IV.—PROF. ADAMSON'S PHILOSOPHICAL LECTURES.¹

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1. PHILOSOPHICAL literature has been enriched by a contribution of the utmost value and importance through the publication of the Lectures of the late Prof. Adamson, so carefully and judiciously edited by his friend, Prof. Sorley. When Prof. Adamson died, in February, 1902, it was generally recognised that one of the most learned and acute of English thinkers had prematurely passed away, and the fear seemed only too well founded that the ripe results of his life-long devotion to philosophical problems would, in large measure, be lost to the world. For, in later years, he had committed comparatively little to writing. He appears to have shrunk from stereotyping his views in print, and to have found in University teaching a more congenial means of giving utterance to conclusions, continually undergoing amplification as the outcome of further reading and reflexion. Seldom has philosophical lecturing served the strenuous purpose it did in Prof. Adamson's hands; it became for him, one might almost say, an instrument of research, so that whilst ostensibly occupied in "giving to others what Plato wisely calls 'the best and fairest thing that the best of men can ever have,' education of soul," he was at the same time engaged in "a single-minded effort to reach the truth, and so far as possible to express it". Consequently, with the exception of a few Occasional Addresses, all that remained of his work as a Scotch Professor (1893-1902) was contained in the notes of the succession of students who attended his classes and took down what he delivered extemporaneously. In seeking, therefore, to recover and preserve his last word on the problems of human thought, Prof. Sorley followed the only course available. He selected out of many volumes of students' notes those which seemed to present the maturest expression of the author's philosophical views and fixed upon reports of four series of lectures, dating from the sessions 1897-1898 and 1898-1899,—two historical and critical, leading up to a constructive Theory of Knowledge; two psychological, dealing with psychical

¹ *The Development of Modern Philosophy, with other Lectures and Essays.* By Robert Adamson, M.A., LL.D. Edited by W. R. Sorley, M.A., LL.D. 2 vols, 1908. Blackwood & Sons.

processes generally, and then more especially with the processes of Thinking,—for the basis of the present work. The first feeling of the reader will be one of thankfulness that so much has been rescued from oblivion, combined with appreciation of the editor's labour in arranging and adapting the materials for the press. The conciseness and consecutiveness of the lectures almost conceal the fact that they are lectures, and altogether the work possesses a systematic form and completeness truly, under the circumstances, remarkable.¹

In his admirable Introduction, the editor refers to Prof. Adamson's steady adherence to the method of overcoming philosophical difficulties by reasoning them out or thinking through them. "The light that guided him was the dry light of reason, and he would never pretend or imagine that he saw more than reason illumined." From first to last, the attitude of his mind was essentially critical, and it was mainly through criticism of the work of others that he reached and formulated definite views of his own. "Philosophy," he says in one of the Occasional Addresses, "has sometimes been blamed for its habitual method of proceeding by negative criticism, and it must be allowed that the business of a philosopher has seemed too often that of rending his predecessors. Yet a general defence might fairly be rested on the ground that such is the method of thought, which always advances by distinctions and limitations, and such is the process of all organic growth and development. A negation never merely expunges. It defines, and at least points the way towards a positive" (ii., 110). The historical lectures on the "Development of Modern Philosophy," contained in the first volume, are one consistent exemplification of this dictum. They possess a continuity and organic connectedness of quite exceptional kind, because the author was gradually working up to a systematic Theory of Knowledge through a sustained attempt to view its problems in the form they assumed at different stages in the development of thought. He had the rare gift of getting to the heart of a philosophic system and of exhibiting its essential features in brief, forcible, and precise language. But he was never content with that alone. In each case, he brought to bear the penetrative and original criticism of a thinker who had placed himself *within* the circle of ideas with which he was dealing, and who, by resolutely following out a philosophical principle to its logical issue,

¹ The volumes are singularly free from *errata*. I have noted only the following: Vol. i.—p. 178, 15 lines from top, for "were present" read "we represent"; p. 265, 6 lines from top, for "injustice" read "justice"; p. 273, 15 lines from top, the comma should be after *to* instead of after *of*. Vol. ii.—p. 288, 13 lines from bottom, for "subject" read "subjective"; p. 261, last line, the word "somewhat" is awkward and misleading. Further, I cannot help thinking the passage on p. 261 of vol. i., beginning 9 lines from top, ought to read: "It may be conceivable—though I do not think it is—that development of the personal finite Ego from the Absolute Ego should accommodate itself to the *second* of these conceptions; it is hardly possible that it can do so to the *first* of them".

was enabled to indicate the exact point at which its inadequacy for further advance became evident.

In regard to fundamental speculative problems, Prof. Adamson's own position underwent extensive modification with the lapse of years. As a student at Edinburgh, he served a period of intellectual apprenticeship to J. S. Mill, and used to relate how he was in the habit of defending the Utilitarian standpoint in his college essays against the objections of the teacher of his class. On becoming acquainted, however, with the Kantian writings, to the study of which he appears to have devoted in the main his Shaw Fellowship period, his confidence in the traditional English method of approaching the problems of Knowledge and Ethics gave way, and from that time forward nothing was more characteristic of him than his insistence upon the supreme importance of the Critical analysis of experience as the basis from which to attempt the questions of modern thought. "If we are to connect our knowledge into coherency and system," he wrote in 1879, "and to understand, so far as it may be given to us, the significance of the universe in which we find ourselves, we must resume the problem as it came from the hands of Kant."¹ And in his Inaugural Address of 1895 he still maintains that in order to make discussion of our present position in philosophy clear and precise, reversion to the Kantian system is necessary (ii., 13). During most of the time at Owens College (1876-1893) he would have expressed himself as being in general sympathy with that mode of advance from Kant pursued by the later idealists, but at no time would he have accepted as satisfactory the constructive work of Hegel or that of T. H. Green and his followers. "Every effort of speculative thought," contended Dr. Adamson in 1881, "is affected by the general condition of knowledge, and every advance in scientific inquiry opens out new aspects of the notions through which explanations of speculative difficulties have been found. The problem which now lies before philosophy is, in brief, the effort to re-think the new materials that have been furnished in such ample quantity."² His own attempt to fulfil this requirement led him to the conviction that an important transition was necessary in the point of view from which the philosophical question must be contemplated, and in the Inaugural Address at Glasgow (1895) he definitely announces his adoption of a "new methodical principle in philosophy". Towards the idealist conception he still, in a later Address, acknowledges "a friendly and companionable feeling" (ii., 109), but it had been too "shy of the facts of experience and inclined to wheel in endless circles round the imperfect pictures which the dividing faculty of thought readily supplies" (ii., 8). In Prof. Sorley's words, "for him, unlike Kant, the Copernican change consisted in displacing self-consciousness from the position it occupies in every system of Idealism".

With the exception of a short fragment on Spinoza, it has not

¹ *Philosophy of Kant*, p. 186.

² *Fichte* (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics), p. 220.

been found possible to include in the present work any of the Owens College lectures, and the probability is they will remain unpublished. I propose, therefore, in what follows to indicate the main lines of difference between the position reached in the volumes before us and that which was formerly defended with an originality and independence characteristic of Prof. Adamson's teaching throughout.¹

2. The determining factor giving rise to what Prof. Sorley describes as the "Copernican change" was undoubtedly the increasing weight which Dr. Adamson came to attach to psychological inquiry as a means of approaching, and contributing towards, the solution of speculative problems. A twofold development seems clearly traceable in his thinking. On the one hand he appears to have advanced farther and farther from the view according to which psychology is to be regarded as a purely empirical or natural science; on the other hand he appears to have been brought more and more to the belief that underlying philosophical Empiricism or Naturalism was to be discerned a fundamental principle as to the nature of knowledge which seemed to him of the utmost significance and value.

