The Emergence of Benefit-Sharing Under the Climate Regime: A Preliminary Exploration and Research Agenda

This paper analyzes the increasing currency of benefit-sharing in the climate regime and its potential to contribute to engendering greater equity in climate governance. Though benefit-sharing is not explicitly mentioned in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change or in the Kyoto Protocol, the international climate regime raises a host of equity questions that have been at least in part addressed by making explicit or implicit reference to the notion of benefit-sharing. This paper maps the use of the benefit-sharing notion in the climate regime, with the objective of developing a research agenda towards ascertaining whether there is any overall coherence in the way it has been termed and interpreted, as well as its potential to better integrate human rights and environmental objectives in climate governance. In order to achieve this, the paper first introduces the main equity questions arising in the climate regime at the inter- and the intra-State levels, to then analyze them through a benefit-sharing lens. The conclusions articulate a series of research questions for further investigation, as well as a preliminary reflection on the implications of investigating equity in the climate regime from a benefit-sharing perspective.


Abstract
This paper analyzes the increasing currency of benefit-sharing in the climate regime and its potential to contribute to engendering greater equity in climate governance. The notion of benefit-sharing has been deployed in international environmental law instruments to equitably and fairly allocate advantages derived from the sustainable use and conservation of natural resources and related traditional knowledge, as well as from the regulation of uses and of conservation of such resources. Though benefit-sharing is not explicitly mentioned in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change or in the Kyoto Protocol, the international climate regime raises a host of equity questions that have been at least in part addressed by making explicit or implicit reference to the notion of benefit-sharing. This paper maps the use of the benefit-sharing notion in the climate regime, with the objective of developing a research agenda towards ascertaining whether there is any overall coherence in the way it has been termed and interpreted, as well as its potential to better integrate human rights and environmental objectives in climate governance. In order to achieve this, the paper first introduces the main equity questions arising in the climate regime at the inter-and the intra-State levels, to then analyze them through a benefit-sharing lens. The conclusions articulate a series of research questions for further investigation, as well as a preliminary reflection on the implications of investigating equity in the climate regime from a benefit-sharing perspective.

Introduction: benefit-sharing in the climate regime
Averting or tempering the impact of future climate changes on generations to come has significant equity implications for present generations, both between and within States. At the inter-State level, climate change response measures may potentially slow developing countries' progress towards economic development and poverty eradication. These countries therefore need finance and technologies to continue on the path towards economic development, while contributing to addressing climate change. At the intra-State level, climate change response measures could potentially restrict access to resources such as energy, land and forests for the most vulnerable segments of the population in developed and developing countries alike. 1 It is therefore necessary to ensure that measures adopted to counter climate change avoid or compensate the negative social impacts they may produce. This paper analyzes these two sets of equity concerns by drawing on the notion of benefitsharing.
In recent years, the notion of benefit-sharing has gained prominence in international law as a means to allocate advantages derived from the use, regulation and conservation of natural resources and related traditional knowledge, at both the inter-and intra-State levels. 2 While benefit-sharing is not explicitly mentioned in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, benefit-sharing requirements have increasingly appeared in the climate regime as a means to compensate, reward and involve various sets of stakeholders in climate change adaptation and mitigation activities. Benefit-sharing is thus already being used as a tool to address the intra-State equity questions associated with the impact of climate change laws and policies on the most vulnerable segments of the population, especially in developing countries; and, in some instances, also as a means to build upon synergies with indigenous peoples' and other communities' traditional practices that are supportive of climate change mitigation and adaptation.
In principle benefit-sharing could also be a means to address the significant inter-State equity implications associated with the distribution of resources to address climate change amongst States. At this level, measures to facilitate access to finance and technologies in the climate regime may be regarded as a form of benefit-sharing. 3 Framing the underlying equity questions in terms of benefit-sharing draws attention to the advantages derived from environmental protection, management and regulation, and to the need to reconcile 1 Ibid.,18. competing State interests while sharing resources to address climate change as a common concern of mankind. 4 The notion of benefit-sharing may also function as a "bridge" between States' obligations under the climate regime and human rights and biodiversity law. 5 In human rights law, benefit-sharing is mainly viewed as a means to compensate negative impacts associated with restrictions over indigenous peoples' and other communities' land and natural resources, 6 and to support their right to free prior and informed consent. 7 The Human Rights Council has specifically drawn attention to the need to ensure that responses to climate change are "coordinated with social and economic development in an integrated manner with a view to avoiding adverse impacts on the latter, taking into full account the legitimate priority needs of developing countries for the achievement of sustained economic growth and the eradication of poverty." 8 These qualifications are particularly important, as the implementation of climate response measures has amply demonstrated that these measures risk creating perverse incentives to violate human rights. 9 Although the UNFCCC does not mention human rights, UNFCCC Parties are expected to comply with their extant international commitments, including those concerning human rights, when they implement their obligations under the climate regime. Human rights treaties and the UNFCCC are equally binding upon Parties, which are required to fulfill their commitments under both treaties in good faith. 10 While the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) has recognized that Parties should fully respect human rights "in all climate change related actions," 11 it has not provided guidance on how States should concretely take human rights into account when taking action to combat climate change. As not all Parties to the UNFCCC have ratified human rights treaties, the extent of the application of human rights in relation to specific climate change response measures depends on a host of national circumstances, and most crucially, on the human rights treaties any given country has ratified. 12 This layered legal landscape is further enriched by the fact that the main international lawmaking body dealing with the protection of biodiversity-the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD COP)-has adopted some guidance concerning climate response measures. 13 In the CBD, benefit-sharing is not only viewed as a means to compensate negative impacts, but also as a means to empower stakeholders, by rewarding them for the provision of ecosystem services and traditional knowledge, or enhancing their participation in relevant decision-making processes. 14 Contrary to human rights treaties, virtually all Parties to the UNFCCC are also Parties to the CBD-with the sole exceptions of the US and Andorra. Parties to the UNFCCC should therefore consider the obligations and guidance adopted under the CBD as they implement their obligations under the climate regime, interpreting them in a mutually supportive way, rather than in a conflicting fashion. This approach is consistent with the general obligation that Parties to treaties fulfill their commitments in good faith. 15 Benefit-sharing therefore presents itself as a potentially useful tool for the mutually supportive interpretation and cross-fertilization of international climate, human rights and biodiversity law. 16 This paper investigates this potential by providing a preliminary analysis of benefit-sharing under the climate regime, with the objective of ascertaining whether there is any overall coherence in the way it has been approached. The paper distinguishes interand intra-State equity demands arising under the climate regime and the role of benefitsharing in addressing such demands. The conclusions articulate a series of research questions, 12 While the UNFCCC has been ratified by 196 Parties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 16 December 1966) 16 Morgera,[35][36] as well as preliminary reflections on the implications of investigating equity in the climate regime from a benefit-sharing perspective.

