The red alkaline filtrate gave a bulky precipitate with alum, but when this precipitate was filtered off, neither the precipitate nor the filtrate any longer afforded a trace of colour with potash. The liberated colouring substance does not seem to enter into combination with nitrate of silver, nor is it visibly affected by corrosive sublimate, sulphocyanide of potassium, chloride of gold, or bichromate of potassium. With persalts of iron it gives a permanent rich brown colour. From these experiments it may be gathered that the colouring material is tolerably stable, that it combines with *basic* acetate of lead, and can still be detected in that state of union by the potash test. It is highly probable that the colour-developing substance is a feeble acid derived from the intra-vascular oxidation of the santonin, and in support of such a view an experiment of Mialhe may be brought forward.

When santonin, in powder, is submitted to boiling nitric acid, a product is obtained which, after saturation, gives, with water, a greenish-yellow solution, analogous in appearance to that which urine assumes under the influence of santonin. This liquid, when treated with an alkaline base, immediately develops a deep orange-red colouration similar to that which urine secreted after the ingestion of santonin assumes with alkalies. This experiment I have repeated on the white and yellow forms of santonin, and with corresponding results, yet, though the reddened alkaline fluid gave an abundant yellow precipitate with basic acetate of lead, neither the precipitate nor its filtrate were any longer coloured by potash. Neither could any colouration be obtained on decomposing the lead precipitate with sulphuric acid, and testing the fluid decanted from the sulphate of lead with potash. If in these respects the artificial colouring matter fails in its analogy to the natural colouring substance in santonic urine, still Mialhe's experiment may be regarded as indicating the direction in which to seek for the cause of the natural phenomenon.

ART. XII.—*Moral Mania.* By J. H. BALFOUR BROWNE, Esq.,
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THAT the one black sheep which is within the fold of a respectable household should be white-washed, may, to piebald brothers and sisters, seem a desirable thing. That a family moving in good society, and living in a good street, should, in the event of one of

its members committing a crime, have recourse to the family physician rather than to the police, and should look upon the act as a symptom of disease and not as a crime in the true sense of the word, seems a very natural proceeding. For a long time insanity was looked upon as the work of God's hand, while, even at the present day, the devil is regarded as the mechanist of crime. If, then, a family has an opportunity of mistaking the hand of the devil for that of God, it will probably embrace it. Many a one when asked, like Sam Weller, if he can see the individual who was guilty of contempt of court, and knows that that individual is a relation, and had laid himself open to punishment, will look at the ceiling, and say "No!" Heaven knows that the grandest things upon earth are those dear home-eyes which won't see our faults—those dear lips that are "no thoroughfare" for reproaches, and those dear heads which are armories full of defences of our errors, which would fain find a leaning to virtue in all our vices, and the mental darkness caused by the shadow of God's hand in that night of the moral life in which the devil rides. But although friends may be break-waters about the home-harbour, it is the duty of a Government to punish crime, and in order to do so it is necessary to distinguish crime from insanity.

Is there, then, such a disease as moral mania?—a disease the symptom of which is crime—and if there is such a disease how is it to be distinguished from immorality? Pinel was the first who asserted that there were "many maniacs who betrayed no lesion whatever of the understanding, but were under the dominion of instinctive and abstract fury, as if the affective faculties alone had sustained injury;" and very many writers since his time have distinguished between intellectual and moral insanity. Some have argued that this disease is exclusively confined to the moral sense, that it may co-exist with a perfectly healthy condition of every other faculty, and that the only symptom which manifests the presence of disease is depravity in a somewhat exceptional degree! That twenty convictions would prove a man mad, the law has as yet denied. That if the disease is manifested by no other symptoms than the commission of criminal acts, the individual shall be liable to the consequences of those acts, the law has upon more than one occasion asserted; and although many loud voices have been raised against the law on account of that denial and that assertion, the principle laid down seems to us to be sound. Nay, further, although we admit that crime is in many cases a sign of

the presence of disease, and although we think that in most cases in which it is so, the history of the individual, and the presence of insanity or nervous disease in the parents will establish the fact of moral insanity in the individual under examination; we are of opinion that only on very rare occasions should moral insanity stand between the individual and the consequences of his criminal acts, for it seems to us certain that punishment is in most cases one of the means of cure, and that moral maniacs may be restrained from criminal acts by an adequate system of discipline!