In his earlier writings, Prof. Adamson was in the habit of drawing a complete distinction between Psychology and Epistemology both in regard to scope and method: "Psychology," he declared in 1881, "as ordinarily conceived,—the scientific account of the phenomena to be observed in consciousness, the description, analysis and history of mental phenomena,—stands on precisely the same level as the natural sciences, and, like them, leaves out of consideration the problem with which philosophy as such has to deal."² Doubtless the qualification indicates that he had begun, even then, to question the sufficiency of such a definition. At all events later, in his lectures at Owens College, this conception of the science was abandoned, and the view adopted which in the essay of 1894 (ii., 45 *sqq.*) he subjects to criticism, *viz.*, that psychology is a treatment of the facts of mind, an investigation into the activities or processes of the inner life. Facts of mind had always the characteristic of being states or phases of a subject, in some way or to some degree aware of itself in and through them. This characteristic entirely separated mental phenomena from the phenomena of external nature, and gave to the former, as contrasted with the singleness of appearance on the part of the latter, a unique double-sided aspect, which altogether precluded a transition from the one to the other as even a possible conception. Still, however, psychology, so far from furnishing a starting point for philosophical inquiry, was itself one of the most concrete of the sciences, and presupposed, as in logical order they did, the more abstract and general study, which Kant called "transcendental".

¹ The materials in my possession are notes of various courses of lectures delivered in the years 1886-1888.

² Fichte, p. 111. *Of. Philosophy of Kant*, p. 22.

In the volumes now published the sharp line of demarcation between Epistemology and Psychology has disappeared, and psychological considerations are allowed a much more primary significance than formerly in regard to the problem as to the nature of reality and the relation of knowledge thereto. Whilst still insisting that, in their material and in point of view, psychology and epistemology are distinct, and that "only confusion can result from prematurely mixing up the two methods and drawing upon the one while carrying out an inquiry under the other," Prof. Adamson is now not less anxious to guard himself against the unqualified rejection of the psychological method to be met with in Kant's treatment of knowledge and to maintain that for the complete solution of the problem it is necessary to combine both modes of investigation (see, *e.g.*, vol. i., pp. 112, 114, 167, and vol. ii., p. 254). Whilst still insisting that "the origin of any special modification of our experience can in no way determine its validity or worth for cognition" (i., 245), he now finds it utterly futile to carry out the inquiry into the meaning and significance of the objective reference in knowledge, without calling to aid the account psychology has to give of the way in which the distinction between subject and object makes its appearance in the history of mind.

The psychology thus brought into requisition as a *Hilfsmittel* towards the solution of what was evidently for Prof. Adamson the central problem of speculative philosophy is, however, a method of research wholly different from that descriptive treatment of psychical phenomena and their laws, the results of which he had previously declared to be "of quite secondary import for the ultimate doctrine of knowledge".¹ No contrast could well be sharper than that between the attenuated, abstract, "objektivierende Wissenschaft" of Munsterberg's *Grundzüge* and the province of eminently concrete, organic material handled in the second volume of the present work. And the difference is due to the fact that while in the former case a feverish anxiety is manifested lest psychology should be tainted by any "kind of compromise with philosophy," in the latter the conception of psychology as merely a branch of natural science is expressly repudiated. "To trace out the history of the mental life, to determine the natural conditions on which it depends, and to follow the several stages of its development from the lowest to the highest, keeping ever before us the concrete character of the whole, is," says Prof. Adamson, "impossible except as part of and in the light of a general philosophical view" (ii., 21). But, inasmuch as philosophy, as a whole, "must keep close to experience and draw its sustenance therefrom," psychology loses not but really gains its character of *Erfahrungswissenschaft* by being regarded as a pursuit so interdependent with Logic and Metaphysics that its problems lead on inevitably to theirs.

¹ *Philosophy of Kant*, p. 23.

The ground on which Dr. Adamson disputes the legitimacy of ranking psychology with the natural sciences was already formulated in the Owens College Lectures, although, at that time, the consequences were not fully developed. "Where we isolate the content (of thought) and treat it as having a quasi existence *per se*, we are," he wrote in *MIND* some years ago, "in the attitude of objective or natural science".¹ Now, according to the view which has lately found perhaps its most pronounced expression in the work of Münsterberg, already mentioned, that is precisely the attitude of the psychologist with regard to the events or processes of mind; he isolates them from their context in the mental life, and treats them as "objects which exist in consciousness as physical objects exist in space". Prof. Adamson, on the other hand, insists that, since in actual experience the events or processes never are thus isolated, to treat them as though they were isolated inevitably results in depriving them of their peculiar and distinctive character. Mental facts, as such, never can be presented in the fashion of objects; they are always facts *of mind*, and this qualification, which distinguishes them from every other class of facts, is exactly what prevents their appearance as objects. We cannot, that is to say, apprehend as themselves objects the acts or processes in and through which there comes to be apprehension of objects at all. By "object," in this connexion, he may be understood to mean that which is represented as a separate distinct existent, standing over against the cognising subject, and upon which the activity of the latter is directed. And the point of the contention is that when we describe mental states by the aid of this category we are describing them not as they are for the consciousness they compose, but as we are vainly making the attempt to regard them from the point of view of an outside observer. All care may be taken to indicate that by object is here meant psychical object, and that, therefore, no predicate which refers to the trans-subjective order of facts is assumed to characterise these so-called objects. For all that, they are still conceived, after the fashion of external things, as objects which the subject dissevers from, and opposes to, himself, rather than as ways in which he becomes himself; they are still contemplated as objects *of* which he is conscious, rather than as modes *in* which he is conscious; they are still spoken of as being *in* mind, rather than as being *of* mind. Such arbitrary severance of the mental life into an observing subject and a series of psychical events, which are taken to be "presented to" the subject, renders both terms of the antithesis unintelligible. Of the nature of the subject we can know *ex hypothesi* nothing; of the psychical states it must be said that there is nothing in them to constitute a mind, still less to entitle the observing subject to regard them as constituting *his* mind. In opposition, then, to this mode of conceiving mental facts, which

¹ *MIND*, O.S., ix., p. 484.

comes historically from the Kantian doctrine of an 'inner sense,' Prof. Adamson proceeds on the view that it is psychology, and not, as in Münsterberg's scheme, history, which has to deal with mental facts as *Erlebnisse des Subjekts*,—processes, that is, which essentially are *not* to be cut loose from the context in which they occur, but to be regarded as stages in the development of mind as a whole,—mind, that is more truly said to *be* its mental states than to *have* them.

On the basis of this conception, the relation of psychology to the Critical Theory of Knowledge can be determined with considerable exactitude. If psychical states as such are never objects; if, in other words, isolation, separation, individuality, are not given facts, but results that come about in experience, which it is the business of psychology to explain, the question arises whether the awareness of objective facts through mental states is itself an invariable concomitant, a primitive, original feature of consciousness. The highly complex set of conditions involved in the perception of an object are sufficient to justify a negative answer. And if we do not start with the representation of outer objects, equally certain is it that the reference to the subject is a derivative and secondary element in conscious experience. For the recognition of what is subjective comes into being only in correlation with the recognition of what is objective, and both imply a combination of factors altogether beyond the range of the rudimentary mental life. Psychology, then, may be said to have for its data, (1) the phenomena of consciousness as primary or immediate experiences, and (2) the process by which, from the characteristics of such immediate experiences, there is developed the distinction between subject and object. Epistemology, on the other hand, is concerned with the worth or validity of conceptions based upon that distinction; its problem, therefore, arises from the recognition of an antithesis, the historical formation of which psychology has to trace.

