II.—THE AMBIGUITY OF TRUTH.

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THE purpose of this paper is to bring to a clear issue, and so possibly to the prospect of a settlement, the conflict of opinion now raging in the philosophic world as to the nature of the conception of 'truth'. This issue is an essential part of the greater conflict between the old intellectualist and the new 'pragmatist' school of thought which extends over the whole field of philosophy. For, in consequence of the difference between the aims and methods of the two schools, there is probably no intellectualist treatment of any problem which does not need, and will not bear, restatement in voluntarist terms. But the clash of these two great antithetical attitudes towards life is certainly more dramatic at some points than at others. The influence of belief upon thought, its value and function in knowledge, the relation of 'theory' to 'practice,' the possibility of abstracting from emotional interest, and of ignoring in logic the psychological conditions of all judgment, the connexion between knowing and being, 'truth' and 'fact,' 'origin' and 'validity,' the question of how and how far the real which is said to be 'discovered' is really 'made,' the 'plasticity' and determinable indetermination of reality, the contribution of voluntary acceptance to the constitution of 'fact,' the nature of purpose and of 'mechanism,' the value of teleology, the all-controlling presence of value-judgments and the inter-relations of their various forms, the proper meaning of 'reason,' 'faith,' 'thought,' 'will,' 'freedom,' 'necessity,' all these are critical points at which burning questions have arisen or may arise, and at all of them the new philosophy seems able to provide a distinctive and consistent treatment. Thus there is throughout the field every promise of interesting discoveries and of a successful campaign for a thoroughgoing voluntarism that unsparingly uproots the intellectualist tradition.

But the aim of the present paper must be restricted. It will be confined to one small corner of the battlefield, *viz.* to the single question of the making of 'truth' and the

meaning of a term which is more often mouthed in a passion of unreasoning loyalty than subjected to calm and logical analysis. I propose, to show (1) that such analysis is necessary and possible; (2) that it results in a problem which the current intellectualist logic can neither dismiss nor solve; (3) that to discard the abstractions of this formal logic at once renders this problem simple and soluble; (4) that to solve it is to establish the pragmatist criterion of truth; (5) that the resulting definition of truth unifies experience and rationalises a well-established classification of the sciences; and (6) I shall conclude with a twofold challenge to intellectualist logicians, failure to meet which will, I think, bring out with all desirable clearness that their system at present is as devoid of intellectual completeness as it is of practical fecundity.

My design, it will be seen, deliberately rules out the references to questions of belief, desire, and will, and their ineradicable influence upon cognition, with which Voluntarism has made so much effective play, and this although I am keenly conscious both that their presence as psychical facts in all knowing is hardly open to denial,¹ and that their recognition is essential to the full appreciation of our case. But I am desirous of meeting our adversaries as far as possible on their own ground, that of abstract logic, and of giving them every advantage of position. And so, even at the risk of reducing the real interest of my subject, I will discuss it on the ground of as 'pure,' i.e., as *formal*, a logic as is compatible with the continuance of actual thinking. In other words, I will attempt as 'cut and dried' an analysis of truth as will retain any real meaning, and though I may possibly succeed better with the 'cutting' than with the 'drying,' I would deprecate beforehand objections on the score of the dulness which may probably ensue from the unnatural limitations placed upon my topic.

I. Let us begin then with the problem of analysing the conception of 'truth,' and, to clear up our ideas, let us first observe the extension of the term. We may safely lay it down that the use of truth is *ἰδιον ἀνθρώπου*, a habit peculiar to man. Animals, that is, do not attain to or use the conception. They do not effect discriminations within their experience by means of the predicates 'true' and 'false'. Again, even the philosophers who have been most prodigal

¹ In point of fact such denial has never been attempted: the inquiries as to how a 'pure' thought, abstracted from the psychological conditions of actual thinking, can validly be considered by logic have merely been ignored.

