

My attack then, is not, like that of Professor Calkins, on the attributes of sensation, but upon the term sensation itself as its most frequent application defines it.

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### AFTER-IMAGES.

In his recently published monograph on 'After-Images,' Mr. S. I. Franz makes with reference to some work of mine a slightly misleading statement. The article referred to appeared in *Mind* for last January, and Mr. Franz implies that its writer while noting the existence of individual variations in the color changes of the image, arbitrarily eliminated them, and that 'her subjects had to be drilled to see a normal image (*i. e.*, like her own).' This way of putting the matter would lead one to suppose that the uniformity of results attained was an artificial one, produced by suggestion: that is, that the subjects were told what I saw, and drilled until they could see the same thing. On the contrary, as the object of the study was to observe the effect of suggestion on the image, I was careful to give no hint to my subjects of my own experiences, during the experiments to determine the normal course of the image. I simply found that while great individual differences existed at first, they tended to disappear in large measure with practice. I quite agree with Mr. Franz that the causes of these variations deserve thorough investigation, but I am inclined to think that one important cause is simply lack of practice in discriminating the image from subjective or other retinal phenomena.

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