Psychology thus recovers in regard to the Critical problem of knowledge very much the position the cruder psychology of the pre-Kantian writers occupied in regard to the problem of knowledge as they conceived it. For if the 'objective reference' be itself the outcome of psychical development, then obviously the import or validity of that reference cannot be determined apart from consideration of the ways in which it has been acquired and has gradually attained to definiteness and completeness in the mental life. The nature of the reality manifested in mature experience cannot be independent of the process in and through which the manifestation is brought about. A field of inquiry of incomparably wider scope and significance than is usually hinted at in psychological text-books is thus opened out for the psychologist and the close and intimate bearing of his researches upon ultimate philosophical questions becomes apparent. And in this connexion, it is worthy of notice that at the end of his

psychological lectures in the second volume Prof. Adamson is to be found discussing the very same problems which, from the point of view of Epistemology, he had dealt with at the end of the first.

3. The fundamental conceptions which the author carries to his treatment of Psychology and the Theory of Knowledge are made to emerge, as already intimated, from criticism of the several systems of philosophy, which form the subject of the historical lectures

The familiar distinction between a mental state as an event or occurrence of the inner life and the content of which in and through the mental state we are aware, is exhibited with great clearness through consideration of Locke's ambiguous use of the term 'idea,'—on the one hand, when he declares it his purpose to describe the manner in which the understanding comes by its ideas, on the other hand, when he defines an 'idea' as the name for "whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks". . . Nothing could be more admirable by way of illustration than the instance given of the error to which this confusion leads. Locke, it is pointed out, identifies the simple idea, regarded as the pure product of affection of a purely passive mind, with the highly developed content of thought, the idea or representation of a simple quality (i., 118). The implications of the distinction between psychological state and content are further unfolded by reference to the double meaning attached by Berkeley to the term 'existence,' in the one case when he speaks of ideas or objects as existing, in the other when he speaks of souls or spirits as existing, and a doubt is at once suggested as to the propriety of using the notion in the first of the two senses (i., 126). The consequence of proceeding on the other alternative is shown in the result reached by Hume that the only type of existence is that of isolated impressions and ideas (i., 145).

So again, following the line of thought originating with Descartes, other characteristics implied in the same distinction come to recognition. At the outset, in the advance which Descartes effects from the isolated datum *Cogito ergo sum* through aid of his fifth axiom, there arises the question whether the 'objective reality' (or content) of an idea can be regarded as an existing thing, for only on that assumption can the step he takes from thought to reality be logically justified (i., 15). Another feature connects itself with Malebranche. Malebranche, it is shown, sees quite distinctly that what he calls an 'idea' (= the essential nature of what is apprehended) cannot be identical with the operation, or the 'modality,' through which it is apprehended. The idea is universal; any modality or operation of the soul is particular. The very nature of the former prevents our regarding it as identical with the latter, for how can we conceive of an apprehended circle or square as an operation of the mind? (i., 53-54.) But proceeding upon the scholastic distinction of existence and essence, he

could not avoid ascribing to the 'idea' a kind of quasi-independent existence, and erecting it into a sort of entity, having its *locus* in the divine mind. To Antoine Arnauld, the acute critic of Malebranche and of Leibniz, the credit belongs of having discerned the weakness of this position. Perception, Arnauld contends, is doubtless an operation of the mind, but our notion of it is incomplete if we take it to be an operation pure and simple. It is always an operation or act of apprehending, and from it the content apprehended must not be separated and placed in a transcendental sphere of being. The distinction is one of aspect, not of existence; the existing fact is the mental operation, the 'idea' is a construction resulting from that operation (i., 55-56). Finally, the difficulty which Arnauld discovered in the reasoning of Malebranche besets Leibniz, when he resorts to an arbitrary fiat of the divine will, susceptible of no further explanation than is afforded by the dubious *Principium Melioris*, to effect the transition from a world of ideas as contents of the divine mind to a world of actual existences, external to the divine mind (i., 104).

Before the Kantian philosophy, then, is reached, Prof. Adamson has already extracted from previous systems two principles of wide generality that form, so to speak, the guiding threads of his psychological and epistemological investigations. The first is that, although the distinction between the act of apprehending and the content apprehended is one of primary significance, it is not to be interpreted as a distinction between two isolated or independent facts. There is only one existing fact involved, the act, namely, of apprehending, which is in its own nature the being aware of a content; the content, regarded in abstraction from the mental act in and through which it makes its appearance, is not itself an existing fact, but an orderly, connected way in which a finite mind arranges its experience. It is exactly the peculiarity of the life of mind that compels us to describe each of its processes in a fashion which indicates a double-sidedness or difference in point of view. But this peculiarity is wholly misconceived, if it leads us to ascribe to the contents of our mental states a fictitious independence, to represent them as in some way 'given' to the apprehending subject, who has no other function in regard to them than that of directing upon them a kind of inner vision. There is no having such contents apart from the process of apprehension itself; they are products of the activity in and through which they are apprehended, "made by it," as Prof. Adamson in one place (ii., 57) expresses the relation. If, for example, we say, apprehension of any content, A, implies recognition of its resemblance to, or difference from, some other contents, A¹, A², A³, and if we regard the contents A, A¹, A², A³, as separate from the act of apprehending, then unawares we are taking the content, A, as it is *after* the act of apprehension to be the fact given to be apprehended. And there is no escaping this dilemma unless it be admitted that the process of recognising resemblances or differences, of discrimin-

ating, and by discriminating of assimilating, is not extraneous to the contents supposed to be operated on by it, but is the process whereby the contents are constituted and come into appearance at all. The second principle is not less fundamental, but is more difficult of correct and adequate statement. Put in Prof. Adamson's own words it runs thus: "Acts or states of consciousness are not rightly conceived as having for their objects their own mode of existence as ways in which a subject is modified. That is to say, a presentation or idea is not to be regarded as an act of inner knowing which has for its object the presentation or idea itself. Regarded from the side of their existence, these acts or modes of consciousness are not objects of which the finite subject is aware; they are successive modes of his own inner life, of which inner life as such the subject in turn becomes aware through the help of distinctions that are given in the content of the presentations and ideas" (i., 288). Or again, "an act of apprehension has not its own content as the object to which reference is made" (i., 287). To some extent, this is but a repetition of the position that psychical states are not objects. It is, however, also a good deal more, and the additional factor may be indicated in some such way as the following. The psychical state in and through which any content is apprehended does not itself partake of the character of that content. The act of apprehending red is not itself red any more than the act of apprehending a triangle is itself triangular. Of the character or nature of the psychical state as such we are never directly aware, it does not throw forward its own mode of being into the content to the cognition of which it gives rise. We are conscious *in and through* our mental states; we are not conscious *of* them. The ground is thus cut from under the Cartesian principle upon which the argument for subjective idealism has always rested, *viz.*, that we have immediate knowledge of subjective states and only mediate or inferential knowledge of what is trans-subjective. Rather is the exact reverse true: "it is doubtful whether we ever have knowledge of subjective experience as such" (i., 285); "the ultimate nature which we designate by the term 'being conscious' is never itself a content of consciousness" (ii., 181). In other words, there is a profound difference of meaning between consciousness and the process of inner observation or introspection. To become *reflectively* aware of a mental state as forming part of the inner life is possible only for a highly developed mind; it is *never* identical with being actually in that state at the moment of its occurrence.

4. Reverting, in the light of these principles, firstly to the psychological account of the mental life as a process of development, I proceed briefly to illustrate Prof. Adamson's mode of treatment, not confining myself exclusively to the published material, but drawing also upon his earlier lectures.