of dogmas concerning the nature of an 'infinite' intelligence (whatever that may mean!), have evinced much hesitation about attributing to it the discursive procedures of our own, and have usually hinted that it would transcend the predication of truth and falsehood. As being then a specific peculiarity of the human mind the conception of 'truth' seems closely analogous to that of 'good' and of 'beautiful,' which seem as naturally to possess antithetical predicates in the 'bad' and the 'ugly,' as the 'true' does in the 'false'. And it may be anticipated that when our psychology has quite outgrown the materialistic prejudices of its adolescence it will probably regard all these habits of judging experiences as just as distinctive and ultimate features of mental process as are the ultimate facts of our perception. In a sense therefore the predications of 'good' and 'bad,' 'true' and 'false,' etc., may take rank with the experiences of 'sweet,' 'red,' 'loud,' 'hard,' etc., as ultimate facts which need be analysed no further.¹

We may next infer that by a *truth* we mean a proposition to which this attribute 'true' has somehow been attached, and which, consequently, is envisaged *sub specie veri*. The *truth* therefore is the totality of things to which this mode of treatment is applied or applicable, whether or not this extends over the whole of our experience.

If now all propositions which involve this predication of truth really deserved it, if all that professes and seems to be 'true' were really true, no difficulty would arise. Things would be 'true' or 'false' as simply and unambiguously as they are 'sweet' or 'sour,' 'red' or 'blue,' and nothing could disturb our judgments or convict them of illusion. But in the sphere of knowledge such, notoriously, is not the case. Our anticipations are often falsified, our claims prove frequently untenable. Our truths may turn out to be false, our goods to be bad: falsehood and error are as rampant as evil in the world of our experience.

This fact compels us (1) to an enlargement, and (2) to a distinction, in the realm of truth. For the logician 'truth' becomes a problem, enlarged so as to include 'falsity' as well, and so, strictly, our problem is the contemplation of experience *sub specie veri et falsi*. Secondly, if not all that claims truth is true, must we not distinguish this initial claim from whatever procedure subsequently justifies or validates it? *Truth, therefore, will become ambiguous.* It will mean

¹ The purport of this remark is to confute the notion, which seems dimly to underlie some intellectualist criticisms, that the specific character of the truth-predication is ignored in pragmatist quarters.

primarily a claim which may or may not turn out to be valid. It will mean, secondarily, such a claim *after* it has been tested and ratified, by processes which it behoves us to examine. In the first sense, as a claim, it will always have to be regarded with suspicion. For we shall not know whether it is really and fully true, and we shall tend to reserve this honourable predicate for what has victoriously sustained its claim. And once we realise that *a claim to truth is involved in every assertion as such*, our vigilance will be sharpened. A claim to truth, being inherent in assertion as such, will come to seem a formal and trivial thing, worth noting once for all, but possessing little real interest for knowledge. A formal logic, therefore, which restricts itself to the registration of such formal claims, we shall regard as solemn trifling; but it will seem a matter of vital importance and of agonised inquiry what it is that validates such claims and makes them really true. And with regard to any 'truth' that is asserted, our first demand will be to know what is *de facto* its condition, whether it sets forth what has been fully validated, or whether it is still a mere, and possibly a random, claim. For this evidently will make all the difference to the meaning and logical value of an assertion. That ' $2 + 2 = 4$ ' and that 'truth is indefinable' stand, *e.g.*, logically on a very different footing: the one is part of a tried and tested system of arithmetical truth, the other the desperate refuge of a bankrupt or indolent theory.

Under such conditions far-reaching confusions could be avoided only by the unobtrusive operation of a beneficent providence. But that such miraculous intervention should guard logicians against the consequences of their negligence was hardly to be hoped for, and accordingly we find, *e.g.*, Prof. A. E. Taylor first laying it down that "true propositions are those which have an unconditional *claim* on our recognition" (of them as *valid* or merely of their *claim*?), and then pronouncing that "truth is just the system of propositions which have an unconditional *claim* to be recognised as *valid*".¹

