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Burnet's *Ethics of Aristotle* The *Ethics of Aristotle*, edited with an Introduction and Notes by J. Burnet, M.A. Pp. lii, 502. Methuen. 18s.

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anyhow P seems nearer the right than L.—872. W.'s note is 'ἄλλην P, ἄλλον L sed o in ras. scr. l.' If ἄλλον is due to a late corrector of L it is not fair to say 'ἄλλον L.' If not, this is another case where P has the better reading. (I expect I was a very late hand who altered L, as in many cases which I have noticed in *I.T.*, to agree with Ald.)—897. καὶ ὁπότ' L χ' ὁπότ' P.—1078. L has μετέλλαχες but P avoids the mistake.—1116. The readings here are perplexing: ἀ*μενοῦς L ἀσμένους P ἀμένους Ald. The only explanation I can give is that here again L was altered to agree with Ald. which omitted the σ by pure error. At the same time the accent in L looks as if it had been copied from a MS. which had the correct ἀμενοῦς. If so the passage makes rather against my contention.—1164. W.'s note is ; 'σε (sic scr. ut facile σῆς legas) μητρός L σῆς μητρός P' surely a far-fetched explanation of so simple a blunder. That P could make a pretty gross blunder we see in v. 1198, where he writes ἡλίου instead of Ἰλίου.

HERACLIDAE.

27. συμπάσχω P, συμπράσσω L.—789. ἐλευθερώσαι changed by the first hand, apparently, to ἡλευθερώσθαι L ἐλευθερώσαι P. This does not look as if P copied from L. On the other hand, at 704, P's μῆ, W. suggests, is best explained as a misreading of L's μὲν, which is written by means of an abbreviation. So at 778 P's unaccountable λεύθει, W. explains as due to the fact that in L the α of λάθει looks like ευ.—858. ἦβη τὸν changed to ἦβητὴν L ἦβη τὴν P. Does not this case outweigh the above arguments on the other side? If P copied from L before the alteration it is inconceivable that he should have altered τὸν to τὴν: if after, it is equally inconceivable that he should have failed to accept ἦβητὴν. The only reasonable explanation of the variants is that both L and P copied independently from MSS. which had ἦβη τὴν, that P left the nonsensical words unaltered, and L altered τὴν to τὸν. In this case we have more cause to thank P than L.

E. B. ENGLAND.

BURNET'S *ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE*.

The Ethics of Aristotle, edited with an Introduction and Notes by J. BURNET, M.A. Pp. lii, 502. Methuen. 18s.

SOME years ago it was matter of complaint that Oxford in spite of the amount of time she bestowed on the *Ethics* had done but little in the way of published writings to promote their study. Such complaint can hardly be made now, when to the old and still very useful edition of Grant there have been added Prof. Bywater's text and contributions, Prof. Stewart's two copious volumes of notes, and now Prof. Burnet's text with notes of a conciser kind. Even if we are so hard to please that we venture to think the ideal edition yet to seek, we must recognise how much of value there is in the work of each of the three, and we need not ask which among them deserves best of Aristotle or ourselves.

I will say at once that, excellent as Mr. Burnet's book is, he seems to have partly fallen into the opposite error to Mr. Stewart. The latter from his stores of learning and reflexion heaped upon us too much; too much at least for students addressing themselves to the *Ethics* for the purpose of University examinations, who were really

the class of readers he had most in view. Mr. Burnet's command of the subject is equally indisputable, but he perhaps has given us too little. One volume of 550 pages (wonderfully light to hold in the hand, thanks to Messrs. Methuen) contains not only his notes and introductions, but Aristotle's text, which Mr. Stewart did not print at all, and also very considerable portions of the *Eudemian Ethics* as well, put on each page below the text and above the notes. He writes tersely enough, but in spite of this we often feel that the notes, though very good, leave a great deal unsaid, and that a thorough commentary on the *Ethics*, such as the ordinary reader requires, cannot be packed into this comparatively scanty space. I do not know whether Mr. Burnet will be satisfied by teachers of the *Ethics* finding his book valuable. Certainly they ought to do so. But students are likely to think that it does not give them as much assistance as they need. The editor seems often to be writing such notes as would be useful rather to himself and other advanced scholars than to the man to whom the *Ethics* are not yet familiar. If the book were wholly for the maturer scholar, the case would of course be different. But it con-

tains much which such readers do not require, and chief under that head I would put the long extracts from the *Eudemian Ethics* (see for instance pp. 112, 113) which pupils will not read and teachers will not want. Any competent teacher may be presumed to have and to read the book entire. Susemihl's text of the *Eudemian Ethics* and Fritzsche's older commentary ought to be in the hands of everyone who will really trouble to read the selections. The room they occupy might have been more usefully filled, I venture to suggest, with further commentary.