Numerous difficulties surround the attempt to obtain a conception of those immediate experiences with which the mental life

must be supposed to begin. In default of direct knowledge, no other course is open than that of reasoning backwards from the complex facts of mature experience and eliminating those features that evince the marks of secondary products. On the side of cognition, it seemed to Prof. Adamson the simplest conceivable phase of consciousness would be afforded by the mere recognition of a content, possessed in however vague, chaotic and confused a manner, of some distinguishable character. The recognition would involve, therefore, the elementary function of discriminating; it would not be a state of mere passive reception, but in essence an act of judgment, although judgment is a term indicating far too developed a process to be rashly employed. On the side of feeling, we were driven, he thought, to the conclusion that the rudimentary act of recognising a content, involving, as it must, a change in the equilibrium of the inner life, would have from the first the accompaniment of pleasure or pain. Finally, although there would be nothing in the primitive consciousness corresponding to 'will,' yet it might be legitimate to assume, as dependent on the elementary feelings and following thereon in quite mechanical fashion, the germs of what we denote by the terms impulse or striving. These three factors would not at first be distinguished by any of the broad obvious differences with which we are familiar. What we have to conceive is rather a subject dimly obscurely aware of sensuous contents, experiencing pleasure or pain thereby, and in consequence being stimulated to movement.

From such-rudimentary beginning, the first problem, because round it most other psychological problems group themselves, is to determine the way in which the all-important distinction of self and not-self comes to be made and gradually to acquire fixity and definiteness. In the volumes before us, two accounts are given of the conditions involved in the primitive form of this distinction, and they appear somewhat difficult to reconcile. In one place, the space-character in certain contents of sense experience is fixed upon as that which furnishes the basis for the earliest and crudest recognition of difference between the objective and the subjective (i., 291). In another place, it is maintained that the simplest phase of the distinction in question concerns solely the difference between sensuous perception and revived idea, the recognition of the latter difference depending on the fact that bodily feelings and impulses accompany actual stimulation of the sense organs and are either absent or less prominent in the case of revival (ii., 274). Probably, however, the apparent discrepancy does not indicate any real inconsistency of view. There is, as is elsewhere remarked, no such simplicity about the notion of object as to render it at all likely that its introduction is due to any one set of circumstances. In the first passage Prof. Adamson is doubtless referring to that element of objectivity which might be specifically described by the term 'externality,' and is seeking to determine how it is originally differentiated from what relatively to it comes to be regarded as

'inner'; whilst, in the second passage, he has in mind the feature of 'reality' that comes to attach to the object in contrast with what is opposed thereto as 'unreal' or imaginary. Each process is certainly susceptible of resolution into a number of constituent factors. For instance, the elementary experiences arising from resistance to movement are, beyond question, essential ingredients of the earliest representation of the extended, and it must also have been by their help that the primitive subject was enabled to characterise what was immediately presented to sense as real. Again, it is certain that in the earlier stages the self was identified exclusively with the body, and that the discrimination of the self from the not-self would be effected more or less through the presence of those presentations, feelings and impulses which mark out the body from extra-organic things. Tracing the subsequent forms of the bi-partition thus introduced into conscious experience, Prof. Adamson was at pains to show that each new characteristic giving definiteness to the object would have corresponding to it a new characteristic giving definiteness to the conception of the self or subject. For example, the characteristics of permanence and independence could not be ascribed to a perceived thing without recognition at the same time of the continuity of the inner life as opposed to its transitory and momentary acts of apprehension; the subject could not conceive of himself as one and identical amidst the variety of his changing activities without at the same time forming an analogous conception of the unity and identity of the perceived thing, in contrast to its contingent and variable qualities. A strict correlation, therefore, obtains in the development of mind. From the first vague distinction, indicated by the terms 'feeling' and 'space-extendedness' to the highly elaborated opposition of subject and object in mature experience, the advance throughout has been two-sided and reciprocal in character.

It was with reference to the processes of Attention and of Thinking that Dr. Adamson was accustomed to work out more fully the stages involved in mental development. As regards the first, he was unable to accept either of the two main theories current among psychologists. Attention did not seem to him rightly interpreted as a simple, unique, irreducible activity of mind, nor did he think the phenomena of attention could be explained on Herbartian lines in terms of the reciprocal relations between presentations. Both theories committed the error of severing the act of attention from that which was attended to, and of giving to the apperceived contents a form of substantive and independent existence. Under the name Attention, there was indicated rather, in his view, a class of complex and variable processes which come about gradually in the history of mind. The earliest phenomena capable of being described as facts of attention would be initiated by differences in the intensity of feeling accompanying any content apprehended. Variations in intensity of feeling would produce at

first no more than the purely mechanical result of retaining for a longer time than would otherwise be possible the apprehended content in consciousness. Increase in the duration of the act of apprehension would tend to permit of more precise and accurate discrimination of the content involved and afford facility for its easy and rapid reproduction in the form of idea. Repetition, in its turn, would afford the material for increased precision of discrimination. Any particular stimulation would occur not in isolation, but in conjunction with a very considerable body of simultaneously existing acts of apprehension,—in the earliest stages those which are concerned with the bodily feelings and sensations. Each succeeding stimulus, while yielding a presentation manifesting differences from what is simultaneously present at the moment, would thereby give to the resulting content new definiteness of outline. And every establishment of a new definiteness in the content apprehended would serve as a means of instituting a new comparison when a repeated stimulus of like kind, operating in surroundings no longer identical with the surroundings of the previous stimuli, took place. There was, he believed, no way of accounting for the clearness and distinctness that constitute one familiar result of attending except by thus connecting the whole process with the elementary function of apprehension, the act namely of discriminating, of recognising features of likeness and difference. In the earlier stages there could be involved by no possibility the definitely recognised distinction between the act of attending and that which is attended to. The rise of that distinction, which could only happen when the consciousness of self had attained a certain degree of stability and fixedness, would coincide for the most part with the conditions under which there is gradually formed, from the elementary experiences that precede and accompany the execution of movement, the individual will, and Voluntary Attention might fairly be regarded as Volition in one of its phases. Sense presentations accompanied with a large quantity of the experience of movement would naturally retain a prominent position in consciousness, and if they excite at the same time the feelings of pleasure or more specially of pain, and are conjoined with motor experiences that are related to continuance of pleasure or removal of pain, they would claim relatively the largest place in consciousness. Thus, in a general way, one could understand how it is that with the phenomena called attention there come to be associated those experiences of straining or effort, which, however, can only be markedly present when the will has been definitely formed, and when the subject is able to exercise control over the trains of ideas and movements. Not, then, by reason of any special activity, but through the circumstances under which the fundamental activities of mind, the activities involved in apprehension generally, develop, do the phenomena of attention, concerning which as they are exhibited in mature experience no one is in doubt, come about.

A similar mode of treatment is adopted in the extremely valuable analysis of the process of thinking contained in the work before us. Here, too, Prof. Adamson is largely engaged in combating the view that thinking is to be regarded as a special activity of mind, which operates on the materials supplied in isolated perceptions and ideas. Thinking, no doubt, in the stricter acceptance of the word, first makes its appearance in and through the separation of the relations of space and time, of identity and difference, of unity and plurality, etc., from the related contents, and the first products of thought, in this sense, are the generalised representations of these relations. But it by no means follows either that the severance mentioned corresponds to an actual separation in mode of existence, or that it points, as, for example, Lotze supposes, to a special form of reactive energy on the part of the soul. There is, indeed, nothing in the nature of even the most evolved products of thought to justify ascribing them to a specific and unique source, or to militate against the theory of a fundamental identity in process between the simpler activities of mind and those comprised under the head of thinking. All mental states, not excepting those of the earliest stages of the mental life, are essentially acts of discrimination and comparison, differing in degree but not in kind from the acts which give rise to the abstract and general notions of the mature mind. Only by a process of relating and comparing contents are likenesses and differences recognised at all, and it may be said that every likeness or difference recognised is by that very fact general and abstract in character; it is freed, in other words, to some extent at least, from its temporary surroundings and dwelt upon, more or less, for itself alone. Further, it is one of the main purposes of Prof. Adamson's analysis to show that the characteristic of necessity or objective validity especially attaching to products of thought is no new appearance in the inner life, but the natural development from the establishment in consciousness of the distinction between the act of apprehending and the content apprehended, a distinction which in its simpler form manifests itself in perceiving so soon as even a crude consciousness of self is possible, and which becomes more and more complicated as the consciousness of self increases in richness and fulness of detail. In conformity with this analysis, the difference between the notion of an object and the perception of an object may be said to consist in the difference between the number of distinctions whereby the object perceived or conceived is marked off from its surroundings. Perceiving, as being more or less bound down to a momentary stimulation of the senses, necessarily involves a smaller amount of such distinctions than thinking, which, on the basis of repeated perceptions, has become able to recognise the more permanent, invariable, essential features. And a corresponding comparison would hold good between the reflective consciousness of self and what might, without impropriety, be called the perceptive consciousness of self,—between the subject, able to conceive of himself

as the permanent correlate to the varied range of experience that has come before him, and the subject more or less apprehended as a centre of bodily feelings and the source of bodily movements.

