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PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE RAISING, ORGANISATION, AND TRAINING OF THE ARTILLERY MILITIA.

*By Colonel J. D. LEGARD, C.B., The Yorkshire
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Thursday, 5th April, 1906.

Major-General Sir J. WOLFE MURRAY, K.C.B., R.A. (Master-General
of the Ordnance), in the Chair.

THE CHAIRMAN :—A very few words, I think, are necessary from me in introducing the lecturer to you. He has lectured here on several previous occasions, I believe, and no doubt he is known to a great many of those who are here present. I would like to point out to you the very special experience of our varied military forces which Colonel Legard possesses, for originally he was in the artillery for a number of years; he served in it throughout the Zulu war, passed through the Staff College, and, after retiring, joined the Auxiliary Forces, in both branches of which he has served. He commanded a brigade of Volunteers, and also commanded, until last summer, a well-known Militia Artillery corps in the north. So that on the grounds of that very wide experience I think he can claim, quite apart from any other personal consideration, a great knowledge of the subject. I will now ask Colonel Legard to give us his lecture.

LECTURE.

GENERAL.

THE consideration of this subject entails to some extent dealing with questions affecting the Militia Force as a whole, before passing to those matters which are peculiar to one portion of it. It will be my endeavour to treat as briefly as possible this afternoon the general subject, and to deal at greater length with that branch of it with which we are for the moment more immediately concerned.

33 years after its transference to the War Office, the Militia was, in 1904, declared by the Duke of Norfolk's Commission to be, in its existing condition, unfit to take the field for the defence of the country. At the same time, it was made clear that the Force itself was not responsible for its deplorable state of inefficiency.

During the two years that have elapsed since the Commission's Report, no serious steps have been taken towards bettering its con-

dition. Minor measures, as to pay and bounty and so on, have been adopted. Experiments have been made and condemned somewhat hastily, such as the appointment of the Militia Advisory Board and the formation of the new Militia Reserve—both, in the opinion of Militia officers, useful reforms. Legislation has been introduced with the object of rendering the Militia liable to foreign service, but not seriously pressed in Parliament. For practical purposes the Militia is to-day in the same, if not actually in a worse, position than it was two years ago. And yet there is plenty of evidence to show what are the real causes of the malady, and sufficient expert advice is available to effect a cure. The case, however, is so bad that reform to be effectual must not only be sweeping but speedy if the Militia is ever to be placed in the position it should occupy in our scheme of Imperial Defence.

The Duke of Norfolk's Commission appeared to have some difficulty in finding out for what purpose the Militia existed as part of our military system. It was suggested that such a large number of men, limited by the terms of their engagement to service within the United Kingdom, and backed by a still more numerous body of Volunteers, could only be intended to resist a somewhat formidable invasion by a European Power. The Committee of Imperial Defence seemed to have held the opinion, since confirmed by a statement in Parliament by the late Prime Minister, and now adopted by the present Secretary of State for War, that nothing more serious than a raid of from 5,000 to 10,000 men need be contemplated under existing conditions. The Commission were told that they might fix the numbers of the Militia provisionally at 100,000 men. (Report Appendix B, No. 6.)

The W.O. itself has never had any doubt as to the proper use for the Militia. They have treated it mainly as a recruiting agency for the Regular Army. No serious attempt has ever been made to make it into an effective fighting force, or to render it in any sense fit to take the field.

The Militia is sometimes described as a cheap force. Figures supplied by the W.O. to the Duke of Norfolk's Commission place the annual cost of the Militia at £2,090,000. It is also stated, with some doubt, however, that £225,000 of this total may be taken as the cost of Militiamen who join the Army, *i.e.*, the value of the Militia as a recruiting agency. The balance, *viz.*, £1,865,000, is the cost of the Militia itself. A force which is "unfit to take the field in the defence of the country" is certainly not worth this sum—it is dear at any price. The Militia can only be made a cheap force by making it effective. Some slight increase of expenditure tending to this end would be money well spent.

Some interesting facts and figures dealing with the Militia have recently been collected by the Master-General of the Ordnance, which he has been kind enough to place at my disposal.¹ They serve to show to what a small extent the Militia under present conditions may be looked upon as an effective fighting force, and the way in which (in the expressive language of the Secretary of State for War) it has

¹ I prefer to use these figures rather than those supplied in the report of the Duke of Norfolk's Commission because the former followed a prolonged peace, whereas in the latter case the Militia was suffering from the disturbing influence of a great war.

been "bled white" to feed the Regular Army. The figures deal with a period of 10 years, 1890-1899, and prior to the Boer War. During that period the average strength of the Militia was 110,472.¹ Of these, 35 per cent. were recruits and 13 per cent. men of over 35 years of age. Therefore not more than 52 per cent. could be considered as really effective for active service. If we further put on one side men under 20 years of age, there remained of those between 20 and 35 years of age only 46 per cent., or 51,000 men. It was from this remnant that the then existing Militia Reserve was taken to fill the ranks of the Regular Army during the Boer War. The depleted units of Militia were then filled up with recruits and untrained officers, and themselves despatched to the front and distributed on the lines of communication. Can we wonder that under these circumstances the Commander-in-Chief was anxious about his lines of supply, or formed a poor opinion of the value of the Militia as a fighting force?

As to recruiting for the Army, an average of 13,618 men, or 12·8 per cent. of the whole force, joined the Army annually. Of these, 11,700, or 86·5 per cent., were recruits, and no less than 60 per cent. had not served an annual training.

Fortunately for our immediate purpose, the element of doubt as to the proper use for at least one branch of the Militia is eliminated. A very clear and definite duty has been assigned to the R.G.A. Militia. They are entrusted with the defence of our naval bases and mercantile ports at home against those very raids which even the extreme "blue-water" school admit to be possible. But I do not propose to limit our enquiry merely to this well-defined area. The opinion is gradually gaining ground that in view of the smallness of our Regular Army and the extent of the Empire which it has to defend, it will be necessary in the near future to extend the duties of the Militia beyond these islands.

The possibility of forming companies or batteries of siege and heavy artillery seems worth considering.

We must remember, too, that the formation of field artillery has already been successfully tried in the Militia, and may be further extended and developed.

There are also subsidiary branches of armament, equipment, and administration connected with an army in the field which must necessarily be kept in a state of dormant activity during peace, and which the Militia might be called upon to quicken into life for war. The scheme now submitted will have reference to these various considerations.

It is a hopeful sign that the Secretary of State for War, in his Statement to Parliament on 8th March, admitted that the Militia is not in a satisfactory condition, and that they have in the past had no definite function assigned to them. Those of us who have the best interests of the Force at heart will rejoice that Mr. Haldane is disposed to regard the Militiaman as part of a force which is more akin to the Regulars than to the Volunteers, and that he is fully alive to the fact that the Army cannot be organised without coming closely into contact with the relations of labour and capital.

It seems to me that, speaking broadly, the best hope for the future of the Militia is to treat it as forming that Home Defence

¹ The present strength of the Militia, as given in the current Army Estimates, is 94,428.

Army outlined in the Report of the Duke of Norfolk's Commission, which, while providing for the internal security of these islands in the absence of our Regular Army, shall at the same time serve as a great reserve or second line to that Army, capable, under certain conditions, of being employed outside the United Kingdom. I believe that this result will best be attained by more closely associating the Militia by affiliation with the Regular Army, both for purposes of organisation and training.

The Swiss system, which is favoured by some, and for which Mr. Haldane has confessed a predilection, was rejected by the Royal Commission. They did not regard the initial training as sufficient. Nor could they recommend its adoption as regards the mode in which the Army of that country is officered. The modern method of extending military training to all classes, while shortening its duration, involves the employment of instructors of the highest possible qualifications; these must be professional officers.

The Commission pointed out that the principles which have been adopted, after the disastrous failure of older methods, by every great European State are, first, that as far as possible the whole able-bodied male population shall be trained to arms; secondly, that the training shall be given in a period of continuous service with the colours, not necessarily in barracks; and thirdly, that the instruction shall be given by a body of specially educated and highly-trained officers.

This is not the occasion to deal with the question of universal training for military service. I hold a strong opinion on it which I have before expressed in this theatre, and is recorded in the evidence given before the Royal Commission. We are more immediately concerned with the organisation and training of a portion of the Militia, and how that training is to be carried out, rather than with the numbers to be trained or how those numbers are to be obtained.

The Commission considered that the requisite initial training of a Home Defence Army could be given within one year, followed by annual periods of a few weeks' exercise. If any system of universal military training in schools be adopted, such as that advocated by Lord Roberts, and spoken of favourably by the Secretary of State for War, this contention would receive additional support.

The relation between capital and labour and military organisation is sometimes lost sight of by military experts. There is a limit to the time which a good workman in regular employment can give annually to military training. This was pointed out to the Royal Commission by great employers of labour, such as Mr. T. E. Vickers. (Q 5,485, 5,591, Minutes of Evidence, Duke of Norfolk's Commission.) Before giving my own evidence I consulted three great employers of labour in the north, one being Mr. Vickers and the others a well-known general manager of a railway, and the head of a great engineering firm. They generally agreed that the maximum time that a good workman in regular employment could give annually and consecutively to military training was 14 days. The unskilled casual labourer, on the other hand, can be spared for 6 weeks, or almost any period you like to name, because his place can always easily be filled. If, therefore, a six weeks' annual training be adopted, as recommended for Militiamen by the Royal Commission, you restrict your recruiting to a limited class, and that the least intelligent and

worst educated. If we are to extend our recruiting area, we must shorten rather than lengthen the period of annual training.

