter of no importance. It probably occupied the bend of the Asopos, lying on the north bank, quite close to the bridge, the retention of which was of the utmost moment to the Persians. Their cavalry must have lain mainly on the south bank. The disposition of the Persians was admirable, posted as they were behind a by no means contemptible river in a strongly entrenched camp, covering their communications with a well-provisioned base.

Mr. Grundy’s description of the first position of the Greeks is probably quite correct.⁶ They advanced over Mount Kithairon, their objective being...

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¹ P. 5 fol. Cf. Leake, North, Gr. ii. 334 and map.
² But modern traffic now follows the loop to the left, which actually passes through Kriekúki.
³ See Grundy, pp. 6, 9.
⁴ Grundy, p. 15.
⁵ Mentioned in Thuc. iii. 24, a passage to be discussed later.
⁶ And is an improvement upon the generally received view, in which Hysiai is put at Kriekúki or E. of it, and Erythrai still further E. Grundy, p. 11 fol.
Thebes. As their point of departure was Eleusis, the allies must have traversed the easy Dryoskephalai pass. On finding the Persians confronting them they threw themselves in extended order across the Athens-Thebes road, thus covering their own communications with the Peloponnese and taking up a favourable position for defence. For as yet it was quite an open question whether Mardonios would not advance to the attack: the veriest tiro could not have construed the Persian withdrawal from Attica as a confession of inferiority. The Greek right rested on the steep slopes of Mount Kithairon: the centre and left seem to have been thrown forward somewhat,—probably in order to take advantage of the wells and conveniences of the village of Erythrai.

The success of the Greeks in dealing with the Persian cavalry was so pronounced that Pausanias was encouraged to make a change of position. The inaction of the hostile infantry also contributed to this resolution. Of greater influence than either of these reasons was the reflection that for the Greeks to remain passive was to play the Persian game. The masterly inactivity of Mardonios forced Pausanias to attempt a daring coup. It was at least better to die free men on a well-fought field than to survive the consciousness that the liberties of Greece had been betrayed by sitting still.

The movement contemplated by the Greek commander involved two serious drawbacks. The hold upon the main road through the range of Kithairon was relinquished, and a descent was made into ground more practicable for the enemy’s cavalry. Herodotos does not furnish any satisfactory answer to the inquiry as to how Pausanias justified his evacuation of the impregnable lines of Mount Kithairon. According to the historian, the change was suggested solely by convenience of ground,—the particular convenience not being revealed, with the exception of the more abundant water-supply, which was confessedly only one of several advantages. The ultimate design of Pausanias in descending from the heights must be given by modern conjecture.

What then was the second position of the Greek army?

If we read aright the intentions of Pausanias we can put our finger on the line. It involved a descent, and a movement into the territory of Plataiai. It lay, therefore, N.W. of the first position. It was reached via the foot-hills of Mount Kithairon and the village of Hysiai. The goal of the advance lay consequently in the neighbourhood of the Asopos, as is clear from the subsequent history. Further than this, two points on the line...
are expressly named, *viz.* the Spring Gargaphia and the τέμενος of the hero Androkrates.

Let us take first the Spring Gargaphia.

Among the low hills on the north of Mount Kithairon there are, according to Mr. Grundy 1, two springs, and only two, that can put forward a claim to the ancient name. The area of the battle-field is marked by a distinct depression, which runs from N.E. to S.W. up the Kriekuki brook to the bottom of the village, and from that point N.W. to the head-waters of the most westerly tributary of the Asopos (stream A1 in Mr. Grundy's map): there it joins the plain, which extends northwards from Plataiai. The two springs lie on the line of this depression. The traditional Gargaphia is the more westerly of the two, *i.e.* the modern Apotripi, which lies nearly on the verge of the plateau, about a quarter of a mile before the Kriekuki-Pyrgos path enters the aforesaid plain. Measured upon Mr. Grundy's map, the distance of this spring from Plataiai is 12 stades. The other spring, or collection of springs, is found at some distance (on Mr. Grundy's map, 5 stades) east of Apotripi. Mr. Grundy follows Leake in giving the name Gargaphia to these last sources.2 They lie 14 stades from Plataiai.

What data do we get from Herodotos as to the position of the Spring Gargaphia? He gives us the following items:—

1. It was 10 stades from the 'Island' (c. 51).
2. It was 20 stades from the Heraion, which was 'in front of' Plataiai (c. 52).
3. By implication we learn that it must have been about 10 stades from the stream called Moloeis, the Argiopian Region, and the temple of Eleusinian Demeter (c. 57).

With regard to the identification of the 'Island,' it will probably be generally conceded that Mr. Grundy has made out his case, and satisfactorily established the locality to which this name was applied.3 More valuable, however, is his identification of the temple of Demeter.4 No one can doubt that its place is marked by the modern Church of St. Demetrios. Only with respect to the temple of Hera is hesitation unfortunately possible.

How do the springs above described square with the data extracted from Herodotos?

1. Measurement shows that the distance of the spring Apotripi from the 'Island,' as identified by Mr. Grundy, agrees more

2 P. 16. Leake, *North. Gr.* ii. 333. Mr. Grundy states that this spring is 16 stades from Plataiai. Comparing this with the 12 stades of Apotripi he writes,—'It is easy to imagine that a mistake of 4 stades was made in a measurement of the distance by the eye alone: it is not so easy to suppose that the error amounted to 8 stades in a calculated distance of 20.' Correcting the measurement as above the error comes to a choice between 6 and 8 stades,—an immaterial difference. Be it remembered also that the point to which the measurement is taken (the temple of Hera) is not yet established.
3 P. 27.
4 P. 33.
closely with the statement of Herodotos than does that of his Gargaphia. At 10 stades from Apotripi we are in the centre of the Nesos; whereas, measuring from Leake’s (and Mr. Grundy’s) Gargaphia, we reach a point too far up the slope of Mount Kithairon, or else actually find ourselves outside the limits of the Nesos, in the direction of the town of Plataiai.

(2) The uncertainty with respect to the situation of the Heraion renders an appeal to measurement here delusive. So far as it goes, the result seems to point to an exaggeration of the distance on the part of Herodotos.

(3) Comparison of the interval separating the two springs from the Eleusinion is decisive against the claims of the well to which Leake and Mr. Grundy give the name of Gargaphia. Measuring from the Apotripi spring, 9½ stades bring us to the Chapel of St. Demetrios, 10 stades to the stream flowing along the S.E. side of the ridge on which that building stands.1 On the other hand, measuring from Leake’s Gargaphia, the Chapel and stream lie at a distance of only 4½ and 5 stades respectively.2 Yet Mr. Grundy accepts the above-mentioned stream as the ancient Moloeis and the scene of the final struggle.

We now turn to consider the position of the monument of the hero Androkrates.

Here we can supplement Herodotos in some slight degree from Thucydides.3 The 212 men who escaped from Plataiai during its investment in 428 B.C. ran at first ‘6 or 7 stades along the road leading to Thebes, having on their right hand the heroön of Androkrates’: subsequently they turned off to the right and fled in the direction of Mount Kithairon, towards Hysiai and Erythrai. We notice that whereas Herodotos speaks of a τέμενος, or enclosed domain, Thucydides calls it a ἱερόν, or monumental chapel. It must have been a building standing in the midst of a sacred enclosure, which was probably planted with trees. That this was indeed the case we learn from Plutarch, who describes the heroön of Androkrates as ‘surrounded with a dense grove of shady trees.’4

Few can have read the passage in Thucydides without having been struck by the apparent pointlessness of his remark as to the position of the

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1 Stream A5 on Mr. Grundy’s map.

2 Yet Mr. Grundy writes (p. 33): ‘It will be seen on the map that the distance from the position of the Spartans near the spring which Leake (rightly, I think, as I have previously said) identifies with Gargaphia, accords closely with the distance given by Herodotus.’

3 Thuc. iii. 24: οἱ Πλαταιῇς ἐγὼροι άθροι τῷ ἐς Θῆβας ἠφώρον ἄδων ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸ τοῦ Ἀντροκράτους ἱερόν . . . καὶ ἐκεῖ μὲν ἐν ἦν ἐπὶ σταδίους ἡ Πλαταιῇς τῇ ἐκ τῶν θημῶν ἐγὼροι, ἀνατρεῖσαν ἐκεῖν’ ὑποτρέφοντες ἴσων τὴν πρὸς τὸ δρόμον ἠφώρον ἄδων ἐν ἑδύρειν καὶ ὑπεραναγιορεῖσαν τὰς ἱερὰς καὶ λαθάμιαι τῶν ἱερῶν διαφεύγοντες ἐς τὰς Ἀθῆνας. Grundy (p. 10 fol.) quite accurately gives the route followed by the fugitives.