¹ In his interesting article on "Truth and Practice" in *Phil. Rev.* for May, 1905, pp. 271, 288. Italics mine. This confusion is repeatedly exemplified; *e.g.*, p. 273, "the truth of a statement means not the actual fact of its recognition" (*i.e.*, its *de facto* validity), "but its *rightful claim* on our recognition," p. 274, also on pp. 276 and 278. Prof. Taylor does not distinguish between 'claim' and 'right' and so has not seen that the question of truth is one as to when and how a 'claim' is to be recognised as 'rightful'. But he errs in the company of his master. It would be difficult to express the ambiguity we are criticising more compactly than Mr. Bradley does in the following sentences (*MIND*, N.S., 20, p. 470). "About the *truth* of this Law" (of Contradiction) "so far

Prof. Taylor wisely does not tell us how the clamorousness of a claim is going to establish its validity, but it is clear that his failure to observe the distinction demolishes his definition of truth. It is evident moreover that not much can be expected from theories which have overlooked so vital a distinction. Their unawareness of it will vitiate all their discussions of the nature of 'truth,' by which they will mean now the one sense, now the other, and now both, in inextricable fallacy.

II. Our provisional analysis, therefore, has resulted in our detecting an important ambiguity in the conception of truth which, unless it can be cleared up, must hopelessly vitiate all discussion. In view of this distressing situation it becomes our bounden duty to inquire *how an accepted truth may be distinguished from a mere claim, and how a claim to truth may be validated*. For any logic which aims at dealing with actual thinking the urgency of this inquiry can hardly be exaggerated. But even the most 'purely' intellectual and futilely formal theory of knowledge can hardly refuse to undertake it. For the ambiguity which raises the problem is absolutely all-pervading. And, as we saw, a formal claim to truth is coextensive with the sphere of logical judgment. We are always liable, therefore, to misinterpret every judgment. We may take as a validated truth what in point of fact is really an unsupported claim. But inasmuch as such a claim may always be erroneous, we are constantly in danger of accepting as validly true what, if tested, would be utterly untenable. Every assertion is ambiguous, and as it shows no outward indication of what it really means, we can hardly be said to know the meaning of any assertion whatsoever. On any view of logic, the disastrous and demoralising consequences of such a situation may be imagined. It is imperative therefore to distinguish sharply between the formal inclusion of a statement in the sphere of *truth-or-falsity*, and its incorporation into a system of tested truth. For unless we do so, we simply court deception.

This possibility of deception, moreover, becomes the more serious when we realise how impotent our formal logic is

as it applies, there is in my opinion no question. The question will be rather as to how far the Law applies and how far *therefore it is true*." The first proposition is either a truism or false. It is a truism if 'truth' is taken in the sense of 'claim'; for it then only states that a claim is good if the question of its application is waived. In any other sense of 'truth' it is false (or rather self-contradictory), since it admits that there is a question about the application of the 'Law'. In the second proposition it is implied that 'truth' depends not on the mere claim, but on the possibility of application.

to conceive this indispensable distinction and to guard us against so fatal a confusion. Instead of proving a help to the logician it here becomes a snare, by reason of the fundamental abstraction of its standpoint. For if, following Mr. Alfred Sidgwick's brilliant lead, we describe as formal logic every treatment of our cognitive processes which abstracts from the concrete application of our logical functions to actual cases of knowing, it is easy to see that the meaning of an assertion can never be determined apart from the actual application. From the mere verbal form, that is, we cannot tell whether we are dealing with a valid judgment or a sheer claim. To settle this, we must go behind the statement: we must go into the rights of the case. Meaning depends upon purpose, and purpose is a question of fact, of the context and use of the form of words in actual knowing. But all this is just what the abstract standpoint of formal logic forbids us to examine. It conceives the meaning of a proposition to be somehow inherent in it as a form of words, apart from its use. And so when it finds that the same words may be used to convey a variety of meanings in various contexts, it solemnly declares the form of judgment to be as such ambiguous, even though in each actual case of use the meaning intended may be perfectly clear to the meanest understanding! It seems to me extremely doubtful, therefore, whether a genuine admission of the validity of our distinction could be extracted from any formal logician. For it is greatly to be feared that even if he could be induced to admit it in words, he would yet insist on treating it too as purely formal, and rule out on principle attempts to determine how *de facto* the distinction was established and employed.

