could be made without thought, but that feeling supplies the content or data (moral emotions, etc.), which thought can never furnish.

In Ch. VIII. on The Principle of Reality in Thought and its Processes, one is surprised to find the easy manner in which Jones disposes of Lotze's basal position that 'Thought is *valid* of reality.' It is not 'worthy of serious discussion' (p. 333, note). The ignoring of this point materially strengthens the criticisms upon Lotze.

The value of the work, as a whole, lies chiefly in the many admirably clear expositions of Lotzean theory, its criticisms and the ambiguity of several of the terms used constituting its chief weakness.

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Time and the Succession of Events. J. L. MCINTYRE. Mind, July, 1895. Pp. 334.

Mr. McIntyre in general criticizes the Kantian doctrine and expounds Lotze.

The modern problem is—'Does time belong to the ultimate real?' If it is only an appearance for us, ultimate reality becomes incomprehensible, whether it be called the 'unknowable' of Spencer or the 'harmonious experience' of Bradley. If it belongs to the Real, we must show in what sense it can be predicated.

Our criterion must come from experience. Merely logical criteria, as Bradley's 'self contradiction' too plainly shows, are purely formal and tell us nothing. For him there can be no positive statement. Any such would involve unity and diversity. We are reduced to a barren identity.

Leibnitz denied the absolute reality of time, but admitted a real succession of events. Kant held that time was an *a priori* form. Lotze took up the argument where Kant left off and showed, that while empty time is a mental abstraction, the appearance of change involves change in the Real. A concrete succession of events must be admitted in the real. Every event is an act, every act is the act of a subject, not it, but expressed in it. The succession of events implies the immanent action of an absolute subject. As unity it is above time and incomprehensible. But the subject can only be a unity in expressing itself in the diverse succession of events. These are inseparable aspects of the real. Past and future are alike constructions: The permanent changing present alone is the real. An adequate conception of this 'present' is difficult to form.

S. F. McLENNAN.