On the other hand, there is ample evidence which goes to prove that if you take a young man for his initial military training at the age of from 17 to 20, before he has usually got fixed in regular employment, the length of such training is really immaterial to him, so far as his future prospects are concerned. Indeed, it is conceivable that when the value of military training and discipline is more universally recognised as strengthening character and physique, the trained man will run a better chance of employment than the untrained. In support of this view, I should like to quote the words of Mr. W. W. Lupton, who is personally known to me, and who has had a large experience in an engineering business. Writing in the *National Service JOURNAL* for January, 1905, he says: "I do not hesitate to say that during 30 years of activity as an engineer and manager of a large body of men, I have generally found that for all purposes, as workmen, draughtsmen, clerks, and labourers, the best at their own job were those who had served in the Navy, Army, Militia, Yeomanry, or Volunteers. . . . One great factor in Germany's success (as a manufacturing and trading nation) has been her Universal Military Service. . . . I am quite convinced that in the ordinary 30 years of working life, a man will do more and better work in six or seven-and-twenty years if he has a good and strict military training for one or two of them."

Evidence was also given before the Royal Commission in support of this view.

It is not in this country only that the burden of a prolonged training of reservists is being felt. In France, backed even as they are by the obligation to universal service, a movement is on foot to shorten the annual training. On the 28th February last, the French Chamber of Deputies, by a large majority, and in defiance of military opinion, adopted 15 days' training for reservists and 6 days for territorial troops. As in France so in England; soldiers who are responsible for the efficiency of the National Forces will have to consider in regard to training, not only what is best from the purely military point of view, but what is possible under the existing conditions of civil life. I think the general trend of opinion towards shorter periods of military service is likely to make itself felt in other Continental nations in the near future.

The training here advocated for the R.G.A. (Militia) is one which fits in with the conditions of civil life, and which, as I shall hope to prove, gives a more efficient training than is in practice given under the present terms of service. I propose that the initial or recruits' training shall be 12 months, carried out to a large extent under the supervision of highly-trained Regular officers, followed in subsequent years by an annual training of 14 days, supplemented in certain cases by a further training of 14 days, not necessarily consecutive.

The prolongation of the recruits' training to 12 months raises important considerations as to barrack accommodation. From Sir J. W. Murray's "Notes on the Militia," it appears that for the 10 years, 1889-1898, the average yearly number of recruits raised for the Militia was 38,534, or 35 per cent. of total strength. If this percentage be maintained, we should require annually for an establishment of 17,899 Artillery Militia, 6,265 recruits, for whom accommo-

dation in barracks would be required for at least the winter months. As appears later on, the recruits' training would take place for part of the 12 months at the *depôt* and for the other part at the station of the affiliated Regular units, and we may assume approximately that half the total number of recruits raised would have to be accommodated at each of these two stations at one time.

As the Militiaman's first period of service is for 6 years, 35 per cent. seems an excessive number of recruits to keep the Force at its establishment. This is caused by the annual wastage of the Militia. This amounts to some 37 per cent. of the whole Force, or 40,000 men annually.

The same return gives the causes and numbers of this wastage as follows:—

1. Transfers to Army and Navy	...	14,000 or 13½ of total force 110,000.
2. Discharges by purchase	...	9,500 " 9½ " " "
3. Desertion and absence	...	9,000 " 8½ " " "
4. Invaliding	...	3,000 " 3½ " " "
5. Completion of Engagement	...	2,000 " 2½ " " "
6. Minor causes	...	2,500 " 2½ " " "
Total	...	40,000 " 37 " " "

If it were provided that no recruit should join the Regular Army until he had served one training, and as the numbers who join at present without having so served are 60·5 per cent. of the total recruits, it is probable that some reduction would be effected under No. 1 of the above table—say one-sixth. No. 2 might be greatly reduced by increasing the amount of purchase money, as has already been done, and with the enlistment of a better class of recruit with a fixed residence and regular employment in view, No. 3 would undoubtedly be diminished. It is perhaps not unreasonable to expect that the wastage due to these causes might be lessened by 18,000 men, and consequently the number of recruits required annually might perhaps be taken at 20,000, for a strength of 110,000, or 18 per cent. Therefore, 3,222 recruits would be required annually for the Artillery Militia to keep up an establishment of 17,899 Militiamen.

I think we must assume that no proposals for reorganising the Militia will greatly commend themselves to the House of Commons which involve increased expenditure. I believe, however, that with a very substantial increase in the numbers and efficiency of the Militia, which is a cheap Force, some relatively small reduction may be possible in the numbers of the Regular Army, which is a very costly Force. An increase in one direction may be balanced by a reduction in the other. The view, I think, is now very generally held that our Army must necessarily be small, but that it must be *or the very best*. It must be a perfect striking Force, with sufficient weight behind it to give momentum as well as velocity to its blows. The weight should be supplied by the Army Reserve and the Militia. The Army and the Army Reserve should be the steel head of the lance of which the Militia would be the shaft.

The kind of reduction of numbers in the Army which I have in my mind would be rather in the direction of rank and file than of cadres. I would submit that so far as the question of furnishing the

drafts and filling the Reserve permits, our Army, reduced to the lowest possible limits, should be one affording a very large supply of highly-trained officers and non-commissioned officers, sufficient, when supplemented by a somewhat less trained body of Militia officers and non-commissioned officers, to command and administer a large force of mobilised troops.

I would provide for the training of the Militia by a body of highly-trained officers and non-commissioned officers by more closely associating it with the Regular Army. The details of the scheme which I now propose to submit affect only the Artillery Militia. I believe, nevertheless, that the infantry could be dealt with on similar lines, although on that point I do not presume to express a definite opinion.

Organisation of R.G.A. (Militia).

The R.G.A. Militia is nominally affiliated with the R.G.A., but in practice it is not. The one brigade of Militia Field Artillery which exists is apparently not even nominally affiliated with the Regular Army.

The existing and rather haphazard distribution and system of affiliation of the R.G.A. has been revised under a recent A.O. (A.O. 25 of Feb., 1906, and Appendix B). All garrison companies at home and abroad are affiliated with the first five depôts. The Heavy Brigade and Siege Train companies at home and in India are allotted to No. 6 Depôt.

The Militia Artillery Corps are all affiliated with the 6-depôts; but as there is no depôt in Scotland or Ireland, the Irish and Scottish corps are necessarily associated with the English depôts. Thus No. 2 depôt at Gosport has affiliated with it one Militia corps in the Isle of Wight, two in Ireland, and two in Scotland. It would have seemed more reasonable to have one depôt in Ireland and one in Scotland, with which might be affiliated the Irish and Scottish Militia and at least those R.G.A. companies stationed in Ireland and Scotland respectively; but for our present purpose it will be best to take the distribution of R.G.A. depôts and companies as it stands, and see how far it can be fitted in with our proposed scheme.

At present, although each Militia unit is affiliated with a depôt, it is, so far as I know, in no way affiliated with any of the R.G.A. companies belonging to that depôt. What I propose is that every Militia Company should be affiliated with a R.G.A. company, either at home or abroad, belonging to that depôt, and that for purposes of training and mobilisation they should be divided into groups consisting of 2 companies of R.G.A. and 2 of R.G.A. Militia. Where one of the R.G.A. companies of the group was abroad, the two Militia companies would be associated for instruction and training with the R.G.A. company at home. Should both be abroad, it would be necessary to attach the Militia companies to another group of the same depôt.¹

¹ Of the 108 Companies of R.G.A., at present 44 are at home and 64 abroad. In ten cases, therefore, both of the Companies of R.G.A. of the proposed groups would be abroad.

It is proposed that half of the Militia, comprising men of over 20 years of age and in their first period of service, should be liable for service abroad in case of great emergency, and while so liable should receive an additional bounty. It might be convenient to form one company in each group of these men and the other of men not so liable.

The normal war stations of both Militia companies, unless they were siege train or heavy companies, would be a work or fortress embraced in the general scheme of coast defence, and at that fortress or work the R.G.A. company with which they were affiliated would be stationed.¹

The 31 existing corps of R.G.A. Militia comprise 181 companies, so that if the proposed reorganisation were adopted, there would be 73 more Militia companies than would be required. Lieut-General Sir W. G. Nicholson told the Norfolk Commission (Q. 92) that there were 13 corps of Militia Artillery unallotted in the scheme of defence, and which were apparently surplus.

Two of these are in England, one in Scotland, and 10 in Ireland. The 13 corps comprise 73 companies. If, therefore, these corps were disbanded or converted to some other purpose, the numbers of the Militia and Regular companies would be identical.

But as it will be necessary under the proposed scheme to increase the strength of the Militia companies, to bring them up to the Regular establishment, it might be preferable to reduce the number of companies in certain corps while retaining the corps themselves. Or, if it be thought desirable, to extend (as subsequently suggested) the formation of Militia Field Artillery, some of the unallotted corps might be utilised for that purpose. The present peace establishment of a R.G.A. company (5 officers, 154 other ranks; heavy battery 149 other ranks; siege train, 6 officers, 194 other ranks) might possibly be reduced in rank and file, but should, I

¹To illustrate approximately the increase of establishment that would be necessary to bring Militia Companies up to an equal strength with those of R.G.A., the following war establishments are given :—

	Officers.	Other ranks.	A.S.C. Drivers.	Total.
R.G.A. Coy. (Home Service)	5	194	...	199
„ Heavy Battery... ..	5	149	7	161
„ Militia Coy.	2½	96	...	(119 Horses) 98½
Increase required G.A. Coy.	2½	98	...	100½
„ „ Heavy Battery	2½	44	...	46½

In the present organisation there are 1 or 2 majors in each Corps of Militia Artillery, according to strength; 1 captain per Company; and 3 lieutenants or second-lieutenants to every two Companies. Under the proposed organisation, I would do away with the rank of major in the Militia, and allot 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, and 2 second-lieutenants to each Company.

think, have an increased establishment of "specialists,"¹ some of whom would be available for duty with the affiliated Militia companies when called up for mobilisation, and during the period that must necessarily elapse before their own "specialists" can be brought up to the required standard of efficiency.