Although, therefore, our distinction appears to be as clear as it is important, it does not seem at all certain that it would be admitted by the logicians who are so enamoured of truth in the abstract that they have ceased to recognise it in the concrete. More probably they would protest that logic was being conducted back to the old puzzle of a general criterion of truth and error, and would adduce the failures of their predecessors as a valid excuse for their present apathy. Or at most they might concede that a distinction between a truth and a claim to truth must indeed be made, but allege that it could not take any but a negative form. The sole criterion of truth, that is, which can be given, is that truth is not self-contradictory or incoherent. This statement, of course, is merely dogmatic assertion: it can hardly inspire confidence so long as it precedes and precludes examination

of the positive solutions of the problem, and assumes the conceptions of 'self-contradiction' or 'incoherence' as the simplest things in the world. In point of fact neither of them has been adequately analysed by intellectualist logicians, nor is either of them naturally so translucent as to shed a flood of light on any subject. As, however, I cannot now enter upon their obscurities, it must suffice to remark that Capt. Knox's masterly article in the April (1905) number of *MIND*¹ contains ample justification for what I have said about the principle of contradiction. If on the other hand the 'negative criterion' be stated in the form of incoherence, I would inquire merely how intellectualist logic proposes to distinguish the logical coherence, to which it appeals, from the psychological coherence, which it despises. Until this difficult (or impossible?) feat has been achieved, we may safely move on.²

III. Let us proceed therefore to discard old prejudices and to consider how in point of fact we discriminate between 'claims' and 'truths,' how the raw material of a science is elaborated into its final structure, how in short, truth is made. Now this question is not intrinsically a hopeless one. It is not even theoretically particularly difficult to answer. For it concerns essentially facts which may be observed, and with care and attention it should be possible to determine whether the procedures of the various sciences have anything in common, and if so what. By such an inductive appeal to the facts, therefore, we greatly simplify our problem, and may possibly discover its solution. Any obstacle which we may encounter will come merely from the difficulty of intelligently observing the special procedures of the many sciences and of seizing their salient points and general import; we shall not be foredoomed to failure by any intrinsic absurdity of our enterprise.

Now it would be possible, I think, to arrive at our solution by a critical examination of every known science in detail, but it is evident that this procedure would be very long and laborious. It seems better, therefore, merely to state the condensed results of such investigations. They will in this shape stand out more clearly and better exhibit the trend of an argument which runs as follows.

It being taken as established that the sphere of logic is that of the antithetical valuations 'true' and 'false,' we observe in the first place that in every science the truth or falsehood of an answer depends on its relevance to the

¹ N.S., No. 54. ² Cf. also *Humanism*, pp. 52-53.

question raised in that science. An irrelevant answer is justly treated as non-existent for that science, i.e. as, strictly, neither 'true' nor 'false'. We observe, secondly, that every science has a definitely circumscribed subject-matter, a definite method of treating it, and a definitely articulated body of interpretations. Every science, in other words, forms a system of truths about some subject. But inasmuch as every science is concerned with some aspect of our total experience, and no science deals with that whole under every aspect, it is clear that sciences arise by the limitation of subjects, the selection of standpoints, and the specialisation of methods. All these operations, however, are artificial, and in a sense arbitrary, and none of them can be conceived to come about except by the action of a purposing intelligence. It follows that the nature of the *purpose* which is pursued in a science will yield the deepest insight into its nature; for what we want to know in the science will determine the questions we put, and their bearing on the questions put will determine the standing of the answers we attain. If we can take the answers as relevant to our questions and conducive to our ends, they will yield 'truth'; if we cannot, 'falsehood'.