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monument in question. For if the heroön lay hard by the road, constituting a familiar landmark, it was surely needless to insist upon its relation to travellers advancing along that road in the direction of Thebes. A closer examination, however, removes this seeming pointlessness. In addition to the regular high road from Plataiai to Thebes (4), a man might cross the low hills in a N.E. direction and so strike either the road that issued from the pass of Hysiai (2), or the main road from Athens (1) issuing from the pass of Erythrai (Dryoskephalai). The remark of Thucydides, that the heroön stood on the right hand of the fugitives, thus turns out to possess considerable value. It fixes their point of exit from the town to the northern section of the enclosing lines, and the route of flight to a northerly direction, thus indirectly eliminating the possibility indicated above,—that the exit was made on the N.E. of the town and the line of flight continued towards the same point of the compass. The corollary from this is that the site of the monument should be sought between the line of the Plataiai-Thebes road and the line of the path that runs to the north-east: in other words, it is an entire mistake to imagine that the heroön lay quite close to the Plataiai-Thebes road, i.e. in the plain itself.

In addition to the passage from Thucydides, we are able to adduce one from Plutarch. It is true that, as history, Plutarch's account of the campaign is of small value. Nevertheless, the circumstance that Plutarch was a Boiotian, and the probability that he knew the ground, combine to give some importance to the few topographical details preserved in his Life of Aristeides. It is only by the adoption of a foregone conclusion that his testimony is brought into conflict with that of Thucydides. We refuse to subscribe to the verdict of Mr. Grundy when he declares that 'one has to stretch the language of Plutarch until it cracks in order to reconcile his topography with that of Thucydides.'

In describing the movement of the allied army to its second position,

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1 In other words, taking the path chosen by the Corinthians in their march from the Herson to the scene of action, as related in Herod. ix. 69: διὰ τῆς ἐπαρχείας καὶ τῶν κολών τῆς φόρμωσαν ἄνω ἕνθε τοῦ ὤλον τῆς Δήμαρχου. Such would not of course be the usual path from Plataiai to Thebes, but it might well have been followed by the fugitives, whose objective was not Thebes, as it had the advantage of bringing them nearer the passes into Attica while avoiding the obviously dangerous route along the base of Kithairon.

2 The words εἰς δὲ τὰς ἐκχώρεις τὸ τοῦ Ἀρησκόπωος ἱππίου are inserted for no other purpose than to define exactly the preceding phrase τῶν ἐς Θήβας φέρωσαν δόλως,—a phrase which was equally applicable to the alternative path mentioned by me. It is ordinarily assumed that the fugitives passed the monument in question. For this opinion I can see no warrant, and I

must refuse to acknowledge with Mr. Grundy, that 'it is evident that Thucydides understood the ἱππίου to be less than three-quarters of a mile from Plataea.' The outcome of this assumption is Mr. Grundy's hypothesis of a triple phase of the Greek second position. All that Thucydides says, is that the fleeing Plataians ran about a mile along that road to Thebes which lay to the left, or west, of the monument: that they actually passed the monument is nowhere stated.

3 P. 35 note. An example of wrong method adopted by Mr. Grundy from Leake, North. Gr. ii. 354, a passage which Mr. Grundy quotes with approval. Mr. Grundy makes much of Plutarch's failure to mention the νίκος. It will be seen that Plutarch is in the right: the situation of the νίκος is of no moment, as we might guess from the fact that not one of the Greek contingents ever reached it.
Plutarch writes as follows,—'near Hysiai, at the foot of Kithairon, there is an ancient temple of Demeter and Kore, and there hard by was also the heroon of Androkrates.' The natural inference from this is that Plutarch imagined the Eleusinion and the heroon to have been fairly close together. Compare this with what Herodotos tells us about the enclosure of Androkrates,—'and there they ranged themselves, nation by nation, close by the fountain Gargaphia and the sacred precinct of the hero Androkrates, partly among hills of no great elevation, and partly upon level ground.' What is there in this to support the double assumption on the part of Mr. Grundy that Herodotos meant to give us the two extremes of the Greek line, and to indicate at the same time that the spring lay among the hills while the monument stood in the plain, i.e. on the left wing? The conclusion to which both Herodotos and Plutarch point is that the heroon of Androkrates and the Spring Gargaphia stood (within reasonable limits) in the same area. What this area was we have already ascertained for the spring. What it was for the heroon we have already deduced from the words of Thucydides. The two streams of evidence guide us to one and the same point for the site of heroon and témevos. That site is marked by the modern Chapel of St. John crowning the height which rises immediately to the north of the Apotripi (Gargaphia) spring.

What then do we conclude as to the second position of the Greeks? It occupied the depression which Mr. Grundy describes as running across the battle-field roughly from east to west. Here the allies had the advantage of a supply of water in the Apotripi (Gargaphia) spring,—the sources farther to the east would obviously also be in their hands; they were screened from the observation of the Persian main body; they were also protected from the cavalry as well as was possible anywhere off the actual slopes of Mount Kithairon. The Greek outposts would occupy the heights to the north of

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1 Plut. Arist. xi: τὸν Τιθηνίων πληρότατον ἐν τῷ Κιθαιρώνα ναὸν ἐστὶν ἀρχαῖος πάνω Δήμαρος ἔλευσινια καὶ Κύρης περαγηγημένης . . . Ανδροκράτεως ἡρωὶς ἤγγος, ἠκαίνε πυκνῶν καὶ συνελήνην δέθρων περισσὸν.
2 Herod. ix. 25: ἀκινάμονος δὲ ἐνάσαστον κατ' ὥσιν πληρόν τῆς τῇ κρήνης τῆς Γαργαφίας καὶ τοῦ τεμένου τοῦ Ἀνδροκράτου τοῦ ἱερον διὰ ἄχους τε ἄκιν ἄφαλεν καὶ ἀκίδον χαρίαν.
3 P. 36 note: 'I think that the words of Herodoto... can only mean that the témevos was on the left of the Greek line, for the ἄσσις χαρίας can only be the plain between Plataea and the Thespian Asopus, on which, by-the-bye, according to Thucydides the témevos must have stood.' Cf. p. 17: 'the témevos of the hero Androcrates, which Herodotus tells us was the other extremity of the line, i.e., on the left wing.' The same assumption is made by Stein (note in loc.) and Grote, (Hist. v. 19 note 2), but is rightly combated by Mr. Hunt (Amer. Journ. of Arch. vol. vi. 471).
4 The same conclusion seems to follow from Paus. ix. 4, 2, where the Temple of Eleusinian Demeter, the μηθύα of Leitos and the Spring Gargaphia are apparently grouped together as contiguous to one another. We may note here that Mr. Grundy is altogether wrong in imaginating (p. 34) the temple of Demeter here spoken of by Pausanias to be different from that mentioned by Herodotus in his account of the battle.
5 Taking into consideration what is told us of the heroion by Plutarch in the passage already quoted, I see in the modern name Platāni (= Plane tree), borne by the locality indicated, a traditional survival of the old Hellenic témevos. See Leake's map. The huts round the chapel have apparently disappeared, but the memory of the name remains.
6 P. 2.
7 The description of the position and its advantages, as given in Diod. xi. 30, 5 (ὁ γαρ
the position, viz. the height on which the heroön stood, and the eminence lying to the east, between the heroön and the temple of Demeter.

The object aimed at by Pausanias in removing from Mount Kithairon is rightly stated by Mr. Grundy. The Greeks tried to effect a great turning movement by their left. They threw themselves upon the Plataiai-Thebes road, intending to force the passage of the Asopos and to cut the Persian line of communication. Mr. Grundy justly calls attention to the fact that the military capacity of Pausanias is universally underrated. For boldness of design, prudence in execution, and power of handling masses of men in the face of almost insuperable obstacles he deserves a high place in the list of Greek generals. Under the conditions of ancient warfare the undertaking was not as desperate as it would seem. In the absence of long-range weapons and arms of precision, it was perfectly feasible. Moreover the advantage in skill, discipline, and equipment was overwhelmingly in favour of the Greeks. The Persians might well have been driven eastwards off their line of retreat. It was necessary, however, to take precautions against the Persian cavalry, which was massed on the Greek right flank, at a distance of at most three miles. A sort of echelon formation was therefore adopted, the Greek contingents being disposed obliquely from S.E. to N.W. across the roads leading from Plataiai to Thebes.

It is at this point that we begin to find the narrative of Herodotus interrupted and distorted by the national bias of his Athenian informants. Here for the first time the historian directs our attention to the disposition of the Greek troops. He goes off at the word κατ’ έθνεα (c. 25) and introduces the quarrel between the Tegeans and the Athenians for the post of danger and honour on the wing (cc. 26–28 init.). The whole of the story must be excised, on the following grounds:

(1) The left wing of the Greeks in the second position lay on ἱπτάσιμος χώρος. It might consequently expect to suffer from the attacks of the hostile cavalry, as was actually the case (c. 49 end). How then reconcile the Tegean demand for station on the left wing with their previous reluctance (shared by the whole army) to support the Megarians against the Persian cavalry in the first position? It is not sufficient to advert to the success already gained against the cavalry river Nebel and the marshes on its banks. Compare also the passage of the Granikos by Alexander.