It will be seen that a certain number of Militia companies will be affiliated with coast-defence companies of Garrison Artillery allotted to works and fortresses. In the case of mobilisation, it would be an immense advantage for the former to find in the work a body of Regular officers, non-commissioned officers, and "specialists" thoroughly acquainted with the work, the ordnance in use, and the details of manning, and who, in the case of a sudden attack following the outbreak of hostilities, would be mainly responsible for the defence. From the moment of mobilisation the Militia units would daily become more proficient in their duties, and ultimately in the earlier stages of the war, and until absolute command of the sea had been established, there would be 3 companies allotted to the work or section of defence worked up to a high state of efficiency and capable of division into 3 reliefs. When we realise the enormous strain that must fall on those engaged in coast defence, liable at any time of day or night to attack, such a distribution of reliefs would

¹ "Specialists" are non-commissioned officers and men told off for special duties which require very careful and special training, e.g., signallers, range takers, dial readers, gun layers, etc. The proposed increase of specialists might be as follows:—

Home Service.

	Present Establishment.	Proposed ¹ Establishment.
S. T. Company — Gunlayers	... 24	48
Observers	... 18	30
Telephonists	... 6	10
Other ranks	... 146	100
Total...	... 194	188
Heavy Battery — Gunlayers	... 12	24
Rangefakers	... 1	3
Other ranks	... 140	100
Total	... 153	127
Coast Defence Co.—Gunlayers	... 8½ = 12	18½ = 24
D.R.F. Men	... 5½ = 8	12½ = 16
Telephonists	... 3½ = 5	7½ = 10
Other Ranks	... 84½ = 129	63½ = 80
Total	... 100½ = 154	100½ = 130

A reduction in Home Establishments effected in—

3 Siege Train Companies at	6 = 18	Rank and File.
6 Heavy Batteries at	26 = 156	" "
36 Coast Defence Companies at	24 = 864	" "
Total Reductions ...	1,038	" "

be none too many. On the other hand, should command of the sea not be in doubt, some of the Militia companies, after a period of embodiment, would be sufficiently good for employment as independent units at any other point in or out of the United Kingdom that might be required.

I would retain the present regimental organisation of the Militia Artillery, which is convenient for purposes of administration and for training under the system proposed lower down.

To illustrate how the proposed change would work, we will take an existing unit of 6 companies on its present establishment, viz., 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 6 captains, 9 lieutenants and second lieutenants (of whom say 3 were of 3 years' service and upwards), and 576 other ranks (excluding P.S.). We will suppose that the corps form 3 R.G.A. companies and 1 Heavy Battery company. It would then comprise 1 lieutenant-colonel, 4 captains, 16 lieutenants and second lieutenants (of whom say 5 would have 3 years' service and upwards) and 731 other ranks. With the exception of recruits' training, the annual cost would be less.¹

The tendency at the present time seems to be to reduce our coast defences, and consequently smaller numbers of R.G.A. will be required. The present estimates will apparently provide for a reduction of 300 guns of those previously allotted to coast defence. On the other hand, it seems probable that a much larger proportion of Heavy Artillery will in the near future accompany armies in the field. This service Militia Artillery might well undertake. Mobility is of less importance than is the case of Horse and Field Artillery, and less skilled drivers would suffice. Siege Train companies might also be formed from the Militia. In both cases the armament and equipment of the units would be kept at their regimental headquarters and used for training and practice.

R.G.A. MILITIA.

The Raising of Officers.

Before you can train an officer you must get him. The country and Parliament must realise that in the absence of compulsory service the only way to get young officers to join a Service which entails a considerable sacrifice of time and money is to make it worth their while. Lord Lieutenants may give garden parties and Deputy Lieutenants may be threatened with the loss of their commissions, but these expedients will fail as others have failed under existing conditions. As things are now, there is a deplorable deficiency of

¹ There would be practically no increase in pay of officers, the daily pay in the first case being £7 13s. 6d., and in the second, £7 13s. 7d. There would, however, be a larger number of rank and file, but trained as to say 4-5ths for 14 days instead of 27, and as to 1-5th for 27 days (specialists). This works out to a saving of 2,420 days' pay of rank and file per unit of 6, reduced to 4 Companies. There would, of course, be a large increase in the cost of recruits' training for one year, instead of 56 days; but the saving in the annual training would go to mitigate this, and with a really efficient Militia, some reductions could, no doubt, be effected in the rank and file of the service companies.

officers in the Militia Artillery. The February Army List showed a deficiency of 2 majors, 25 captains, and 114 lieutenants and second lieutenants out of an establishment of 35, 181, and 275 of those ranks respectively. Under the proposed reorganisation we shall require for the R.G.A. no majors, 108 captains, and 432 lieutenants. Therefore at present we should have a surplus of majors and captains, but a deficiency of 271 lieutenants and second lieutenants. The Duke of Norfolk's Commission appears to have made no recommendation as to how an adequate supply of officers was to be obtained. It is admitted that the present training is inadequate; but if you increase the necessary time to be given to training you will make it yet more difficult to get officers. There is only one way to get them, in the absence of the ballot or some form of compulsory service, and that is by offering a sufficient inducement to young men, either pecuniary or otherwise, to give part of their earlier years to military service. In my evidence before the Royal Commission I strongly advocated the giving, by competitive examination, of valuable military scholarships, tenable for 3 years at a university. A condition attaching to such a scholarship would be that the holder should serve for a fixed number of years (say 5) in the Militia after leaving the university, or refund the value of his scholarship. I consulted the Vice-Chancellor of a university on the subject, and he cordially approved of the proposal. The only member of the Commission who appeared hostile to the suggestion was Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, and chiefly on the grounds that these scholarships would be more valuable than those already obtainable at Oxford and Cambridge. I think that by this means you would obtain exactly what you want in the artillery, viz., an officer with a good general education up to the university degree standard, and who would soon pick up the military part of his training. If the universities would co-operate, a considerable amount of military knowledge might be acquired during the undergraduate stage.

Increasing the establishment of subaltern officers would have two advantages: (1) A sufficient number would in all probability remain in the Militia to fill the senior ranks, especially if the rank of major were abolished; and (2) It would supply what was universally felt to be a serious want in the late war, *i.e.*, a reserve supply of trained junior officers.

I may mention here that one reason why I advocate the abolition of the rank of major in the Artillery Militia is that by so doing you obviate a possible difficulty as to command when the R.A. and Militia company are serving together.

Training of Officers.

Omitting details of courses on first appointment, courses necessary to qualify for commissions in the R.G.A., and the I. of A. course, under the present regulations, until promoted to command a corps, each officer must (a) once in three years attend for one month a Garrison Artillery School of Instruction, or be attached for one month to a company of R.G.A. during the period of company and regimental training. (b) An officer *may* attend as in (a) every year. (c) To qualify for promotion an officer *must* attend as in (a) and obtain a certificate.

I would suggest that (a) should be amended, to read: "To be attached to his affiliated R.G.A. company during the whole of the

company and regimental training, *i.e.*, 5 weeks." I believe this course would be more useful to a company officer, either as battery commander or gun group commander, than a course at a school of instruction, and he would also become acquainted with the armament of the work to which his unit was allotted on mobilisation.

For the initial training I would adopt the Royal Commission's recommendation, *viz.*, that it should be for six months, and be completed within 12 months from date of appointment. Of these, 2 months should be with the *depôt* or headquarters of his corps, 2 months at a school of instruction, and 2 months with his affiliated R.A. company or battery, the latter to include, if possible, the company and regimental training.

Recruits' Drill on Enlistment.

The recruits' training would be for 12 months, as already stated. For the first period, say 6 months, at the *depôt* or regimental headquarters, under the Regimental Staff, assisted by Militia officers of the unit, and for the second period, at the station of the affiliated R.G.A. Company, under the officers of that company, assisted by Militia officers of the unit.

The idea underlying the proposal is, that when a man has once been made a soldier, in the professional soldier's sense of the term, a much shorter period of time is required for annual training to keep him efficient. Habits of obedience, self-respect, and discipline have become a second nature, and all that is required is to bring him up to the mark from time to time in drill and practice. An experiment is, I believe, being tried to prove that you can teach a soldier all that he ought to know, and make him all he ought to be, in a six months' course of training. If that can be done, the question is, of course, by so much, simplified. It is, however, contrary to the belief and practice of all great military nations, and many would argue that twelve months is insufficient for the purpose. It is submitted, however, that the present period of Militia recruits' training is quite insufficient to make him an effective soldier. Nor will even a six weeks' annual training enable you to complete his manufacture. The foundations of the building are unsound, and the superstructure is, therefore, insecure. The plan proposed is also based on the proposition so strongly pressed by the Duke of Norfolk's Commission, that to make a soldier, even in twelve months, his training must be conducted by highly-trained and highly-efficient officers.

ANNUAL TRAINING.

The Present System.

Recruits are called up for 14 days' instruction in gunnery, and specialists are, with their own consent, also called up for instruction for the like period immediately before training. The ordinary training is for 27 days (or for 42 days, when conducted at a work of defence, normally every third year).

Under the present system, there are two things which militate against efficient instruction:—(a) Specialists are not efficient when the annual training begins. Some of them have not attended during

the recruits' gunnery course, and their instruction and redrilling, including testing of gun layers, has to be carried on while the rest of the rank and file are being trained in gun drill, fire discipline, and elementary practice. The latter cannot be conducted to any useful purpose except with the aid of well-trained specialists. (b) At Regimental Headquarters, there is not sufficient equipment, even where a good up-to-date practice battery exists, to train more than about one-third of the non-commissioned officers and men in their most important duties at the same time. This difficulty is, in some cases, further aggravated by the guns and equipment being required by Volunteer Corps. The result is, that two-thirds of the corps are engaged in other duties, such as musketry, company and battalion drill, elementary repository work, etc., good things, no doubt, in their way, but in no sense essential for Auxiliary Forces, whose whole time should be taken up in learning those duties and those only which they would have to perform in war.

To show how this works out, I may state what happens in the case of the unit I lately commanded when training at Scarborough—the Regimental Headquarters. There is a good practice battery fairly up-to-date, comprising 6-inch, 5-inch, and 3-pounder Q.F. guns; but only two companies can make use of the battery at the same time.

