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ON THE HISTORY OF THE ARISTOTELIAN WRITINGS.

On the History of the Process by which the Aristotelian Writings arrived at their present Form, by the late R. SHUTE. Oxford. 7s. 6d.

THIS essay was written for the Conington Prize in 1882. It is matter for deep regret that it was not published at the time and that it now sees the light in an unrevised shape. It is stated in the memoir of the author that 'his intention had been to go over in a thorough way the bases of Aristotelian study. He had got beyond the results here published, but had not time to correct them or record his later impressions and acquisitions.' This being so, disappointment is inevitable.

After a lively statement of the problem, the history of Aristotle's works is traced to the time of Alexander Aphrodisiensis. Any one who takes the trouble to compare the second chapter of Grote's Aristotle will feel convinced that the essayist has the advantage in greater fulness of detail and in a more critical attitude. He tells the Sceptis story afresh, but he is careful to point out the variations of the version in Athenaeus. He has one or two novel suggestions: that Polybius got from the treatise *Περὶ φιλάας*, (that is, *Eth. Nic.* viii. ix.) his account of the true succession of constitutions, though without knowing these two books to be Aristotle's: further, that in the Aristotelian works themselves there is no evidence in favour of the supposed quarrel between Aristotle and Isocrates, but a very considerable presumption the other way. Cicero's evidence seems to us somewhat strained, and more might have been made of the undoubtedly spurious works in the canon: e.g. not a word of the *De Mundo* in connexion with Nicolaus Damascenus or any one else.

We pass on to Mr. Shute's original contributions. He very decidedly pronounces the titles of the various treatises, and the

cross-references from one to the other, to be post-Aristotelian. He thinks that the reference-maker was sometimes doubtful either of the authenticity or the value of the work quoted. A noticeable instance of this class, according to him, is the passage in the *Politics*, iv. (vii.) 13, 1332a 7 sqq. *φαμὲν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὀφελος, κ.τ.λ.* 'Whoever put in that reference,' we read, 'did so at a time when some question had been raised as to the *Nicomachean Ethics*. He himself, apparently, to some extent shared the doubt, whatever it was' (p. 112). What a strange fancy! Why, in the summary at p. 177 of this very essay there is a paragraph beginning in precisely the same way, 'if there be any value in these conclusions,' assuredly without implying mock-modesty or doubt. Mr. Shute also holds that it was the reference-makers who cited the *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*, and that by this term they meant the dialogues, now lost, speaking of them slightly and disparagingly in comparison with 'the esoteric and unpublished works' in their own keeping. 'Peripatetic philosophers, in giving their wares to the world, took care to inform that world that they had much more valuable goods in reserve, which could only be obtained by direct initiation and oral instruction. Thus they talk of the dialogues under the general and somewhat contemptuous name of the external doctrine (*sic*), without taking the trouble to specify what special dialogue the doctrine is to be found in' (p. 103). The value of this as an explanation of the distinction between exoteric and esoteric (or acroamatic) is much impaired by the reluctant admission made tentatively and hypothetically, it is true, on p. 167. 'If we adopt the theory that these two books,' the books on the best constitution, vii. (iv.) and viii. (v.) of the *Politics*, 'represent Aristotle's finished style, and that nothing unfinished was ever given to the general public during

his life-time or with his consent, we shall arrive at some very convenient results. In the first place we shall be able to admit that there is some value to be given even during Aristotle's lifetime to the distinction between exoteric and esoteric, though of course not precisely that which even our earliest authorities give to it; still less that which later Romanists like Aulus Gellius, or slapdash writers like Plutarch, gave to it. Had Mr. Shute more fully considered this alternative suggestion he might have seen his way to abandoning the other, which rests upon very insecure foundations. He says himself (p. 21) that he cannot attach much weight to Bernays' identification of the 'exoteric discourses' with the dialogues: in fact, we may remark, the identification is open to such grave objections that it is now generally discredited. Taken as a whole, the treatment of the Aristotelian citations appears to have suffered from the hasty composition of the essay. There would have been great propriety in giving a complete list of them with a discussion in detail; there is certainly room for such a list even after the full and lucid statement to be found in the *Index Aristotelicus* of Bonitz, pp. 97-105 (which by some unaccountable slip is three times attributed to Brandis). It would have been as well to examine whether they are of a uniform type, whether they can always be easily detached from the context. Here the contrast with the undoubtedly spurious treatises in the canon is instructive. There are no references in the *De Mundo*, in the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, or in the half dozen *Opuscula Varia*. The *De Plantis* alone contains a choice specimen: it was no clumsy imitation of the stereotyped form ὡς περ εἶρηται ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς which gave birth to the monster in *De Plantis* II. c. 2, ad init. ἐκτεθείκαμεν δὲ αἰτίας περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τῶν πηγῶν καὶ τῶν ποταμῶν ἐν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ βιβλίῳ τῷ περὶ μετεώρων, ἐν ᾧ εἵπομεν κ.τ.λ. Such is the happy inspiration which seizes a forger desirous of inserting a reference. Then there are the internal references—the references in a given treatise to the preceding or succeeding portions of it, which are far more numerous than the citations of other treatises. Take the *Politics*: it refers six times to the *Ethics*, once to the *Poetic*, twice to the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι and, as Mr. Shute thinks, three or four times to the *Oeconomica*. (This is an enigmatic remark: besides 1330a 3, 33, the former a doubtful case, Bonitz gives no other reference to the *Oeconomica*. Possibly Mr. Shute had in view 1326b 33, 1335b 4.) These