1 Pp. 22, 43.
2 The situation finds its counterpart in the battle of Blenheim. The Asopos did not constitute a more formidable obstacle than did the river Nebel and the marshes on its banks.
3 Cf. Holm, Grk. Hist. ii. 75 (E.T.): 'the Greeks were well-handled bodies of heavily-armed infantry.'
4 Cf. ix. 25: δ' ἄκτενον χωρίου; 31: ἐπι τῷ άσωτῷ τῷ ἀγχοῖ (49: δ' ἄκτενον χωρίου).
5 ix. 21.
(c. 25) and to the confidence thereby inspired, for the service now demanded was much more than steadiness against cavalry.

(2) There is no evidence to support the statement made, according to Herodotos, by the Tegeans, that post on a wing was their prerogative. Subsequently at any rate we find the Tegeans occupying precisely the station finally allotted to them on the field of Plataiai, i.e. next to the Spartans themselves. This is the case in 418 B.C. at the battle of Mantinea, and in 394 B.C. at the battle of Corinth.

(3) How was it that the Corinthians, 5000 strong, did not raise objections if they were moved from the side of the Spartans, presumably a post of honour, in order to make room for the Tegeans?

(4) The Tegean demand, if ever urged, must have been decided instantly by tactical considerations. A large compact body, like that of the Athenians (8000 in number), which was accompanied by the best light troops in the army (archers), was required on the wing, not the Tegean handful of 1500.

(5) The story of Herodotos is irreconcilable with the words which occur in chap. 28,—'The place next to themselves was given by the Spartans to the Tegeans, on account of their courage and of the esteem in which they held them.' These words suggest that their actual place in the line was assigned to the Tegean hoplites in pursuance of some plan not given in Herodotos. The nature of the plan will clearly appear in the sequel.

(6) The quarrel, if a genuine incident, must have occurred earlier than is stated by Herodotos. It must in fact have broken out at the moment of taking position on Mount Kithairon. For the evidence goes to show that there also the Tegeans had not been posted on the wing.

1 Thuc. v. 71.
2 Xen. Hell. iv. 2. 19. And at that battle of Mantinea in which Epameinondas fell in 362 B.C. the Tegeans apparently stood next to the Thebans, i.e. the leaders, in this case on the left wing. Cf. Diod. xv. 85, 2: ἡ παράστασις ἔχουσα Ἀρέας, τὸ ἐξ δεξιῶν παρέδωκαν Ἀργεῖοι κ.κ. κ.λ. The point is that they stand shoulder to shoulder with the premier corps, whatever its position.
3 ix. 28: προσεχεῖς ἃ φρόνοι ἐναντάται στρατιάται τοῦς Τεγέαται καὶ τιμᾶς ἔνεκες καὶ ἀρετῆς.
4 In the second position the Megarians are third in the line, reckoning from the left, i.e. they stand next on the right of the Plataians and Athenians. This place apparently corresponds to that which they held in the first position: for there also they occupied the left centre (cf. ix. 21: Μεγαρίτες ἵππους ταχέως τῇ τῇ ἐπιμαχήτατον ἐν τὸν χώρον παντός, καὶ ἐν πρόσοδοι μέλισσα τάφυς ἐγίνετο τῇ ἤπειροι,—this can only have been on the left and left centre of the line). To this we ought to add the consideration that, if the Tegeans had been on the wing in the first position, they would have urged that as an argument here.
On these grounds we unhesitatingly reject the story of the quarrel. It is an Athenian invention designed to flatter Athens by means of a verdict put into the mouths of the best troops in Greece, at the expense of a contingent second to none in valour (c. 28).1

In fact, the whole account of the marshalling of the Greek troops comes far too late in the narrative. Their arrangement in the line must have dated from the opening day of the campaign. With it disappears also the account of the marshalling of the Persian forces. There was no such formal parataxis as Herodotos depicts. The place of the account, which is closely modelled on the epic, is determined solely by artistic reasons, without reference to the logic of military practice. It is inserted precisely at this point because we have reached a crucial stage of the campaign: but the arrangement of the troops strictly belongs to an earlier moment, while the quarrel to which it is represented as giving rise is a pure fiction.

Having thus adopted from his epic model a quite artificial scheme of events, how does Herodotos proceed to develop it? Here we have the two armies ranged and described in battle array, but—nothing comes of it. Recourse is had to the sacrifices in order to explain the refusal of the combatants to finish the business, thus happily begun, in the true Homeric fashion.2 Herodotos is manifestly quite in the dark as to the real reason for their delay. His assertion of the only obstacle that would appeal to his hearers,—the persistent veto of heaven,—involves him in difficulties, as it directly contradicts the account given in chap. 41, which relates the conference of the Persian officers. For if Mardonios was so eager to fight,3 why had he not long ago given battle? It was surely not out of respect for the feelings of the Greek contingents fighting on the Persian side that he had conformed to the utterances of their soothsayers. Why should Mardonios summon his Staff only to insult it? The episode of the conference is inserted for no other purpose than that of enabling Herodotos to contrast dramatically, more neo, two antithetical solutions of the situation,—on the one hand decisive battle for good or ill, on the other the sound policy of waiting for disaffection and bribery to do their fatal work upon the national forces.4

Next there follows the account of the midnight visit of Alexander of Macedon to the Athenian lines.5 This also is a story full of improbabilities, and without any claim to retention. How did Alexander escape recognition at the bridge-head held by the Persians? Or, if that is supposed to be no difficulty, how did his errand elude the notice of the Persian sentinels? If again these imagined him to be the bearer of despatches to the Greeks, where

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1 The turn of expression in the concluding sentences (chap. 28) is designedly invidious,—Ἀφαίρετας ἀξιωματέρων εἶναι ἔχειν τὸ κέρας ἀπὸ Ἀρκάδας. Who does not recognize the curl of the lip in this?

2 Observe how skilfully the history of the various soothsayers (ix. 33-38 刬.) is used in order to interrupt the narrative and to give the impression of delay in the action.


4 Partly also Herodotos design to give expression to his own opinion on the situation.

5 ix. 44 fol.
was the risk of which he makes so much? The reasons which he alleges to account for the Persian delay in attacking are very obviously put into his mouth by Herodotos himself in conformity with what he has already written in chaps. 36, 37. The assertion that the Persians found their commissariat breaking down is a manifest lie. The very emphatic and artistically well-managed revelation of his name on the part of Alexander was quite superfluous to Aristeides, who must have become familiar in Athens with the face, figure, and tones of the Macedonian king. Lastly, the whole point of the clandestine interview was to warn the Greeks of the intention of Mardonios to fight a decisive battle on the morrow. Yet, in spite of the alleged eagerness of the Persian general and the difficulties threatening his army, the following day passed without any serious attempt being made to justify the Macedonian’s prognostications.

The excision of the nocturnal visit of Alexander necessarily involves also the abandonment of the disgraceful story contained in chaps. 46, 47. According to Herodotos, the near prospect of encounter with the Persians and Medes so alarmed Pausanias that he suggested to the Athenian leaders an interchange of position on the part of their respective divisions. The Athenians moved to the right, while the Spartans withdrew to the left in order to face the Boiotians and the other Greeks who fought in the ranks of the Great King. The exchange, however, was detected by the Boiotians, who at once informed Mardonios. The Persian troops were consequently transferred to the right of their line, so as to bring them once more in front of the Spartans. Pausanias then for the second time changed his position, and resumed his post on the right wing. Finally, the Persians returned to their old station, and the farce was brought to an end.

‘No incident similar to this,’ remarks Grote, ‘will be found throughout the whole course of Lacedaemonian history.’ He might safely have gone further and denied that any such incident ever did occur. From beginning to end the story must be stigmatised as a slander.

(1) If the Spartans had contemplated the movement at all, for what had they delayed its execution? They could not have foreseen that they would receive timely warning of the approaching battle, nor yet that the Persian onset would be retarded long enough to enable the change in position to be made. It is evident that the proposition was only possible upon a very
general and decided feeling in its favour on the part of the Spartan hoplites; hence it cannot be set down to a sudden nervousness depriving Pausanias of self-command.

(2) It was surely a strange preparation for the decisive struggle, fraught with such grave consequences for Greece, to march and countermarch the best regiments of the allied army in the face of the enemy.

(3) What was the effect of the Spartan cowardice upon the mass of the Greek troops? The motive of the manoeuvre must, one thinks, have been as apparent to the rank and file of the contingents as to the Athenian hoplites.

(4) How is it that we never subsequently hear a syllable of this compliment to Athenian arms?

(5) The genesis of the story can be traced quite satisfactorily.

As the last of our long series of excisions we must abandon the incident narrated in c. 48. Mardonios sent a herald to the Greek lines with an absurd challenge, proposing that the Spartans and the Persians should fight on behalf of all. It is obvious that if the attempted change of post is cut out it must carry with it the challenge. It is modelled upon similar scenes in Homer; but it is also not uninfluenced by reminiscences of previous history. Apart from this, the narrative is intrinsically unsound; for how do the words 'puffed up by the empty victory' square with the statement that nothing more was attempted or achieved against the Greeks than the usual harassing attacks of the cavalry? We expect some deed of arms to redeem the doughty resolves of chap. 41.