The 27 days' training are always reduced to 19 actual working days, after deducting days of assembly and dismissal, 2; giving in arms and equipment, 1; inspections, 2; Sundays, 3; total, 8. Allowing 4 parade hours per day, and deducting half-holidays, there are actually available 69 working hours during training. But as only two companies out of six can use the battery at one time, there are only 23 working hours per company, the remaining 46 hours being occupied in work which is of little importance:

Proposed System.

In place of the present system, I propose that in the case of a 6-company unit, there should be 4 companies of the strength given above, and that each company should be called up separately in succession for 13 days' training, instead of 27. Three days would be occupied in assembly, dismissal, and giving in clothing, etc., and there would be one Sunday; total 4. The inspection should consist in the inspecting officer being present during the whole of one day's company practice, seeing the camp, books, etc., so that no deduction of working time would be necessary for this purpose. Three hours might be devoted to company drill, etc. There would then be 33 hours available for work in the battery instead of 23 under the present system.

The specialists, if it be thought essential that they should work with their own companies during gun drill and practice, would be called up for 14 days' instruction immediately preceding the assembly of their company. This would result in the enormous advantage of each company from the commencement of its training having the assistance of a trained body of specialists, and I have no hesitation in saying that the value of the training would be thus increased by at least 50 per cent.

There is another alternative that I would submit for consideration. It has already been suggested the affiliated service R.G.A. companies should comprise a higher establishment of specialists than at present.

It is worth considering whether the Militia company, while up for training, might be supplied with specialists from the affiliated service company, the latter, at the same time, undertaking the training of the Militia specialists. By this arrangement the annual training of the latter might also be reduced to 14 days.

Under the proposed arrangement, the annual training of the 4-company unit would, including the training of specialists, be spread over a period of 10 weeks. The Lieut.-Colonel Commanding, and the whole of the permanent staff, should be present. Company officers should come up for 27 days, and be present during the preliminary training of their non-commissioned officers and specialists.

Permanent Staff.

It is suggested that the adjutant should be appointed for 3 years; that specially selected officers should be so employed; and that exemplary service should be considered in connection with accelerated promotion.

The non-commissioned officers should also be specially selected, and should revert periodically to the affiliated service company. Good service with the Militia should be considered in qualification for promotion.

An instructor of artillery should be added to the Permanent Staff, who might be a Militia officer or a Regular. Two sergeants per company should also be added, and these additional appointments might be open to specially qualified Militia non-commissioned officers. I would abolish the rank of Militia-sergeant.

System of Pay.

Pay duties at present take away a Permanent Staff-sergeant in each company from drill and instruction just when he is most wanted, and are always a source of anxiety, and frequently of loss to the officer commanding the company. The quartermaster, with a sufficient clerical staff, should act as regimental-paymaster. Officers commanding companies would still issue the daily pay on a pay sheet, supplied by the regimental-paymaster, but would not be accountants, and need only keep a cash book. They would thus be able to devote more time to the instruction of their companies.

No doubt a good deal of extra work and responsibility will be thrown on the quartermaster by the scheme. Advantage might be taken of this to improve the status and pay of Militia quartermasters, which is apparently at present considerably worse, both as to pay and pension than that of district officer, although both are now promoted from one general roll of the warrant officers of the regiment.

Field Artillery.

There is reason to believe that the formation of Militia Field Artillery, at present only in its experimental stage, can be considerably augmented.

There is at present only one brigade (3 batteries) of Militia F.A. (the Lancashire). The major-general commanding the N.W. District told the Royal Commission that the experiment of the

Militia Field Artillery could certainly be regarded as a success, and their work was very creditable. They had obtained a fair degree of mobility, their driving was very creditable indeed, and he would certainly like to see the experiment extended. (Q. 2,672-78.)

I have made recent enquiry, and am informed that the system is an excellent one; at the end of their 2 months' training the batteries fall very little short of a Service battery R.F.A., and with 6 months' training would be well able to hold their own; the keenness displayed by all ranks is astonishing.

Practice is carried out annually at the School of Gunnery Practice Camp on Salisbury Plain at the same targets and under the same conditions as batteries R.F.A. Last year one battery obtained a 2nd class, and the remaining 2 batteries a 3rd class, and this in spite of the fact that the Militia batteries have only 200 rounds allowed, as against 600 for batteries R.F.A.

The establishment is as follows. (Regimental Establishments, p. 40, q. v.):—Permanent staff (Regulars), 3¹ officers, 118 warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, 30 horses; Militia, 14 officers, 297 warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, 195² hired and 30 P.S. horses; total 432.³

Up to the present no difficulty has been experienced in obtaining officers or non-commissioned officers and men, although the training is a long one, and the work during training is hard.

Training.

Recruits receive 1 month's training, of which 8-10 days are taken up by vaccination. This appears far too short a time. It seems probable that with a longer recruits' training some curtailment of the annual training might be possible.

Battery commanders, Militia gun-layers, non-commissioned officers and artificers come up for one month before training.

Brigade then assembles for 56 days' annual training and practice.

Officers are trained with their units in F.A. duties and equitation. On joining they do 1 month's preliminary drill, 2 months' training, and 1 month's course either at the School of Gunnery or with a Service battery. After the first year the courses are the same as for R.G.A. (Militia).

The system seems to work admirably and give good results; but the hire and keep of horses for training is costly, amounting to £5,000 per annum.

I submit that as great efficiency at less expenditure could be attained by the same system of affiliation that I have advocated for the R.G.A. (Militia). For this purpose I would affiliate a Militia Brigade with a Brigade R.F.A., and would constitute the latter the training school for recruits in drill and equitation, and the school of instruction for officers in all duties, and for the preliminary drill of officers, non-commissioned officers, artificers and men. The R.F.A. Brigade would be kept at a full

¹ 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 adjutant; one battery is commanded by a major. R.F.A.; the remaining two by Militia officers.

² Hired for training by Remount Department.

³ The present Estimates provide for the formation of two additional brigades of field artillery, establishment as above.

establishment of horses, so that in case of mobilisation a sufficient supply of trained horses would be in readiness to supply the gun teams and riding horses of both Regular and Militia Brigade Divisions. For annual training the Militia Brigade would be supplied with horses by the R.F.A. Brigade.

Under such an arrangement it would seem that a considerable reduction in the permanent staff might be effected. No horses or drivers would be required. The adjutant and non-commissioned officers of the permanent staff might be attached to the Regular Brigade and assist in training recruits. The lieutenant-colonel commanding the Militia Brigade, at present a Regular officer on full pay, might be replaced by a Militia lieutenant-colonel, as experienced officers of the Force became available, or retired R.A. officers might in some cases be appointed to such commands.

What saving in the Army Estimates could be effected by the development of Militia F.A. here indicated?

The annual cost of a Militia Brigade F.A. under the present system is £21,000; of this £3,000 is for hire of horses and £2,000 for their keep. Some saving would be effected under the latter head, but as I propose that the R.F.A. batteries should be kept at a higher establishment of horses than at present, *i.e.*, guns and wagons fully horsed at war strength, I take no credit for this item, and I put the annual cost of the Militia Brigade at £21,000 - £3,000 = £18,000. A Service brigade costs £39,000 per annum, a difference in favour of the Militia of £21,000.

The Secretary of State for War told the House of Commons recently that there was a surplus of 36 batteries R.F.A., having regard to the number of Regular troops that we were prepared to put in the field. At the same time, he fully recognised the necessity, in view of the experience of modern war, of not hastily making any reduction in this arm.

If it be admitted that with six months' training, Militia F.A., under their present organisation, can be brought up to the standard of Regulars, it is, perhaps, permissible to suggest that at least our surplus R.F.A. batteries might be gradually superseded by Militia. If this were done in the 12 brigades of surplus R.F.A., whose places would be taken by Militia, we should effect a saving of $12 \times £21,000 = £252,000$ per annum.

Ammunition Columns.

I see no reason why a portion of a Militia unit which supplied a F.A. brigade or heavy batteries should not be organised as an ammunition column, and thus relieve, to some extent, the Regular artillery from a somewhat onerous duty in the field. Some years ago I submitted a detailed proposal embodying this idea, but it was considered to be too revolutionary to be even thought of, and it did not get further than G.O.C. District.

SUMMARY.

Summing up briefly the suggestions submitted for consideration, they are:—

1. To treat the Militia seriously as the main reserve or second line to the Regular Army, available, under suitable conditions, for service outside the United Kingdom.

2. To increase its efficiency, and at the same time its recruiting area, by giving a prolonged training to recruits and a shorter annual training suited to the conditions of civil employment.
3. To reorganise the artillery, so as to render its training more efficient by adopting the above proposals, and by more closely affiliating it with the Regular artillery.
4. To increase the Field Artillery Militia, and to form Militia companies of siege and heavy artillery and Militia ammunition columns. By such increase to render possible some reductions in the Regular artillery.
5. By a more efficient organisation and training of the Artillery Militia as a whole to render available the same number of guns both for coast defence and in the field as at present, but at a reduced cost.

I believe that a scheme such as outlined above, or some other on similar lines, that may be worked out by those who have more experience and wider knowledge than myself, would do much to make the Militia what it ought to be—the backbone of our reserves, and that its recognition as a vital part of our military system would go far towards increasing its popularity with officers and men.

APPENDIX.

NOTES ON THE MILITIA.

The information contained in these notes is all derived from the published material contained in the annual reports of the Inspector-General of Recruiting, and in the General Annual Report on the British Army, etc. All that has been done is to collect and place together statistics from these two sources extending over a period of ten years—a period sufficiently long to enable a fair average to be deduced. The decade 1890—1899¹ has been taken as being a period during which the condition of the Militia was normal; the years subsequent to that period were disturbed by the abnormal conditions of the war.

A.—COMPOSITION OF THE MILITIA.

Table I.—Ages of Militia (Including Permanent Staff).