Seeing thus that everywhere truth and falsehood depend on the purpose which constitutes the science and are bestowed accordingly, we begin to perceive that the predicates 'true' and 'false' are not unrelated to 'good' and 'bad'. For good and bad also have reference to purpose. 'Good' is what conduces to, 'bad' what thwarts, a purpose. And so it would seem that 'true' and 'false' were valuations, forms of the 'good'-or-'bad' which indicates a reference to an end. Or, as Aristotle said long ago, in a passage the significance of which I am ashamed to have observed only quite recently, "in the case of the intelligence which is theoretical, and neither practical nor productive, its 'good' and 'bad' is 'truth' and 'falsehood'".¹

Truth then, being a valuation, has reference to a purpose. What precisely that reference is will depend on the purpose, which may extend over the whole range of human interest. But it is only in its primary aspect, as valued by individuals, that the predication of 'truth' will refer thus widely to any purpose any one may entertain in a cognitive operation. For it stands to reason that the power of constituting 'objective' truth is not granted so easily. Society exercises

¹ *Eth. Nic.*, vi., 2, 8. Cf. *De Anim.*, iii., 7, 481, b 10. where it is stated that "the true and false are in the same class with the good and bad," i.e., are valuations.

almost as severe a control over the intellectual as over the moral eccentricities and nonconformities of its members; indeed it often so organises itself as to render the recognition of *new* truth nearly impossible. Whatever therefore individuals may recognise and value as 'true,' the 'truths' which *de facto* prevail and are recognised as objective will only be a *selection* from those we are subjectively tempted to recognise. There is therefore no real danger lest this analysis should destroy the 'objectivity' of truth and enthroned subjective licence in its place.

A further convergence in our truth-valuations is produced by the natural tendency to subordinate all ends or purposes to the ultimate end or final purpose, 'the Good'. For in theory, at least, the 'goods,' and therefore the 'truths,' of all the sciences are unified and validated by their relation to the Supreme Good. In practice no doubt this ideal is far from being realised, and there arise at various points conflicts between the various sorts of values or goods, which doubtless will continue until a perfect harmony of all our purposes, scientific, moral, æsthetic and emotional has been achieved. Such conflicts may, of course, be made occasions for theatrically opposing 'truth' to 'goodness,' 'virtue' to 'happiness,' 'science' to 'art,' etc., and afford much scope for dithyrambic declamation. But a sober and clear-headed thought will not be intolerant nor disposed to treat such oppositions as final and absolute: even where under the circumstances their reality must provisionally be admitted, it will essay rather to evaluate each claim with reference to the highest conception of ultimate good which for the time being seems attainable. It will be very chary, therefore, of sacrificing either side beyond recall; it will neither allow the claims of truth to oppress those of moral virtue nor those of moral virtue to suppress art. But it will still more decidedly hold aloof from the quixotic attempt to conceive the sphere of each valuation as independent and as wholly severed from the rest.

IV. We have seen so far that truth is a form of value, and the logical judgment a valuation; but we have not yet raised the question as to what prompts us in bestowing or withholding this value, what are our guiding principles in thus evaluating our experience. The answer to this question takes us straight into the heart of Pragmatism. Nay, the answer to this question is Pragmatism, and gives the sense in which Pragmatism professes to have a criterion of truth. For the pragmatist contends that he has an answer which is simple, and open to inspection and easily tested. He

simply bids us go to the facts and observe the actual operations of our knowing. If we will but do this, we shall 'discover' that in all actual knowing the question whether an assertion is 'true' or 'false' is decided uniformly and very simply. It is decided, that is, by its consequences, by its bearing on the interest which prompted to the assertion, by its relation to the purpose which put the question. To add to this that the consequences must be *good* is superfluous. For if and so far as an assertion satisfies or forwards the purpose of the inquiry to which it owes its being, it is so far 'true'; if and so far as it thwarts or baffles it, it is unworkable, unserviceable, 'false'. And 'true' and 'false,' we have seen, are the intellectual forms of 'good' and 'bad'. Or in other words, a 'truth' is what is useful in building up a science; a 'falsehood' what is useless or noxious for this same purpose. To determine therefore whether any answer to any question is 'true' or 'false,' we have merely to note its effect upon the inquiry in which we are interested, and in relation to which it has arisen. And if these effects are favourable, the answer is 'true' and 'good' for our purpose, and 'useful' as a means to the end we pursue.¹ Here then we have exposed to view the whole rationale of Pragmatism, the source of the famous paradoxes that 'truth' depends on its consequences, that the 'true' must be 'good' and 'useful' and 'practical'. I confess that to me they have never seemed more than truisms so simple that I used to fear lest too elaborate an insistence on them should be taken as an insult to the intelligence of my readers. But experience has shown that I was too sanguine, and now I even feel impelled to guard still further against two possible misapprehensions into which an unthinking philosopher might fall.