Inter-State benefit-sharing
The principles guiding Parties in achieving the objective of the UNFCCC expressly mention equity as the basis for action to protect the climate system. 17 Three main inter-State equity considerations characterize the climate regime: States' responsibility for causing climate change; their capacity to contribute to solving the problem; and their need for or right to the resources at stake. 18 All three ultimately relate to how to distribute financial and technological resources to tackle climate change and address imbalances between States. 19 The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities may be regarded as the core distributive paradigm and the main operationalization of equity in the climate regime. 20 Whilst the UNFCCC distinguishes between developed and developing country Parties, 21 singling out some groups among the latter as particularly vulnerable, 22 the allocation of costs and resources under the international climate regime has been dominated by the first two orders of equity considerations. In other words, while the climate regime places a heavier 'burden' upon developed country Parties in consideration of their historic responsibility for climate change and their better capacity to address it, its law and practice have only given limited consideration to the question of Parties' needs. 23 Differentiation in the climate regime mainly concerns Parties' obligations, the modalities of implementation of obligations, and the assistance they should receive. 24 First, while some obligations are common to all Parties, 25 others are only incumbent upon developed country Parties-above all, the obligation to adopt national policies and measures to mitigate climate change by limiting anthropogenic emissions. 26 Second, developed country Parties must support developing ones in complying with their obligations under the Convention 27 and adapting to climate change, including through transfers of finance and technologies. 28 Third, developing country Parties' implementation of commitments under the UNFCCC is subject to developed country Parties' compliance with their obligations related to the transfer of technology and financial resources. 29 The UNFCCC also gives some consideration to the special circumstances of some developing country Parties, especially those particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. 30 While differentiation is well embedded in the climate regime, its interpretation has become the source of much contention in ongoing negotiations on a new climate agreement. 31 The first and most acrimonious issue of contention is that the distinction between developed and developing country Parties is based on the state of affairs in 1992 and, although theoretically amendable, 32 it has not been revised in light of present levels of economic development and emissions. The second and more subtle but equally intractable issue of contention is the fact that lack of differentiation amongst developing countries has produced some perverse outcomes in the implementation of the climate regime, with 'better-off' developing countries, such as China, taking a large share of the resources made available to developing countries, 33 thus raising the question of how to better attend to the needs of the least developed countries.
Disagreement over the interpretation of differentiation between the Parties has been of great consequence for the evolution (or lack thereof) of the climate regime. While Parties agree that their future efforts should be undertaken "on the basis of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities," and taking into account "he imperatives of equitable access to sustainable development," 34 disagreement on the interpretation of the latter terms has been a major bottleneck preventing progress towards the adoption of a new climate agreement. This has led to calls for a reinterpretation of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities "in a more nuanced fashion." 35 27 UNFCCC, Article 4.3. 28 UNFCCC, Article 4.3-5. 29 UNFCCC, Article 4.7. 30 UNFCCC, Article 3.2. 31 In 2011 UNFCCC Parties launched an ongoing process for the negotiation of a new climate agreement, which is expected to be adopted in Paris in December 2015. See Decision 1/CP.17. Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (2011) FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 2. 32 UNFCCC Article 4.2(g), which provides that any party not included in Annex I may, in its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or at any time thereafter, undertake obligations outlined in Article 4.2 (a, b) for Annex I Parties. 33  This debate ultimately boils down to the question of how to secure a transition to low-carbon and climate-resilient economies on fair and equitable terms. In this connection, thinking of how the benefits (rather than the burdens) of climate action can be shared fairly may provide a more constructive approach to climate governance. 36 The relevance of these questions can be better appreciated by considering specific instances where measures to stimulate climate change mitigation and provide finance to developing countries have lead to a host of inter-State equity concerns.