	Under 17.	17 to 18.	18 to 19.	19 to 20.	20 to 25.	25 to 30.	30 to 35.	Over 35.	Total.
Highest ...	994	8,496	16,060	14,281	28,516	19,957	16,160	15,458	—
Lowest ...	769	6,076	12,275	11,731	24,726	17,917	14,904	13,112	—
Average ...	859	7,096	13,802	12,941	26,935	19,023	15,409	14,407	110,472
Per cent. ...	1	6·5	12·5	12	24	17	14	13	100

¹In certain instances it has not been possible to get statistics for 1899; in those instances the period 1889 to 1898 has then been taken, as the tables show.

Table II.—Ages of Recruits (1889 to 1898).

—	Under 17.	17 to 18.	18 to 19.	19 to 20.	20 to 25.	Over 25.	Total.
Highest	622	13,354	14,491	6,146	11,851	2,898	—
Lowest	431	7,628	10,879	3,817	5,226	1,242	—
Average	500	11,141	12,114	4,839	7,959	1,931	38,534
Per cent.	1	29	31	13	21	5	100

The following are the deductions from the above tables:—

Percentage of recruits to total strength - 35 per cent.¹

“ “ men over 35 to total strength 13 “ “

Exclusive of recruits there are between 20 and 35 years of age 51,000 men = 46 per cent.

Exclusive of recruits there are over 20 years of age 66,000 men = 59 per cent.

Exclusive of recruits there are under 35 years of age 57,000 men = 52 per cent.

About 32 per cent. of the Militia are under 20 years of age.

“ 20 “ “ “ “ “ 19 “

Table III.—Statistics of Older Classes of Militiamen.

—	Re-engaged.	Re-enlisted.	Discharged soldiers.	Total.
Highest	35,225	7,488	7,997	—
Lowest	31,422	5,933	6,008	—
Average	33,534	6,579	7,311	47,424
Per cent. on enrolled strength	31	6	7	44

Tables I. and II. have shown that 65 to 70 per cent. of the Militia remains after deducting recruits; this table shows that out of this 65 to 70 per cent., two-thirds, or 44 per cent., of the force, consisted of men who have either served one or more terms of 6 years in the Militia or have been trained in the Regular Army.

Unfortunately, statistics of the services of the Militia cannot be given for want of published *data*; the first table giving such informa-

¹ This deduction is only correct to a limited extent; the total number of recruits in Table II. is the total number enlisted during the course of the twelve months, not the number of recruits who may happen to be serving at any given time of the year; while the total strength of the Militia in Table I. is the strength at a given time of the year. Some deduction has, therefore, to be made, and it is possible that at any given time the Militia may contain only about 25 to 30 per cent. of recruits.

tion will be found at p. 130 of the General Annual Report for 1905. That table shows that of a total strength of 86,491 men, 22,220, or 25·7 per cent., were under 1 year's service, and 13,552, or 15½ per cent., were of from 1 to 2 years' service, etc.

B.—THE MILITIA AS A FEEDER TO THE ARMY.

Table IV.

—	Militia.					Regular Army.	
	Total Effective. (1)	Effectives Infantry. (2)	Total Recruits. (3)	Infantry Recruits. (4)	Joined Regulars. (5)	Total Recruits. (6)	Infantry Recruits. (7)
Highest ...	113,330	96,707	43,774	43,939	15,659	42,700	25,699
Lowest ...	101,032	86,346	33,205	29,109	11,774	28,532	17,246
Average ...	106,295	90,015	39,283	34,983	13,618	35,452	21,723
Per cent. ...	100	81·7	37·4	32·9	12·8	—	—

Table V.—Militiamen Joining Regular Army.

—	Total Joined Regulars. (1)	Of those in Column 1.			Of those in Column 1.	
		Did not serve Training. (2)	Served Training. (3)	Served 2 or more Trainings. (4)	Under 20 years of age. (5)	Over 20 years of age. (6)
Highest ...	15,659	9,681	4,000	2,022	11,617	4,086
Lowest ...	11,774	7,145	3,133	1,494	9,155	2,582
Average ...	13,618	8,222	3,558	1,838	10,381	3,237
Per cent. ...	100	60·5	26	13·5	76	24

Deductions from the foregoing tables:—

89 per cent. of the Militia recruits are for the Infantry Militia.

Assuming this proportion to hold good in the case of the Militia recruits who join the Regulars, and assuming also that the Militia Infantryman generally joins the Infantry of the Line, it seems probable that about 12,000 Militiamen join the infantry of the Regular Army annually.

38 per cent. of the Regular recruits come from the Militia.

55 per cent. of the Regular Infantry recruits come from the Militia.

Assuming those in columns (2) and (3) to be recruits, then 30 per cent. of the Militia recruits, in any one year, join the Regular Army.

Observe that 60 per cent. of the Militiamen who join the Regular Army do so without having attended a Militia training.

C.—WASTAGE OF THE MILITIA.

Table VI.—Causes of Wastage.

—	Died.	Com- pleted En- gage- ment.	Inva- lided.	Re- cruits Re- jected.	Discharged.		Deser- tion & Ab- sence.	Joined.		Total.
					By Pur- chase.	Other Causes.		Army.	Navy.	
Highest ...	503	4,870	4,193	877	11,793	1,492	14,048	15,659	869	—
Lowest ...	335	3,109	2,803	444	7,952	905	7,581	11,774	395	—
Average ...	416	4,004	3,294	613	9,552	1,060	9,899	13,618	598	43,054
Per cent.	1	9	8	1.5	22	2	23	32	1.5	100
		Re-en- listed.					Re- joined from Deser- tion.			
Average ...	—	2,230	—	—	—	—	1,054	—	—	—
Average Net Wast- age ...	—	1,774	—	—	—	—	8,845	—	—	—

The net annual wastage of the Militia is about 40,000 men, or, roughly, 37 per cent. of its total strength. The principal causes of this wastage are, in round numbers:—

—	—	Percentage of	
		Wastage.	Total force of 110,000.
Transfers to Army and Navy ...	14,000	35	13
Discharges by purchase ...	9,500	24	9
Desertion and absence ...	9,000	23	8
Invaliding ...	3,000	7	3
Completion of engagement ...	2,000	5	2
Minor causes ...	2,500	6	2
	40,000	100	37

The small number of men who leave the Militia on completion of engagement is remarkable. The remaining figures speak for themselves. It is particularly worth noting, however, that the discharges by purchase have during the past few years fallen very largely; thus for the twelve months ending 30th September, 1904 and 1905, these discharges only amounted to 5,578 and 4,442 respectively, out of total strength of 86,488 and 85,814, giving a percentage of discharges to total strength of 6.4 and 5.2 respectively, as against a percentage of 8.63 for the decade 1890-99.

The following tables deal with the other most fertile cause of wastage:—

Table VII.—Desertions (all Militiamen).

—	Total Effectives.	Deserters.	Rejoined.	Net Loss.	Per-centage.	Year.
Highest ...	102,032	12,330	1,257	11,073	12·0	1892
Lowest ...	108,392	7,613	949	6,664	6·2	1895
Average ...	106,295	9,899	1,051	8,845	8·8	—

Table VIII.—Desertions (Recruits).

—	Total Recruits.	Casualties before Training.	Remaining after Casualties.	Absent without Leave.	Percentage of Absentees.	Year.
Highest	46,733	19,004	27,729	6,408	23·1	1893
Lowest	36,825	13,305	23,521	2,850	8·2	1899
Average	36,857	16,278	20,578	3,395	16·6	—

Table IX.—Services of Deserters (1889-1898).

—	Under 1 year.	1 to 2 years.	2 to 3 years.	3 to 4 years.	4 to 5 years.	5 and upwards.	Total.
Highest ...	7,607	2,924	1,251	831	662	1,295	14,025
Lowest ...	2,782	1,789	870	611	376	725	7,578
Average ...	4,261	2,174	1,077	709	515	1,004	9,746
Per cent. ...	43·8	22·3	11	7·3	5·3	10·3	100

It is remarkable that the rate at which recruits desert is nearly double that of the rate of desertion throughout the Militia; and the large proportion of desertions in the first year of service is very noticeable.

The following table is also highly instructive:—

Table X.—Wastage of Recruits.

—	Average.	Highest.	Lowest.
1. Total recruits approved ...	36,857	46,733	31,323
2. Casualties of recruits between approval and training ...	16,278	19,522	13,305
3. Recruits absent without leave from training ...	3,395	6,408	2,188
4. Recruits who joined Army not having served one training ...	8,221	9,681	7,145

Deducting items 4 from 2 and adding item 3 we find that, out of a total of 36,857 recruits approved, there were 11,451 men who disappeared between approval and the first annual training; in other words, after eliminating those recruits who join the Regular Army, 40 per cent. (*i.e.*, 11,451 out of 28,635) disappear between their approval and the annual training.