Perhaps the most interesting and valuable contribution that the new edition makes is the constant reference to Plato and the frequent indication there of something to which the words of Aristotle refer or at any rate seem to owe their origin. This is no new discovery, but Mr. Burnet carries it a good deal further than earlier editors have done. It is indeed closely connected with a point on which he lays stress, that the *Ethics* is not so much a scientific as a 'dialectical' treatise. Although he does not state his precise meaning in this quite as clearly as one could wish, he seems to say that Aristotle is often arguing from premises, especially Platonic premises, which we are not bound to suppose that he himself accepted; 'nor can we even assume' he adds 'that the true solution is necessarily given at all.' Quite admitting that much of Aristotle's reasoning is of this kind and that he is most anxious to argue with people on their own ground, we may still think that Mr. Burnet suggests, if he does not adopt, a somewhat exaggerated view of the extent to which Aristotle deals in arguments and even in conclusions unsatisfactory to himself. The *Ethics* is not a piece of clever dialectic only, in which he draws men on from positions, which they and not he have adopted, to others, which they ought to accept, though he himself knows better. Surely we may say that the conclusions, the main positions taken up, are such as really satisfy him, and that most of the reasoning too is valid enough at bottom or at least seems so to him, though in a semi-popular treatise he does not always care to state things in their severest scientific form. Prof. Burnet rides his dialectical hobby rather too hard. For instance, when Aristotle says (1. 7. 1097 b 24) *εἰ ληφθεὶ τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, he comments "this is still 'taking' *ἐνδοξοὶ προτάσεις* from the wise." Then what shall we say of *Poetics* 14. 1453 b 15 *ποῖα οὖν δεινὰ ἢ ποῖα*

οἰκτρὰ φαίνεται τῶν συμπιπτόντων, λάβωμεν. Does this mean 'take from other people'? Not at all. It means something like 'let us ascertain, fix,' and that is what *εἰ ληφθεὶ* means in the *Ethics*. So 1174 a 17 *κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονήν* 'no one could find, put his finger upon, a pleasure.' cf. Bonitz s.v. *λαμβάνειν* 422 b 38.

Mr. Burnet believes and assumes that Books V-VII were really Aristotle's. On this point I have not myself any decided opinion to maintain, but it seems odd he should not distinguish the two questions, (1) are they Aristotle's? and (2) are they properly a part of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and of these as we have them? Ought it not to be pointed out that, even if Aristotle wrote them or if they were made up somehow from Aristotelian material, it does not follow that they were ever meant to stand in their present form along with the present form of the other books. Mr. Burnet sees no difficulty even in the two accounts of pleasure, that is, neither in the fact of there being two accounts in one treatise nor in the apparent discrepancies that the two accounts present. This is not the place to discuss a large subject, but it is one of many points, of which fuller treatment would have been welcome.

Mr. Burnet prefixes to his edition an excellent introduction of some fifty pages, and there are also introductions to the separate books, of which those to Books I and II strike me as especially useful. A great deal is compressed into the notes, though it is also true that a good deal is not to be found there. I may venture to indicate a few points of disagreement, while fully recognising the great knowledge and ability that lie behind Mr. Burnet's commentary.

He lays it down that *λόγος* in such phrases as *λόγον ἔχειν*, *λόγον μετέχειν*, *κατὰ λόγον* &c. never means *reason* but always something like *ground*, *account*, *theory*, *rule*, &c. Positive proof one way or the other is hard to find, but to me *λόγον μετέχειν*, *ἄλογος*, *εὐλογος*, and various other habitual or occasional expressions certainly suggest the sense of *reason*. The other meaning is of course indisputable and common, but why should *λόγος* not have meant *reason* too? What would Mr. Burnet say of *ratio* or of the word *reason* itself? In 1, 10 and 11 he thinks, as Zeller seems to do, that 'there is no question of the departed being aware of what goes on in this world' after their death. No doubt this would harmonise better with what we make out to have been Aristotle's real convictions. But I must confess that

I cannot understand Chapter 11 on any other hypothesis than that some sort of consciousness, some liability to feelings of joy and sorrow, on the part of the dead is assumed, though doubtfully and presumably without any real belief.