Inter-State benefit-sharing and climate change mitigation
Although developing countries have not undertaken binding emission reduction targets under the climate regime, their participation in mitigation endeavors has been facilitated by the establishment of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and, more recently, by socalled 'policy approaches and incentives' to reduce emissions in the forest sector in developing countries, commonly referred to with the acronym REDD+. 37 Both the CDM and REDD+ may be conceptualized as a means to transfer finance (and to a more limited extent, capacity) to developing countries to facilitate climate change mitigation. From an inter-State equity perspective, these arrangements should target developing country Parties that most need the technological and financial assistance to mitigate climate change provided through the CDM and REDD+. However, both of these instruments have neglected to address considerations concerning the equitable distribution of available resources. Most CDM projects have been approved in 'better-off' developing country Parties, thus frustrating the need to facilitate access to finance and technologies among least developed countries. 38 Whilst the need to give greater consideration to these inter-State equity considerations has been brought to the attention of Parties, 39 the related debate is presently stalled, due to overall uncertainty concerning the future of the Kyoto Protocol and of the mechanisms it created. 40 The matter of the equitable distribution of REDD+ funding amongst eligible developing countries has not been addressed at all in the context of negotiations on REDD+, where the major focus has rather been on targeting States with greater mitigation potential in the forest sector.  Another considerable inter-State equity concern underlying the climate regime is that the market-based instruments that Parties have created to stimulate climate change mitigation in developing countries, like the CDM (and potentially REDD+), have raised the concern that these countries sell off the 'low-hanging fruits' of their climate change mitigation, without creating the circumstances to facilitate their own switch to a low-emissions development paths. 41 Increasing emphasis has therefore been placed on the need to ensure that developing countries actually benefit from mitigation activities beyond the mere financial revenues created by the sale of carbon offsets. In some cases these benefits may be ecosystem-based, for example in the case of forest-related activities, whereas in others they may be related to broader societal advantages, for example in connection with the wide range of activities falling within the scope of the CDM, such as the reduction of emissions from industrial and energy production.
The CDM was originally expected to engender a series of monetary benefits (e.g. increased foreign investment) and non-monetary benefits (e.g. transfer of technologies, dissemination of best practice and strengthening of local institutional, financial and technological capacity) in countries hosting projects, 42 as well as lessened reliance on carbon-intensive development. 43 Implementation of CDM projects, however, has revealed that expectations of windfall monetary benefits for host countries were largely misplaced. While the CDM has mobilized considerable finance, the vast majority of projects have been funded domestically, and increased foreign investment has largely failed to materialize. 44 Furthermore, as CDM credits are generated and sold on a project basis, the recipients of the monetary benefits are project developers (rather than States) and, only to a limited extent, domestic authorities receiving administrative fees or taxes associated with projects. 45 As far as non-monetary benefits are concerned, such as the transfer of technology and capacity building, due to the lack of indicators designed to report these benefits of CDM activities, evidence from the implementation of project activities is inconclusive. 46 An expert report prepared in the context of the policy dialogue on the reform of the CDM specifically underscores the necessity to give greater consideration to Parties' needs, 47 and measures to this effect have already been unilaterally undertaken by the European Union. Furthermore, explicit requirements for positive impacts on the economy, health, welfare and environment of the local community hosting projects already feature in voluntary standards deployed by non-State actors for the 41 Ibid.,[49][50][51] certification of CDM projects. 48 However, no internationally coordinated measures in this direction have been adopted under the Kyoto Protocol, and so far inter-State benefit-sharing under the CDM has remained more a theoretical possibility than a concrete reality. REDD+ has also raised inter-State equity questions similar to those arising in the context of the CDM, drawing attention to the need to balance the global benefits of forest-based climate change mitigation with host countries' interests and priorities. More specifically, adopting a market-based approach to REDD+ finance could promote the sell-off of a significant share of developing countries' climate change mitigation potential, without increasing their capacity to deal with climate change and develop more sustainably. The question of how to ensure that concrete benefits flow to developing countries has been addressed in the context of voluntary certification standards 49 as well as in safeguards that UNFCCC Parties must promote and respect in the implementation of REDD+ activities. These safeguards request that REDD+ activities avoid causing harm and "enhance social and environmental benefits." 50 The matter has been furthermore addressed in the context of the ongoing debate on so-called "noncarbon benefits" of REDD+, which concerns the advantages produced by REDD+ activities beyond mere carbon storage, such as poverty relief and biodiversity protection. 51 A heated debate presently centers on whether these non-carbon benefits should be reported and monitored and, if so, how, and whether they should attract payments. 52 Reporting non-carbon benefits in the information system devised for REDD+ safeguards could be an important tool to provide international scrutiny of the flow of benefits to developing countries associated with REDD+. At the time of writing, it is too early to say whether and how this debate will conclude. There nevertheless seems to be a need to better ascertain the equity implications of UNFCCC Parties' decisions on these complex matters. 53

Inter-State benefit-sharing and climate finance
Another area to pose significant inter-State equity questions is that of climate finance. Even though some efforts in this direction have already been made, so far climate finance 48 See for example the Gold Standard, Version 2.2 (2012), which was developed at the initiative of the World Wildlife Foundation to certify climate change mitigation projects that "positively impact the economy, health, welfare and environment of the local community hosting the project." instruments have failed to target the developing countries most in need. 54 While criteria for the allocation of resources used by all climate funds established under the Global Environment Facility (GEF) give at least some consideration to the distribution of funds amongst developing country Parties, 55 their operation has reportedly resulted in a bias towards Asia and lower-middle income countries, 56 contributing to dissatisfaction with the performance of the GEF as a financial mechanism under the climate regime. At the time of writing it is too early to say whether the Green Climate Fund (GCF), established as a new financial mechanism under the climate regime, will manage to address shortcomings in the operation of the GEF. 57 GCF guidance makes reference to the allocation of funding based on "the urgent and immediate needs of vulnerable countries," only with regard to adaptation. 58 This proviso is largely resonant with the practice of the Adaptation Fund, which was established under the Kyoto Protocol to specifically address the needs of Parties particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. 