valuable. The author may be mistaken in holding that the goodness of pleasure is not in its pleasantness, that of fullness of life in vitality, that of a good will in its chosen efficiency and wisdom; though, of course, each may on occasion be good for other reasons too. But he is assuredly right in maintaining that no one of these things is alone good, there being several classes of good things.

Passing over the judicious discussion of right conduct, we come to the main thesis of the last chapter, that the pleasures of human intercourse, and aesthetic enjoyment, are the two things greatly good, which is interestingly set forth at some length. Here the objection would seem to be to what is excluded, rather than to what is included. Surely other things are greatly good. If doubt exists, ask the camper about fullness of life, the participator in large enterprises about a steady and reasonable will, a clear and smoothly running mind, power efficiently exercised for a worthy object, or a worthy national chief executive about a well organized state in a rich country, peopled with worthy citizens. There are circles in these suggestions as must be the case if activities are to be included among our greater goods, and wise men have considered them, rightly I think, to be the greatest. But the alternative is to strangle life by logic, and count among human goods only emasculated passivities.

S. E. Mezes.


What is the relation of the study of society to the ethical standard? Does it afford any light upon the respective values of the conflicting ideals—individualism and socialism—which compete for approval to-day? Spencer's individualism is not derived from his biology; indeed the conception of individualism is brought into union with the biological principle of adaptation to environment by an optimistic teleology like that of the orthodox economists. Neither is the individualistic goal which he foresees warranted by the course of society thus far. For society finds itself obliged to multiply rather than decrease its functions. Nor is it legitimate to confound, as Spencer does, individuality with independence. Individuality does increase with social progress; but this very increase means an increase of needs and hence of dependence. Wundt's theory of the will, presenting an ideal which subordinates the individual to the whole, is a legitimate development of German idealism. But both aspects of the theory, (1) that the will is the good, and (2) that the universal will, just because it is universal, is good, encounter difficulties if applied to
the test of social laws. For the complexity of social facts prevents us from making any one principle, such as pleasure, interest, sympathy, or even will, the single principle; and to say that the universal, purely as universal, is superior to the individual is to hypostasize the general in an inadmissible fashion.

On the other hand, can we dispense entirely with the conception of an ideal? Lévy-Bruhl in his suggestion that the old conception of the ideal must give place to that of a science des mœurs falls into an error the opposite of idealism. For to point out imperfections in conduct implies the conception of a higher type of social order. The doctrine of a science des mœurs also raises the question, treated by Windelband and Rickert, as to the uniqueness of the historic, and consequently as to the possibility of establishing any such science.

Positively, a study of society shows that both aspects—that of social dependence or the moral consciousness, and that of independent activity—are present as moving forces: the first, dominant in primitive society, the latter, soon emerging. And it is possible to find in present society growing recognition of both these forces. Thus socialism now claims that it is not opposed to individualism but rather affords the only true means for the realization of individualism. It maintains that Nietzsche, the individualist, "is one of us," for he believes in humanity, the great humanity of the future.

A correlate tendency, namely that of socialization in the camp of individualism, is indicated in the growing conviction that the individual can develop only by the aid of society. The aspirations for the various goods, material, intellectual, aesthetic, which are desired by the rising individual can be secured to him only by the protection of the state. The necessity of equality in privilege, the barbaric crudity of luxury, are other suggestions which social progress is teaching.

"The social regimentation is in contradiction with the laws of life. When we have comprehended this, can we hesitate?"

J. H. T.

DISCUSSION.

A NOTE ON COLOR-DISCRIMINATION IN THE CREEK CHUB.

Mr. Peterson, reviewing in the Psychological Bulletin for May 15 (page 169) our study entitled 'The Establishment of an Association Involving Color-Discrimination in the Creek Chub, Semotilus