Now that the ground has been cleared of the excrescences due to Athenian light-hearted manipulation of history let us resume the interrupted story of the Greek movements.

We have surmised that the movement of the allies to the second position was based upon something more than the desire merely to obtain a better supply of water: for the abandonment of their main line of communication and the greater exposure to the Persian cavalry on the lower ground were attendant drawbacks too serious to be counterbalanced by the single advantage named by Herodotos. Pausanias had determined to make a dash across the Asopos by the road which ran directly from Plataiai. The second Greek position represents the army in the act of carrying out this manoeuvre. It is disposed obliquely across the field, the left wing leading upon the Asopos.

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1 Cf. Hom. H. iii. 90 fol. Combat of champions was unsuccessfully used to decide the claims of Sparta and Argos to the Thyreatis, Herod. i. 82 (Thuc. v. 41).
2 ix. 49: ὅ ἐν περίχαρε γενόμενοι καὶ ἔκαστος ἰσομερής νίκη ἀρνητικὴ ἡν ἡ πρώτον ἐπὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων. If it is argued that the cavalry onset was designed to introduce the infantry attack, why did that attack not ensue in due course? Confessedly (according to Herodotos) the cavalry were more successful this day than ever before.
3 See Note A on the Asopos of Herodotos.
Why then was the offensive designed by the Spartan general not developed beyond this point; and why do we not find in Herodotos a syllable in allusion either to the scheme itself or to its collapse?

The first difficulty is solved by reference to the position of Pausanias. The army under his command consisted practically of three brigades constituted respectively by the Spartans (with whom we must reckon the Tegeans), the Athenians (along with the Plataians), and lastly the general body of the allies. The loose structure of the Greek national levy made unanimity in sentiment and cohesion in action impossible beyond certain narrow limits. Hence the delay in accomplishing the passage of the river, a delay that ruined the scheme, and all but ruined the national cause.

The latter part of our question is answered by reference to the ignorance of the historian's informant, who was quite in the dark as to the strategic ideas of the Greek commander-in-chief.

Another cause also is at work. It must be remembered that the campaign was a national affair, and it was undoubtedly a point of national honour to present it in the most favourable light. By tacit general consent the battle never became the subject of discussion. An analogy may be found in the medism of the Delphic oracle, which yet, by a species of national self-deception, did not forfeit its claim to Hellenic respect, in spite of its failure in the hour of trial. So in the case before us, no Greek would have been so unpatriotic as to confess that dilatoriness and cowardice on the part of the national army had nearly proved fatal to Hellenic freedom.

We must also bear in mind that our knowledge comes almost entirely from the Athenians, and only from a certain section of them, so that we know scarcely anything of the views current outside Athens. In spite of Athenian reticence, however, we clearly see that hesitation on the part of the Greek force, and more especially on the part of the Athenian contingent, which was in the van, enabled the Persians to divine the intentions of the Greek commander, and gave them time to perform a lateral movement in order to cover the Plataiai-Thebes road. Their clouds of skirmishers then effectually prevented all approach to the Asopos, and the favourable moment was lost.

This brings us to the origin of the story, already condemned, which is so discreditable to the Spartans.

The Athenians, being on the left extremity of the line, which rested on the Asopos, would cross the river at the head of the column. After crossing

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1 Cf. Holm, Grk. Hist. ii. 60 (E.T.).
2 Can we, for example, believe that the Athenian version of the retirement of the centre to the Herision (ix. 52) passed current among the states whose troops were implicated in that movement?
3 ix. 49: ἵπποι τῶν Ἀσσωτῶν. By a strange inversion the Persian skirmishers lining the Asopos banks are regarded by the tradition as designed to entice the Greeks across the river (chap. 40: μέχρι μὲν τῶν Ἀσσωτῶν ἐπήσαν αὐτὸν Πέρσαν, πετρέμοντας τὰς ἐλήνους). Such are the marks of a literary battle, not the touches of a man versed in the actual experiences of the field.
they would wheel to the right, in order to check the Persian advance along the bank to hinder the passage. The Spartans, who were posted on the extreme right, formed the rear-guard of the column, and covered the crossing from the Persian cavalry—a most dangerous and responsible position, and one that explains why the valiant Tegeans were associated with the Spartan hoplites.\(^1\) When the whole Greek force had made good its footing on the far side of the Asopos, the Spartans would naturally form the left wing of the new line. It is on this reversal of position,—one suggested, but never actually realized,—that the Athenian misrepresentation is based.\(^2\) It contains this much of truth, that the brunt of the fighting, until the Spartan rear-guard effected its passage of the river, must have fallen upon the Athenians, who were required to sustain the whole weight of the Persian attack upon the head of the column.\(^3\) There was surely honour enough in that to have rendered superfluous the sorry attempt to cast shame upon the best troops in Greece,—the more so as it was entirely due to the Athenians’ own want of resolution that the Spartan valour was not put to the test contemplated by Pausanias.

The warp of the tissue of these fifty chapters is the green thread of Athenian jealousy of Sparta.\(^4\) It is a highly suggestive fact that we find both the Spartans and the Tegeans,—who shared the honour of the final victory,—more or less skilfully represented in Herodotos as inferior to the Athenian troops. And in each instance we have been forced to the conclusion that the episode is false and due to Athenian vanity. The cloven hoof is unmistakably displayed in the account of the events following the challenge feigned to have been thrown down by Mardonios. With what painful circumstantiality are we assured that it was to the Spartans, and the Spartans alone, that the thanks of the allies were due for the destruction of the Spring Gargaphia?\(^5\): as though to give point to the alleged reluctance of the Spartans to face Persian infantry by instancing this, probably equally fictitious, failure to stand against Persian cavalry.\(^6\) If these things were done in the green tree, what

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1 ix. 28: προσεχόμεν δὲ ὕπερ εἰπόντο κατάναι οἱ Σπαρτείται τοὺς Τεγέαντας καὶ τιμήσαντες καὶ ἀρετῆς.

2 Possibly also the Persian change of position, from the left to the right wing, is a genuine incident: the change might very probably be actually made in order to meet the threatened advance of the Greek left.

3 This is the truth underlying the garbled account in Plutarch of the grumbling on the part of the Athenians against Pausanias. ‘They thought that Pausanias carried it with a partial and high hand in moving them up and down, like so many Helots, at his pleasure, to face the boldest of the enemy’s troops.’ This surely alludes to the disposition of troops previous to the crossing of the river. Plutarch’s sequel (the speech of Aristides and consequent consent of the Athenians to change their position) is merely again the self-laudatory Athenian tradition.

4 Contrast the reiterated jubilation found in our Athenian sources over the victory at Marathon with the silence observed with regard to the brilliant achievement of the Spartans and Arkadians at Plataiai.

5 ix. 49: ἦσαν μὲν δὲ κατὰ τὴν κήπην Λακεδαιμονιῶν τεταγμένων μοῦνα. Here again the phrasing is used with set purpose.

6 Here I may say that I see no sort of evidence for Mr. Grundy’s laboured hypothesis of three ‘developments’ of the Greek second position. His theory leaves him with 100,000 men huddled on a single hill, cut off from water, harassed by cavalry, and with morale at zero point. Surely this ‘development’ could issue only in tragedy.
would have been done in the dry! Recall also the invidious expressions used with reference to Spartan duplicity, so different from the manly and straightforward, withal modest, character of the Athenians, and the reference to the by this time threadbare theme of Spartan cowardice, so glaringly in contrast with the calm steadfastness of conscious valour that glowed in the breast of the Athenian hoplite. Nay, the Spartans must be flouted even at the price of complimenting an almost equally odious people. Therefore it is recorded that the Tegeans charged the Persian rampart of shields before that the Spartans advanced a foot: far be it from the Athenians to see any other city deprived of its meed of honour for the sake of other than—themselves! Lastly, what prominence is given to the Athenian share in the assault on the fortified camp. Well might this be so, else were the hoplites of Athens like to have been but sleeping partners in that day’s achievements. Here as so often, the Lakedaimonians were baffled by the combination of barricades and stout defence. Not until the invincible amalgam of Athenian valour and resolution (άρετή καὶ λυπαρίτη) was applied could any impression be made on the fortifications. Into the breach there rushed, not the Spartans,—alas for that national defect of ponderosity,—but the Tegeans.

With the end of chap. 49 there comes a change in the nature of the Greek operations,—a change from offensive to defensive tactics. The allied army, having lost the opportunity of turning the Persian position, is reduced to its old attitude of covering the approaches to the Peloponnese, and of waiting for Mardonios to take the initiative.