59 The matter of the distribution of resources to address climate change amongst States has attracted much attention also in human rights fora. Both the literature and reports of human rights procedures have addressed the impact of climate change 60 and of climate change response measures on the protection of human rights. 61 While the first issue is of more direct consequence for the purpose of inter-State equity, the second is more directly related to equity considerations arising at the intra-State level (see infra). 54  At the inter-State level, human rights bodies have drawn attention to the adverse effects of climate change for the effective enjoyment of all human rights and to the need to address these in light of States' extant obligations. 62 In this regard, some human procedures have singled out the availability of climate finance and its distribution amongst indicators to assess progress in meeting the right to development, 63 as a means to equitably share environmental burdens. 64 Some authors have argued that human rights may be used as benchmarks of acceptable outcomes based on widely agreed principles and legal structure and more generally, work together with the climate regime towards a defragmentation of international law. 65 Others have emphasized how human rights could help in identifying which climate impacts should be given priority, what kind of action should be taken and who should bear the costs of action. 66 The translation of these human rights discourses into inter-State obligations is, however, problematic. 67 The protection awarded by human rights instruments has considerable jurisdictional limitations, which are due to the fact that human rights obligations inherently deal with the relationship between States and subjects within their jurisdiction, rather than the relationship between States. 68 Rules on jurisdictional scope vary quite significantly from one human rights treaty to another. 69 In this respect, there is a clear divide between civil and political rights on the one hand, and social, economic and cultural rights on the other. 70 In the first set of treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, only in very limited circumstances have human rights bodies interpreted jurisdiction clauses in a way to cover events or consequences of State actions outside the territory of the contracting States, for example in connection with situations of territorial occupation. 71 Thus, the Human Rights Committee, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights have generally required some control over territory, or control and authority over individuals, in order to apply the obligations under the relevant treaties. 72 Conversely, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) contains no jurisdictional clause 73 and the body charged with interpreting its provisions, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, has interpreted the scope of the Covenant rather liberally. 74 Independent Expert John Knox has suggested that the extraterritorial application of States' obligations under the ICESCR is in accord with the fundamental obligation of States to carry out their treaty commitments in good faith, and to avoid taking actions calculated to frustrate the object and purpose of a treaty. 75 While this is a tenable interpretation, it scarcely supports arguments for the extraterritorial application of States' positive obligations associated with the protection of economic, social and cultural rights in the context of climate change. 76 It seems, in other words, difficult to argue that States have specific obligations to undertake positive action to secure the protection of human rights associated with climate change beyond their territorial boundaries.
In this regard, it has more realistically been suggested that international human rights law may "usefully inform debates on equity and fair distribution of mitigation and adaptation burdens" 77 and strengthen international, regional and national policymaking in the area of climate change, promoting policy coherence, legitimacy and sustainable outcomes. 78 In this limited sense, the general obligation of international cooperation contained in the ICESCR, 79 and in the Charter of the United Nations 80 constitutes a basis to require States to work together to protect subjects within their jurisdiction from the effects of climate change on their human rights. 81 However, States already have more clear-cut cooperation obligations in this connection under the climate regime, so human rights considerations seem to do little but add moral arguments on the need to take international action to tackle climate change. 82

Interim conclusions
There seems to be some scope to use benefit-sharing as a conceptual "frame" 83 to analyze how the climate regime addresses inter-State equity questions and distributes resources amongst States. A study of the climate regime through a benefit-sharing lens has the potential to provide added value to negotiations on a new climate agreement, where inter-State equity considerations and calls for reflecting on the role of human rights in climate governance are being looked afresh. 84 While so far this use of benefit-sharing has not been investigated in the literature, support for a benefit-sharing 'rhetoric' has been expressed by influential epistemic actors. 85 Framing equity questions raised by climate law in terms of Parties' needs, and focusing on the interplay with the protection of human rights, 86 has the potential to stimulate greater awareness of mutual supportiveness between States' international law obligations and go beyond entrenched dynamics in the climate regime.

Intra-State benefit-sharing
At the intra-State level, profound equity questions concern the need to temper the impact of climate change response measures on particularly vulnerable segments of the population in developed and developing countries alike. Contrary to the inter-State level, however, the climate regime already features examples of intra-State benefit-sharing requirements specifically aimed to do just that. Depending on the type of activity, under the climate regime benefit-sharing requirements are attached to the conservation, use and regulation of natural resources, such as renewable energy generation, forest carbon sequestration and other forms of land-based mitigation.
Rather than being adopted by the UNFCCC COP, these requirements are included in standards formulated by a heterogeneous set of actors, in some instances acting outside the international law-making fora established under the climate regime. So while some benefitsharing requirements have been formulated by subsidiary bodies to the COP exercising delegated regulatory powers, others have been adopted by international agencies established beyond the institutional remit of the UNFCCC, and by voluntary certification initiatives of non-State actors. 87 For the present purposes, the array of instruments adopted through processes that do not involve, or only partially involve, States, are relevant because of the normative consequences that States and intergovernmental organizations attach to them. 88 The interplay between this complex web of sources has resulted in a situation in which no one single notion of benefit-sharing has emerged but many, and some areas, such as climate finance, have witnessed more pronounced developments than others. These multifarious manifestations of benefit-sharing tend to be strongly characterized by the subject area in which they have emerged, and by the institutional culture of the actors that have formulated them. This in turn has profound implications on the interpretation and overall coherence of the notion of benefit-sharing in the climate regime.
While the notion of benefit-sharing has considerably evolved as a result of the interplay between human rights and biodiversity law, 89 benefit-sharing requirements emerged under the climate regime are predominantly inspired by the understanding of benefit-sharing in human rights law. The main reason for this is that benefit-sharing arrangements under the climate regime largely aim at compensating the negative impacts of climate change response measures on individuals and communities, rather than empowering them to participate. There is, however, a significant exception to this rule, in the context of REDD+.