From the psychological point of view, there appears, then, ample warrant for the conclusion that "mind is not an abstraction, that it lives only in and through its concrete expression, and that what we represent as the product of mind might just as fairly be said to be the very making of mind" (ii., 18). Mind brings with it no forms, whether of attending or thinking or even of its own unity, wherewith to master the world of fact. The states or processes, which constitute the mind's existence, and which from first to last are acts of discriminating, comparing and relating, have significance only as being ways in which awareness of contents comes about; they contribute nothing out of some original nature of their own to the nature or structure of that which they know. It is only in and through the gradual arranging and organising of its experience that mind comes to possess any unity or structure of its own, any notions or categories by which to interpret the system of nature of which it forms a part. And, on the other hand, as at the beginning there is no mind fully equipped for exerting activity, so there is none for passively receiving isolated impressions of sense. The material of experience, indeed, is given, but it is given in the form of a whole, which, as apprehended, is at first vague, undifferentiated, indeterminate, though containing within itself the conditions which enable apprehension of its parts and of their relatedness ultimately to be attained.

5. I turn, secondly, to the epistemological inquiry, conducted with the help of the two principles already explained, though furnishing at the same time independent grounds in support and confirmation of them.

The point of departure from which Prof. Adamson works his way to the position he describes as "no more than the legitimate development of what is contained in the Kantian work" (ii., 311) is that of the Subjective Idealism, which he finds lurking in most pre-Kantian systems, and vitiating much of Kant's own reflexion. The implications of the view in question are suggestively unfolded in a criticism of the Kantian doctrine of the "thing-in-itself". Ordinary experience accounts for the fact that sensations are given to, and not produced by, the conscious mind by referring to the natural conditions under which sensation comes about. But the natural conditions to which, in ordinary experience, we appeal are never unknowable things-in-themselves, but the determined, and to that extent at least known, objects of perception. Against this simple, common-sense explanation, an idealism of the Berkeleian type presses the argument that the natural conditions are themselves just such produced dependent results as those which are to be explained by their means, that, in fact, the *petitio principis* has been committed of accounting for the production of sensations by appealing to sensations themselves. The plausibility of this

argument depends, however, upon the illegitimate identification of two totally distinct propositions: "(1) that whatever knowledge we have belongs to mind and is of the nature of mind, and (2) that whatever is known consists in its own nature of those processes which are called by us 'states of mind'" (i., 233). Knowing is, of course, always an act or process of mind, but so far from this carrying with it the consequence that the object known must be a state of the subject knowing, it justifies rather the contention that were the content known equivalent to a mode of existence, a finite mind could never become aware of its own existence. Subjective Idealism starts with the assumption that the finite mind exists and knows itself as existing, but "the contents of consciousness which really constitute our knowledge are not in their own nature characterised either as having substantive existence or as constituting ways in which a finite subject exists" (i., 234). If, therefore, we have reason to believe that the external objects, to which contents of knowledge refer, give rise to the stimulation from which apprehension of sense qualities follows, the fact that the said objects are knowable, or partially knowable, is no valid ground for discrediting the belief.

According to the Kantian theory, however, the objective reference in knowledge signifies no more than the orderly and connected way in which the manifold of intuition is combined, that feature in the perceived content which constitutes its necessary and universal aspect, as opposed to the merely arbitrary sequence of sense-particulars. The object, in other words, denotes for Kant the correlative in knowledge of that unity of apperception which is the logical condition of knowledge. Everything, then, depends upon the interpretation to be put on the all-important notion "unity of apperception". And here Kant wavers between two alternatives equally unavailing for the problem under consideration. On the one hand, he draws a sharp distinction between the individuality of the finite subject and the transcendental ego, and then he characterises the latter as a purely formal identity, without element of difference, in which case it cannot contain the source of the materials of sense; on the other hand, he tends to identify the two, and then it becomes impossible to distinguish his doctrine from the Berkeleian idealism he repudiates.

In the present work,—and herein one notices a decided divergence from his former exposition of the Critical Philosophy,—Prof. Adamson appears to think that the latter tendency is on the whole most in accordance with the general drift of Kant's reflexion. If, then, the Categories are but forms of the finite mind, evidently their application to the sensuous data cannot save the content apprehended from the character of pure subjectivity. And to point, as Kant does, to the difference between external and internal intuition, even though that distinction were less open than it is to objection on other grounds, in no way relieves the difficulty, for both types of objects, the so-called outer equally with

the so-called inner, are still left in the position of *Vorstellungen*, states or modifications, that is to say, of the individual mind.

Repeatedly, in the course of his argument, Prof. Adamson returns upon the Kantian theory, as thus interpreted, in order to force its inherent weaknesses to the front. Apart from the difficulty already alluded to, he points out that the conception on which it proceeds is utterly irreconcilable with the account psychology has to give of the genesis and development of mind. "What Kant offers as the explicit notion of object may be a description of what thought achieves, and may have even special importance as a description of a necessary stage in the development of experience ; it cannot be accepted as indicating the immediate proximate addition to the first incoherent movement of sense-perception. . . . No one can suppose that the first, the simplest, form in which the antithesis arises in consciousness between the subjective contents of mind and an object is that developed systematised representation which appears in Kant's analysis as the correlate and expression of understanding" (ii., 254). So again, the objective unity of self-consciousness, although obviously involved in all our thinking treatment of experience as a systematic whole, is altogether inconceivable as a simple, primary datum. "From the psychological point of view, at all events, we are compelled to recognise a continuous gradation in the consciousness of self ; and we cannot regard that highly developed form of it, in which it is the correlate of the orderly systematic representation of a world of things in space and time, as being the first form in which it comes forward in our experience. It may be true that what we call thinking is just the operation in and through which self-consciousness develops. But we are not justified in deriving the operation of thought from self-consciousness, still less from a form of self-consciousness which we cannot suppose to be present from the outset in the development of mind" (ii., 255-256). Once more, the conception of thinking as the activity which is necessary in order that consciousness should recognise itself as a unity may correspond fairly well to what comes about in our experience, but it cannot be accommodated to that primitive stage of mental evolution in which the representation of either object or subject is wholly wanting. The theory in question, then, places mind in an altogether false relation to experience ; it lays the emphasis on the wrong side of the antithesis. So far from mind constituting experience, it would be truer to say that experience constitutes mind. So far from the unity of consciousness being there at the beginning to organise experience into knowledge of objective fact, it is only in and through the knowledge of objective fact that unity of consciousness is either possible or has significance.