The philosophy of the subject seems somewhat defective. We find frequent assertions that this disease consists in a morbid perversion of natural feelings, or habits, or moral dispositions, and that it is unaccompanied by any lesion of the intellect; that it is a disease of the moral sense, and various other assertions of similar import. Writers have not taken the trouble to ascertain, in the first instance, whether there be a moral sense or no; they have not endeavoured to discover whether it is possible that reason, when directed in one particular direction, can be affected with disease, while in other directions it can be exercised under all the conditions of health. It is an easy thing to take for granted, and then to assume as proved.

Ethics is the science of the laws of our actions looked at with regard to their morality or immorality, and presupposes a knowledge of man as a moral agent. If, however, our ideas of right and wrong are formed in connexion with the ideas of reward or punishment—if our dislike and disparagement of certain actions, and our approbation and praise of other actions, is founded on our belief that in the one case the individual committing the action should be punished, and that in the other case he should not, it is evident that our moral distinctions have an intellectual origin, and that any such phrases as moral sense, or conscience as distinguished from ordinary intellectual function, are apt to deceive, and any distinction between moral and intellectual insanity is unphilosophical. This is not the place to consider whether this is a true statement of the fact or not. Man, individually, ought to make all his actions perfect. Government has to be content with a moral code that will *do*. Government cannot enact the whole moral law as laid down in books of ethics or in great human hearts. All it can attempt is to make men free to be good if they will by restraining acts of violence. Expediency is essentially the science of government, and as that is the case it will be sufficient if we, in this place,

point out what acts government ought to recognize as moral, what acts government ought to punish as immoral, and in what way a somewhat rough and ready morality may be applied to the solution of the questions which arise in reference to the so-called moral insanity.

That for all governmental purposes "good" may be defined as "happiness," and "bad" as "misery;" and that as each person's happiness is in this view regarded as good to that person, the general happiness must be regarded as a good to the aggregate of persons seems to us to be true. That those actions which tend to the happiness of the individual, and which do not interfere with any enjoyment of other persons, should be regarded by the legislature as moral, and that such acts as lead either directly or indirectly to the misery of the individual, or which, while ministering to the happiness of the individual, are calculated to take, either directly or indirectly, from the happiness of others, should be regarded as immoral, seems to us fair. The government, be it representative or not, is a trustee for the community. The object of the trust is the attainment of the greatest amount of happiness to the *cestui que trust*, and one of the means adopted in this country for the attainment of that object is the enactment of a code of laws, which declares that certain acts—believed to militate against the public good—shall be punished in case they are committed, not because government wishes to punish crime that has been committed, but because the invariable connexion between an act and a serious disadvantage to the actor is likely to lead to the discontinuance of the act, and in that way lead to the greater happiness of the community.

The various mental peculiarities, some of degree, some of kind, which distinguish man from the brute, seem to be—1. The greater ability of the former to profit by experience, to get the essence out of facts, to learn something more from his faults and failures. 2. The more perfect means of communication which man possesses in grammatically constructed languages, and a much more complete repertory of the lower gestures, of body, and the higher gestures, of expression. 3. The more intimate relations of man to man than those which exists between animal and animal, which lead to an infinitely great play of feeling, to voluntary ornamentation, which is not directly connected with material well-being, and to which may be referred the tendency to associate, which is characteristic of man, and which induced Aristotle to