The present section reviews benefit-sharing requirements as they have emerged under the climate regime with a view to tracing their origins and the way in which they have concretely evolved. For this reason, this section distinguishes instances where benefit-sharing operates as a form of compensation for the impact of climate response measures, from those where it may be regarded as a form of reward for the individuals or communities.  (2014), at 4: "Limiting the effects of climate change is necessary to achieve sustainable development and equity, including poverty eradication. At the same time, some mitigation efforts could undermine action on the right to promote sustainable development, and on the achievement of poverty eradication and equity. Consequently, a comprehensive assessment of climate policies involves going beyond a focus on mitigation and adaptation policies alone to examine development pathways more broadly, along with their determinants." Human Rights Council and its Special Rapporteurs and Independent Experts have frequently drawn attention to the need to take into account the human rights implications of climate change response measures. 91 For example, the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing has remarked how the development of alternative sources of energy for climate change mitigation, such as hydroelectric dams, may result in human rights violations, 92 underscoring the importance of participation to enable those who stand to be most directly affected to have a say in the design and implementation of such activities, and avert rights violations. 93 The Rapporteur has also highlighted the need to evaluate the distributional impacts of climate change projects, 94 and provide redress for grievances and compensation in response to inevitable damages, as well as the role of environmental impact assessments in this regard. 95 Equally, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Water has drawn attention to the need to ensure that climate change response measures integrate human rights standards and principles, amongst others by ensuring participation of concerned communities and stakeholders in local and national adaptation efforts, and in connection with decision-making associated with the use of official development assistance; and by means of "accessible, affordable, timely and effective mechanisms of redress" to safeguard against violations of the rights to water and sanitation. 96

Intra-State benefit-sharing as a form of compensation
So far there has been little uptake of these exhortations in international climate change lawmaking processes. In its sole reference to human rights to date, the UNFCCC COP has generically recognized that Parties should fully respect human rights "in all climate change related actions." 97 Since the UNFCCC does not contain any conflict clause, this assertion may be regarded as a significant statement concerning the relationship between the climate and the human rights regimes. As there is no intrinsic priority of one set of obligations over the other, when faced with implementation conflicts, obligations under the UNFCCC should be interpreted in such a way as to support, rather than conflict with, human rights. This important specification on the relationship between the climate and human rights regimes gives little guidance on how to concretely pursue synergies between the two. In this connection, the African Commission has specifically urged the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union to ensure that "human rights standards safeguards, such as the principle of free, prior and informed consent, be included into any adopted legal text on climate change as preventive measures against forced relocation, unfair dispossession 91 In fact, the Human Rights Council has recently specifically encouraged "relevant special procedures mandate holders to give consideration to the issue of climate change and human rights within their respective mandates." Compare Human Rights Council Resolution 26/L.33 (2014), at 8. 92 Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context (2009)  Benefit-sharing is one of the tools that have been deployed to strike a balance between human rights protection and climate response measures. In developed countries, multiple instances of benefit-sharing arrangements exist, largely to provide individuals and communities affected by renewable energy generation activities with various forms of monetary and nonmonetary advantages, like cheap access to energy. 100 Analogous arrangements may also emerge in relation to carbon capture and sequestration, once this technology goes to scale and starts to be widely implemented. Benefit-sharing arrangements associated with renewable energy generation activities in developed countries take various guises and forms, depending on the relevant domestic law framework and on the contractual arrangements assisting each particular project or activity. 101 It is interesting to note how these arrangements do not necessarily target the vulnerable, but instead any individual that happens to be affected by renewable energy generation activities. Furthermore, they do not seem to be driven by international guidance or human rights-related discourses, but rather to be the byproduct of established domestic laws and policies associated with energy generation activities, such as nuclear plants. 102 The discourse on benefit-sharing associated with climate response measures is rather more complex in developing countries, where various forms of internationally coordinated guidance have been adopted to ensure the protection of indigenous and other vulnerable communities' rights over lands, territories and natural resources. 103 This has been especially true in the context of climate finance. As explained earlier, climate finance may be regarded as a means to operationalize inter-State equity in the climate regime, and enable developing countries to adapt to climate change and participate in mitigation endeavors. The use of climate finance, however, raises specific intra-State equity questions concerning the social impacts of sponsored climate change mitigation or adaptation activities. Institutions handling climate finance both within and without the institutional scope of the UNFCCC have adopted safeguards to prevent, assess and compensate such negative impacts. These safeguards include intra-State benefit-sharing requirements, which ultimately concern the need to 98 African Commission, Resolution 153 on Climate Change and Human Rights and the Need to Study its Impact in Africa (2009) balance the pursuit of global benefits associated with climate change adaptation and/or mitigation with local needs and priorities. There has, nevertheless, been a significant degree of variation amongst these benefit-sharing requirements, both in connection with the identification of beneficiaries, as well as in the extent to which they align with human rights law and practice.