There remains, however, the other trend of reflexion in Kant according to which the transcendental unity of apperception is not to be identified with the individuality of the finite subject. On

this, in his earlier lectures, Prof. Adamson was wont to lay stress as the really valuable side of the Critical Philosophy, and to maintain that the merely formal character assigned by Kant to Self-consciousness was by no means a necessary feature of the conception as such. His view of what the theory really implied was expressed in some such terms as the following. The criticism of Knowledge had been perfectly general in character, and, as such, had been entirely independent of any individuality in the subject of reference. It merely warranted us in saying that whatsoever notion we form of experience, as being antecedent to, or subsequent to, the existence of empirically conditioned finite minds, no world of reality at all can be conceived except as involving relations possible only for intelligence. What it came to in brief was this, that when we represent to ourselves a universe as consisting of related facts, whatever those facts may be, we are representing that which is possible only in and through conscious experience. The individuality of the finite subject being, then, one of such facts, we are entitled to insist that it too shall be interpreted in terms of intelligence. No doubt the phrase "in terms of intelligence" is liable to misapprehension. It must be taken, however, to refer to the contents of knowledge, and so far as they are concerned the principle is laid down that no relations of reality can be admitted as ultimate which are incapable of expression as relations of thought. If that conception be followed out, it need be in no way incompatible with what as mere matter of fact is admitted and must be admitted in respect to knowing and thinking as modes of the activity of finite subjects. As portion of the total world of experience those activities of the finite subject have their function. It is in and through them that the world of intelligible reality attains its highest expression, and such subjective activities by reason of their difference from the reality that is expressed in and through them in no way render impossible the assumption that the essential relations of things are relations of thought.

Such briefly was the direction in which at one time Prof. Adamson was prepared to carry forward the Kantian argument. A more thorough analysis of what Kant had to offer in respect to the interpretation of real existence would, he thought, lead to the necessity of largely extending the scope of that notion. For in the end Kant was compelled to admit a reality which could not be brought under the first narrow conception of reality as a determined content of perception in space and time. The treatment thus allowed to be valid in respect to that aspect of spirit or mind which is the foundation of morality must be extended to the whole realm of being, and the final conclusion of Kant, that underlying teleological judgments was the notion of intuitive understanding as forming the ultimate root of real existence, must be regarded not only as a regulative idea of reason, but as an idea necessary to complete our otherwise limited conception of the world of experience.

It is, however, clear from the present work that Prof. Adamson had come to doubt the legitimacy of this mode of advance, and had in a sense returned again to Kant for the purpose of proceeding along a different path. "It is evidently a hypothesis for which no definite grounds can be offered," he says, in criticising a statement of Prof. Stout's, "that the real core of existence is of the nature of consciousness" (i., 347). That "no foreign factor can play a part in the development of thought itself" is, he declares, "the tremendous assumption of all speculative Idealism" (i., 259). He no longer finds it possible to amend the Kantian distinction between category and idea by accepting the equally objective character of the regulative principles, for in any legitimate sense of the term 'object' the regulative principles can not be regarded as constituting part of the structure of the objective world (ii., 293).

The grounds that ultimately compelled the relinquishment of the standpoint of Post-Kantian Idealism may be gathered from the volumes before us. Prof. Adamson seems to have become convinced that the Hegelian system, having for its fundamental position the conception of thoughts or intelligible essences as constituting the structure of reality (i., 274), involved, in the long run, the same error which lay at the root of all forms of subjective idealism,—the confusion, namely, between the life of mind as a concrete mode of existence and the contents of knowledge or thought in respect of which the predicate of existence has no significance. So far at least as the finite subject is concerned, analysis had yielded the result that 'ideas,' as existences,—states of mind, as psychical occurrences,—never enter into knowledge, that in fact existence never is a part of the content of any idea; and if it be contended that content and existence in the Absolute coincide, some attempt, at all events, must be made to show how such coincidence is conceivable. Now, the place assigned by Hegel to nature seemed to Prof. Adamson wholly unintelligible, and the *Naturphilosophie* to be "in the mass and in detail a needless excrescence and a blunder" (ii., 12). And there can be little question that he encountered with respect to the Hegelian position generally the "difficulty so persistent in its appearance in Leibniz's doctrine," and "so uniformly felt in all idealist systems" (i., 104),—the difficulty, namely, of effecting a transition from the sphere of "essence" to that of concrete existence. The crude expedient of a creative act of the divine will, which Leibniz called to his aid, in so far as it is capable of intelligible interpretation at all, involved the curious assumption that between essence and existence the difference was merely a difference of degree. The compossibles, as the contents of the ideas contemplated in the divine intelligence, needed, that is to say, a supplement added to them in order to issue forth as actualities. But addition can only take place when the things added are alike in kind, whereas ideality and actuality are evidently, on Leibniz's own showing, qualitatively unlike. In the Hegelian philosophy, the conception of development supplanted that

of an inexplicable creative act, but development, regarded as the unfolding of what is already contained in the nature that develops, instead of furnishing an explanation, seems to Prof. Adamson only "to repeat as ground what is actually presented as effect or consequent" (ii., 187). He would, indeed, have agreed with Dr. McTaggart that Hegel is wrongly charged with attempting to deduce facts from the nature of pure thought.¹ So far from accepting the interpretation criticised by Dr. McTaggart, Prof. Adamson used to insist,—and the exposition of Hegel's teaching in the present work is quite in accordance therewith,—that it was never intended by the use of the dialectical method to assign any measure of real existence to the abstract generalities, which, taken together, made up the systematic idea of reality. In the procedure of the *Logic*, Hegel was well aware that he was doing no more than disentangling from the conception of reality the several elements indispensable in its regard, that he was doing no more than laying bare, so to speak, the ultimate structure of self-consciousness which in reality existed only in the concrete life of mind. But, even when so much is granted, the abstract thoughts were still in their totality taken to form a species of absolute structure or organisation in regard to which concrete reality had no other function than that of *manifestation* or exemplification. And under cover of this baffling use of the notion of manifestation, which rightly has significance only in reference to the non-existent contents apprehended, there has been surreptitiously introduced the transition from essence, conceived as though it had objective existence, to fact or actuality. As in the case of Leibniz, there has been left unexplained precisely that which called for explanation.²

Hegel's emendation of Kantian doctrine is, in fact, an inversion of what is demanded by a more thorough analysis of knowledge. Recognising that an ultimate distinction of kind between Category and Idea was inadmissible, he broke down the distinction by accepting the regulative principles as entering, equally with the constitutive, into the very structure of the objective world. But the feature really calling for emendation is rather the function assigned by Kant to the Categories. If they are regarded not as giving an exhaustive statement of the structure of the object, but

¹ *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 55 *seq.*, cf. p. 207.

² Dr. McTaggart endeavours to show that the transition in question is actually made at the very commencement of the dialectic, which, he argues, requires as its postulate that experience really exists. By starting with the idea of Being, Hegel, he thinks, necessarily assumes "the existence of some experience,—in other words, that something is". And such an assumption, he contends, is justifiable on the Cartesian ground that either denial or doubt would involve the existence of the denial or the doubt as well as the existence of the person who denies or doubts (*op. cit.*, pp. 20-21). To which Prof. Adamson would have replied that if by the denial or doubt you mean the 'content of an idea,' existence is not involved in it, and that if it were, the passage to the existence of the denier or the doubter would be for ever foreclosed.

as abstract expressions of the ways in which a finite subject comes to interpret its sensuous experience under the conditions of space and time, and thereby to attain to self-consciousness, the regulative principles will indicate a higher grade in the same development, and the difference will represent no more than a difference of content. The opposition of form and matter will be overcome, not by assuming an absolute mind as the ground of their unity, but by recognising that the material of experience is naturally characterised by coherence and constancy of connexion, and that were it otherwise mind of any sort would be an impossibility.