I would venture to point out in the first place that when we said that truth was estimated by its consequences for some purpose, we were speaking subject to the social character of truth, and quite formally. What consequences are relevant to what purposes depends, of course, on the subject-matter of each science, and may sometimes be in doubt, when the question may be interpreted in several contexts. But as a rule the character of the question sufficiently de-

¹ Strictly both the 'true' and the 'false' answers are, as Mr. Sidgwick says, subdivisions of the 'relevant,' and the irrelevant is really unmeaning. But the unmeaning seems to be relevant until it is detected; it baffles our purpose as surely as the 'false,' and the 'false' answer does not mean what we meant to get, *viz.*, something we can work with, and is so far unmeaning. Hence there is no great harm in treating all that fails us as 'false'.

finds the relevant answer which can be treated as true. It is not necessary therefore seriously to contemplate absurdities such as *e.g.* the intrusion of ethical or æsthetical motives into the estimation of mathematical truths, or to refute claims that the isosceles triangle is more virtuous than the scalene, or an integer nobler than a vulgar fraction, or that gravitating bodies must move not in ellipses but in circles, because the circle is the most perfect figure. Pragmatism is far less likely to countenance such confusions than the intellectualist theories from which I drew my last illustration. In some cases doubtless, as in many problems of history and religion, there will be found deep-seated and enduring differences of opinion as to what consequences and what tests may be adduced as relevant: but these differences already exist, and are in no wise created by being recognised and explained. Pragmatism, however, by enlarging our notions of what constitutes relevant evidence is far more likely to conduce to their amicable settlement than the intellectualisms which condemn all faith as inherently irrational and irrelevant to knowledge. And ideally and in principle such disagreements as to the ends which are relevant to the estimation of any evidence are always capable of being composed by an appeal to the supreme purpose which unifies and harmonises all our ends: in practice no doubt we are hardly aware of this, nor agreed as to what it is; but the blame, surely, attaches to the distracted state of our thoughts and not to the pragmatic analysis of truth. For it would surely be preposterous to expect a mere theory of knowledge to adjudicate upon and settle offhand by sheer dint of logic all the disputed questions in all the sciences.

My second caution refers to the fact that I have made the predication of truth dependent on relevance to a proximate rather than an ultimate scientific purpose. This I have done because I believe it represents our actual procedure. The ordinary 'truths' we predicate have little or no concern with ultimate ends and realities. They are true (at least *pro tem.*) if they serve their immediate purpose. If any one hereafter chooses to question them, he is at liberty to do so, and if he can make out his case, to reject them for their inadequacy for his ulterior purposes. But even when the venue and the context of the question have thus been changed, and so its meaning, the truth of the original answer is not thereby abolished. It may have been degraded and reduced to a methodological status, but this is merely to affirm that what is true and serviceable for one purpose is not necessarily so for another. And in any case it is time perhaps to cease

complaining that a truth capable of being improved on, *i.e.* capable of *growing*, is so far not absolutely true and therefore somewhat false, and worthy of contempt. For such complaints spring from an *arbitrary* interpretation of a situation that might more sensibly be envisaged as meaning that none of the falsehoods, out of which our knowledge struggles in its growth, is ever wholly false. But in actual knowing we are not concerned with such arbitrary phrases, but with the bearing of an answer on a question actually propounded. And whatever really answers is really 'true,' even though it may at once be turned into a stepping-stone to higher truth.¹

V. We now find ourselves in a position to lay down some pragmatic definitions. Truth we may define as logical value, and a claim to truth as a claim to possess such value. The validation of such claims proceeds, we hold, by the pragmatic test, *i.e.*, by experience of their effect upon the bodies of established truth which they affect. It is evident that in this sense truth will admit of degrees, extending from the humble truth which satisfies *some* purpose, even though it only be the lowly purpose of some subordinate end, to that ineffable ideal which would satisfy *every* purpose and unify all endeavours. But the main emphasis will clearly fall on the former: for to perfect truth we do not yet attain, and after all even the humblest truth may hold its ground with-