In general, all climate finance standards make reference to both monetary and non-monetary benefits to be derived from funded activities -focusing on compensation for any adverse impacts that these activities may have. For example, GEF standards require that financed projects and operations foster full respect for indigenous peoples' human rights, so that they do not suffer "adverse effects" and receive "culturally appropriate" social and economic benefits. 104 Restrictions on access to land and natural resources associated with conservation activities specifically should be compensated by means of full and effective participation and equitable benefit-sharing. 105 The GEF standards, however, focus narrowly on indigenous peoples, thus falling short of established human rights practice, which requires that 'tribal' communities too enjoy, at least in some circumstances, some of the rights enjoyed by indigenous peoples, for example in connection with their free prior informed consent. 106 Similar considerations apply to the recently adopted GCF environmental and social safeguards, which aim to "identify, analyze, control and reduce the adverse environmental and social impacts" of funded activities on indigenous peoples and maximize their potential environmental and social benefits. 107 The GCF standards also refer to ensuring respect for indigenous peoples' human rights, knowledge and practices; and to the need for indigenous peoples to receive sustainable and culturally appropriate development benefits and opportunities from funded activities. 108 The Adaptation Fund has adopted a comparatively more progressive stance on these matters. Its environmental and social policy was expressly adopted to bring the Fund's practices in line with those of "other leading financing institutions active in environment and development financing;" by enhancing the sustainable development benefits of funded activities and avoiding unnecessary harm. 109 The policy is nevertheless notable in that it addresses all affected communities (and thus, not only indigenous peoples), 110 with the objective to provide "fair and equitable access to benefits" in a manner that is "inclusive" and does not impede access to "basic health services, clean water and sanitation, energy, education, housing, safe and decent working conditions, and land rights." 111 Funded activities should avoid imposing disproportionate adverse impacts on marginalized and vulnerable groups 112 and respect and promote international human rights. 113 Applicants are required to describe economic, social and environmental benefits, with particular reference to the most vulnerable communities and vulnerable groups. 114 Funding requests should furthermore include information on expected beneficiaries, with particular reference to the equitable distribution of benefits to vulnerable communities, households, and individuals, giving special consideration to minority groups and indigenous peoples. Thus, at least on paper, the Adaptation Fund's standards are more ambitious than those of the GEF and the GCF, in that they strive to encompass a wider range of beneficiaries, and include a specific list of basic guarantees, as recommended in the guidance by the human rights bodies mentioned above.
In sum, climate finance standards treat benefit-sharing as a safeguard to protect stakeholders likely to be negatively affected by the implementation of climate measures. Some of these benefit-sharing standards explicitly draw upon international human rights law and practice. Nevertheless, not all climate finance standards have adopted an equally open approach to human rights, thus raising some concerns about the coherence with which the matter of benefit-sharing is addressed by various financing bodies operating under the climate regime and, more generally, about potential frictions with obligations under human rights law.

Intra-State benefit-sharing as a reward for the use of traditional knowledge and ecosystem stewardship?
The notion of benefit-sharing as a means to reward indigenous peoples and local communities for their ecosystem stewardship and reliance on their traditional knowledge is well embedded in the CBD framework. 115 Thus under the CBD, benefit-sharing is not only a means to compensate negative social impacts, but also to empower stakeholders in various ways by rewarding them for the provision of ecosystem services and traditional knowledge, and enhancing their participation in relevant decision-making processes. 116 The CBD COP has specifically "invited" its Parties to take into account the provision of ecosystem services in the planning and implementation of climate change mitigation and adaptation activities, including through the consideration for traditional knowledge and the involvement of indigenous and local communities. 117 While under the CBD benefit-sharing from traditional 111 Ibid.,13. 112 Ibid.,14. 113 Ibid.,15. 114 Operational Policies and Guidelines for Accessing Funding (2013), Annex 4, Request for Project/Programme Funding from the Adaptation Fund, 4-5 115 CBD Decision VII/12 (2004) Annex II, Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity; CBD Decision VII/16C (2004), Annex, Akwé: Kon voluntary guidelines for the conduct of cultural, environmental and social impact assessments regarding sacred sites and lands and waters traditionally occupied or used by indigenous and local communities; CBD Decision X/42 (2010), Annex, Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct. See discussion in Morgera,[25][26] Morgera," 19. 117 CBD Decision X/33,8(v) knowledge is a specific legal obligation, 118 the UNFCCC does not address the issue in any way. The text of the Convention mentions ecosystems only generically, 119 and the UNFCCC COP has made little effort to draw upon CBD guidance on the issue. Clearly not all climate change mitigation and adaptation activities may be framed in terms of ecosystem services and stewardship. While the link with ecosystems is evident in virtually all land-based mitigation activities, such as reduced deforestation and enhanced carbon sequestration in land and forests, several mitigation activities in the industrial and energy sectors are not associated with ecosystem stewardship. Even in the instances where the links with ecosystems are apparent, the climate regime has so far made little use of benefit-sharing arrangements as a means to reward traditional knowledge and ecosystem stewardship. The only notable exception is the emerging legal framework on REDD+. REDD+ may be regarded as a form of payment for ecosystem services, 120 and from the beginning the sharing of the monetary and non-monetary benefits derived from forest conservation and enhancement activities with affected individuals and communities was singled out as crucial to its success. 121 While this matter is not addressed in the UNFCCC COP guidance, the issue has enjoyed great prominence in the context of so-called REDDreadiness standards adopted to create the enabling conditions to carry out REDD+ activities. Both of the main international initiatives established to facilitate REDD-readiness -i.e. the UN-REDD Programme and the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)have adopted standards concerning the sharing of benefits associated with REDD+ activities, which have largely taken the guise of revenue-sharing arrangements focused on compensating stakeholders affected by REDD+ activities. 122 There is, however, a significant chasm between the standards adopted by these two institutions. While the UN-REDD has embraced a human rights-based approach, 123 drawing upon substantive and procedural elements of established human rights law and practice, 124 the FCPF has not. Instead, FCPF standards subject the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples to a series of distinguos and leave partner countries to interpret these in light what they ambiguously define "legally binding national obligations under relevant international laws." 125 This gulf in benefit-sharing standards used by the UN-REDD and the FCPF has significant implications for how intra-State equity considerations are addressed in REDD-readiness processes, which require better coordinated international guidance. 126 Overall, this compensatory approach to benefit-sharing is largely in line with that concerning climate finance, even if benefit-sharing requirements in the REDD+ context are likely in scope, in terms of both their beneficiaries (which include all affected stakeholders, and not just indigenous peoples) and the range of benefits provided (i.e. both economic and non-economic).