are all the cross-references in the *Politics*, but some 140 internal references have been enumerated, mostly of the type *supra*, *infra*, *alio loco*, and at least a dozen of them are unfulfilled promises, so far as the extant treatise is concerned. Now to separate the two classes of references and to treat exclusively of the one seems undesirable. However that may be, since 1882 Birt's treatise has thrown fresh light upon the publication of ancient books. The most conservative of critics will now readily admit that the division into books is not Aristotle's, and that when the system of publishing larger works in a number of separate rolls was once introduced it was very natural to supply, where necessary, transitional passages from one 'book' of a treatise to another. Andronicus, or whoever subsequent to this change brought out an edition of Aristotle, may very possibly have done this in certain cases. Nay more; if he brought out a complete edition he may have inserted, or completed and supplemented, the system of cross-references, and his ὅστερον or πρότερον may denote no more than that he adhered to a fixed order. But this requires to be established in detail, and Mr. Shute has by no means made out his case that the references frequently involve mistakes as to doctrine or fact. More important is it to insist that all this, which may be conceded, is hardly any ground for modifying our previous views as to the nature of the text. It is incontestable that most of the writings subsequently called Aristotelian received some sort of publication in pre-Andronican times; that the treatment of a subject by the master and the school was from the first kept distinct; that a course by Theophrastus on First Philosophy or *Politics* or the history of Physical Doctrines, or a course by Eudemus on Physics or Ethics, was at the time in no danger of being mistaken for, or confounded with, one by Aristotle. Had it been otherwise surely we should have had more anachronisms, as we see by the *Historia* and *De Causis Plantarum*.

Coming now to the repetitions in the text, Mr. Shute did most valuable service by publishing in *Analecta Oxoniensia* the duplicate version of *Physics*, B. VII. On p. 119 he condemns both versions as spurious. But what becomes of his theory as to their origin when we find in the catalogue of Diogenes Laertius this double entry, (45) περὶ κινήσεως α, (115) περὶ κινήσεως α? Must we not infer, with Diels, that the library whence Diogenes' authority ultimately de-

rived his catalogue already possessed the 'first text' and the 'second text' of *Physics* B. VII., which we hear of in Simplicius? If so, it was not between the times of Alexander Aphrodisiensis and Simplicius that the double text arose (or, as Mr. Shute would say, the one text was differentiated into two): on the contrary, the two texts are carried back to the Alexandrine age: this is admitted for Diogenes' catalogue (p. 93). Thus one way of accounting for repetitions fails the first time it is tried. Next it is applied to the two texts, as they are called, of the *Politics*. This seems unfortunate. There is hardly a vestige of evidence that rival schools of commentators ever took up the *Politics* in the way in which Alexander, Themistius, Philoponus, Simplicius and others worked away at the *Physics*: and it is not to the labours of rival schools, but rather to time and careless copying, or the revision of Byzantine pedants, that one would ascribe such discrepancies as are found in the *Politics* between two classes of manuscripts, or between all extant manuscripts and the *Versio Antiqua*. Mr. Shute is on his own ground, however, when he shows from *Physics*, VII. (p. 127 sqq.) how, when two texts had in whatever way arisen, the copyists were sure in the course of time to make confusion worse confounded by 'contamination'; how the variant was certain to creep first into the margin and then into the text. This, which is all excellent, is then applied to the far more complex case of *De Anima*, II. III., whether rightly or wrongly remains to be seen. The last two chapters of the essay are intended to exemplify the positions previously laid down, especially as to citations and repetitions, by a closer examination of the *Ethics* and *Politics*. The latter work is said to consist of two parts, six books of political lectures and the 'finished (*sic*) tract

of the Perfect State.' Here, strange to say, the analysis might have been carried further. Birt (*Das antike Buchwesen*, p. 459, n. 3) at once fastened on book E, on *Revolutions*, as a separate treatise: nor is the connexion of books Δ Z either with the first three, or with 'the tract of the Perfect State,' one whit less obscure than the connexion between those two portions of the work themselves. Are we then to amend Mr. Shute's 'certain result' and say that the *Politics* is made up, not of two, but of *four* independent treatises of different classes? Before this be done it is worth while to weigh well the indications pointed out by Susemihl some time ago, and quite recently by Mr. Newman, of unity of plan and structure pervading the work, although none of its various parts fits exactly with the others. For example, the writer who sketches a perfect state is found to embody exactly the good points which are praised, and to avoid exactly the bad points which are censured, in the constitutions reviewed in B. II. The essay supposes that the two books containing a sketch of the Perfect State 'whoever was their author, were not written as part of the general course to which the remaining books of the *Politics* belong.' Then how to explain these 'undesigned coincidences'?

We take leave of this essay with the conviction that it is creditable to English scholarship. It is not probable that it would have won acceptance for its conclusions, even if published while they were held as yet unchanged by the writer himself. But it really grapples with its subject, it sets the reader thinking perforce, and displays qualities as rare as they are intrinsically valuable in research of this kind, originality to seize novel points and courage to follow out every hypothesis to its conclusions.

R. D. HICKS.

ROSCHER'S MYTHOLOGICAL LEXICON.

ARTICLES ON ROMAN RELIGION AND MYTHOLOGY.

THESE articles form only a small portion of the twelve parts of the Lexicon which have as yet appeared, and are altogether inferior in interest, and perhaps also in workmanship, to the extensive mass of writing on the Greek deities so elaborately and ably criticised by Mr. Farnell in recent numbers of this Review. A long delay seems to have occurred in the publication of the thirteenth

part, which is to contain an account of the Italian Hercules; and this delay may mean, it is to be hoped, that as the more important figures in the Roman religion are approached, the contributors are taking greater pains, and the editor exercising his rights with greater vigilance.

For in spite of the labour bestowed on some of the articles, and the learning brought to-