¹ If therefore we realise that we are concerned with human truth alone there is nothing paradoxical in affirmatively answering Prof. A. E. Taylor's question (*Phil. Rev.*, xiv., 368) as to whether "the truth of a newly discovered theorem is created by the fact of its discovery". He asks "did the doctrine of the earth's motion become true when enunciated by the Pythagoreans, false again when men forgot the Pythagorean astronomy, and true a second time on the publication of the book of Copernicus?" If we grant (what is, I suppose, the case) that the Pythagorean, Ptolemaic and Copernican systems represent stages in a progressive approximation to an adequate account of celestial motions, it is clear that each of them was esteemed 'true' while it seemed adequate, and became 'false' when it was improved on. A very slight improvement, moreover, might occasion such a change in valuation. Prof. Taylor has failed to observe that he has conceived the scientific problem too loosely in grouping together the Pythagorean and the Copernican theory as alike cases of the earth's motion. No doubt they may both be so denominated, but the scientific value of the two theories was very different, and the Ptolemaic system is intermediate in value as well as in time. He might just as well have argued that the emission theory of light was true all along because the discovery of radioactivity has forced its undulatory rival to admit that light is sometimes produced by the impact of corpuscles. Perhaps also the pragmatic doctrine has given him offence because he has mistakenly conceived the *making* of truth as a *creation*. But it should by this time be unnecessary to point out that truth is not made out of nothing but out of earlier 'truth,' and that the notion of a creation out of nothing is pseudo-theological.

out suffering rejection. No truth moreover can do more than do its duty and fulfil its function.

I hope that these definitions will have sufficiently borne out the claim made at the beginning that the pragmatic view of truth unifies experience and rationalises the classification of the normative sciences; but it may not be amiss to add a few words on both these topics. That, in the first place, the conception of the logical judgment as a form of valuation connects it with our other valuations and represents it as an integral part of the *ἔφεσις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, of the purposive reaction upon the universe which bestows dignity and grandeur upon the struggle of human life is, I take it, evident. The theoretic importance of this conception is capital. It is easily and absolutely fatal to every form of Naturalism. For if every 'fact' upon which any naturalistic system relies is at bottom a valuation, arrived at by selection and purposive manipulation, there is a manifest absurdity in eliminating the human reference from results which have implied it at every step. The pragmatic doctrine (at all events in its 'humanist' development) affords a protection against Naturalism which ought to be the more appreciated by those interested in taking a 'spiritual' view of life now that it has become pretty clear that the protection afforded by idealistic absolutism is quite illusory. For the 'spiritual nature of the Absolute' does nothing to succour the human aspirations strangled in the coils of materialism: 'absolute spirit' need merely be conceived naturalistically to become as impotent to aid the theologian and the moralist as it has long been seen to be to help the scientist.

And the unification of logic with the other normative sciences is even more valuable practically than theoretically. For it vindicates man's right to present his claims upon the universe in their integrity, as a demand not for Truth alone, but for Goodness, Beauty and Happiness as well, commingled with each other in a fusion one and indiscerptible; and what perhaps is for the moment more important still, it justifies our efforts to bring about such a union as we desire. Whether this ideal can be attained, cannot, of course, be certainly predicted; but a philosophy which gives us the right to aspire, and inspires us with the daring to attempt, is surely a great improvement on monisms which, like Spinoza's, crush us with blank and illogical denials of the relevance of human valuations to the truth of things.

In technical philosophy however it is good form to profess more interest in the formal relations of the sciences than in the cosmic claims and destinies of man, and so I hasten

to point out the signal aid which pragmatism affords to a symmetrical classification of the sciences. If truth also is a valuation, we can understand why logic should be a normative science along with ethics and æsthetics: if all the natural sciences make use of logical judgments and lay claim to logical values, we can understand also how and why the normative sciences have dominion over them. And lastly we find that the antithetical valuations and the distinction between claims and their selection into norms run through all the normative sciences in a perfectly analogous way. Just as not everything is true which claims truth, so not everything is good or right or beautiful which claims to be so, while ultimately all these claims are judged by their relation to the perfect harmony which forms our final aspiration.