6. In contrast to an idealism or rationalism of the Hegelian type, Prof. Adamson describes the philosophical position to which his own investigation leads as realism or naturalism. Formerly, in his Owens College lectures, he used the term "naturalism" as designation for the view in accordance with which the knowing subject is to be conceived as a natural object, and as standing in connexion with the objects of its experience after a fashion similar in kind to the connexion assumed to hold among objects of nature generally. Such an implication is, of course, entirely foreign to the theory with which we have here to do. Again and again it is pointed out that nature regarded as a complex of objects in space and time is not, and cannot be, equivalent to the sum-total of reality. For the latter includes both mind and nature, and, as constituting a whole, these two can neither occupy a position of absolute independence, nor can their inter-relation be that of two types of existent objects which come somehow into combination. The very features upon which the view of external nature as itself constituting a whole is based are features which express no more than ways in which external nature is represented by us. The mechanical theory, which makes abstraction from all that is qualitative, and limits its treatment to the perfectly general laws of quantitative relation, deals with what can be at best only the form of reality, and furnishes in no sense an adequate explanation even of mechanism itself. It is compelled to assign all qualitative difference to consciousness, and too readily neglects the consideration that such qualitative differences must have something corresponding to them within the sphere of mechanism. It is prevented by its conception of law from taking account of the highly specialised forms in which all concrete facts come before us, and consequently leaves on our hands a residuum, on its principles practically irreducible, but nevertheless of primary significance for any true understanding of the real character of natural phenomena. Accordingly, however legitimate and necessary such procedure may be within its own province, we are bound to insist that there can be in the concrete no existents corresponding to the abstractions of mechanical science, and that ultimate reality cannot be broken up in the way assumed for purposes of scientific explanation. The Atomism, for example, which represents all mechanical occurrence as coming about from the changing rela-

tions of ultimate elements, which are themselves to be conceived as *unchanging*, rests in the long run upon an assumption exactly similar in kind to that made by the opposed idealist theories, the assumption, namely, that what is undoubtedly a characteristic of the contents of our intellectual apprehension (changelessness) must necessarily be a characteristic of the realities cognised thereby. But the assumption is not only in itself unjustifiable; it is utterly irreconcilable with what admittedly is a fundamental feature of all that is real, namely, that it is a process. "Change," as Lotze puts it, "must find its way to the inside of being": a change in relations can only be a real occurrence if the nature of the related elements be itself involved in the change. Generally, then, it is to be said that the mechanical theory, even within its own field, begins with abstractions and ends with abstractions; it can in no sense be accepted as a final and exhaustive explanation of what comes before us in external nature.

Reality, therefore, in the concrete, can find adequate expression neither in terms of idealism nor in terms of mechanism; still less can it be regarded as the arithmetical sum of two types of being, alike possessing substantive existence and connected only in the manner represented by the scheme of reciprocal determination. "Reality is an interconnected system, of which the correlatives, mind and the apprehended world of fact, are the partial manifestations" (ways, that is to say, in which we imperfectly represent what in themselves are aspects of one and the same process of actual existence). Of that reality, the life of mind is an integral part, not less necessary to the completeness of the whole than nature (ii., 20). Nor does it at all detract from the position that mind occupies in *rerum natura* to say that mind *comes into being*. The prejudice in question arises from our imperfect way of representing the law of change in the ambiguous form of a series in time. In all knowledge, the content known is freed from the conditions of time, and is in so far timeless. By an easy transition, we identify this universal characteristic of subjective apprehension with the nature of the real, and conceive of the latter as enjoying a timeless mode of existence in contrast with which that which emerges into being in time seems secondary and inferior. But not only is the contrast valueless, for the predicate of eternal would in no way intensify existence or enhance its worth; it creates a qualitative distinction between reality and its products which impoverishes the former of all the characteristics of the latter, and we are left with the empty substratum, which, whether in the form of mind or matter, has played so evil a part in philosophical speculation. If, however, that error be avoided, there is, in Prof. Adamson's judgment, nothing to contradict the supposition that in the real process of existence certain highly complex combinations, describable by us as mechanical, take the form of that immediate experience which constitutes a mode or state of consciousness.

The circumstance that we cannot represent to ourselves the pay-

chical as itself a change of the mechanical kind should occasion no insuperable difficulty. For a state of consciousness, whatever its nature, forms no part of the content apprehended ; and of what we call the mechanical we have, as already insisted, only an abstract and imperfect conception.

If this view be accepted, the question arises as to how far we are justified in supposing that the nature and structure of real existence find adequate representation in knowledge. So far as sense-perception is concerned, the answer is simple. The content perceived is certainly to be distinguished from the real fact to which it refers, but not as though it were another existent intervening as a *tertium quid* between the real fact and the perceiving mind, and preventing the latter from ever coming into contact with the former. The distinction indicates no more than the exceedingly partial fragmentary character of the picture which, in and through the act of perceiving, we form of the real fact immediately before us. It is, however, with regard to the products of thought, by which a conscious mind seeks to correct and supplement its first imperfect impressions, and yet in doing so would seem to place itself at a farther remove from the reality it depicts, that the problem as to whether our mental operations truly represent the nature of things chiefly calls for treatment. Throughout the present work, for example, the antithesis between truth and fact has been emphasised. The characteristic of fact is its concreteness ; the contents of thought are universals. The order of fact is one of change ; the contents of thought are just the types for us of the timeless and the unchangeable. The relations which seem to us to characterise the order of fact are the relatively external relations of co-existence and sequence ; the relations in the order of thought may be said to be those of logical dependence. The contrast, then, is sufficiently pointed. In dealing with it, Prof. Adamson reverts, in the first place, to his psychological doctrine of the continuity between thought and perception. Each of the characteristics mentioned as distinctive of thought can be traced back to their earlier forms in the more primitive process of perceiving. The object perceived, however concretely represented, comes to have the two aspects of being independent of and determining the act of perceiving, and of being common to all percipient minds. Generality, therefore, is present, crudely no doubt at the outset, in the apprehension of fact, which we are in the habit of confining to perception, and differs in degree only and not in kind, from the generality of truth which we are in the habit of assigning specifically to thought. Again, the content apprehended in sense-perception, as distinguished from the act of apprehending, presents, no less than a content of thought, the aspect of timelessness ; the simple qualities apprehended in perception undergo no change ; change in their case, as in that of notions, means the substitution of one for another. Once more, the relation of dependence is the result of a generalisation of space

and time relations, and of such identities as come before us in the presentations of sense. Consequently, the contrast between truth and fact is far from absolute; perceiving and thinking denote only stages in the development of one and the same fundamental process. And the advance is throughout dependant upon and conditioned by the concrete material of experience, the transformation which that material undergoes is throughout regulated and controlled by the uniformities of conjunction in real existence, and such reconstruction as may be specifically ascribed to the activities of the inner life is possible only because those activities themselves have been formed and determined in and through the real process of which they are a part and upon which in turn they come to be exercised. The categories of thought, therefore, throw over the given material of experience no specially subjective colouring; they are but ways in which the mind organises and arranges its experience, ways which have themselves been fashioned by the experience which they organise. Accordingly, Prof. Adamson maintains, in the second place, that, since it is the necessity of fact which creates the necessity of thought, there is contradiction even in supposing that thought, thus determined and conditioned, should by its own nature be incapable of solving problems which it is compelled to put to itself and of which it is constrained to seek the solution.

7. I have been endeavouring in this article to trace the course of a very remarkable effort at philosophical construction and to marshal its several lines of reflexion under one connected view. Only in conclusion do I venture upon suggesting one or two questions, by way of criticism.