call him a political being. But of these three characteristics of humanity the first seems to us, perhaps, the most important, and possibly the characteristic to which the development of the other two peculiarities might be referred. With regard to the power which is inherent in the being of man, of availing himself of surrounding phenomena, of profiting largely by experience, and of advancing through failure to success, through pain to pleasure, it must be borne in mind that animals have the same power, although in a less degree. Monkeys that have once burned their lips in swallowing hot liquids afterwards wait with patience until they are cooled.^a Every one knows that by means of rewards and punishments dogs, cats, canaries, and fleas can be taught many things. But there is a certain degree in which this power or capacity is possessed by different animals, and beyond that power punishment is thrown away, or rather its effects are manifested, not in the improvement of the individual on whom the punishment is inflicted, but in deterioration both of the individual punishing and the individual punished. The doctrine of all true educational or reformatory punishment is to punish as long as the individual and class to which he belongs, and on whom the example will operate most powerfully as a deterrant, have capacity sufficient directly to concatenate the suffering with the offence, and to understand how they may avoid the commission of a like crime. Any infliction of punishment under circumstances other than those just alluded to is not only inefficacious, but tends to diminish the aggregate happiness of mankind, and is to that extent a breach of the trust reposed in the government of the country. It will, therefore, be understood that repeated convictions on account of the same crime would naturally lead to a suspicion of an amount of incapacity which would justify the law in exempting an individual from criminal consequences; and while such an amount of incapacity is proved in reference to acts occurring in the life of the individual, other than those which have come under the cognizance of courts of law, the presumption is strengthened; and further, if in conjunction with these circumstances it is found, upon inquiry and examination, that there is an inherited tendency to insanity, or malformation of the skull—if the history of the case is such as to lead a physician to suppose that it is not impossible that the mind may be diseased, in such a case it seems to us that the law would do well to admit the existence of moral mania, and exempt the

^a Bennet—*Wanderings in New S. Wales*, Vol. ii., p. 158.

individual from the legal consequences of criminal acts. But the law is asked to do more: it is asked to believe that persons who, while "labouring under this disorder, are," according to Pritchard, "capable of reasoning or supporting an argument on any subject within their sphere of knowledge that may be presented to them—and they often display great ingenuity in giving reasons for their eccentric conduct, and in accounting for and justifying the state of moral feeling under which they appear to exist"^a—are in no case fit objects for punishment. It is owing to such demands that the criminal courts of this country have been less willing to admit moral insanity as a bar to punishment than they would otherwise have been, for those persons who have gone so far as to assert that a morbid perversion of sentiments, as manifested by repeated acts of crime, should in all cases be treated as disease, have not hesitated to regard all crime as a form of morbidity, instead of regarding it, in its truest sense, as one of the conditions of the health of a community. That such pretensions should have made lawyers and legislators sceptical as to the authority to be attached in questions of this kind to the evidence of medical gentlemen, was not to be wondered at. But the two questions—Is there moral insanity? and if it is proved, how far should law recognize it as depriving the individual of that capacity which is commensurate with responsibility?—are distinct. As to its existence let us examine the evidence.

1. It is asserted by many of the ablest writers upon insanity.
2. There are many cases in which the motiveless character of the act done, the past history of the individual, the carelessness as to whether the commission of the crime is discovered or not, lead to a belief in the existence of insanity. We almost invariably find that this form of insanity is said to be accompanied by what are called "depraved impulses," and that it is asserted by many that "defective volition" and "perverted emotions" are mental symptoms of the presence of this form of disease. Now, as ordinary criminals have depraved impulses, as their wills must be defective to some extent, and as their reasoning powers must, through this deficiency, have led to their detection; as, further, the emotions of criminals are not generally of a very perfect human type, it would seem necessary clearly to understand what is meant by the assertions of those who pretend to know something about the subject. Before doing so we may state our belief that, through various circumstances to be afterwards

^a *Cyclopædia of Practical Medicine*, Art. *Insanity*, p. 826.

alluded to, a man may reason correctly concerning one set of phenomena, while he is incapacitated from reasoning concerning other sets. We find in ordinary life that Reason does not seem to be current coin, but a sort of local issue—that the very familiarity with the logical sequence in relation to a certain class of facts renders the individual unable to appreciate the same identical sequence in relation to facts of a different nature—that there seem to be men who can reason concerning the dry-bone facts of science, and are utterly unable to grasp the sappy facts of human science. A very limited knowledge of abnormal conditions will serve to convince one of the truth of the fact that this is much more prominent in connexion with disease. So that at this stage it would be wrong to deny that a mind, because it shows shrewdness and ingenuity with relation to many intellectual matters, may, at the same time, be unable to appreciate the relation of acts to personality looked at in their moral relation, just as there are many perfectly sane persons who can never come to regard virtue as an end in itself, which must ever be one of the crowning advantages of all true morality; for, as Mr. Mill observes, “there is this difference between it (the love of virtue for its own sake) and the love of money, of power, or of fame, that all these may, and often do, render the individual noxious to the other members of the society to which he belongs, whereas there is nothing which makes him so much a blessing to them as the cultivation of the disinterested love of virtue.”^a We proceed, then, to inquire what this “impulsive insanity” may be. As for the literature of the subject, so far as it has come under our notice, it is simple assertion, together with reports of some cases in which impulse was supposed to be present; and we may say here, that if medical gentlemen would, instead of clamouring for the recognition of irresistible insane impulses in courts of law, devote themselves to the proof of their existence, their time might be more profitably spent.