The real objective of the movement of the Greeks to the ‘Island’ was the recovery of their line of communication, upon which they had then but precarious hold. They were, it is true, not driven entirely off it, for, as Mr. Grundy points out, the Plataiai-Megara pass (3) still remained in their hands. Nevertheless, according to Mr. Grundy, the character of the most westerly pass is such as to render it impossible to supply satisfactorily the wants of one hundred thousand men through this channel alone. That the occupation of the eastern passes by the Persian advanced posts had begun to tell upon the Greek forces may readily be believed, but Herodotos himself represents the determination to fall back as due primarily to want of water, in consequence of the failure of the Spartans to protect Gargaphia.

1 ix. 54: τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων φρονήματα ἀδὲ ἐλλα φρονεῖται καὶ ἐλλα λεγότας. For Athenian mock modesty, see chap. 46 end.
2 ix. 56: Ἄθηναιοι δὲ ταχίντες βίζαν τὰ ξεκίλον ή Λακεδαιμόνιοι. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε ἔχουν διάταξιν καὶ τής ὑπορείνας τοῦ Κυημανίου, φοβεῖσθαι τὴν ἔπος, Ἄθηναιοι δὲ κάτω τραφινές ἐν τοίνυν.
3 ix. 62: σφαξονοικότατες πρότεροι οἱ Τεγεηται ἐχάρεσιν ἐν τούς Βαρβάρους.
4 ix. 70: ἦκε μὲν γὰρ ἄπτησαν οἱ Ἄθηναιοι, οἱ δὲ ἡμόνοι καὶ πολλὲς ἐπλόον εἶχον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων διότι οὐκ ἐπισταμένων τεχιμαχίες. ὡς δὲ κρίειν oἰ Άθηναιοὶ προσῆλθαν . . . τέλος δὲ ἄρετή τε καὶ λυπαρίτη εἴδωσιν Ἄθηναίοι τοῦ τείχους κ.τ.λ.
5 This ‘bull-dog obstinacy’ is precisely the quality usually attributed to the Spartans. At any rate Thucydides recognizes this,—v. 73: χρονισάτω τὰ μάχας καὶ βεβαλώσω τῷ μέκεν ποιώτατα.
6 See Note B for the chronology of the events preceding the battle of Plataiai.
7 P. 32.
8 ix. 50: ἄτε τοῦ τε διάστος στρατικῆς τῆς στρατιάς.
This repetition of the water difficulty we should be inclined to reject here again, at any rate as furnishing the ground of the retirement. For, wherever we place Gargaphia, the army had still the other spring at its command; and Herodotos admits that at the foot of Mount Kithairon, ten stades or so in the rear of the position, water was abundant.1 There was also the water supply of the town of Plataiai itself.2 For surely the Greeks ought not to be imagined as cut off from Plataiai and the base of the hills, and hopelessly surrounded by the Persian horsemen. There cannot have been any grave difficulty in supplying the needs of the troops in line on the Spring Gargaphia,3 as the country between that position and the mountain is by no means difficult. The stress laid upon the deficiency of water, if not due to the character of the historian's informant, has its origin in the desire to bring in the Spartans as ultimately responsible for a retrograde movement primarily caused by the Athenians themselves.

The main features of this last act of the drama, as given by the Athenian tradition, are as follows.4

The council of generals determined to execute a night movement to the rear, the so-called 'Island' being given as the rendezvous of the contingents. It was further resolved that, on the same night, half the army should be detached eastwards to Mount Kithairon, in order to extricate the commissariat train blocked up in the pass. When the appointed hour arrived the centre fell back,—not to the 'Island,' i.e. 10 stades, but 20 stades, finally taking post at the Heraion, which lay 'in front of' Plataiai. Next, the Spartans were ordered to retire; but the irrational obstinacy of the Lochagos Amompharetos, who construed the movement as a flight, detained the Spartan contingent all night. Meantime the Athenians, suspecting the Spartans of a desire to play them false, remained in position on the left awaiting definite instructions. As day dawned, Pausanias at last abandoned his recalcitrant captain to his fate, and set his troops in motion 'along the line of the hills.' The Athenians also retired, by way of the plain. After marching 10 stades Pausanias halted for the Pitanate regiment under Amompharetos on the stream called Moloeis, near a temple of Eleusinian Demeter, in the district called Argiopian. Simultaneously with the appearance of Amompharetos the Persian cavalry swooped down upon the Spartans and Tegeans, to be followed soon by the Persian infantry.

Such is the narrative of Herodotos, deceptive in its simplicity and apparent straightforwardness. Closer examination reveals in it the features with which we have become familiar. On the one hand Herodotos fails to appreciate the significance of the various movements of the forces, on the
other he has incorporated all that national vanity, with the double object of glorifying Athens and disparaging Sparta, had invented.

Up to this point in the story the central brigade of the allies has escaped Athenian calumny; its share in events is shadowy, but not actually disgraceful. Its turn has at last come. Although the troops of the centre had borne the heat and burden of the day that proved so disastrous to Spartan prestige, yet now, under the cloak of night, they flee in headlong haste, eager only to secure themselves against the dreaded cavalry. Mark, however, the point wherein the narrative halts. In spite of their anxiety to put themselves beyond the reach of the Persian horsemen, the contingents of the centre do not seek shelter in Plataiai itself nor on the rocky slopes of Mount Kithairon (which ultimately became their refuge¹), nor yet on the 'Island,'—a position admittedly outside the sphere of cavalry operations,²—but they take up their station, apparently in good order, 'in front of' the temple, which was itself 'in front of the town.'³

There are several possible sites for the Heraion.⁴ The most probable one stands within the circuit of the existing enceinte of Plataiai, just to the east of the akropolis. The question of the site is of far greater moment than is the identification of the 'Island,' which was in fact never reached by any of the Greek force at all.⁵ Its importance lies in this, that, knowing the exact site of the temple, we should be able to decide what amount of credence should attach to the Athenian account of the conduct of the troops composing the centre.

That account can hardly be accepted as it stands. It will be observed that the suggested site of the Heraion lies at no great distance ⁶ from the tract of ground which is convincingly identified by Mr. Grundy as the 'Island.' The Heraion may well, therefore, have been actually the position which the central brigade was instructed to occupy. Its proximity to the town ⁷ is an important feature; it was surely of some moment for the Greeks to retain possession of Plataiai, which was a fortified place commanding the entrance of the pass to Megara. In order to carry out the project of Pausanias it was essential to dispose the various brigades in such a way

¹ When cut to pieces by the Theban cavalry, ix. 69.
² See the American Journ. of Arch. vol. vi. (1890) p. 469.
³ Yet the identification of the 'Island' is generally made the touchstone of theories of Plataian topography. This misconception of the comparative value of the two points is strikingly exemplified by Mr. Grundy, who finds it possible to discuss the operations without reference to the site of the Heraion, other than its incidental mention in a sentence or two on p. 17.
⁴ About eight stades, or one mile, on Mr. Grundy's map.
⁵ When cut to pieces by the Theban cavalry, ix. 69.
⁶ About eight stades, or one mile, on Mr. Grundy's map.
⁷ See the American Journ. of Arch. vol. vi. (1890) p. 469.
that they might support one another. The new post of the quondam centre, near the Heraion under the walls of Plataiai, was well chosen in this respect, to check any attempt on the part of the Persian cavalry to creep along the side of the mountain and endanger the operation in which the Spartans were about to engage.

That such was the intended function of the Greek centre appears from its behaviour during the conflict. Herodotos tells us¹ that the Greek right was already pushing the enemy off the field when news was brought (ἀναγέλλησαι) to the centre at the Heraion 'that the fight had begun, and that Pausanias was gaining the victory.' The words of Herodotos are here significant,—not in respect of any inference that may be supposed to be deducible therefrom as to the site of the temple, but as indicating that Pausanias deliberately detached a member of his force for this special service, and also that he knew exactly whither to send his messenger. Here again Herodotos has missed the real import of the fact. The message of Pausanias was nothing less than an urgent summons for an advance. The sudden development of the Persian attack caused a rapid modification of the combinations of the Greek general; and, failing support from the 'Island' (upon which the Athenians ought long before to have taken up their position), a message was despatched to the centre, then lying uselessly at Plataiai, to hurry it up in reinforcement. It is in the highest degree worthy of notice that the centre in response at once splits up into two sections. The Corinthians and their companions marched off through the hills, while the Megarians and the Phliasians with their comrades proceeded by way of the plain. Now, in the second position, the Corinthians stood alongside of the hoplites of Tegea and Sparta: the Megarians were ranged shoulder to shoulder with the Plataians and the Athenians. It is pretty clear from this that the two sections of the centre² hastened to join their respective wings,—in accordance with the orders transmitted from the commander-in-chief: it was no pell-mell scramble to be in at a battle already decided without them.³

With regard to the centre of the Greek line all is intelligible and free from complications. In opposition to the received view I maintain that it is almost entirely in connection with the left wing, i.e. the Athenians, that difficulties arise. The Athenians were evidently hard put to it to render an

