tive' in the best sense, with frequent reference to the relations, positive and negative, which one system bears to its predecessors. Only now and then does the author let fall a criticism or suggestion which indicates his own point of view, *e. g.*, pp. 24, 250, 295.

Dr. Rehmke divides his work into Ancient and Modern philosophy. Notable here is his inclusion under the former head, not only of the philosophies of the Hellenistic period, but also of Scholasticism and the philosophy of the Renaissance, on the ground that these are essentially only pupils of the Greeks. The Christian Middle Ages is treated very briefly, only 15 pages. Modern philosophy is divided into Pre-Kantian, Kantian and Post-Kantian. Naturally a large place, 46 out of 200 pages, is given to the exposition of Kant, while Post-Kantian philosophy gets a space of only 44 pages. The chapter on Kant shows the author at his best, and is decidedly a fine piece of work. Naturally a considerable preponderance is given by the author to Continental and especially German thought. The more recent English thought is omitted entirely.

A few minor errors have caught the eye in a somewhat rapid reading: on page 4 (l. 26) Anaximander stands instead of Anaximenes; on page 84 the date of Philo is given wrongly; on page 103 Bacon's famous simile for final causes has strayed from its original connection.

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Die Impersonalien. M. JOVANOVIĆ. Belgrade, 1896. Pp. 143.

After a short introduction in which he deals with the history of previous investigations, Jovanovich presents his point of view and then enters upon the consideration of his subject proper, the impersonal judgment, under the three heads—origin, function, limits.

Previous investigators mistakenly isolated the grammatical and the psychological-logical points of view. On the one side an identity of thought and language was maintained; on the other there was a discrepancy. The representatives of both views fell into hopeless confusion and contradiction. A true estimate does not admit the identity of thought and language nor a discrepancy between them.

Anthropology forbids us to maintain that impersonal judgments are the original embryonic forms out of which all others have been differentiated. Animism as expressive of the earliest form of experience teaches us that primitive man interpreted all outer occurrences in terms of his own personal life; the clouds and heavens

'rained.' In the mythological age these personal activities were generalized; Jupiter, Zeus, Indra, 'rained.' Finally, when thought freed itself from personification, the causes of certain experiences became completely undetermined and unknown. At this stage the impersonal 'It' arose.

The function of impersonals was and is that of indicating a subject which is altogether unknown, but which, nevertheless, the mind must still think.

From this also the limits of the impersonal are clear. All endeavor to determine the subject, in whatever degree this determination may be presented, is artificial and arbitrary. It inevitably leads to confusion and perversion of meaning. Our only method of classification must be based solely upon the different kinds of experience which are referred to the unknown subject.

So much for Jovanovich's own treatment; the monograph is, throughout, dependent entirely upon Wundt's interpretation. In fact, the author's deference to his master, and his confident assertion of the falsity of views differing from his own, do not seem to be consistent with the supposed impartiality and scientific thoroughness of the German student.

The investigation is indicative of the difficulty which has met all enquirers in this field from the time of the Greek grammarians. The impersonal judgment has been considered an anomaly which must be dealt with from the standpoint of certain presuppositions. Underlying Jovanovich's treatment I find these: (1) All experience is objective; (2) the fundamental relation is that of subject and object; (3) judgment consists in the uniting of thought and reality, *i. e.*, it is discursive.

The mere statement of the first two presuppositions will suggest the criticisms likely to be made. The third is the most important. If we admit that all judgment is discursive then a subject must be sought for the impersonal. Predication without a subject of predication is a contradiction. But, on the other hand, no subject has been found for the impersonal. Is the controversy then to be continued forever? The difficulty might suggest that it would be profitable to lay aside our presuppositions, in order that we might understand the impersonal not as a judgment, nor as having a subject or a predicate, but as an experience. This point of view leads, in my own opinion, to the following result. The impersonal presents us with a situation immediately recognized as such. It distinguishes itself from intuition in that the impersonal is vague, schematic, while the intuition is clear and

definite. Again, certain forms of the impersonal indicate a breaking-up of this immediate recognition and a reference to a vague whole not immediately grasped. Now in as much as reality is grasped, differentiated or measured in the impersonal, we may rightly call it a judgment. But it is a judgment in which subject and predicate do not appear. This analysis leads us to believe that the essential nature of judgment is recognition or differentiation, not reference. In the impersonal and intuitive forms recognition is immediate; in the ordinary discursive form it is mediate.

This view is supported by child psychology in which we find definite situations or realities recognized before there is any use of noun and verb. Again, comparative philology shows that the noun cannot be derived from the verb and *vice versa*, but it points (as Jovanovich admits) to a stage in thought where they were simply implicit. Finally, when we recognize that in the child's consciousness the use of noun and verb, and the recognition of a self as opposed to an object, arise together, we see how our theory fits in with the necessity felt by Romanes of getting a connecting link between the perceptive processes of animals and the conceptual processes of man. The impersonal recognizes the facts which Romanes brought forward and frees his position from the logical entanglements which it presents, in giving us percepts apart from concepts.

Thus as the immediate recognition (though in a vague schematic way) of reality and the beginning of a reference to a mediately recognized whole, the view of the impersonal above presented unites the various conflicting theories. As immediate recognition there is neither subject nor predicate; as a vague reference to a larger whole a subject is found in varying degrees of determinateness. Finally, when the "It" represents merely a shorthand way of indicating a familiar object, we have the singular judgment.

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Quelques Remarques sur L'irréversibilité des Phénomènes psychologiques. E. HALÉVY. Rev. de Met et. de Mor., Nov., 1896.

M. Halévy's article is, in the main, a criticism of the attempt made by psychologists of the Association School to apply to mental phenomena the principle of mechanical reversibility. In a purely quantitative science like geometry all terms have the same *logical* value, and may be defined in the same manner with *change of sign*. If all Force be reduced to modes of motion the same doctrine will hold in