In the context of REDD+, however, benefit-sharing has also been used as a means to reward communities for their ecosystem stewardship and traditional knowledge. 127 This issue is implicitly encompassed in REDD+ safeguards adopted by the UNFCCC COP, which specifically mention that REDD+ activities should respect the knowledge of indigenous peoples and local communities by taking into account the "relevant international obligations, national circumstances and laws." 128 While the UNFCCC COP has thus left to its Parties to address the issue of the interplay between safeguards and human rights law and practice, UN-REDD Programme standards make specific reference to the need to share the benefits derived from the use of traditional knowledge. 129 The rationale, although not explicitly mentioned, is clearly to reward the holders of traditional knowledge. At the time of writing, little evidence exists on how this standard has been interpreted and implemented. It is nevertheless evident that UN-REDD Programme standards have gone beyond the UNFCCC COP safeguards by encapsulating guidance on traditional knowledge elaborated in the context of the CBD, in line with their mandate to "uphold UN conventions, treaties and declarations, and apply the UN agencies' policies and procedures." 130 Further developments concerning benefit-sharing may also emerge in the incipient intergovernmental dialogue concerning the application of traditional knowledge and practices to climate change adaptation 131 and in negotiations on agriculture. 132 The UNFCCC COP has already underscored that adaptation measures should be guided and based on traditional and 126 See for example, Annalisa Savaresi, "The Role of REDD in Harmonising Overlapping International Obligations," in Climate Change and the Law. A Global Perspective, ed. Erkki Hollo, Kati Kulovesi, and Michael Mehling (Springer, 2013), 391-418;Annalisa Savaresi, "REDD+ and Human Rights: Addressing Synergies between International Regimes," Ecology and Society 18, no. 3 (2013): 5-21. 127 See e.g. K. Graham and A. Thorpe, "Community-Based Monitoring, Reporting and Verification of REDD Projects: Innovative Potentials for Benefit Sharing," Carbon and Climate Law Review 3, no. 3 (2009): 303-13. 128 Decision 1/CP.16, Appendix I, 2: "respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of local communities, by taking into account relevant international obligations, national circumstances and laws" as well as "the full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular indigenous peoples and local communities." 129 UN-REDD, Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria, Criterion 11. 130 Ibid.,2. 131 Best practices and available tools for the use of indigenous and traditional knowledge and practices for adaptation, and the application of gender-sensitive approaches and tools for understanding and assessing impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change (2013) FCCC/TP/2013/11, 57. 132 Report on the workshop on the current state of scientific knowledge on how to enhance the adaptation of agriculture to climate change impacts while promoting rural development, sustainable development and productivity of agricultural systems and food security in all countries, particularly in developing countries, taking into account the diversity of the agricultural systems and the differences in scale as well as possible adaptation co-benefits (2014)  indigenous knowledge as is appropriate. 133 Nevertheless, UNFCCC Parties have not so far addressed the matter of benefit-sharing, focusing only generically on the global benefits to be derived from traditional knowledge for adaptation 134 rather than on the benefits that ought to flow to the holders of such knowledge. Only very recently has the need to ensure "predictable and tangible benefits" for, and for the empowerment of, communities, as a means to both stimulate and reward their collaboration towards adaptation been mentioned at a technical meeting convened under the auspices of the Adaptation Committee. 135 It is too early to tell whether these developments will lead to the adoption of specific requirements concerning benefit-sharing from traditional knowledge. 136 This is, however, clearly an area where large untapped potential exists for building the climate regime on the basis of the well-established body of law developed under the CBD, not only at the intra-State level, but, at least potentially, also in its transnational dimension-i.e. in relationships between traditional knowledge providers and users across jurisdictions. 137

Interim conclusions
In the climate regime intra-State benefit-sharing arrangements have been predominantly deployed as a means to compensate stakeholders for the negative social impacts associated with climate change mitigation activities, rather than as a means of empowerment. There has however been some movement towards considering benefit-sharing as a means to reward indigenous peoples and other communities for ecosystem stewardship, potentially also for their traditional knowledge. As observed in connection with inter-State benefit-sharing, guidance provided in international human rights and biodiversity law could usefully complement climate law, supplementing it with internationally agreed guidance on matters upon which States have already reached painstakingly negotiated consensus. It would therefore seem obvious that climate law-makers rely on this guidance, without attempting to "reinvent the wheel" every time. 138 In this exercise, it is however important to underscore the fundamental difference between international biodiversity and human rights law. While Parties to the CBD and the UNFCCC are virtually the same, this is not the case with human rights treaties.
While a wide array of human rights may be affected by the implementation of climate response measures, these rights are embedded in a multifarious set of international, regional, as well as 'specialized' human rights instruments. 139 The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) 140 builds on existing human rights obligations, 141 and while some of its provisions may be regarded as part of customary international law, 142 this does not apply to all. Thus UNDRIP does not in itself address the issue of the fragmented nature of States' obligations on indigenous peoples. 143 As a result of their fragmented nature, States' obligations under human rights instruments are inherently context-specific and need to be ascertained on a case-by-case basis. And even where there is evidence of some cross-fertilization between the interpretative practice of one regional human rights instrument and another, 144 this does not entail an automatic translation of the approach emerged in one regime into the other. 145 In this regard, national law-and decision-makers are ultimately in charge of interpreting States' obligations under the climate regime in line with their international legal commitments on human rights. Implementation of climate response measures, however, has already provided ample evidence that there is a need to be especially vigilant over the human rights violations that may be associated with these measures. 146 It is therefore important to consider means by which to ensure that obligations under climate and human rights law are implemented in a mutually supportive fashion.