We know how intimately all our feelings are connected with thought, and how much thought is influenced by feelings. Well has Bacon said—“The light of the understanding is not a dry light, but drenched in the will and affections;” and it is well, in further explanation, to add that thought is, as it were, the skeleton of our mental life, while feelings and desires are the muscles and nerves which clothe it. Under such circumstances it is impossible to see in what way the one set of faculties, so to speak, can be

^a Utilitarianism, P. 57.

affected without the other. If a man does not know right from wrong he reasons badly. If he is unable to restrain desires by the leash of thought, or by fear of consequences, again he reasons badly. If the ordinary motives have no influence over the mind of an individual, we say he is a fool, or he is mad. Now there are very various ways in which a man may lose control over his actions. If you tickle the sole of a sensitive foot during sleep the leg is withdrawn by what is sometimes called "involuntary" retraction. If acts are repeated very often they become what is popularly called "second nature," that is to say, they become as involuntary as any of the actions which are performed during infancy, or as any of those habits which are the heritage of the race. Many actions in this way pass beyond the range of will or motives, for every act tends, by repetition, to become easier, and to pass out of the dominion of wilful choice into that of automatic origination. Every one knows the influence of habit. *Hamlet* says to his mother:—

"Refrain to-night,
And that shall lend a kind of easiness
To the next abstinence; the next more easy,
For use almost can change the stamp of nature."

One ethical philosopher has well said—"Do right, and trust to God to make it easy." So it is that many acts become so easy in the doing, require so little effort of consciousness, that they are said to be done unconsciously, or, in other words, out of the ordinary relation to thought in point of time. These acts we may call automatic or impulsive. The constant modified exercise of any of the muscles, will, in the time to come, tend to the same modified exercise under the influence of a comparatively insignificant exciting cause. And thus in all the manifestations of mind, whether they be connected with impressions on the senses, with the result of the processes of thought, or with one's actions as a moral agent, there is a liability to pass partially out of the power of will or motive—for we are using these two words in the same sense—a liability to recur under the influence of what would in time past have been an inadequate stimulus, and to become what may be called involuntary or impulsive. But this is much more speedily done under the influence of disease than in the conditions of health. The infinite variety of the actions that one is called upon, while in a healthy state, to perform, protects the individual from the effects that follow habitual action in one direction. But it can easily be understood that the presence of a delusion must greatly modify

many of the relations of motives to conduct; and the same effects will be produced by the influence of unrestrained habit, or of hereditary tendency. So powerful is hereditary tendency that we may be said to inherit ready-made habits; so powerful is it that a father may weaken the power of will, or weaken those powers by which men judge of motives, in his offspring. It is stated as a fact that Oxford, the regicide, believed that he was St. Paul, and that his grandfather had done the same. An interesting example of a hereditary propensity to steal—which descended from a real thief, who could refrain from pilfering when paid to do so, to his son and grandson—is given in Dr. Julius Steman's very excellent work on "Hereditary Disease," and other examples of a similar tendency to the reproduction of morbid propensities will be found in Mr. F. Hill's "Reports on Prisons." We find voices, features, even acquired skill, modified by the past, so that the handwriting of one individual member of a family has in some cases been found to resemble that of some ancestor whose writing he had never had an opportunity of seeing. All this seems to us to explain what we mean by the "depraved impulse," as present in many cases of moral insanity, and what, in this relation, we understand by defective volition. That disease has the power of withdrawing certain acts from the influence of will, and that in many cases it so much incapacitates the individual as to place him so thoroughly under the influence of one set of motives as to make any action arising therefrom rapid and unhesitating, is, we believe, the only true explanation which can be given of those diseased impulses which find place in the minds of the insane; and we are further inclined to interpret the apparently motiveless character which belongs to such impulsive actions as, in truth, due to the strength of the motive to which they owe their existence.

