to be. Even the simplest relations between the phenomena of the lowest order of consciousness and the concomitant cerebral activities are far too fluctuating, complicated and changeable to be subsumed under this principle. Of parallelism in space we cannot speak appropriately in this connection. Of parallelism in time there is only an incomplete and broken analogy. And when one tries to think out clearly the conception of a complete qualitative parallelism, one finds the principle soon ending in inadequacy, and finally becoming unintelligible or absurd * * *."

Nor if the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism, in the fullest meaning of the phrase, were proven, would monism necessarily follow. Rather the clearest inference would be to a moderate dualism, even though it is difficult to share the author's confidence that the 'double-aspect' theory is utterly meaningless.

The remaining discussions of the 'Origin and Permanence of Mind' and the 'Place of Man's Mind in Nature' point forward to the future development of Professor Ladd's views on ethics and the philosophy of religion. These will be the more eagerly awaited in view of the value of the present volume, which, in spite of defects, is one of the most notable contributions of recent years to the literature of the subject.

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Elements of Psychology (Syllabus of Philosophy I). J. H. HYSLOP, Columbia College, New York, 1895. Pp. 130.

This syllabus is best described in Dr. Hyslop's own words: "As a time-saving instrument in my lectures on the subject, and as a guide to my students in their reading and study." It has also a personal interest in showing those who have been instructed by the author's work in other departments—logic and ethics—his general conception of the psychological area and its problems. Aside from these two uses it is hard to see what purpose it can serve. The analysis, while systematic and thorough as analysis, (excepting the chapter on emotion) does not allow one to see far enough into Dr. Hyslop's mind to warrant confidence as to one's insight into what his psychological position really is. This, of course, is a defect, if defect it be, not in execution but in original design; for Professor Dewey has recently shown in his 'Study of Ethics' the possibility of a syllabus which shall contain both outline and suggestive doctrine. The analysis is indeed so thorough and comprehensive that here at least we believe that 'the part is not worth more than the whole,' and we hope that Dr. Hyslop may see fit some time to give his lec-

tures text-book form. The balance between the introspective and the 'extrospective' methods is, so far as can be judged, well preserved, and the author's breadth of view and psychological tolerance are well shown in his use of the observations of the 'psychic researchers.' How justifiable his particular use of these observations is, is another question (witness, for example, the remarks on the phenomena of retention), for the condensed analytic outline, because of its necessary meagerness, warns one off the field of interpretation and criticism. This is shown again in the remarks made on subliminal consciousness.

Particularly striking is Chapter X, on the 'Will or Conation.' Psychological students owe the author a debt of gratitude for this piece of analysis. It is a valuable supplement to the chapter on the 'Freedom of the Will' in the Ethics. These two chapters throw light on each other.

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Popular Scientific Lectures. E. MACH. Translated by Thomas J. McCormack. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1895. Pp. 313. Price, \$1.00.

Nearly all the lectures constituting this volume deal with the physiological or psychological side of physical questions; four treat of the methods and development of science, briefly outlining a theory of cognition.

Science, according to Prof. Mach, is essentially an *economy of thought*. Rooted in the most primitive psychical functions of life, this economy reaches its highest perfection in language and mathematics. Here, in the psychological origin and nature of our ideas, the elucidative power of the principle is obvious.

A natural law is a rule or body of directions for the mental reconstruction of facts; enabling us to anticipate and retrace in thought the steps of nature. To this end it embraces *only certain aspects* of the facts, such as are determinative. By means of these determinative elements and their formal constituents, we complete in thought *facts that are only partly given*; derive complete results from incomplete data. To reach the ungiven elements we should, on the primitive plan, have to resort to slow and tedious experience; that infinite pains we *save* ourselves by economical natural laws. This is all that science accomplishes. Its individual results we could reach in a sufficiently long time directly and without methods.

The mental reconstruction of facts we accomplish by *description*,¹

¹ The view that 'explanation' is merely the description of unknown phenomena in terms of known phenomena was stated by Mach before either Clifford or Kirchhoff.