Perhaps the only noticeable novelty in the text is 1. 5. 1096 a 6, where for $\delta\delta\epsilon$ χρηματιστῆς βίαιός τις ἐστίν Mr. Watt's conjecture of $\delta\delta\epsilon$ χρηματιστῆς βία ὅστις ἐστίν is adopted, and this will probably not be found convincing. It is hard to see the propriety, or indeed the meaning, of ὅστις ἐστίν. Mr. Burnet asks, 'Can a χρηματιστῆς, or even a χρηματιστῆς βίος, be called βίαιος in this sense?' I should answer that a χρηματιστῆς βίος certainly can, just as in *Pol.* 5. 4. 1338 b 41 the diet of an athlete in training is called βίαιος. In both cases the thing is only adopted because with a certain end in view there is no alternative: it is forced upon you. χρηματιστῆς may probably be taken as an adjective. Cf. *ιδιώτης βίος* in *Plat. Rep.* 578 c: ἀλήτης βίος *Herod.* 3, 52, 3: οἰκέτης βίος *Eur. Ion* 1373. Nouns in -της, like Latin words in -tor, are perhaps specially easy to use in this way. But rather than accept βία ὅστις ἐστίν I would myself read χρηματιστικός, just as I think it is clear that in 6. 8. 1142 a 10 πολιτείας is an error for πολιτικῆς.

In 1. 7. 1098 a 11 προστιθεμένης τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείας πρὸς τὸ ἔργον surely πρὸς τὸ ἔργον goes with ὑπεροχῆς, 'superiority at the work,' not with προστιθεμένης, 'added to the work.' In 1, 9, 1099 b 18 εἴη δ' ἂν κ. τ. λ. can hardly be 'a reservation.' It is a consequence of what precedes. If well-being comes in the way stated, then it will admit of being widely diffused, whereas, if it came by chance or divine dispensation, this would be less likely. In 2, 6, 1106 a 26 Mr. Burnet scarcely proves his point that διαπερόν cannot be *discrete*. He ignores *Pol.* 1, 5, 1254 a 29 εἴτ' ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτ' ἐκ διηρημένων, and what warrant is there for saying that διαπερόν means 'infinitely divisible'? It may be true that διαπερόν means *divisible* here, but is it really certain? He says the importance of Book IV 'is entirely missed if we imagine that Aristotle is setting before us types of character for our admiration and imitation. His aim is not edification, but the application of the test of fact to a general law.' But does not Aristotle think that all the mean states constituting the virtues and good qualities in this book are in their degrees worthy of admiration and imitation? A man ought to aim at being εὐτράπελος, able to make and

take a joke, still more at being πρᾶος. They cannot exemplify the theory of the mean at all without being desirable qualities. One may doubt again whether it is right to say that the standard or rule of the mean turns out finally to be the θεωρητικὸς βίος. In what intelligible sense does the desirability of this fix the precise point up to which I may and should feel anger or assert my own interests against those of other men? This is, of course, not the question as to the place of reason in morals, but whether the moral mean is determined by a reference to the intellectual life. Would Aristotle really have said that ὁ φρόνιμος fixed the mean with this rule or aim consciously before him and no other?

We hardly get over the difficulty of 5, 11, 1138 a 6 οὐ κελεύει ἀποκτινύναι ἑαυτὸν ὁ νόμος· ἃ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει by saying 'the simple interpretation and the right one is to supply ἀποκτινύναι after μὴ κελεύει. The law forbids us to kill anything which it does not expressly enjoin us to kill.' Supposing that ἀποκτινύναι should be understood, the passage still remains as hard as ever. It is not in the least true that Greeks were forbidden to kill whatever they were not expressly enjoined to kill. Were they expressly enjoined to kill fish?

