

thought, and think still, that it was comparatively unimportant to the ethical discussion. A critical notice does not profess to be a table of contents.

(5) He misunderstands my 'relative universality'. I say that the social organism, of which the individual in Essay V. is explained to be essentially a part, is a *relative* and not an *absolute* whole. That is, it is not the universe: and we have no reason to identify its will—granting this to be real and cognisable—with the universal or Divine Will to which our wills should conform.

(6) I did not absurdly complain that he combined in his *positive* doctrine the common view of society as a natural organism with his peculiar view of this organism as possessing a reasonable will: I criticised him for not distinguishing them in his polemic against Individualism. The result of the non-distinction is that much of this polemical argument—as far as I can trace it through its folds of rhetoric—is directed against an individualism which will find no defenders: the individualism, namely, to which the 'Social Compact,' belongs, and to which Utilitarianism long since gave the *coup de grâce*.

(7) (8) I still maintain that the non-theoretical unreflective person who is exalted in Essay V. as furnishing the moral standard will be considerably startled to find his encomiast justifying, with whatever qualifications, "open and direct outrage on the standing moral institutions which make society and human life what it is". He will regard Mr. Bradley as almost a "thinker," and at least "on the threshold of immorality". And I doubt whether he will be quite consoled by learning that this justification is not "meant to influence practice": though I admit that the consolation is well adapted to the average philosophical capacity of the non-theoretical person.

But I need not press this point: because Mr. Bradley, as I understand, admits the possibility of a conflict between common sense and his private moral consciousness; and is prepared, in case of such conflict, to rely entirely on his own particular moral intuition, allowing no appeal to any express principle or external standard. If this be so, his apparent reference to an external standard in Essay V. is found (as I said) to be devoid of precise meaning or scientific value.

To sum up, then, I have nothing to retract or qualify on any of the points raised by Mr Bradley—except a pair of inverted commas which were accidentally attached to a phrase of my own. But I should prefer to part from him in a friendly manner; and therefore I am glad to find something to concede to him in the phrase in which I characterised his style as over-rhetorical. I still dislike the quality of his rhetoric, whether it be satirical, pathetic or declamatory: and I think it is sometimes introduced, at important points, so as to interfere with the closeness of his reasoning. But I find that the sentence in which I combined these two judgments was too strongly worded: and am glad to substitute for it the milder phrases just given.

HENRY SIDGWICK.]

*Mr. Hodgson on 'Cogito ergo sum'.*—Assuming that Descartes' first principle really means what Mr. Hodgson (MIND IV.) says it does—that my being and my consciousness are one, that my being *is* my consciousness and my consciousness my being—what are we to make of a sentence like the following?—"If the true sense of '*Cogito ergo sum*' is what I contend, *My existence means my consciousness*, we can go on to generalise this in application to other things: their existence

means the consciousness which I or others have of them; *esse* means *percipi*." Is there not something very far wrong here? When I say, *I exist*, I mean, *I am conscious*; but Mr. Hodgson declares that this statement generalised runs so—The existence of other things means, not *their* consciousness, but *my consciousness of them*. Now, it appears to me that this is a generalisation in which the essential element of the particular has been left out of the general, that there is, in fact, absolutely nothing in common between the particular proposition started with and the generalised result. If the fundamental truth of philosophy were, My existence arises *in* my consciousness, existence and consciousness might be regarded as possibly different; in any case, the *nature* of existence would be an open question. But if the ultimate fact is, My existence arises *as* my consciousness, then existence and consciousness are indissolubly one, and conceivable only as different names for the same thing. When, therefore, I generalise the conception of *my* existence, and apply it to that of other things, the generalisation ought to be—The existence of other things means *their* consciousness. This seems so obviously the only fair logical extension of Descartes' deliverance as interpreted by Mr. Hodgson, that I am half disposed to believe that I am somehow misunderstanding the very plain-looking words of the sentence just quoted. If all that I know of existence at first hand—that is, in my own case—is, that it is always a mode of consciousness, then, when I extend this unvarying experience to other existences, real or conceived, is it lawful for me to strike out of the idea of existence as thus extended its inseparable other-half, consciousness? Surely this would be no extension of my own individual experience at all—no generalisation in any proper sense of the word. In my own case, existence and consciousness stand or fall together; but the existence of Peter and James and John, and stocks and stones, is secure enough, it appears, *if somebody else is conscious of them*. The logic here looks alarming, but Mr. Hodgson is responsible for it, if I have not grossly misunderstood his language.