General Sir RICHARD HARRISON, G.C.B., C.M.G., Colonel Commandant Royal Engineers:—I had not intended to take part in the discussion this afternoon, but I am very glad to have the opportunity of saying a word or two previous to the officers who have been brought up in the artillery—and of whom probably there are a good many here—saying anything with regard to the details of the lecture. Before that more detailed examination of the lecture begins, I should like to say that I have been present during four lectures on the Militia that have been given in this theatre—two on the infantry of the Militia, one on the engineers of the Militia, and one this afternoon on the artillery of the Militia. I think we should congratulate the Council of this Institution on having brought to the front this most important question of the organisation of the Militia. The fact that they have done so must have great weight with all those whose business it is to reorganise our Army, because, as you know, the Council of this Institution is very carefully selected, and is composed of officers whose opinions are worth having. In regard to the details of the lecture, I propose to say nothing, except to remark that I think Colonel Legard has given us an exceedingly interesting and well-thought-out lecture. I had the pleasure of knowing him years ago when he used to come down to the Western District and encamp on Staddon Heights. I know how, even then, he used to consider Army problems, and I am quite sure that all present will appreciate how exceedingly carefully he has thought out the subject he has brought before us to-day. With regard to the Militia generally, I should like to make two remarks. It is sometimes forgotten, or overlooked, that a Militia system gets us out of one very great difficulty, and that is the marriage difficulty. Those who have had intimate connection with our Army know that the marriage difficulty is a very great one. In the Militia there is no difficulty at all in that connection. Any Militiaman can be married; we never ask any questions about whether he is married or not. In the Army, as you know, the marriage question is a great difficulty in many ways, which I need not go into now. I have often thought what an extraordinary thing our marriage system is in the Army. You will remember that when Sir John Moore was retiring at Corunna he left a rearguard of ladies to keep the French army in check at one of the towns in Spain. There is another peculiarity attending a Militia system which we must bear in mind, and which the lecturer has not forgotten, namely, that a Militia system, as I understand it, is arranged so that the labour market of the country does not suffer. Whatever we do in the direction of the creation of a Regular Army, we more or less disturb the labour market; I do not think you can possibly help it. We must do it as little as possible in the Regular Army; but by a Militia system you disturb the labour market still less. The lecturer has told you how he proposes to do it. Of course, there are different ways of doing it. The two points I have mentioned should always, I think, be borne in mind by those who are arguing for a Militia system as against a Regular system, namely, the marriage difficulty and the difficulty of the labour market of the country in which your Army is being organised. With these few remarks I shall

sit down and say no more, but I hope that some of the officers present will give us their experience in connection with the working of the Artillery Militia, consequent on what the lecturer has said.

Colonel H. H. A. STEWART, late Donegal Artillery (Militia):—Unfortunately I did not get a copy of the lecture, and having been for a few years out of the Militia, I feel that I am rather on the shelf. The last speaker has touched on two very important questions: showing the great advantage the Militia possesses over the Regular Army as regards its having no marriage system, and also owing to the fact that the men in the different districts in the country are called up for their annual training at a period of the year when the labour market is least disturbed thereby—at all events, that has been my experience of thirteen years in the Militia, and over twenty years in the Regular Army. I came here to-day to listen and not to speak, but I had hoped that the lecturer might have made some suggestion for the employment of Militia officers as adjutants of their corps. I have seen several adjutants of the Regular Army appointed to the Militia, and I am perfectly confident that Militia officers of superior qualifications could be readily found to perform the duties of adjutants. Then, with regard to another matter: In these days there is greater difficulty than ever in getting officers to serve in their county Militia regiments, and one great reason is that the landed interest has been so very hard hit of recent years that parents or guardians cannot afford to put the young men into the Militia, and thus let them lose their time with no object. I have for twenty years past suggested that a *proportion* of the adjutancies of Militia regiments should be offered to Militia officers. That would tend to keen competition between the two branches of the Service, the Regulars and the Militia, and you can entail upon Militia officers the passing of any examination you like. I also say that the Staff Colleges should be open to Militia officers, and I am very certain that an excellent body of staff officers could be furnished from the force.¹ Colonel Legard is a Staff College man, and I should like to have his opinion on that point. I served in four regiments of the Regular Army, and in those four regiments there was not a single University graduate throughout my service. I then joined a Militia regiment in the North of Ireland, and there were three University graduates among its officers. I should like to have said more on the subject, but as I had no copy of the lecture I am not prepared with further remarks.

Captain Sir JOHN COLOMB, K.C.M.G., late R.M.A.:—I came here to-day not to speak but to listen. I am very sorry indeed that there is a tendency not to discuss the subject of this paper, which I regret because however able a paper may be, it is in the conflict of opinion and in the discussion which takes place we arrive at the germs of truth. I am afraid that I am a fossil, and have no business to speak on the technicalities of this subject, and if it had not been for the silence which has occurred I

¹ During many years I have advocated, as a right, the representation of the Auxiliary Forces by the employment of *their own officers* on the Headquarters *Executive Staff* at the War Office. These forces have an establishment of nearly half a million men, yet (can it be believed?) until the year 1904 they had no such representation. Now they have three "Assistant Directors"—hardly a moiety, I submit, of their proper quota.—H.H.A.S.

should not have risen with the object of speaking, because most of the audience in this room were not born when I was first of all in the Marine Artillery, and for a short time an adjutant of Militia artillery in the West of Ireland, when the Militia was re-created after its total annihilation or suspension during the Fenian disturbances. But I have studied the bigger problems of Imperial Defence, and I have a very warm place in my heart for the Militia, especially for the Artillery Militia. I think we must remember that whatever Service we are speaking of, we must first of all fix our attention upon the work to be done and upon the exact function that the force has to undertake. It appears to me that, as far as Garrison Artillery is concerned, which is the subject of the paper, we have to remember that the function this force has to discharge is the limited function of the manning, controlling, and management of the sea defences of certain military ports; but we have to remember, in conjunction with that fact, that the condition of modern naval science is making the defence of such places more and more aquatic. In any case, if you are to have economy you must have the Militia Artillery as far as possible trained at the place where they will be wanted in war. When you come to consider the question of the distribution of the Militia Garrison Artillery at the present time, you will find that they are scattered about this kingdom in places where they are not wanted at all; because a hundred years ago there were some forts on the Shannon, you now have Garrison Artillery Militia in the West of Ireland, where they cannot ever be possibly wanted to do any local work; but round Dover and Portsmouth, for example, where you must provide for some defence by means of artillery, what have you got? In the surrounding district you have mostly infantry. Therefore it appears to me that the primary question we have to consider in connection with the Militia Artillery is, where will these men be wanted? and the men should be drawn from the districts round those places. When I brought forward this question before the Institution more than forty years ago, it was part of a general survey of the naval and military requirements of our Empire. I then had a conversation on the subject with a friend of mine, who happened at that time to hold a political position at the War Office, and I pointed this out to him. I said: "You have Artillery Militia where there are no forts, and you have in the places where artillery will be wanted, Infantry Militia." His answer struck me very much, and rather chilled my enthusiasm. He said: "My dear friend, you do not know what a row there would be in Parliament if you asked gentlemen who had always been dressed in blue to wear red, and *vice versa*." That discloses one of the difficulties which has to be faced and got over by military reformers. The only other thing I would like to say is this: That I have always advocated, and strongly advocated, a closer association between the Militia and the Regular Army and an extension of the area of Militia service from the Kingdom to the Empire. I regard the Militia as suffering from having been stamped out by the popularity of the Volunteers. If you look at the question properly you will see that by the spontaneous creation of the Volunteers a vast force was incontinently thrust into our military arrangements, and the Militia was jostled out of sight; but in my opinion, as the Volunteer force exists, the Militia, and the Garrison Artillery portion especially, ought to be now made available for service anywhere within the Empire. My last point is this: Of course I am not competent to discuss the details of this paper, but Colonel Legard has mentioned that Militia Artillery can be created in a very short time if you treat them properly. That is quite true,

but I extremely regret that he should have advocated that Militia Field Artillery should rather supplant the Regular artillery than supplement it, because when he summed up the conclusions of his paper he showed how cheap such a policy would be. I strongly protest against any idea of that sort. I am entirely with him in what I believe to be the fact, that you can and ought, if you set yourself to work properly, make the Militia, especially the Garrison Artillery Militia, a thoroughly effective force in reserve for service anywhere within the Empire; but I will steadily oppose, and on all occasions have opposed, anything that tends to the cutting down of the field artillery or cavalry of our Regular Forces. The Militia would be cheaper, but it is nonsense to say it could be ready for instant service. I look upon our military obligations abroad as being so great that we have no business to cut down artillery or cavalry available for immediate service beyond sea; but, on the other hand, I agree that we can make the Artillery Militia efficient by a common-sense system, so that it will be an efficient force in reserve to supplement, and not supplant, the Regular Artillery.

Colonel C. E. YATE, C.S.I., C.M.G., Indian Army :—May I say one word to supplement the speech of Sir John Colomb? I am not an artilleryman and I am not a Militiaman, and therefore I have no right whatsoever to speak on the technical part of the question; but I notice that the lecturer has proposed to reduce the thirty-six so-called surplus batteries of Regular Field Artillery and to supersede them by Militia. In a small Army like ours—an Army that must necessarily be very highly organised—surely we ought to be specially strong in our artillery. Ought we not to have a larger number of guns per thousand men than any other nation in the world? I am perfectly in accord with what Sir John Colomb has just said: that the Militia should not *supersede* the Regulars. Let us increase our Militia Artillery as much as we can, and I hope we shall do so; but let us stick to every gun we have got in the Regular Army.

Major E. C. HAWKSHAW, late R.A. :—I should like to say a very few words on this subject. In 1878 I was with a field battery at Woolwich, and we were supplemented to war strength by the Garrison Artillery Militia that came down from Hartlepool, so that for several weeks—in fact, I think through the whole of that summer—I was soldiering with these men. We found that when they had been with us for a short time they were capital fellows. None of them had had much to do with a field battery before, but they did their work to the best of their ability, and we parted from them and they from us with the greatest regret. It seems to me, if I may say so, that the main difficulty of the whole thing is the question of officers. May I make a suggestion for what it is worth? The scientific training that we must have in garrison artillery demands constant attention to gun laying, signalling, and science of many kinds day after day, and unless you have officers who are up to the work you will not get the non-commissioned officers and men to carry out their part in the necessary way. Therefore, the whole thing revolves upon the difficulty of getting officers. Do not you think, Sir, it would be possible to make more of an interchanging between the officers of the Garrison Artillery Militia and the officers of the Regular Garrison Artillery? There are always cases in which officers ordered abroad desire for special reasons to stay at home. In those cases the Militia officers would be very glad to be posted to the service units temporarily, if

they could get the chance, both for the sake of the trip and what would be learnt professionally; there need not be any fixing of time one way or the other. Benefits would accrue all round for obvious reasons. There is one other point I should like to refer to, namely, that a very great deal of stress is now being laid, in the papers and elsewhere, upon the question of whether a corps of the Auxiliary Forces in a case of emergency is liable to serve abroad, or whether it is not. Why, bless my heart, in cases of emergency, would not any one of us go abroad to any part of the Empire if we were wanted? If we would not, surely we are not fit to call ourselves Englishmen, much less hold a commission. It is our duty to the State. I was in Japan at one time, and saw a lot of the people there, and noticed constantly that they were always full of the national spirit which carried them through this late war. If anybody had dared to hint that he was not liable for service where he was wanted he would be told to commit the happy despatch as soon as he liked; in fact, he would be made to do so whether he liked it or not. And yet we allow men who wear His Majesty's uniform to quibble as to whether, in cases of national emergency, they are liable for foreign service! We have to ask them, in fact, whether they will be kind enough to defend their country! Surely such an idea as this should be firmly suppressed. I am distinctly averse to allowing anyone to join with such ideas.