In this life our course is not a clear one. Duty is often difficult to do. We have the choice of Hercules at every turning point of our life. The more one knows of the possibilities of the future, the more careful will one be in fashioning the actualities of the present. And Shakespeare says—

"Rightly to be great
Is not to stir without great argument."

It is to the ignorant that choice is easy: it is to the wise that choice is difficult. A child finds no difficulty in choosing between a bank-note and a lollypop, and from the impulsive way which it grasps at the latter, we think it is uninfluenced by motives,

the fact being that it is influenced by the motives of actual enjoyment powerfully, and by those of remote contingency not at all. So it arises that an overwhelmingly powerful motive has, to the eyes of those who are in the habit of connecting choice of motives with struggle, the same appearance as no motive at all. Our idea of choice is the swaying of the scales, not the kicking of the beam by one of the scales; so that we have, in thought, connected actions which spring from a very strong motive with the expression "motiveless," because struggle, resistance, is a sign of humanity in the hands of cause, while yielding is the sign of inanimate matter under similar circumstances.

We believe that this explanation of an "irresistible impulse" is conformable to all the circumstances which attend their manifestation, as far as they have been accurately observed; and we further believe that, with such an explanation as the above, courts of law would, in connexion with the various cases, be satisfied of the existence of morbid impulses; and it would be admitted that persistency of criminal tendency, and the commission of criminal acts in spite of repeated punishments, and in spite of every human reason to believe that the connexion between future acts of crime and punishment would be invariable—all point to the existence of disease. A few cases are added to show that the real ground for exempting from punishment has not been sufficiently understood, and to illustrate the phenomena of this disease.

"An only son of a weak and indulgent mother, was encouraged in the gratification of every caprice and passion of which an untutored and violent temper was susceptible. The impetuosity of his disposition increased with his years. The money, with which he was lavishly supplied, removed every obstacle to the indulgence of his wild desires. Every instance of opposition roused him to acts of fury. He assailed his adversaries with the audacity of a savage, sought to reign by force, and was perpetually embroiled in disputes and quarrels. If a dog, a horse, or any other animal offended him, he instantly put it to death. If ever he went to a fête, or any other public meeting, he was sure to excite such tumults and quarrels as terminated in actual pugilistic encounters; and he generally left the scene with a bloody nose. This wayward youth, however, when unmoved by passion, possessed a perfectly sound judgment. When he became of age, he succeeded to the possession of an extensive domain. He proved himself fully

competent to the management of his estate, as well as to the discharge of his relative duties, and he even distinguished himself by acts of beneficence and compassion. Wounds, law suits, and pecuniary compensations were generally the consequences of his unhappy propensity to quarrel. But an act of notoriety put an end to his career of violence. Enraged with a woman who had used offensive language to him he precipitated her into a well. Prosecution was commenced against him; and on the deposition of a great many witnesses who gave evidence to his furious deportment, he was condemned to perpetual confinement in the Bicêtre."^a Although this case is recorded by Pinel, it seems to us anything but a satisfactory illustration of moral insanity; and it is somewhat strange that it has been quoted in that connexion by some more recent writers on the subject. "Strong passions," seem to us, all that is made out in the case just quoted; and if that plea is to open the door of a lunatic asylum instead of that of a prison, courts of law may shut their doors. That the strong passions were unrestrained in youth, that a defective education led to careless self-control, that the means of gratifying passions made them strong—just as in a country's economy, plentiful supply strengthens demand—that habit strengthened more and more what tendency had made in clay, seems all that can be gathered from the facts of this case. The same story might be told of many of those persons one meets each day and never excite a suspicion of insanity. We suspect that the money, of which he had much, and the domain, which was extensive, had something to do with his incarceration in the Bicêtre.

A case mentioned by Hoffbauer^b better illustrates what we understand by moral mania. It is a well known case, and we therefore content ourselves by referring to it. We epitomize a case given in an article upon the subject under consideration, in the *Medical Mirror*.^c

W. R., was twenty-seven years of age. He had been eight times in the house of correction. His father was an epileptic, and he himself had been subject to convulsions when teething, and at intervals during his after-life. He tortured animals, picked out the eyes of a kitten with a fork. He lied and stole. He was expelled from school as too bad to be kept. He afterwards consorted with the worst characters, was drunken, debauched,

^a Pinel *Sur l'Aliénation Mentale*, p. 156, s. 159.