¹ ix. 69: εἰ δὲ τῶν τῷ γιγομένῳ φόβῳ ἀναγέλλησαν τοὺς ἄλλους ἔλλησαν τῶν τεταγμένων πέρι τὸ Ἡραῖον καὶ ἀπογειμένῳ τῇ μάχῃ, δι' αὐτῆς τῇ γέγονε καὶ νικήν ὁ μετὰ Παυσανίαν κ.τ.λ.
² And, again, these sections correspond in strength to the wings. The right wing (Lake-daimonians and Tegeans)=11,500. The left wing (Athenians and Plataians)=8,600. The united contingents of the centre numbered 18,600. If we take the expression in ix. 69: αἱ ἄμφως Μεγάραι τε καὶ Φλιασίους to give the two extremes of that section, and thus to include the contingents standing between those of Phlius and Megara, we shall find that it numbered 7,300 men. The remainder of the centre was 11,300 strong; the numerical strength of the central sections thus bearing an appropriate relation to the strength of the respective wings. The two sections also contain a nearly equal number of contingents. I think that the mention of the Phliasians is really meant to indicate the point of cleavage of the centre, as above suggested.
³ As it is represented in ix. 69: οἱ δὲ ἀκούσαντες τῶνα οὐδένα κόσμον ταχύτερον κ.τ.λ. Lower down, the Thebans espy the Megarians ἐπειγομένους οὐδένα κόσμον.
explanation of their action during the retirement to the ‘Island.’ It is in vain that with malice prepense meaningless prominence is given to their own march through the plain, while the Spartans fell back through the hills.\(^1\) Meaningless, for this reason: given the position and the objective point of the wings, no other route than that which is so innudgeously described by Herodotos is possible. The map furnishes the unanswerable proof of the disingenuousness of the narrative. The historian tries to fasten upon the centre the imputation of deliberate betrayal of the wings;\(^2\) but what of the Athenian disobedience to orders? For the Athenians also never reached the ‘Island.’ Could anything be more transparently false than the reason assigned by the Athenians themselves for their breach of discipline,—‘knowing that it was the Spartan temper to say one thing and do another, they remained quiet at their post’?\(^3\) Although Pausanias had issued the order for the troops to fall back, an order which he knew had already been obeyed by the centre, one which he had a right to believe was likewise respected by the left wing, we are asked to allow that it was possible for him to remain in position unsupported, for no other reason apparently than to delude the Athenians at the cost of his own destruction and the ruin of Greece. The Spartan king appears in the Athenian tradition as a simple farceur. Amid all the contradictions in which the narrative of the campaign abounds no sentence is so preposterous; none exhibits in a more baleful aspect the inherent vice of the Athenians. The lie is inserted in order to conceal their own failure to gain the rendezvous appointed by the council of generals,—a council in the deliberations of which Aristeides the Just had a voice. It was necessary in 479 B.C., and still is necessary, to ask how it came about that the right wing found itself without supports when the attack opened against it.

The root of the distorted version of the retirement of the army to its third position is the malicious persistence of the Athenians in depicting the movement as a flight instigated by the Spartans. Hence they were at pains to minimize their own share in it, oblivious of the fact that in avoiding this feigned Scylla they fall into the more terrible Charybdis of confessed disloyalty and insubordination.

The desperate efforts of the Athenians to represent their conduct as magnanimous would be amusing were it not that their tradition has won its way to credence as sober history. The honour of the victory belonged solely to the Tegeans and the Spartans. It was a bitter pill to swallow, but Hellas could not be befooled on so patent a fact: all knew that the Athenian hoplites had not contributed a single blow to the overthrow of the Persian infantry in

\(^1\) ix. 56: ὁ Παυσανίας . . . ἀπῆγε διὰ τῶν κολοσσῶν τῶν λοιπῶν πάντας . . . Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ταχθέντες βίσαν τὰ ἔμαλιν ἦν Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε ὄχθων ἀντίχοροι καὶ τῆς ὕπαρξεις τοῦ Καθαρώτας, φοβούμενοι τὴν Τιτον, Ἀθηναίοι δὲ κάτω τραβάθεντες εἰς τὸ πεδίον.

\(^2\) ix. 52: ἐναύατα ἀνεβάτες οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπαλλάσσωσι, ἐν μὲν τῶν χωρῶν ἐν τῶν συνεκέστα ὅπως ἐν τῷ ἄγρεις κ.τ.λ. Cf. the expressions used in the fictitious message from Pausanias, ix. 60.

\(^3\) ix. 54: Ἀθηναίοι δὲ ἐπολεύσαν τοιοῦτον ἔχον ἄρμασα σφαίρα ἐνταχθησαν, ἐπιστάμενοι τὰ λακεδαιμονίων φρονήματα ἣν ἄλλα φρονοῦσθων καὶ ἄλλα λεγόμενα. ἀς δὲ ἐκνήθη τὸ στρατόπεδον, ἄρα καὶ τὸ περιστέρι οὐκ ἔφαγεν τε χρήστησαι ἐπισχείροντος ἢ τοιαύτης, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ παράκατο μὴ διανοεῖται ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι, ἐπείσθαι τε Παυσανίαν τὸ χρέον εἰς πολέμου.
the decisive struggle. The efforts of the Athenians were perforce confined to accounting for the damaging fact and turning it to the national honour. The Theban attack at the head of the second Persian column 1 came in here very opportunistly to prevent their carrying aid to the Spartans, who were beset in spite of their pusillanimous concern to be secure. What, however, is the value of the text of the Spartan message which bulks so largely in the narrative? There is an evident anxiety to magnify the Athenian arms on this day: 2 yet their victory over the Thebans is not so decisive as to drive their cavalry from the field. 3

From what I have written, my conception of the plan adopted in the council of generals 4 is easily gathered. The Greek force was instructed to retire by brigades,—the centre to the Heraion, covering Plataiai and the 'Island,' the Athenians to the ‘Island’ itself. These two divisions were designed to support the crucial element of the entire movement, viz. the Spartan advance to the relief of the convoys beset in Mount Kithairon. To the right wing, composed as it was of the flower of the army, this difficult and dangerous task was appropriately committed. In the new position, the old central brigade would form the extreme left, under the shelter afforded by the Heraion and the fortifications of the town: on the other hand, the troops of the new centre, being nearest to the Spartans, might anticipate heavy calls upon their acracy and courage, so that they were judiciously composed of Athenians. As in the second position, so in the third Pausanias made the best possible distribution of his forces. The Spartans themselves were designed from the first to advance straight from their old position, near the Spring Gargaphia, to the pass. The locality in which the final encounter took place proves this, for it lies off the line that must have been followed by troops falling back directly upon the 'Island.'

What, then, caused the break-down of this scheme? To this question Herodotos has a ready answer. The obstinacy of the Spartan captain who refused to withdraw from his post was the prime cause of the collapse of the plan. His ill-timed punctiliousness broke the Greek force into its component brigades, which at the moment of contact with the enemy found themselves sundered by no considerable intervals. The different units had all but lost touch of one another when the Persian squadrons held the Spartan division fast for the attack of their supporting column.

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1 ix. 61: οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι . . . ἔρημάτω βατινέως καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἐκθαμών. καὶ σοὶ ξῆδε στείχοσιν ἐπιθέται οἱ ἀντισεβάστες Ἑλλήνων . . . οὗτοι μηκέτι δύνασθαι βαθθοῦσιν τὸ γὰρ προσκείμονον φορεῖ ἐλεύθεροι.

2 ix. 67: Βευτοὶ Ἀθηναίοις ἔρημάτω χρόνον ἐξεπευρ. οἱ γὰρ μὴ βιώσαντες τῶν Θηβαίων, οὕτω εἰχον προσωμίαν ὧδη ἀληθὴν μαχαίριν τε καὶ ὧδη ἐθελοκακιῶντες, οὕτως δέ εἶναι τρικαλοῦν αὐτῶν οἱ πρώτοι καὶ δριστά ἐναύλα τεκεον ἐν' Ἀθηναίων. Herodotos has taken care in a previous chapter (ix. 40 end) to prepare for this by magnifying the courage of the Thebans in leading the cavalry charges. When the Athenians co-operate in the assault on the fort (ix. 70) οὕτω δὴ ἑκατον ἐγίνετο τείχους ἑγίνετο καὶ χρόνον ἐπὶ πολλῶν.

3 Which cuts to pieces the Megarians and Phliasians on their march to the scene of action, ix. 69.

4 ix. 50: οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατηγοὶ . . . συνελιγκότας . . . παρὰ Παυσανίαν κ.τ.λ.
The story about Amompharetos is perhaps one of the most difficult points in the narrative of the operations preceding the battle. We may,—and this is the least satisfactory course,—accept the story, and compare the attitude of Amompharetos with the refusal of the polemarchs Hipponoidas and Aristokles to execute a tactical movement at the battle of Mantinea on the orders of king Agis. Or has Herodotos here incorporated a regimental tradition of the Pitanates, one derived from his Pitanate friend Archias? I prefer to account for the origin of the story in the following manner.