In constructing his theory of an ultimate reality, in which conscious minds arise and obtain a field for the development of self-consciousness, Prof. Adamson has found the category of reciprocal determination, with which scientific naturalism has usually terminated, wholly inadequate for his purpose, and is constrained to offer a more metaphysical interpretation of the concreteness and interconnexion implied in whatsoever can lay claim to the title, real. He insists upon the impossibility of retaining the Kantian distinction between the abstract notion of causal nexus and the concrete idea of the adaptation of nature to intelligence, according to which the first is a necessary condition of experience and the second a regulative principle. The latter, the principle of the existence of definite uniformities in the material of perception is, he contends, "a condition constitutive of our intelligence, involved in its genesis, and, therefore, in some fashion, assumed at every stage in the development of that intelligence" (ii., 298). Were there no constancy of connexion and recurrence in nature, then neither thinking nor perceiving would ever spring into being (ii., 299). Further, there are in nature not only laws, but what Dr. Chalmers called "collocations" (ii., 309). In short, reality is a whole in the sense that "throughout our experience nothing is or can be given

which is without intelligible connexion, which is incapable of being worked into a systematic form" (i., 350). But uniformity, connectedness, collocation, intelligibility,—these are characteristics of the real which not only admittedly stand in the closest relation to the products of our thinking activity, but are themselves what Hegel designated "objective thoughts". Do they not force upon us a more radical transformation of the older naturalism than even Prof. Adamson appears to have thought necessary? He is strenuous in maintaining that "the coming into being" of mind in no way settles its place in the scheme of things as a secondary and inferior fact. But, on the other hand, does its "coming into being" in any way minimise the demand we must make on the scheme of things in which such a "coming into being" takes place?

This question leads at once to the interpretation Prof. Adamson gives of the notion that plays so large a part in his system,—that of development. It is, he contends, a cardinal error committed by "writers more or less of the Hegelian school," and by idealists generally, to represent the essential character of development as the unfolding or manifestation of that which in another aspect is already contained in the ultimate reality. According to this view, nothing arises in the developing nature *de novo* which is not in some way preformed and anticipated from the beginning; the process consists in making explicit what is already implicit; there is implied throughout "the idea of the end which is to be realised as somehow existing" (ii., 304). A very Proteus, this conception of End as an efficient idea, impressed on and operative in the structure of that which develops, turns up in infinitely varied forms; now as the Platonic world of ideal perfection, now as the Hegelian absolute, now as the modern naturalist's cosmic order (ii., 83). In Prof. Adamson's judgment, all such theories are utterly devoid of justification. The notion of end is, he contends, a wholly practical category and has no consistent application beyond the limits of the individual's practical experience. Even there, the doctrine that morality is the gradual realisation of a final end, known beforehand, is untenable and altogether barren; what the human agent has before him, at all events in concrete form, is never the absolutely best, but only the relatively better, and that not as in any way already existing, but only as represented in idea. In the phenomena of organic life and of the life of mind there are, however, no grounds for assuming that the sequence of changes is preceded by a representation of the result to come about. The course of development, manifested by the phenomena in question, is, in no sense, so pre-determined that the external conditions play the part only of stimulating occasions calling forth into explicitness what is implicit. The development can never be explained as arising solely from the activity of some inner process, but is in all cases dependent on external circumstances, which may or may not be furnished.

It is worth noticing that in no respect is the difference between

Prof. Adamson's earlier and later position more marked than in regard to this notion of "End". In his Owens College lectures of 1888 he maintained strenuously that the conception of an absolute or final end, of a good-in-itself, was implied in the very idea of a self-conscious being whose life exhibits development. For development in the spiritual life was much more than mere growth; it presupposed that the subject was capable of representing to himself that, the realisation of which would yield complete satisfaction to, or be the perfection of, his nature. It was true that no more than the general characteristics of such final end could ever be presented to himself by the moral agent, at any particular stage of his development, but of these general characteristics he could at least be well assured. It would be an end and not a means, an end requiring unconditionally to be followed, not only final but internal,—a mode of self-conscious activity or existence, prescribed by reason and recognised by a rational being as unconditionally desirable. This good-in-itself had, indeed, significance only when taken in relation to what the concrete subject had been able to determine as good, but to question the validity of the conception on that account would be akin to questioning the possibility of general notions in knowledge because any act of knowing is the particular act of an individual mind. Always in human experience there were the two factors, distinguishable but not separable, the empirical and the ideal. In knowledge, as in action, there was involved, by the same necessity of reason, an ideal conception, the conception of a completed system, insight into which is never realised to the full, and the exact representation of which is from its very nature constantly varying.

The decisive consideration which led to the abandonment of 'final end' as a legitimate conception, either in the sphere of the practical or the theoretical life, appears to have been the impossibility Prof. Adamson felt of freeing the notion from the implication that the realisation of such final end in some way already exists. And it cannot be denied that both in the passage he cites from Hegel and in the writings of Green,¹ that implication is acknowledged in so many words. As against it, Prof. Adamson's reasoning seems to me conclusive. Why should a perfect and absolute mind proceed to institute within itself a laborious process of evolution for the sake of producing that which, with or without such process, in Green's phraseology, "eternally is"? But it may well be doubted whether, on our author's own premises, the conception of development has been disengaged from all that is specific to the Category of End and that we are left with nothing corresponding to it save "a characteristically distinct combination of empirical features" (ii., 192). "That a new product shows traces of being modified by what is past ought not," he says, "to be interpreted as signifying that the new fact is merely explicit

¹ See, e.g., *Prolegomena*, § 187.

manifestation of what is implicit" (ii., 191). The external conditions, that is to say, have been no less instrumental in bringing about the result than the internal. Granted; but then the argument of the present work has been one sustained polemic against the tendency of severing the inner and outer sides of conscious experience as though they were two distinct realms of being. Does it not seem, then, a natural question to ask whether the terms implicit and explicit are equally devoid of significance when applied, not to any particular constituent of reality, but to reality as a whole? Prof. Adamson cannot be taken to imply that the emergence, for example, of psychical life "under certain conditions describable by us as mechanical" is to be regarded as a purely fortuitous or accidental occurrence; such an interpretation would render "the necessity of fact," on which he insists, unintelligible. He cannot mean that mind is an episodic appearance in world, which might conceivably have gone on existing without it; such a view would contradict all he has to say of the life of mind being no less necessary to the completeness of the whole than nature. But if this supposition be ruled out, is there between it and the theory of an ultimate purposiveness in nature any half-way house left in which to escape from the inference which the contention that "throughout our whole experience, nothing is or can be given which is without intelligible connexion" seems to force upon us? Surely there is a possibility of conceiving what Green called "a plan of the world" without imparting into the conception his implication that the said plan is eternally realised in the absolute mind. Indeed, one might go the length of saying that the two things are essentially contradictory. If, in the finite mind, all thinking is idealising (ii., 113), what valid reason is there for refusing to admit the idealising character of thought even where the attribute of finitude no longer attaches to it? In other words, can we not conceive a mind, the contents of whose knowledge stand, so far at least as the cardinal feature of the non-existential character of truth is concerned, in much the same relation to the whole process of reality as the contents of our knowledge stand to that limited portion of the real with which we are in contact? At all events, without a terminus of this description, Prof. Adamson's metaphysical system reaches no logical completion, but leaves us with a characteristic set of problems unsolved. And formerly he used to insist that it was incumbent on us, as one part of the attempt to lay out the theoretical basis of knowledge and morality, to show how reality can be of such a nature as to furnish the field of development for beings capable of forming intellectual and ethical ideals. The ultimate ground of an intelligible and moral order of facts,—an order in which the evolution of human consciousness on its theoretical and practical sides is an integral part,—could not lie, he then urged, in the facts themselves as such; it was to be sought in the meaning and significance the contents of experience come to possess for a thinking mind, and

in the interpretation of which a thinking mind attains its highest exercise and worth.

But whether or no we are able to call halt exactly at the point to which these volumes bring us, there cannot be a moment's question as to the permanent place they will occupy in philosophical literature. They mark a distinctly new stage in the history of English speculation, and will form a basis of profitable discussion for many years to come.