^b Hoffbauer's *Médecine Légale*, s. 126, p. 132.

^c Notes on Moral Insanity, *Medical Mirror*, Vol. iv., No. XLVIII.

dishonest. He attempted, or pretended to attempt suicide. He was utterly false and untrustworthy. He delighted in torturing those patients who were, like himself, confined in the lunatic asylum, and who were too weak to resent injury with violence. He was indelicate in the presence of females, and attempted a rape on his mother and on his sister. Yet, with all, he was intelligent, exceedingly cunning, and while he was actually the victim of epileptic seizures, he was prone to feign fits, and did it with considerable ability. In spite of careful watching he repeatedly effected his escape. Was exceedingly vain; and, in the presence of some persons, seemed to be exceedingly devout. He was ingenious in excusing his errors; and, although exceedingly mischievous, was careful to avoid disagreeable consequences. All these facts indicate the presence of disease; and, we are inclined to believe, that the case above quoted is one in every respect typical of general moral mania; and yet it is not one in which it seems to us, looking at the function of government, as we have described it above, where even the presence of this morbid state should not protect from the consequences of criminal acts. In all the circumstances of the case we have partially described, two things are observable:—1. A fear of personal inconvenience, a dislike of ordinary punishments, and many of the ordinary motives of human nature—as self-aggrandizement, sexual indulgence, the praise of those whose praise is ordinarily thought of value, personal vanity, and the like; and, 2. An intelligence of such a high order as to enable him thoroughly to understand the relation between a found out crime and its punishment, as he invariably tried to conceal the commission of the criminal act by lies, hypocrisy, and various clever explanations. And either of those two conditions of health seems to us—where no incontrollable impulse is proved—to indicate a fit object for punishment. And the writer of the article from which the case is quoted, evidently, although a medical man, tends to the same opinion, for he says:^a “Humane and well devised punishment must follow all their (the morally insane) misdemeanours; and they must be made to feel that, in certain matters, subjection to a dominant system is an inevitable necessity. The gradual formation of habit is, above all things, to be aimed at.” It is quite evident that many such individuals exist amongst us, with a heritage, if not of actual disease, yet of accumulated crime, which is the clay in the hands of that potter, Time, of which insanity is made, who do not restrain their morbid impulses

^a Page 739.

on account of the fear of punishment. But because the law has, by various punishments, failed to make a man honest, to regard him when he again steals as exempted from punishment on account of the number of his crimes—and because it has failed, to do damage to its declaration by rendering the connexion of crime and punishment less invariable, seems absurd. It is just because this consequent and antecedent are not invariably and inevitably connected that some men commit crime, and that those who have a tendency to commit crime through strong passions, habit, or disease, are not restrained. It is true, there are some insane persons whom an invariable sequence will not teach *the* lesson of life, and whom the pain which is the invariable consequent of violently striking one's head purposely against a stone wall, will not teach to refrain from that act. When such a state of mind exists, whether it arises from imbecility or mania—intellectual or moral—it is absurd to punish. In most of the cases of moral mania which have been brought under our notice, the tendency to sin is, doubtless, due to disease; but it is not so strong that an absolute certainty of proximate suffering could not restrain from the commission of the criminal act—indeed in many cases it is not stronger than the tendency which exists in those persons that circumstances have brought to sin, and that habit has made criminals; and as it is for the latter class that laws are enacted, it seems to us, the former class are co-heirs with them in the advantages to be derived from the infliction of punishment. Another case may be quoted to illustrate this position; it is a case “where, with great natural shrewdness, general information, and gentlemanly manners, where no delusion or incongruity of thought can be detected, there exists an inveterate desire to torment and irritate those around: to enjoy the dissension and disputes which ensue, and to violate every rule of decency and delicacy by obscenities of look, word, and action, *when these objects can be accomplished without detection.*”^a We imagine that the case just quoted, and the following case, which we take from Prichard,^b prove that in many of the relations of the morally insane to the State, they may, for all the purposes of just governmental discipline, be regarded as sane; and that, in many respects, those who are afflicted with moral insanity must be treated in the same way as those in whom we can only discover moral turpitude. “Mr. H. P., had been for many years confined in a lunatic asylum, when, an

^a Crichton Institution Report for 1850, p. 26.