The existence of other things being supposed, it seems clear that, if we are entitled to extend to them that conception which is given in every one of our own conscious acts, we *must* attribute to all conceived existences *some* form of consciousness—a generalised form, of course, but still a consciousness. Otherwise, there will have been no true logical extension of Descartes' primary conception. If *esse* means *percipere* in the particular, it cannot be transformed into *percipi* in the general. It is absurd to represent the passive voice as a generalised form of the active.

Mr. Hodgson remarks that Descartes' deliverance "does not tell us what existence *in general* is; that would disqualify it at once for a *beginning* of philosophy; it speaks only of a particular case, the case of *ourselves*". But existence in general must be the same *in kind* as existence in particular, else generalisation would signify metamorphosis; and if consciousness is the very essence of existence in each particular case, it must be conceived as present in all cases. And there is the more need for extreme watchfulness as to the use made of this root-

proposition, because many things just now seem pointing to the conclusion, that on Descartes' '*Cogito ergo sum*,' rightly understood, the philosophy of the future can find its only firm footing; that his first principle, boldly carried to its farthest logical issues, can be shown to possess that necessity and universality without which no system of thought can be other than an unenduring cloud-world of more or less consistency. If consciousness were clearly seen to be co-extensive with existence (actual and conceivable), that hitherto fruitless and painful search for the *Ding-an-sich* would cease—for the "thing in itself" would then have been found; the Kantian dualism, with all its perplexing inconsistencies, would fall to pieces; and the incorrigible Hegelian even would acknowledge that all the unquestionable truth in his master's system had been embraced in the one dictum, Existence is Consciousness. Whether or not Descartes himself saw to the end of the road along which his principle points, this is not the place to inquire; the intention here is simply to note the fact that Mr. Hodgson, at all events, would appear to have missed the path altogether.

As against Mr. Arnold's reading of the famous '*Cogito ergo sum*,' the passage quoted by Mr. Hodgson seems decisive, though it is more than questionable whether it will appear so to the author of *God and the Bible*. Mr. Arnold's own contributions to philosophy having hitherto, most of them, taken the form of contemptuous remarks upon philosophers, expressed in the choicest of English, and with all the graces which culture can bestow, he is not likely to be greatly moved by this note or that of Mr. Hodgson. But all those who make philosophy a serious study will be disposed to admit that the significance of the Cartesian First Principle is, even in these advanced times, worthy of the strongest possible emphasis.

ALEXANDER MAIN.

[Mr. Main's note is opportuneness itself. I was quite aware that many might require to have the grounds of my generalisation of the '*cogito*' fully drawn out before accepting it, but I was withheld from saying more by the fear of travelling out of the record. Now, however, Mr. Main comes to my aid, and that by so clear and forcible a statement of the opposite alternative as to save me from all need of restating it, as I must have done if I had explained the whole case myself.

Assuming, then, that *my existence means my consciousness* expresses the true sense of the '*cogito*,' I argue that Mr. Main's generalisation of that statement, *viz.*, that the existence of other things means their consciousness, and that *esse* means *percipere*, is inconsistent with its true sense. In *my existence means my consciousness*, *my consciousness* may *primâ facie* be taken to signify one of three things, either (1) myself being conscious, or having my states of consciousness; or (2) my states of consciousness as coming from existing things; or (3) my states of consciousness alone. (The word *my*, in all three cases, is merely a word of designation, to make it clear to the reader that I am not passing beyond the limits of the subject, my consciousness). Now the two first of these meanings are excluded from being the true meaning, because each of them assumes existence as known, the existence of myself in the first case, of things in the second, and thus nullifies the statement *my existence means my consciousness*, and disqualifies it as an explanation of

my existence. It is no explanation of my existence to say that it means myself having consciousness, for that assumes that I already know myself as having something, that is, as existing.

It is this meaning of my consciousness which is involved in Mr. Main's generalisation. It would make Descartes' '*cogito*' say, *I exist because I exist thinking*; it would simply unsay the '*cogito*'. The only admissible sense of the '*cogito*' is the one in which my consciousness means my states of consciousness alone, states which become objects to me in the '*cogito*' moment, which is the moment of self-consciousness or reflection. They and they alone, in the first instance, are the explanation of my existence; my *esse* is not my *percipere* but my *percipi*.

Adopting this, the sole admissible, meaning of my existence means my consciousness, I then generalise it by dropping the particular circumstance that it is mine. The *esse* of anything means that it is an object in some consciousness, its own or other. As Mr. Main truly remarks, "existence in general must be the same in kind as existence in particular".

