The Conscience, Its Nature and Origin. WILLIAM W. CARLILE.
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This article is in the main a protest against the view of Herbert Spencer that it is the experience of rewards and punishments accorded in this world during many generations to right and wrong action respectively that has evolved the conception of duty. Such a view postulates a psychological hypothesis of transformations that follow the analogy of chemistry, *i. e.*, a metamorphosis from pleasure and pain elements into ethical ideas of justice, the right, the true, etc., which we cannot expect to understand. Such hypotheses, transcending the understanding, lead to paradoxes and absurdities, and rule out the *reductio ad impossibile* in mental science, where a refutation of a false induction may be attained by a simple appeal to fact. In psychology, it is impossible to appeal to a fact, to an ethical sentiment, for instance, in the same way as appeal may be made to the physical phenomena evidenced by the senses; nevertheless, appeal may be made to the circumstances which occasion the sentiment in question. Thus an objective reference may be made indirectly. And this is analogous to the operation of mechanical forces, that is, where the cause is seen in the effect, and not an obscure metamorphosis akin to chemical changes. Causation in the sphere of ethical phenomena must be intelligible. It will not do, therefore, to derive a sense of justice, either directly or indirectly, from fear of punishment.

How, then, can a law enforce itself without hint of penalty? The answer may be suggested by two acknowledged psychological phenomena. One is that a representation in the mind of the act contemplated always precedes the actual volition and consequent realization of the volition in conduct. And the second is that the conception of ourselves is moulded on the conception of others. A judgment of self is the reflected judgment of others. Therefore when we are tempted to a mean or wrong act it must first appear before our minds as a presentation that may be rendered actual in conduct, and, moreover, it is represented *sub specie alius*. The contemplated act arouses resentment against any who would commit, or whom we think of at the moment as committing it, but wholly in an impersonal way; then we transfer the resentment to ourselves considered as committing it. This transfer makes the act personal. The consequent feeling of disapprobation has arisen through a direct line of causation, after a mechanical and not a chemical analogy. This transfer of resentment accounts for the prohibitive aspect of conscience; its positive aspect as an incentive to all virtue is accounted for by a like

transfer of gratitude. This view is, therefore, superior to the Kantian view which accounts only for a negative virtue. This view is illustrated in the ethical grandeur of Hellenism, which the author thinks has been unfairly disparaged by Matthew Arnold.

I am, on the whole, in sympathy with the writer's main contention that fear of punishment, however developed, and through increasingly complex associations, be they ever so many, can never be transformed through a psychological metamorphosis into a sense of honor, or of justice, or a regard of duty for duty's sake alone. Yet I feel that he can not summarily rule out all explanations of psychological phenomena, which are of the chemical rather than the mechanical type; for instance, the relation of the purely physiological to the psychological phenomena can not be explained by transformations of the mechanical kind, where the cause is seen in the effect. Moreover, the comparison between self and others and the consequent transfer of the feeling of resentment or of approbation does not wholly account for the rise of the moral sentiments. We might ask, whence the original feeling of resentment in an impersonal way concerning the acts of others? And in the transfer to self there seems to me to be a supplementary comparison overlooked by Mr. Carlile, namely, the comparison between the possible self, conceived as agent of the contemplated act, and the ideal self, of which the act in question would be unworthy. There is, moreover, a tendency on the part of the writer to identify the true and the right, where, for instance, he says that 'Ought' is the formula of deduction in speculative truth as well as in ethics. The ethical 'ought,' however, has a deeper significance and produces peculiar psychological effects, as the consequent emotions attendant upon its presence in the mind, and depending upon the will's response to its behests. The true may cause but the minimum of emotional functioning, and may deliver no command to the will; the right, however, speaks always with authority, stirring emotional depths, and resulting in conduct accordingly.

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The Philosophy of Lotze — Doctrine of Thought. H. JONES.
New York. Macmillan & Co. 1895. Pp. viii. + 375.

This volume, the first of two on the philosophy of Lotze—the second will deal with his metaphysics—is a criticism from the Neo-Hegelian standpoint of the Lotzean Epistemology contained in the