^b Cyclopædia of Practical Medicine, Art. Insanity, p. 834.

estate having devolved upon him by inheritance, it became necessary to subject him anew to an investigation. He was examined by several physicians, who were unanimous in the opinion that he was a lunatic; but a jury considered him to be of sound mind, attributing his peculiarities to eccentricity, and he was consequently set at liberty. The conduct of this individual was the most eccentric that can be imagined; he scarcely performed any action in the same manner as other men; and some of his habits, in which he obstinately persisted, were singularly filthy and disgusting. For every peculiar custom he had a quaint and often ludicrous reason to allege, which indicated a strong mixture of shrewdness and absurdity. It might have been barely possible to attribute all these peculiarities, as well as the morbid state of temper and affections, to singularity in natural character, and to the peculiar circumstances under which this person had been placed. But there was one conviction deeply fixed on his mind, which, though it might likewise be explained by the circumstances of his previous history, seemed to constitute an instance of maniacal delusion. Whenever any person, whom he understood to be a physician, attempted to feel his pulse, he recoiled with an expression of horror, and exclaimed—‘If you were to feel my pulse you would be lord paramount over me for the rest of my life.’” “The result has proved,” this author goes on to say, “that confinement is not always necessary in cases of this description. Mr. H. P. has remained at liberty for many years, and his conduct, though extremely singular, has been without injury to himself or others.”

This is one case, and many others might be collected in which an illiterate jury have, in spite of medical evidence, succeeded in doing the right thing; but it is also a case which shows how very frequently moral insanity is connected with intellectual delusion. Indeed, we are convinced that many observers have not—in their anxiety to prove the fact of a kind of insanity which exists independently of any prominent intellectual symptoms—been sufficiently careful to look for signs of the existence of that which they did not wish to see. Many people like Nelson—when he was told that there was a signal from the Admiral’s ship commanding his return—put the telescope to their blind eye, and say, “I cannot see anything.” So Dr. Ray^a quotes the case of the Earl Ferrers, who was executed in 1760^b for the murder of his steward, in illustration

^a Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity, p. 119.

^b See Hargrave’s State Trials, Vol. x., p. 478.

of what he regards as moral insanity. Dr. Ray does not, in the description he gives of the condition of the accused—in which he asserts that the disease was in a more advanced condition—state that it was proved that his lordship was occasionally insane, and incapable, from his insanity, of knowing what he did, and of judging of the consequences of his actions. He laboured under the delusion that his relations and friends had formed a conspiracy against him, and he regarded Johnson, his victim, as an accomplice. His conduct was of such a character as to convince those who knew him of his insanity. That the verdict of guilty may have been erroneous, and that the sentence and execution may have been inexpedient, is true, but that the accused laboured under moral mania seems to us false. In another place we point out the relation of those afflicted with intellectual mania to the State—here we would, while we praise the caution of our courts of law in hesitating to recognize moral insanity, and point out that, from the rarity of cases in which this disease is unaccompanied by very prominent intellectual symptoms, very little injustice has been done in consequence of the law's unwillingness to recognize this kind of insanity—we would censure the dogged persistence of lawyers who will not, even in the present state of medical psychology, and with the amount of evidence which has been accumulated, admit that there can, or ought to be, a recognition of such a form of disease by our criminal law.

ART. XIII.—*On Acute Inversion of the Uterus.* By THOMAS MORE MADDEN, M.R.I.A.; M.R.C.S., Engl.; L.K.&Q.C.P.I.: L.F.P. & S., Glasg.; Senior Assistant-Physician to the Dublin Lying-in Hospital (Rotunda); Corresponding Member of the Gynæcological Society of Boston, U.S., &c., &c.

INVERSION of the uterus is one of the rarest and most dangerous complications of parturition. The rarity of this accident is well illustrated by the Statistical Reports of the Master of the Dublin Lying-in Hospital (Rotunda); and as these reports are more familiar to myself, as one of the medical officers of this Institution, than any others, I shall commence by referring to them, not only on that account, but still more so from the fact that these statistics afford, as Dr. Mathews Duncan, of Edinburgh, has shown, the largest, and, perhaps it might be added, the most accurate mass of information on all obstetric subjects in existence.