As to Aristotle's division of 'particular justice' no doubt scholars will continue to differ. Mr. Stewart thinks τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς is included in τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον; Mr. Burnet is equally sure of its being comprised in τὸ διορθωτικόν, διορθοῦν according to him meaning *to adjust*. But, if anyone will go through all the passages where the word in its various forms is used by Aristotle, he will find that for once where it bears this meaning there are many places where it unquestionably means *correct*, *set right*, and the same thing is true of the use in Greek generally. The *Politics* will satisfy him as to Aristotle. Again, if διορθωτικόν means 'adjusting' or 'regulating *ab initio*,' how is it that throughout Ch. 4, which certainly deals with τὸ διορθωτικόν, all the cases mentioned are cases where there is a wrong to be put right? On Mr. Burnet's showing the regulative principles of Ch. 5 ought to come before the corrective principles of Ch. 4. Mixed up with this is a misunderstanding as to ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα. He will not allow that τὸ διορθωτικόν is only a principle for rectifying any wrong arising in the course of such transactions, because 'if a wrong has arisen, the συνάλλαγμα at once becomes ἀκούσιον.' This is not true. A ἐκούσιον συναλλάγμα is expressly

defined as one of which the *beginning* is voluntary (on both sides). Sale is voluntary because the two parties agree to it, nor does it cease to be voluntary because the buyer withholds the price he has covenanted to pay. At no stage can a *ἐκούσιον συνάλλαγμα* become *ἀκούσιον*. An *ἀκούσιον συνάλλαγμα* is one which was *ἀκούσιον* from the very beginning. To my mind then it is as impossible to bring τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός under the second sub-division as it is to bring it under the first. There is no difficulty at all in distinguishing it from both. The only difficulty arises from the writer's saying that there are two species and then going on to describe three.

I must add that, while feeling the objection to the common explanation of τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφοράν etc. (5. 4. 1132 a 4 foll.),

I find it very hard to accept Mr. Burnet's theory that it is a compressed expression for the difference between the abstract wrong committed and the actual damage inflicted. A point so recondite would hardly have been stated in so imperfect and obscure a manner. I take it too that τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφοράν stands in a certain contrast with the preceding sentence, οὐδὲν διαφέρει εἰ ἐπιεικὲς φαῦλον ἀπεστέρησε κ.τ.λ., and also with what follows, καὶ χρῆται ὡς ἴσοις, as though it ran 'it is not any difference in the men, but the difference made by the act in question, that the judge has to regard. The men he treats as equal.' On Mr. Burnet's view all the antithesis would disappear.

HEBBERT RICHARDS.

SEATON'S TEXT OF APOLLONIUS RHODIUS.

Apollonii Rhodii Argonautica, edited by R. C. SEATON, late Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 2s. 6d.

It is satisfactory that in the earliest issue of Classical Texts in the new Oxford series, Apollonius Rhodius should be included. The *Argonautica* has been strangely neglected by English scholars. It rarely appears on any list of lectures, and, so far as I know, no edition has been published in England since that of Shaw—hero of the famous 'putide Shavius' criticism—which is more than a hundred years old. In Germany Merkel brought out a very satisfactory text in the Teubner series in 1852, and a large edition in 1854, which contains a slightly altered text—generally for the better, 186 pages of prolegomena written in Latin sometimes curiously obscure, a good apparatus criticus, which gives the various readings (including the corrections) of the all-important Codex Laurentianus, also those of the Guelferbytanus, a list of the more important emendations, and lastly, the valuable scholia of the Laurentian MS. But no exegetical commentary of any value exists: and it is to be hoped that Mr. Seaton, who has been engaged for many years on the study of Apollonius, may supply this want. It must be admitted that it is unlikely that Apollonius will ever be widely read. The poem is long; it is often dull; the

style has none of the vigour and freshness of the old Epic—wholly taken from Homer, as Couat says in his *Poésie Alexandrine*, the language is not in the least Homeric; on the contrary, in some of its traits, *e.g.*, the employment of long passages of oratio obliqua, it shows the syntax of a late period; the attractive freedom of the Homeric syntax is gone, and we get the style of the historian, not that of Homer, nor even that of Herodotus. But the curious use of Epic words—the same word employed in every possible sense which it could bear in different passages of Homer—will always amuse the student of language. The matter also of the poem has an interest of its own. After admitting the unheroic character of the hero—Jason never leads, but is always led either by other mortals or by divinities who have nothing of the divine except the capacity of being called in *ex machina*: after granting the lack of any completeness in any style, granting (to quote Couat again) that the poem has neither the grandeur of an epic, nor the unity of a drama, nor the sustained interest of a romance—we must yet allow merit to the new romantic interest of the passion of Medea for Jason and some real interest to the narratives, the archaeology and the folk lore which are cleverly mixed with the account of the voyage in the last half of the first and of the second book. If a poet may be called in as a judge of a poet, we may believe that