SPECIAL REVIEWS

The Self and Nature. DEWITT H. PARKER. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1917. Pp. vi + 316.

The writer of this notice would like to deduce from the fact that DeWitt H. Parker's book on *The Self and Nature* was sent for review to the PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN the hopeful conclusion that publishers at any rate recognize that psychology has to do with selves. She must however admit that, in this case, the title has proved misleading. The truth is that self and nature, mind and body, may be either scientifically treated—accepted without challenge of their ultimate reality for analysis at the hands of the scientists—or may be treated from the metaphysician's standpoint. Professor Parker's book is the embodiment of a philosophical system; it sets forth an independent and vigorous idealism with Berkeley's and with Bergson's, though identical with neither. Mr. Parker "finds it reasonable to interpret the processes of the external world after the analogy of the inner world" (p. 143.) He says truly (p. VI.) that: "The source of all our knowledge of reality is given experience—without a careful analysis of this there can be no sound metaphysics." It follows, of course, that the philosophy of self or mind is rooted in psychology; and there is accordingly no cause for surprise in the fact that more than one chapter of the book is fruitful in suggestion to psychologists. This is notably true of Chapter II. in which Mr. Parker asserts as facts of experience both the identity and the changing nature of the self. "Permanence and change," he says, (p. 50¹) "adventurous seeking for the new and a tragic holding on to the old or effort to escape the old; self-making and self-mending—such is the life of the mind. Throughout there is the thread of identity; the old man remains in some respects the same as the child. Yet the amount of this identity varies on different occasions. It is great when a man puts all his emotional energy into some task which requires the use of his whole past experience, the total resources of his memory and learning; then, as we say, he is most himself; it is little when in a light moment of gaiety, he forgets himself, feeding on new impressions."

Professor Parker sharply and successfully contrasts the "idea" or "concept" or "thought" of identity with the immediate "feeling"

of it. "The abstract concept of identity," he says (p. 41³), "like all concepts, is the reflex or representative in the mind of something real in that which the mind knows and reflects upon. The application of a concept to anything is the assertion that there exists in the thing a reality corresponding to the concept, known by the concept. . . . Personal identity, is however (p. 51²), no more identical with self identification than blue is with the concept of blue. When we waken in the morning we feel ourselves to be the same without any over assimilation of the new experience to the idea of ourselves; the idea may not arise at all. There are times when the idea of self is in abeyance, as when we work quietly; yet there is a sense of familiarity which pervades all experience and is the abiding identity within it." A second point which is stressed is the fact that the feeling of personal identity persists during great disturbances of *cœnæsthesia* and of memory. "Personal identity," Parker says, "can be more or less. . . . From birth to death there is a continual acquisition of new experiences; a partial preservation of these through the residua of memory; a re-emergence of old activities; the loss again of these; the irreparable loss of some" (p. 50¹). We usually," he adds, "call a man another man when he fails to recognize himself—when he applies to his experience a different concept of self from the one which we have been accustomed to (p. 50²). . . . Yet identity may exist here as elsewhere. . . . Experience may in some measure be familiar still."

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Applied Psychology. H. L. HOLLINGWORTH & A. T. POFFENBERGER.
New York: Appleton, 1917. Pp. 337.

This book is the first attempt in English to cover in one volume the entire field of applied psychology. Such an attempt, especially in a volume of medium size, must needs be cursory, but the authors are content "if it assists in systematizing" the field,—which it certainly does. According to the preface the work is intended alike for teacher, student and the general reader. It might very well serve as a nucleus on which to build a course in applied psychology and it is sufficiently non-technical to be understood by the business or professional man who is interested in the subject.

The first chapter touches upon the modern behavioristic trend, pointing out that in practical situations it is behavior (in the broad sense) which is of importance. Exception is taken to Munsterberg's