I cordially concur also in the necessity for extreme watchfulness in the use made of this "root-proposition"; and also in the belief that it offers the only firm footing for philosophy. But I cannot agree that Mr. Main's generalisation of it necessarily precludes a *Ding-an-sich*. On the contrary, the interpretation on which it rests apparently introduces a *Ding-an-sich* as Subject; for by that interpretation a percipient Subject is assumed without the explanation of a predicate. But by my interpretation a predicate is given to the supposed Subject.

Some other consequences too of Mr. Main's interpretation, if the '*cogito*' is also made the basis of philosophy, are familiar to us. It is the conception which is at the root not of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel only, but of all the forms which are or may be included in the now fashionable philosophy of Monism, the latest importation from chimeraland. The last outcome of philosophy would be evidently necessary from the very first step in it, on Mr. Main's interpretation of Descartes. If to be endowed with consciousness is a condition of existing, it follows at once that whatever exists is, or has been endowed with consciousness,—for instance, the Universe. Philosophy is not so royal a road as this syllogism would imply.

Another side of the question remains to be considered. No generalisation of the '*cogito*' can be true which contradicts or unsays the '*cogito*'. The true sense of the '*cogito*', when once established, is a test to which we must bring any proposed generalisation. The consequence in the '*cogito*,' its *ergo*, may *primâ facie* be taken as one of three different kinds, namely, as introducing and assigning either (1) the condition of existence of my existence; as, my existence results from my consciousness; or (2) the condition of my knowing that I exist; as, the fact that I exist is shown by my being conscious; or (3) the condition of my knowing what my existence is; as, my existence means my consciousness. There are three possible alternatives, because there are three ultimate sorts of conditions, *existendi*, *cognoscendi*, and *essendi*. The last of the three alternatives has been shown to be the true one. I argue, therefore, that any proposed generalisation of the '*cogito*' which either assigned a condition of existence for existence at large, or assigned a condition of knowing the fact of existence at large, would not be true as a generalisation of the '*cogito*'.

But Mr. Main, in his first sentence, puts my interpretation of the '*cogito*' thus: "that my being and my consciousness are one, that my being is my consciousness and my consciousness my being". The word

*is*, when standing as copula, gives no indication which kind of condition is intended by the proposition. And therefore I was careful to interpret the *is* in the '*cogito*' by the word *means*, having shown the '*cogito*' to express only *what* existence was, and not how it arose nor how it was inferred. Mr. Main, in recurring to the unanalysed use of *is*, really unsays Descartes' proposition.

SHADWORTH H. HODGSON.]

## XII.—NEW BOOKS.

*History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century.* By LESLIE STEPHEN. 2 vols. London: Smith, Elder & Co. Pp. 466, 469.

This very important work will be reviewed at length in a future number. It is first of all, as the preface tells, a history of the Deistical movement; but for this it "seemed necessary to describe the general theological tendencies of the time, and, in order to set forth intelligibly the ideas which shaped those tendencies, it seemed desirable, again, to trace their origin in the philosophy of the time and to show their application in other departments of speculation". The author therefore begins with an account of the contemporary Philosophy, and seeks besides "to indicate the application of the principles accepted in philosophy and theology to moral and political questions, and their reflection on the imaginative literature of the time"; though in dealing with political theories he tries to keep as far as possible from the province of political or social history.

*A Treatise on the Moral Ideals.* By the late JOHN GROTE, B.D. Edited by Joseph Bickersteth Mayor, M.A. Cambridge: Deighton, Bell and Co. 1876. Pp. 519.

Professor Mayor, continuing his work as editor, here prints the constructive treatise on Ethics which the late John Grote turned to write on resigning his original intention of publishing a controversial answer to Mill's *Utilitarianism*. The controversial treatise, which had been partly printed when laid aside, after all saw the light first, being published six years ago by Prof. Mayor, in the exercise of his editorial discretion, under the title of *An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy*. The present work will be reviewed in the next number of MIND, and all reference to its contents may therefore be deferred. As in the case of the former work, the editor's duties have been very onerous. He now proceeds to prepare for the press the second part of the *Exploratio Philosophica*, of which Part I. appeared in 1865, the year before Professor Grote died.

*A Philological Introduction to Greek and Latin*, translated from the German of FERDINAND BAUR by C. Kegan Paul and E. D. Stone. London: King & Co. 1876. Pp. 153.

This little work, however technical, calls for notice in MIND by reason of the remarkably clear psychological conceptions underlying