VI. I promised at the outset to conclude this paper with a twofold challenge, and now that I have set forth as well as I am able the advantages proffered by the pragmatic view of truth I will revert to this challenge, in a spirit not of contentiousness so much as of anxious inquiry. For I fear that a really resolute adherent of the intellectualist tradition would be unmoved and unconvinced by anything I, or any one, could say. He would simply close his eyes and seal his ears, and recite his creed. And perhaps no man yet was ever convinced of philosophic truth against his will. But there are beginning to be signs (and even wonders) that our intellectualism is growing less resolute. And so perhaps even those who are not yet willing to face the new solutions can be brought to see the gaps in the old. If therefore we bring these to their notice very humbly, but very persistently, we may enable them to see that the old intellectualism has left its victims unprovided with answers to two very momentous questions. Let us ask, therefore, how, upon its assumptions, they propose (1) to evaluate a claim to truth, and (2) to discriminate between such a claim and an established truth? These two questions constitute the first part of my challenge. They are, I think, good questions, and such that from any theory of knowledge with pretensions to completeness an answer may fairly be demanded. And if such an answer exists, it is so vital to the whole case of intellectualism that it may fairly be required to produce it. If it is not produced, we will be patient, and hope that some day we may be vouchsafed a revelation of esoteric truth; but human nature is weak and the longer the delay the stronger will grow the suspicion that there is nothing to produce.

The second part of my challenge refers to the intellectu-

alist's rejection of our solution. If we are so very wrong in our very plain and positive assertion that the validity of a truth (claim) is tested and established by the value of its consequences, there ought surely to be no difficulty about producing abundant cases in which the truth of a doubtful assertion is established in some *other* way. I would ask, therefore, for the favour of *one clear case of this kind*.¹ And I make only one stipulation. It should be a case in which there really was a question, so that the *true* answer might have, before examination, turned out *false*. For without this provision we should get no illustration of actual knowing, such as was contemplated by the pragmatist, whose theory professes to discriminate cases in which there is a real chance of acquiring truth and a real risk of falling into falsity. If on the other hand specimens merely of indubitable or verbal truths were adduced, and it were asserted that these were true not because they were useful, but simply because they were true, we should end merely in a wrangle about the historical pedigree of the truth. I should contend that it was at one time doubtful, and accepted as true because of its tested utility: my opponent would dispute my derivation and assert that it had always been true. We should agree that it was *now* indisputable, we should disagree about the origin of this feature; and the past history would usually be too little known to establish either view. And so we should get no nearer to a settlement.

By observing on the other hand *truth in the making*, inferences may be drawn to the nature of *truth already made*. And whether truth is by nature pragmatic, or whether this is a foul aspersion on her character, it is surely most desirable that this point should be settled. Hitherto the chief obstacle to such a decision has been the fact that while in public (and still more in private) there has been much misconception, misrepresentation and abuse of our views, there have been no serious attempts to contest directly, unequivocally, and outright, *any* of our cardinal assertions.² And what perhaps is still more singular, our critics have been completely reticent

¹ Since this was written Prof. Taylor has attempted to answer an earlier form of this challenge in the last number of *MIND*. I shall discuss his article in the next number.

² Prof. Taylor may now perhaps be said to have supplied this desideratum by denying that psychology has any relevance to logic (*loc. cit.*, pp. 287, 287). And yet immediately after (p. 287) he feels constrained to argue that the efficient cause of his accepting any belief as true is a specific form of emotion! I should have thought that the fact that no truth could be accepted without this feeling constituted a pretty substantial connexion between psychology and logic.

as to what alternative solutions to the issues raised they felt themselves in a position to propound. The whole situation is so strange, and so discreditable to the *prestige* of philosophy, that it is earnestly to be hoped that of the many renowned logicians who so vehemently differ from us some should at length see (and show us !) their way to refute these 'heresies' as clearly and articulately as their *θυμοειδὲς* permits their *φιλόσοφον* to express itself.