The Spartans did not evacuate their position without taking the precautions demanded by the situation. Amompharetos and his Lochos were detached to occupy the crest of the ridge which concealed the Spartan lines: on the ridge stood the monument of Androkrates. The object of this was twofold,—to observe the Persian cavalry, which would soon resume its daily task of keeping in touch with the Greeks, and to retain as long as possible the semblance of the Greeks being in position. Amompharetos stuck to his post to the last minute that it was prudent to do so, and then rejoined the main body 'at a walk'; the honour of a Spartan would not have permitted a less leisurely pace. The main body had come to a halt for him and his news a little over a mile in advance. His arrival just in time, with the report that the Persians were moving, enabled the Spartans to change front and to form in a favourable position on the slopes at the head of the stream Moloeis and the Argiopian region. Amompharetos is painted by Herodotos as an obstinate fool, the rival of his commanding officer in buffoonery. On the contrary he was an officer conspicuous even among Spartans for intrepidity, one whose tried valour gained for him the perilous but honourable task of screening the retirement of the main body. Not undeserved was the prize he won for bravery in the presence of the enemy, a prize which the Spartan purchased only with his life. Possibly there is this amount of truth in the story of his refusal to retire, that he may have been prominent at the council in urging the rejection of the combination which Pausanias tried to effect. The parenthetical remark of Herodotos, that

1 Thuc. v. 71. But there the charge had already begun, and the movement may well have been impracticable. The fact that a court martial condemned the two commanders to banishment proves nothing.
2 For Archias see Herod. iii. 55. We need not enter here upon the vexed question of the Pitanate regiment, the existence of which is denied by Thuc. i. 20.
3 So Herodotos (ix. 58 itid.) correctly distinguishes between the report brought to Mardonios by his scouting cavalry (σαν ἐπιθέτο τοις "Ελληνας ἀποχώτους ὑπὸ νύστα) and the evidence of his own eyes (πάντες τοῖς χώροις ἔρημοι). The former refers to the discovery by the cavalry of the true state of the case, notwithstanding the presence of the Greek outpost on the hill; the latter indicates that by the time Mardonios made his inspection the rearguard had withdrawn, and the heights upon which the Greek sentinels had been for some days visible were deserted (cf. ἂτοι τὶ λήπτες τάδε ἀρχαντες ἔρημα).
4 ix. 57: ἀναλαβόντα τὸν λόχον τὰ ὅπλα ἢγ' ἔβασιν πρὸς τὸ ἐλλό στίφας.
5 Ibid. τὸ δὲ ἄκελθὼν δεσ τὰ δέκα στάδια ἀνέμει τὸν Ἁμομπάρετον λόχον, περὶ ποταμὸι Μολοῖς ἐνεργοῦν Ἀργηπίας τοὶ χώροι καλέμενοι, τῇ καὶ ἄνημερος ἐξουσιάζων ἢρων ἥττας... καὶ οἱ τέ ἀρμαῖ τοῖς Ἁμομπάρετον παραγίνοντο φιλι... καὶ ἦν οὗτος ἢ τῶν μπαδάρων προσεκτέα τάσας.
6 ix. 55: δ' ἂς (sc. Παυσανίας) μαυρόμενον καὶ οἱ φρενάρα καλῶν ἕκινον.
7 ix. 71.
Amompharetos had not been present at that council, is scarcely credible in itself and has the air of a makeshift to get round what the historian himself felt to be an improbability. The retirement of the various divisions of the army cannot have been attempted simultaneously. It was an operation of much delicacy for an army of nearly 100,000 to fall back over hilly ground in the dark, especially if we accept au pied de la lettre the account of the demoralisation produced in the Greek force by the incessant attacks of the cavalry. Not until the centre was on the march did Pausanias give the word to his own brigade. The retirement was evidently intended to take place by divisions. It was timed to begin at the second night-watch, i.e. about midnight. The sum total of the retiring centre, according to Herodotos, was about 39,000 men. The battle was fought in the month of July-August, when day begins to break between half-past four and five. A simple calculation from these data brings us to the conclusion that the manoeuvre could not have been executed within the time allowed. The Athenian division, deliberately or not, made the mistake of not marching first: they were consequently delayed by the clumsiness and unwieldiness of the centre, and the Spartans themselves were surprised by daylight as they advanced towards Mount Kithairon.

The failure of the scheme must be traced to the tactical unskilfulness of the Greek commanders. In the battles of the pre-Alexandrine age in Greece nothing is more striking than the absence of tactics, and this in spite of the brilliant success attending the combinations of the few tacticians who passed meteor-like across the horizon of Hellas. In 479 B.C. it is almost too early to speak of tactics in connection with Greek armies: their movements are still somewhat haphazard and capricious. Pausanias set his officers a task beyond their powers. They had succeeded in the advance from the first to the second position; but in the retrograde movement, with all its complications of direction and its nice adjustment of the divisions to the work of mutual support in the offensive designed by the Spartan general, the commanders of the contingents utterly failed. The army was split up into separate bodies.

1 ix. 53 : θάνατῳ τε ὅσῳ τῷ ποιεόμενον, άτε οὐ παραγενόμενος τῷ προτέρῳ λόγῳ.
2 The following also occurs to me,—that Athenian wit gave this turn to the facts in order to exhibit a quasi-comic reductio ad absurdum of the boasted Spartan principle as laid down by Demaratos, Herod. vii. 104: 'Law forbids them to flee in battle, whatever the number of their foes, and requires them to stand firm and either to conquer or to die.' The Athenians must have been as weary of hearing this as the Spartans themselves were of hearing about Marathon (Thuc. i. 73).
3 Recent Greek history affords an instructive parallel.
4 ix. 53: Παυσανίης δὲ ὅρων σφέας ἀπαλλασσόμενος ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ παρῆγγελλε καὶ τούτω λακεδαιμονιάζοντι.
5 ix. 51: ἕκαστος τῷ νυκτὶ ζητότα δεινόρθος φυλακή, ὡς ἦν μὴ Ἵσιλατο οἱ Πέρσαι θριμμευμένοι καὶ σφέας ἐπόμενοι παράδοσον οἱ ἱππόται.
6 ix. 56: τούτω δὲ ἔτρεκε ἀνακρυμμένως πρὸς ἑαυτοῖς ἥπας κατελάβατε.
7 It is instructive to notice that it is precisely when in conflict with foreign troops that tactics and strategy are exhibited by the Greek generals, in the earlier period of Greek history. For the whole principle governing such contests was quite other than that governing the inter-tribal wars. Hence the battles of Marathon, Salamis, and Plataiai stand apart in interest in this respect. It is a difference that is not explicable merely by reference to our fuller knowledge of the details of the operations.
but the rare steadiness of the men retrieved the blunders of their leaders. Plataiai also was a 'soldiers' battle,—one of the finest ever won by the 'Dorian spear.'

NOTE A.

On the Application of the Name Asopos in Herodotos.

Mr. Grundy (p. 18 fol.) finds in the use of the name Asopos the 'real difficulty' in the account of the operations at Plataiai, and suggests that its solution lies in the assumption that Herodotos used the name in two senses:

(1) The main stream of the Asopos, called by Leake the Thespian Asopos.
(2) The stream that takes its rise in the Apotripi stream (stream A in Mr. Grundy's map: cf. Leake, North. Gr. 333).

He bases his opinion upon the following arguments:

(1) The Greek second position was defined by the Spring Gargaphia and the monument of Androkrates, which lay in the plain 'less than three-quarters of a mile from Plataea.' Yet, at the end of chap. 30, in speaking of the same position, Herodotos uses the words μεν των ταχέων ἐπὶ τῷ ἀσοπῷ ἐστρατευθέντος.
(2) The expression just quoted is followed in the very next sentence (chap. 31) by the words παρῆκαν, τυθόμενοι τοῖς Ἑλλήνες ἐν τῷ Πλαταιᾷ, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῷ ἐσωτήρ τῷ στόμα.

From this, Mr. Grundy concludes that the reference in the first passage is to the tributary A, and that the addition of the words τῶν ταύτης βόστα, 'not evidently referring directly to the Asopus at the end of chapter 30, but to the words ἐν Πλαταιᾷ, leaves no 'reasonable doubt that the stream here mentioned is the main Asopus.'

In chap. 40 (μέχρι μὲν γὰρ τοῦ Ἀσοποῦ ἐπίσκεψις οἱ Βάρβαροι κ.τ.λ.) the reference is again to the main or Thespian Asopos.

Reading further (p. 26), we find that this hypothesis of a twofold signification of the name has apparently been prepared in order to surmount the difficulty presented by the statement in chap 51, that the 'island' lay 10 stades 'from the Asopos and Gargaphia' (τῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἀσοποῦ καὶ τῆς κρήνης τῆς Γαργαφίας, ἐπὶ ἐστρατευθέντος τότε, δέκα σταδίων ἀπόστασιν).

We must altogether reject Mr. Grundy's suggestion. The name Asopos is applied by Herodotos consistently to the main stream, and to it only. If Mr. Grundy is right in taking Leake to task (p. 45) for calling the large Krickaki stream the Asopos, it is somewhat strange to find that he himself applies the name to the insignificant brook A on the ground that it can be seen from the walls of Plataiai, while the main river is invisible (p. 26).