Colonel W. TYLDEN, R.F.A.:—With your permission, Sir, I should like to ask one or two questions. I am a field artilleryman, and there are one or two things I should like to know in connection with Colonel Legard's scheme for employing the garrison artillery in the field in conjunction with field batteries. I had some conversation with a colonel of the Militia Garrison Artillery on the subject of training some of the unallotted Artillery Militia units as ammunition columns, and I should like to have Colonel Legard's opinion as to whether he thinks he could get the Militia to take up that job. I want to ask him, too, if he will kindly tell me, when he says that a service brigade costs £39,000 a year, whether he means a brigade placed on a war establishment or a brigade on the present lower establishment basis, because if he means the lower establishment basis, before he can attach any Militia Field Artillery for training he would want a tremendous increase in the establishment and the horses, if the Militia is to be trained in any way at all. With the lower establishment, the Regular batteries have very hard work to keep up as it is now. Of course, he says in the paper that they must be kept at a high establishment and be fully horsed and at war strength; but what I want to find out is whether that £39,000 refers to a service brigade on those terms.

Colonel A. P. PENTON, R.A., Commandant, Ordnance College:—We have heard a great deal to-day about the field artillery side of the question, and I should like to say just a word about the garrison artillery proposals, with which branch of the Service Colonel Legard has lately been connected. He proposes in his paper that companies of the Militia Artillery should be attached to companies of the Royal Garrison Artillery, and should work with them and train with them as far as possible for their annual training. I am sure, speaking as a Royal Artilleryman, the Royal Garrison Artillery would be very happy to welcome the scheme, and learn to work in peace time with the men with whom they would have to work alongside of in time of war; but I think there are very great difficulties in the way of carrying out this proposed training. For instance,

if you take the district that Colonel Legard belonged to—the North-Eastern District—there are three Artillery Militia regiments in that district. As six companies are proposed for each Militia regiment, this would mean that eighteen companies from this district would have to be trained annually with the Regular companies of the Garrison Artillery. But there are no Regular Garrison Artillery beyond a *dépôt* in the North-Eastern District. There is a small force of Garrison Artillery in Scotland. All the training of the Militia Artillery as now proposed would have to be carried out away from the district. This means that you would have the expense of training your Militia Artillery every year in outside districts, and the expense would be very considerable. I know what the difficulties are in training the Auxiliary Artillery in Colonel Legard's district. In this district there were three Militia Artillery regiments and some seven Garrison Artillery Volunteer Regiments, with only one practice battery in the district. The training season is not very long, and the crush we had at that practice battery was very great, because a large proportion of the Volunteer regiments, and perhaps two Militia regiments had to train at this one battery during the whole of the practice season. I know that Colonel Legard's regiment once or twice suffered because they could not get the use of the practice battery when they wanted it; but of course this would be obviated as far as the Militia is concerned by the training of the Militia companies out of their own districts, and by their training in works of defence. There is another thing which militates very much against Militia efficiency, I think, and that is the way we take our recruits from the Militia regiments. I do not know whether Colonel Legard approves of the idea, that after training the recruits for twelve months, as he proposes, that we should try as we do now to get the recruit, after his twelve months' training to enlist into the Regular Army. I think by doing so we would waste a lot of time; I do not think it would be very beneficial to the Militia to train a man for a year to fit him for the Militia, and then to enlist him into the Regular Army. I hoped that we should have heard some Militia officers speak this afternoon and point out some way of working out the salvation of their branch of the Service. Speaking as a garrison gunner, I think we all owe Colonel Legard a very great debt of gratitude for the way in which he has put the case of the Militia Artillery before us this afternoon.

Lieut.-Colonel H. M. SLATER, R.A.:—With regard to the remarks made by Colonel Penton on the subject of the Militia recruits, I think I may say a great many recruits join the Militia for the benefit of the training and the food they get, and so that they can grow up to the required standard. I have had many recruits brought before me who have not been quite up to the standard, and they have wanted to be made fit for enlistment in the Regulars. As a rule, I defer approving them until they have fully reached the standard for the Regulars; but I think many of these men would not join the Militia at all except with the hope of eventually getting into the Regular Artillery. As regards the twelve months' training which Colonel Legard suggests for recruits on enlistment, if that is carried out in barracks it will mean that a very considerable augmentation of existing barrack accommodation will have to be made, and that of course will entail a very heavy expenditure. Augmentation of barrack accommodation is, I believe, anathema with the present Government.

Colonel LEGARD, in reply, said :—I must first of all thank those who have been kind enough to take part in the discussion for the favourable way, on the whole, in which they have received my remarks. Really, hardly any serious criticism has been made on the paper; and any slight criticism that has been made is due, perhaps, I think, to some slight misunderstanding of what I intended to say. Sir Richard Harrison alluded to the Militia having solved the marriage difficulty. I would remind him that it was not by any means solved when the Militia was embodied; it was surprising to find the large number of men who had wives, and of course those wives had to be supported. Not only were they at the time supported out of public funds, but they were also supported by private subscriptions, and many of them were very much better off than they had been at any other time during their lives.

General Sir RICHARD HARRISON:—That only occurs when there is a war.

Colonel LEGARD :—Then Colonel Stewart suggested the employment of Militia officers as adjutants. I am afraid I cannot quite go with him in that. I think it is possible that, in certain cases, we might find Militia officers who could be brought up to the level of efficiency of the Regulars, but I think they would be exceptional cases. I would personally rather that greater care should be taken in selecting officers as adjutants for the Militia, and that they should never be appointed for more than three years, so that a man would come in fresh from the Army and thoroughly up-to-date. I think the Militia officers themselves would, on the whole, probably appreciate that arrangement better than having one of their own officers as adjutant, although I do not say that you can never find a Militia officer who is not qualified to do the work of an adjutant. With regard to the question of the admission of Militia officers to the Staff College, it probably would be some benefit to officers of the infantry, but I doubt very much whether Militia officers in the artillery would gain very much by the instruction. I cannot say myself, from my own experience of the Staff College, that I gained very much information that has been useful to me as a gunner; but, still, I think it might be desirable for the infantry. Sir John Colomb alluded to the present policy of the distribution of the Artillery Militia, and suggested that they should be distributed nearer the points where they would be wanted on mobilisation. That no doubt would be a very good thing if it could be carried out, but I am afraid we should at once be met by the recruiting difficulty. For instance, if you take the Devon Artillery, which is recruited close to Plymouth, the whole of that district is so tremendously over-recruited both by the Navy, by the infantry, and by other forces, that the Devon Artillery has always had very great difficulty in getting men. Up in the North, where I happen to live, we have no difficulty at all in getting men; and although there are no fortresses in our immediate neighbourhood where we are wanted, still we are by that means, being located in that particular area, able to get the men.

Sir JOHN COLOMB :—But there are Militia Infantry in Devonshire; it means transferring from one branch to the other.

Colonel LEGARD :—If the Infantry Militia were transferred to the North, and the Artillery Militia were transferred to the South, my objection would not have very much force; but, as a matter of fact, that

is the difficulty in a great many of these places like Portsmouth and Plymouth, that the country is so denuded of recruits that you cannot get as many as you want. I did not at all mean to suggest that the Garrison Artillery should be supplanted by the Militia Artillery; what I rather had in my mind was that they should be supplemented. What I suggest in my paper—it is shown in detail in a note—what I suggest is that the Garrison Artillery should have a much larger establishment of specialists, men who have a very high training, and that you might reduce somewhat the establishment of ordinary gunners. You could soon train the Militiamen up to the standard of the ordinary gunner. I do not at all mean that you should reduce the number of companies of Garrison Artillery, but I think you might supplement them by filling the places of the gunners by Militiamen, especially if you had a strong body of highly-trained specialists. Colonel Yate questioned the advisability of my suggestion for reducing our present establishment of Field Artillery. I must confess that I put that forward with very great hesitation. As an old gunner myself, I should deplore any great reduction of the Regular Artillery. I quite recognise the enormous importance to us, having a very small Army, of having that Army supported by a very powerful artillery, even in excess of the proportion that is usually considered necessary in Continental Armies. I perhaps spoke rather too strongly on the point. What I feel is, that it is conceivable in the future that some economising War Minister may insist upon some reduction in the artillery, and then, when that time comes, I think it would be far better if we were able to supply some really effective force of Militia Artillery in its place. All Royal Artillerymen and all soldiers would rather have the real artilleryman than the more or less make-believe—the Regular soldier rather than the Militiaman; but, failing the Regular soldier, I would rather have a Militiaman than nothing at all. I think the suggestion made by Major Hawkshaw of the interchange of officers between the Royal Artillery and the Militia Artillery is exceedingly valuable. I have on several occasions had the advantage of having Regular officers attached to me during training, and we have always found that they have been a great deal of help to us, and we have always worked extremely well together. I think it is quite possible also that many Militia officers, if they had the chance, would be glad to take part in foreign service in place of some Regular officers who desire to serve at home. Colonel Tylden asked me whether I thought the Militia would take up the duties of the ammunition column, and I believe another speaker also asked the same question. That, of course, is a very difficult question to answer, unless you actually try the experiment. I think myself it is very probable that the Militiamen would take up the duties if the work was made sufficiently interesting, and if it was recognised as part of their duties that they would be actually called upon for service outside the United Kingdom in case of war. If you give an officer or a man an opportunity of going on service he would practically take up almost any duty. What I had in my mind when I first made the suggestion was that the ammunition column and the brigade of Militia Artillery or Heavy Artillery should be raised from one unit, so that one part of the unit would be the ammunition column and the other would be a brigade of Field or Heavy Artillery. Then a question was asked as to the cost of the brigade of Field Artillery being £39,000. The figures were supplied to me, and my impression is that they apply to the present peace establishment.

