criticism indeed indicates that he can. I await with some eagerness such information. Otherwise the meagerness of his personal opinion vouchsafed so briefly may not be sufficiently appreciated.

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THE METHOD OF EXPRESSION AND THE AFFECTIVE QUALITIES.

In a recent paper, entitled *Sensory Affection and Emotion*,¹ Mrs. Woolley writes as follows:—

“Now in the discussion of these results [the results of the method of expression] carried on between Titchener and his pupils, and the Leipzig school, there has been no question of the fundamental validity of the method. The mutual criticisms have been directed merely against methods of experimentation and of dealing with the curves obtained. But what can be the basis of the assumption that a constant set of physiological processes means an elementary conscious state?”² “For instance, suppose that Wundt establishes his thesis that strain is always accompanied by a given set of changes in pulse and breathing—does that prove that strain is an *elementary* conscious state?”³

Much may be pardoned to one who writes from memory and Phrapatoom. But I should be sorry to have it supposed, by those who have not followed the discussion in question, that I had ever admitted the possibility of determining the elementary affective qualities by appeal to the method of expression. In my first criticism of the Wundtian theory, I said: “Bei dem jetzigen Mangel an Experimenten im Gebiete der Gemüthsvorgänge muss ich mich auf dem Boden der inneren Wahrnehmung und des allgemeinen Raisonnements halten; anderes Terrain hat auch Wundt selber nicht betreten.”⁴ That is, I explicitly ruled out the method of expression as a relevant method. Wundt's reply is largely taken up with an exposition of the results obtained by this method.⁵ That it failed to shake my conviction is sufficiently shown by my adoption of the method of impression in the paper prepared for the Wundt *Festschrift*,⁶ and also by the

¹ THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, XIV., 1907, 329 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 339.

³ ‘Zur Kritik der Wundtschen Gefühlslehre,’ in *Zts. f. Psychol. u. Physiol. d. Sinnesorgane*, XIX., 1899, 321 ff.

⁴ ‘Bemerkungen z. Theorie d. Gefühle,’ in *Philos. Studien*, XV., 1900, 149 ff.

⁵ ‘Ein Versuch die Methode der paarweisen Vergleichung auf die verschiedenen Gefühlsrichtungen anzuwenden,’ in *Philos. Studien*, XX., 1902, 382 ff. Here I try to convict Wundt out of his own mouth, by quoting the passage: “Die Ausdrucksmethode kann immer nur Ergebnisse liefern, die die physiologi-

direct statements in my St. Louis address.¹ Here I say: "I cannot believe that the method of expression will help us very greatly towards an affective psychology. The organic reactions which the expressive method registers are closely interwoven and interdependent, and the task of differentiation presents difficulties which, if not insurmountable, have at least not yet been surmounted. I am disposed to think, *e. g.*, that the plethysmograph, as a differential instrument, is doomed to disappear from our laboratories. The sphygmograph, and especially the pneumograph hold out better hope; but I doubt if, at the best, a differentiation of affective qualities is to be expected from them."²

Here, surely, there is 'question of the fundamental validity of the method'! In her assertion that criticism has been confined to experimental technique and the interpretation of curves, Mrs. Woolley is probably thinking of the paper by H. C. Stevens, on the plethysmographic evidence for the tridimensional theory of feeling. In this, it is true, the writer expressly disclaims any intention of dealing with affective theory: 'the more immediate end of this essay . . . is to test the validity of the interpretation placed by Wundt upon certain of Lehmann's curves;' 'our own attempt has been to show the invalidity of Wundt's interpretations of certain of Lehmann's curves, selected by him on the basis of his own *differentiæ*.'³ On the other hand, the same author's Plethysmographic Study of Attention concludes that "(1) changes in rates of pulse and respiration are brought about by the psychophysical process of sensation; (2) every sensory stimulus (probably in proportion to its intensity) tends to produce a fall in volume; (3) inhibited respiration is a characteristic of active attention," and offers these observations in explanation of the 'failure of the method of expression in the domain of feelings'!⁴

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schen Begleiterscheinungen der Gefühle, nicht aber deren psychologische Natur aufzuklären im stande ist" (p. 383). The same method of impression has recently been employed in my laboratory by S. P. Hayes: see *Amer. Journ. Psychol.*, XVII., 1906, 358 ff.

¹ 'The Problems of Experimental Psychology,' in *Amer. Journ. Psychol.*, XVI., 1905, 208 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 213 f.

³ *Amer. Journ. Psychol.*, XIV., 1903, 15, 20.

⁴ *Amer. Journ. Psychol.*, XVI., 1905, 478; also 410 f., 470 f.