It is in the highest degree improbable that two distinct senses of the word should have been so closely combined as in the two consecutive sentences quoted from chaps. 30, 31. In so far as Mr. Grundy's hypothesis rests upon the locality to be assigned to the monument of Androkrates, it has already been refuted. It is also partly the outcome of a too great rigidity in the translation of the phrase ἐπὶ τῷ ἀσοπῷ. Mr. Grundy is concerned to show that the army was literally astride the brook (p. 21). The preposition is used in its technical military sense, which would not conflict even with the ordinary acceptation of the situation of the heroön. (Cf. chap. 38 τῶν δ' ἐπὶ τῷ ἀσοπῷ Μαρκℏου μεμισθών...ἔθετο: which does not mean literally on the banks.) There is no mystery in the addition of the words τῶν ταύτης βόστα to the name Asopos in the second passage. They merely indicate the change of position to another portion of the river. It would surely have been strange to remark simply that the Persians also advanced to the Asopos,

1 Aesch. Pers. 812 fol.
seeing that they had been encamped on that river since the commencement of the operations (cf. chap. 19: ἵππον τε δὲ τῶν παραβάτων ἐνὶ τῷ ἀσπιᾷ στρατηγευμένων). The words mean little more than 'to this precise point.' Even admitting them to have some special signification, it would surely follow from Mr. Grundy's confession that they refer to the words ἐν Πλαταιᾷ (p. 19), that Herodotus meant thereby the stream A1, which takes its rise in the direction of Plataiai.

When we reach chap. 40, Mr. Grundy decides, on what criteria I know not, that the Asopos there mentioned, is 'certainly the main or Thespian Asopus.' This, taken in conjunction with the rest of his topography, necessitates the adoption of a theory as to three 'developments' of the second Greek position (p. 19). It would surely have been simpler to keep to the first hypothesis, that the Asopos upon which the Greeks lay was the stream A1, than to pile up this new hypothesis in order after all to bring the Greeks to the main stream.

There remains the passage relative to the situation of the 'Island.' If we take the Asopos from which the 10 stades are measured to be the main river, then the given co-ordinates (10 stades from Gargaphia, and 10 stades from Asopos) bring us to Leake's 'Island,' a position which Mr. Grundy has shown to be impossible (p. 23 fol.). Yet if the Spring Gargaphia is rightly identified with the Ἀποτρίπη, it becomes obvious impossible to argue that Herodotus measured from the stream A1, as his starting-point in that case could only be either the source or the mouth of the stream. The source is impossible as it coincides with the spring. The mouth is equally impossible as that is on the line of the Thespian Asopus, which line is out of the question, as already remarked. I suggest that Κ' (= 20) has dropped out before the ΚΟΙ. We should read Κ' ἵππον τῷ ἀσπιᾷ τῷ Παραβάτῳ ἐνὶ τῷ ἀσπιᾷ στρατηγευμένῳ τὸ εὖς διὰ σταθμὸς ἀπέπλησα. The tract of ground identified as the 'Island' by Mr. Grundy lies almost exactly 20 stades from the Thespian Asopus.

The latest utterances of Mr. Grundy (Classical Review, April 1898, p. 161), in answer to Mr. Frazer, simply re-affirm his views, with the additional conjecture that in the application of the name Asopos to the stream A1 Herodotus has preserved the local custom of the Plataians!

NOTE B.

On the Chronology of the Operations at Plataiai.

The views advanced in the preceding pages necessarily involve the rejection or the modification of the chronological items embedded in the narrative of Herodotus. Herodotus does not tell us how long the Greeks remained in their first position, on the breast of Mount Kithairon. We are informed, however, that the two armies had been encamped opposite to each other already eight days before Mardonios was advised to close the pass through which the Greeks received their supplies (ix. 39). The pass was actually closed at nightfall of the same day. The expression of Herodotus is ambiguous: it is not clear what is the point of departure involved in the words ἴππον τῷ ἀσπιᾷ τῷ Παραβάτῳ ἐνὶ τῷ ἀσπιᾷ στρατηγευμένῳ τῷ ἐγείροντα ἐκτά. Are the eight days to be counted from the marshalling of the troops in the second position? Such seems to be the generally accepted view, but it has always appeared to me somewhat of a marvel that historians should credit this reflection upon the intelligence of the Persian general. If Herodotus really meant that the Greeks had been eight days in the second position before the pass was blocked, I should see in the statement but one more instance of the working of national antipathy. The Greeks cannot allow the invaders to have possessed ordinary common sense. Obvious as was the stroke of blocking the main artery of the Greek communications, the tradition puts it to the credit of Timagenidas, a renegade Theban it is true, but still a Greek (ix. 38 fol.). Mardonios, to my mind, was more than a match for his opponents in point of military skill, and an explanation more in accordance with the probabilities of the case must be sought. The words quoted bear reference to and date from the first day that the two armies found themselves face to face in the first position. The pass was closed as soon as the evacuation of the lines on Mount Kithairon threw it open to attack. The Greeks abandoned their first position within the week.

In precisely the same way must we interpret the words in chap. 41: ὡς δὲ ἐνδεκάτη ἐγείρονε ἡμέρα ἀντισταθμένοι ἐν Πλαταιᾷ. The expression ἐν Πλαταιᾷ simply indicates the theatre of
operations, and does not restrict us to the second position. The eleven days in this case also are reckoned from the opening of the campaign. Whether this was indeed the intention of Herodotos must be left undecided.

The next note of time is given in the important words at the opening of chap. 40: 'after this the armies waited two more days' (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸ ἑργον ἑκάστρα ἐνα ἡμέρας διήτριψαν, οὐθέτεροι βουλήμενοι μάχης ἱράζαντα). What are the two termini involved in this expression? With regard to the event from which the reckoning is made no doubt is possible: it is, as Herodotos says, the closing of the pass. When we ask to what conspicuous event in the development of the drama the two days' interval brings us, the reply is vague and unsatisfactory. For they are followed by the resolution of Mardonios to end this idle delay; and yet two days more intervene before his purpose is accidentally accomplished. As it stands, the sentence is meaningless. It becomes intelligible only upon the view already developed.

The eleventh day is devoted to the consultation of his Staff by Mardonios (ix. 41). Alexander's visit to the Greek outposts takes place at midnight (ix. 44). On the twelfth day occur the challenge of Mardonios, and the cavalry attacks which culminate in the loss of the Spring Gargaphia: the Greek generals determine to fall back upon the 'Island' (ix. 48 fol.). During the night the army evacuates the second position (ix. 52 fol.). In the early morning of the thirteenth day the final battle is fought (ix. 56 fol.).

Now we have already seen that we must cut out as fictitious items the consultation, the visit, the challenge, and perhaps also the loss of the spring,—that is to say, the whole of the matter allotted to the eleventh and twelfth days, with the exception of the deliberation of the Greek generals. The evacuation of the second position and the final struggle must therefore be antedated by two days, and be assigned to the night of the tenth day and the morning of the eleventh day respectively. In other words, the event to which the reckoning is made in the sentence quoted from chap. 40 ('after this the armies waited two more days') is the final battle itself, which took place two days after the closing of the pass of Dryoskephalai.

The story, as given by Herodotos, imperatively requires a somewhat protracted stay in the second position on the part of the Greeks. It was also clearly impossible, from their very nature, that the interpolated episodes of the consultation, the challenge, etc. should immediately follow the adoption of that position. Herodotos has consequently duplicated the interval between the closing of the pass and the final battle. He may perhaps be acquitted of the mistake already pointed out, by which a further addition of eight days is made to the time spent in the second position.

My idea is that when their offensive failed the Greeks at once retired, i.e., at midnight of the tenth day, reckoning from their first appearance on the northern slopes of Mount Kithairon. They were not more than three days in the second position.

Hence my diary of the operations is as follows:

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The usual scheme gives in addition:

1. An unknown number of days in the first position.
2. Eight days in second position before the closing of the pass.
3. Two days of purposeless waiting after the closing of the pass.
4. Two days devoted to Persian Council, the Challenge, and blocking of the spring.
The result of the usual scheme is that the battle was fought on the thirteenth day after the occupation of the second position, and Thebes is reached on the twenty-third day after the same event. If the same generous measure is used in meting out the time spent in the first position, the Greeks must have been four or five weeks on the Asopos. Could a force of one hundred thousand men have kept the field for that length of time in the fifth century B.C? The case is very different from that of a blockade, in which one side has an absolute superiority. Lastly, how explain on the ordinary theory the arrival of the Mantineians and Eleans too late to take part in the battle (ix. 77)? An explanation cannot be found in the closing of the passes, as one at least remained open to the end; nor, if such had been the reason, would the leaders of those contingents have been banished for failure to arrive in time. On the view here presented, ten days covered the whole series of operations previous to the final catastrophe; and the two Peloponnesian contingents may well have found that events before Plataiai outstripped their progress to the seat of war.

W. J. W.