Colonel TYLDEN :—I think that will raise your figures a good deal.

Colonel LEGARD :—On the other hand, I would point out that my Militia figures also apply to the present existing establishment, so that it is comparing one thing with the other. If the peace establishment of the Regular Artillery costs £39,000, the cost of the war establishment of course would be higher. The peace establishment of the Militia Artillery is only £18,000; of course its war establishment would be higher. I am comparing the peace establishment in one case with the peace establishment in the other.

Colonel TYLDEN :—It means that you will not be able to train them with the peace establishment; you must have the war establishment in the Regular Army before you can train the Militia.

Colonel LEGARD :—Quite so. I propose that the existing Field Artillery should be increased as regards horses up to war establishment. Colonel Penton alluded to the difficulty of training the Militia Garrison Artillery with the Regulars in districts where there were no Garrison Artillery companies. I did not contemplate that that training should take place always at the country station of the Garrison Artillery company. My idea was that the specialists might perhaps always be trained with the Regular companies, and the Militia companies would be sent to train with their affiliated Royal Artillery companies every third year as they do at present, and in the other two years they should train at their headquarters, as they do now, but that the training should be distributed over a longer period. I have not made any suggestion as to the recruits joining the Regular Army after they have completed their twelve months' service. Personally I have always done my best to encourage Militiamen to go into the Army, and I do not see any reason why a man when he has done his twelve months in the Militia should not go into the Army if he likes to do so; but I would like to get him for twelve months in the Militia and let him serve one training before he joins the Regular Army. I quite corroborate what Colonel Slater has said; he was my last commanding officer, and is very well up in the Militia. It is perfectly true that a great many recruits do join the Militia on purpose to go into the Army; they go into the Militia to grow. They do not look on the Militia as a permanent service. I think about 25 per cent. of my own recruits—I might almost say 50 per cent.—I never used to see; Colonel Penton and Colonel Slater used to snap them all up and get them into the Royal Artillery before I had a chance to see them. But I do not grudge them the men; I think it is the duty of the Militia to do their best to support the Regular Army, which is the real thing. The Regular Army is far more important than the Militia. I thank you very much for the very kind way in which you have listened to my remarks.

The CHAIRMAN (Major-General Sir J. Wolfe Murray) :—It is laid down as one of the duties of the Chairman that he will give his own views on the discussion and on the subject, unless special reasons prevent his remaining to the end. I have been able to remain to the end; but there are special reasons for which I must ask to be excused from giving my views on the subject, though I will try and say something about the discussion. This subject of the Militia is perhaps one of the most important connected with Army Reform that you can touch upon at the present time; and I may say, without, I think, any breach of confidence what-

ever, that it is engaging a very great deal of attention at the War Office at the present moment. It is therefore quite impossible for me to touch at all upon the subject in its essence without going into questions which might lead to inconvenient disclosure. I may say, in that connection, that the Council of this Institution sent a special invitation to the Secretary of State for War to be present at this lecture and the subsequent discussion. Mr. Haldane answered that he was extremely obliged for the very kind invitation, but that he much regretted the pressure of his Parliamentary duties prevented his accepting the invitation, adding that he would read the copy of the lecture sent to him with very great interest. I think I can assure you that not only will he pay great attention to the lecture, but that he devotes very much of his time to considering the present position in regard to the Militia. I think Sir Richard Harrison, when he opened his remarks by saying of what great value it was that this Institution should bring forward these particular topics, touched a very useful point. I am sure the lectures which are given here do us an immense deal of good, and the lecture we have listened to to-day is an instance in point. What has been urged to-day in regard to the many points that have been raised must give us all food for a great deal of thought. There are very many valuable suggestions in this lecture, and in the other lectures which have preceded it, which all of us must, I think, take to heart very much. Colonel Stewart, in advocating the employment of Militia officers occasionally as adjutants, as I understood him, rather contended for elasticity in certain points in regard to the Militia.

Colonel STEWART:—Elasticity and efficiency.

The CHAIRMAN:—Quite so. But I think what you wished to urge was to make the conditions of Militia service perhaps a little more elastic in the future than in the past. Sir John Colomb, I think, brought home to us all what the fundamental considerations of any reformer must be, and he also, I think, presented to us in a very clear light some of the difficulties that the reformer meets with at the outset of his career. He pictured to us very forcibly how the distribution, and to use, perhaps, a rather germane word, the dislocation, of our Army has grown up. That dislocation has grown up owing to a set of circumstances which no longer obtains, and the consequence is that, as changes have supervened, the distribution which fitted at one time is no longer applicable. Again, Sir John Colomb pointed out—and nobody knows it better than he—the difficulty which the Army reformer encounters in trying to cope with these things, because the moment you attempt to remedy any of these defects in the system you are met with a howl from vested interests, which perhaps makes itself more loudly felt in the House of Commons than anywhere else. I should like, if I may, to defend Colonel Legard from the attack which was made upon him of trying to fix the proposal for the reduction of the Regular Artillery upon him. As I read the lecture, I thought he clearly attributed that proposal to the source from which it originally emanated, and that he merely took it up and amplified it as presenting to his mind the most reasonable way out of the difficulty. The lecture, from its heading, might have been expected to deal with the artillery portion of the Militia mainly; but fortunately, as I think, Colonel Legard did not limit himself to the narrower field, for he gave us a much wider view of the Militia generally. That being so, I propose to place before you certain remarks and deductions which may possibly prove

of interest. In the first place, so far as I can judge from the figures which are available, the Artillery Militia appears to have pretty well retained its popularity, and though there has been some falling off in numbers, it is very much less than that which has occurred in the infantry portion of the force. Colonel Legard alluded in his lecture to certain notes with which I have furnished him. At the time I furnished him with those notes I had no thought that he was going to quote them in his lecture, and I had no intention really that he should have quoted me at all. But as he has done so, I may say that from the figures I have furnished to him and others I deduce that during the ten years prior to the South African war the average strength of the artillery was, roughly, 14,500, and the average number of recruits which they took annually was 3,800. The latest annual report of the Director of Recruiting and Organisation for the year ending 30th September, 1905, shows that the strength of the Artillery was 13,254, and the number of recruits was 3,823. Thus there has been a falling off in numbers of about 8½ per cent.; but there appears to be no diminution in the numbers who are ready to enlist. This is an interesting point connected with the artillery portion of the force. If we turn, however, to the infantry we find a different state of affairs. For the decade ending 1899, the effective strength of the infantry averaged 90,000 men; it has now fallen to 69,629, a decrease of 22½ per cent., aggregating more than 20,000 men. The average number of infantry recruits enlisted annually for the period mentioned was close upon 30,000; in the last Militia year it was only 24,562. Although General Miles's report brings out certain causes which have led to this diminished number of recruits, it would appear on the face of it that there is not quite the same readiness to enlist in the infantry as in the artillery; and that there is some difficulty in recruiting for the former arm. There is probably some explanation of this marked difference which is worth investigating. It is a point that occurs not only, I believe, in connection with the artillery of the Militia, but also in the case of the artillery of the Regular Forces. It seems that the artillery maintains its popularity at times when the infantry portion of the force cannot attract recruits. But I will pass on to some other and more general considerations to which a somewhat cursory survey of these Militia statistics have led me. At first sight it might appear that the falling off in the effective strength of the whole Militia force—it has gone down from an average of 106,000 for the decade ending 1899 to under 86,000 at the present time—is attributable to the falling off in infantry recruits above mentioned; but this, as I think I can show, is not necessarily a correct deduction. The decreased intake of recruits has almost exactly been balanced by diminished wastage in other directions. Two of the most fertile sources of loss to the Militia used to be desertion and discharge by purchase, these causes being accountable during the 1899 decade for an annual wastage of nearly 19,000 men. The losses from these causes have of late years been steadily diminishing, and in the year ending September, 1905, they amounted to only 8,338. Thus it is clear that, for the last year at any rate, the diminished intake of recruits of all arms, which was 9,000 less than the average of the decennial period, 1891 to 1899 (30,000 as against 39,000), was more than counterbalanced by the lessened loss from the two principal causes of wastage, which gave us a gain of some 11,000. The point I make, therefore, is that although you have less recruits you have not diminished your force, because you have diminished the wastage almost exactly to an equal amount. We must look elsewhere, therefore, for the true cause in the falling off of the strength of the Militia, and this, I

think, is to be found in the decreased number of re-engagements in the force. For, whereas in the 1899 decade there were on an average 40,000 re-engaged and re-enlisted men serving in the ranks of the Militia, there are now only to be found just under 19,000 men of those classes; in other words, the fall in the effective strength of the Militia of 20,000 men almost exactly coincides with the diminution of 21,000 men which has occurred in the numbers of these two valuable classes. The percentage of these two classes to the total effective strength used to be 37; it is now only 22—a difference of 15 per cent. If this assumption as to the cause of the falling off in the strength of the Militia is correct, it is perhaps not impossible to find a remedy for it. At all events, the figures which I have quoted afford a certain amount of food for study, and I commend them to your careful notice. I will only again say, as I said at the beginning, that I think the opportunity which has been afforded us here this afternoon of looking into questions of this kind can do nothing but the greatest good, not only to this Institution, but, I hope, to the public at large. I now ask you to join with me in according a hearty vote of thanks to Colonel Legard for the pains which he has taken to bring the subject under our consideration this afternoon.