The use of benefit-sharing requirements may serve exactly this purpose, and function as a means to incorporate human rights considerations into international processes dealing with climate change response measures, avoiding conflicts and exploiting synergies with States' human rights obligations. However so far little intergovernmental effort has been made to systematically use benefit-sharing as a means to take human rights into account when construing, developing, and operationalizing climate response measures. The little guidance that exists on the issue is the result of the autonomous initiative of institutions dealing with climate finance and REDD+. This state of affairs has engendered a situation whereby no one single approach to benefit-sharing exists under the climate regime, and various degrees of cross-fertilization between human rights and climate law have occurred. It would seem sensible to adopt a common approach to this matter, and clearly the UNFCCC COP is the institution best-equipped to undertake such an endeavor. The UNFCCC COP however has dedicated little time and effort to considering safeguards and overlaps with human rights law. 147 The CBD has been far more proactive and solicitous in its approach to the matter, 148 but its guidance has so far remained little noticed and only covers ecosystem-related climate response measures.
Thus, ultimately ensuring that benefit-sharing under the climate regime is performed in line with States' human rights obligations largely remains a matter left to the autonomous efforts of national decision-makers and single institutions, in what Sebastian Oberthür has aptly described as "autonomous" or, at best, "unilateral interplay management." 149 As a result, single States and/or institutions are faced with the challenge of interpreting international law on human rights and climate change in a synergistic fashion -as opposed to more systemic forms of interplay management, where such coordination endeavors are carried out by a set of institutions together, or by an overarching international institution. The risk that autonomous and unilateral interplay management endeavors end in incoherence is already palpable when we consider that the standards addressing benefit-sharing in the climate regime already differ greatly, depending on the institution that has adopted them. This state of affairs poses considerable challenges for developed countries wishing to access funding, and faced each time with different standards. While this is not a matter arising only with regard to benefit-sharing, it is particularly concerning that such incoherence affects standards that are ultimately aimed at ensuring equity in the implementation of climate response measures, potentially engendering the risk of widespread human rights violations.

Preliminary inferences and questions for further investigation
This paper departed from the premise that analyzing climate law and policy by focusing on benefit-sharing provides a novel angle to scrutinize equity in the climate regime both amongst and within States, by taking into account developing countries' and communities' needs, as well as ensuring mutual supportiveness with other key international objectives, such as the protection of human rights and biodiversity conservation. The preliminary investigation carried out here has shown that benefit-sharing is already being used as a tool to operationalize equity in the climate regime, and its use has accelerated considerably in recent years.
These developments are most evident at the intra-State level, where the climate regime already features many instances of benefit-sharing requirements. In this context, benefitsharing has been used both as a form of compensation for the negative impacts stemming from the implementation of climate response measures lato sensu, and, in the case of ecosystem-based activities that entail some degree of stewardship and/or use of traditional knowledge, as a reward for the individuals and communities involved.
These intra-State benefit-sharing requirements overlap with the considerable and much more developed body of law and practice on benefit-sharing in the spheres of international human rights and biodiversity law. While some efforts have been made to bring these elements together, multiple approaches to benefit-sharing have emerged, raising questions on the relationship between the legal regimes relevant to the interpretation of the benefit-sharing requirements. Questions about the relationship between the climate regime, human rights law and biodiversity law have already been addressed in the literature, 150 without however focusing on benefit-sharing as a means to address the intra-State equity challenges raised by climate change response measures. Uncovering the extant ramifications of benefit-sharing in climate law may not only draw specific attention to the limits posed by parallel developments under the CBD and human rights law, but also highlight constructive approaches to address common challenges concerning climate change response measures in a mutually supportive fashion. Future academic reflection is therefore needed in this direction. First, it is necessary to further understand the nuances of the various forms of benefit-sharing arrangements that have emerged in international climate change law and conceptually clarify the extent to which it is possible to theorize a common benefit-sharing approach in the context of climate response measures. Second, there is a need to explore the link between the notion of ecosystem and that of benefit-sharing in the climate regime. So far this dimension has not been addressed in climate law. There is ample scope to investigate the role of the ecosystem approach in the context of REDD+, as well as in the incipient policy debate on agriculture, 151 where overlaps may also arise with the notion of benefit-sharing embedded in the multilateral regime for access and benefit-sharing of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGR). 152 Finally, the incipient debate on the use of traditional knowledge in the climate regime may engender friction with obligations under the CBD, ITPGR and human rights law. It is therefore in order to investigate how the matter of traditional knowledge is addressed in the climate context and obligations that UNFCCC Parties should take into account when they consider ways to use traditional knowledge.
As far as inter-State equity is concerned, the preliminary review carried out in this paper has uncovered potential benefit-sharing aspects lying behind obligations concerning finance, technology and capacity-building in the climate regime, paying specific attention to the distribution of these resources amongst developing countries and to the question of Parties' needs. Although the UNFCCC does not make reference to benefit-sharing, the role of this notion in addressing inter-State equity considerations within the framework of a common concern of mankind will be explored as a means to contribute to ongoing scholarly debate on a new climate agreement, where questions of differentiation and equity between Parties are being looked at afresh. 153 No academic study on the potential of addressing inter-State equity questions arising in the climate regime from a benefit-sharing perspective yet exists. A study of inter-State benefit-sharing considerations underlying climate governance is thus expected to provide international law-makers with a useful lens to focus on the mutually supportive interpretation of obligations in the climate regime as well as those under other international regimes, and to potentially bring about new and more equitable solutions to vexed climate governance questions.