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An Agreement Between Shakespeare and Aristotle

G. G. Greenwood

The Classical Review / Volume 17 / Issue 09 / December 1903, pp 463 - 464

DOI: 10.1017/S0009840X00208949, Published online: 27 October 2009

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0009840X00208949

How to cite this article:

G. G. Greenwood (1903). An Agreement Between Shakespeare and Aristotle. The Classical Review, 17, pp 463-464 doi:10.1017/S0009840X00208949

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and later collegiate) was as Dom G. Morin tells me, under his invocation, and contained his body; outside a small portion of Eastern France and Lorraine it would be very surprising to find mention of him. I infer with some confidence, from the occurrence of his name in the Propertius, that that manuscript was once domiciled in or near Metz. More than this, the script of the volume agrees very well with the idea that it not only dwelt, but was born in that region. The libraries of Metz were rich in early books, and had a fair share of Latin classics: the *Aulularia* of Plautus is specially mentioned in a fragmentary list of books at St. Vincent's. But no complete ancient catalogue exists of any one of these libraries, nor of that of Épinal, and those of Toul and Verdun (the latter only a partial one) do not help us.

I do not regard the inscription *Goeric* as a press-mark, or anything of the sort. It is merely a *probatio pennae*. The writer by way of trying his pen scribbled a name that was familiar to him. It may have been his own name, or that of a friend. None the less it is a name which would only be borne by some one living within the

very limited sphere of influence of St. Goeric.

The suggestion may perhaps be made that the inscription No. 7 is really *M. mett* . . . and contains the name of Metz (*Mettis*). I do not think this is possible, gratifying as it would no doubt be.

I may add that the oldest of the Leyden MSS. of Propertius (Baehrens's A) which I have also inspected recently, is, in my opinion, certainly not Italian in origin, but most probably French. I should place it early in the fourteenth century: I could even conceive it to have been written in the last years of the thirteenth. I am glad to find myself here unconsciously following the steps of Sir E. Maunde Thompson who, as the Editor has kindly informed me, gave his verdict (*Class. Rev.* ix. 1895, p. 184 n.) in these terms: 'the Vossianus was written about 1300 and just as likely before it as after it.'

As to the text of both the Wolfenbüttel and the Leyden manuscripts we shall expect to be further informed in due time by my friend Mr. O. L. Richmond, who has been making a thorough examination of them.

MONTAGUE RHODES JAMES.

AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN SHAKESPEARE AND ARISTOTLE.

'Sense sure you have, else could you not have motion.'—*Hamlet*, Act III. Sc. iv. 71.

The old commentators could make nothing of this passage, and even now what I submit to be the true explanation does not seem to be appreciated. Thus Mr. Israel Gollancz, in the 'Temple' edition, explains '*Motion*' as 'emotion, impulse,' but thinks it worth while to record Warburton's futile emendation '*notion*.' Eight and twenty years ago (see the *Athenæum* February 27th 1875) I ventured to explain the passage by reference to the Aristotelian Psychology. In the *De Anima* (Bk. ii. chs. 2 and 3) we are told that the faculties (*δυνάμεις*) of the soul (which is here co-extensive with the vital principle) are growth, sense (or sensibility), desire, motion, and reason. Plants have only the principle of growth; animals have sense as well, which is the distinguishing faculty of the animal soul. 'For even of things which do not move or change their place, provided that they have sense (*αἴσθησις*), we say that they are animals, not only that

they live.' Then comes motion, so that motion (*κίνησις ἢ κατὰ τόπον*) implies sense (*αἴσθησις*), and an animal that has motion must necessarily have sense as well. I take the following from M. Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire's translation: 'Quant à la série régulière des facultés, voici comment elles se subordonnent entre elles: la nutrition d'abord, sans laquelle les autres ne sont pas: la sensibilité, dans laquelle le toucher peut s'isoler des autres sens, puisqu'il y a des animaux qui n'ont ni la vue, ni l'ouïe, ni l'odorat; la locomotion, qui suppose toujours la sensibilité, mais dont la sensibilité peut fort bien se passer; en fin l'intelligence, qui suppose nécessairement toutes les facultés inférieures.'

Here, I venture to think, is undoubtedly the true explanation of Hamlet's 'Sense sure you have, else could you not have motion' (words, by the way, which are only to be found in the Quartos). But it is not necessary to suppose that Shakespeare had studied the *De Anima* in the original Greek.

No doubt there were many references to this Aristotelian classification in the philosophical works of the time. Thus Bacon, though he does not make mention of Aristotle, is evidently following him when he treats of the affinities and differences of plants and living creatures. (*Nat. Hist.* Cent. vii, § 607). Having dealt with what he calls 'the radical differences,' he writes, 'For the secondary differences, they are as follows: First, plants are all fixed to the earth, whereas all living creatures are severed, and of themselves. [This is by no means so accurate as Aristotle.] Secondly, living

creatures have *local motion*, plants have not. . . . . Seventhly, living creatures have *sense*, which plants have not. Eighthly, living creatures have *voluntary motion*, which plants have not.' Again, in the *De Augmentis* (Bk. IV. ch. 3), we read 'Ignorance on this point drove some of the ancient philosophers to suppose that a soul is infused into all bodies without distinction; for they could not conceive how there can be motion at discretion without sense, or sense without a soul.'

G. G. GREENWOOD.

REVIEWS.

ADAM'S TEXTS OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

Texts to illustrate a Course of Elementary Lectures on Greek Philosophy after Aristotle. By J. ADAM, M.A., Hon. LL.D. of Aberdeen (London, Macmillan, 1902). 3s. 6d. net.

THIS slender volume covers a wide subject, Greek philosophy in its decline. Though primarily intended for those who make a special study of ancient philosophy, it is well adapted to the requirements of a wider circle who read the later classical authors as pure literature. They will find here the main facts well arranged: the account of Epicureanism is especially clear and adequate. Dr. Adam very sensibly includes seven or eight extracts from Lucretius, a distinct advantage when we compare the parallel account in Ritter and Preller, for the latest editors of that work pedantically refrain from ever citing the Roman poet in the text and only sparingly refer to him in the notes. Of course such a book loses half its value when severed from the lectures which it served to illustrate. Nor is either the Latin or the Greek always easy reading for the tiro. What, for instance, will he make of the technical terms in Cicero *de finibus* I. 22 (§ 47) or III. 16 *sqq.* (§§ 157, 158)? Or take § 6, the enigmatical inference of Arcesilas τῶν δοξαστῶν ἔσται ὁ σοφός, Sext. *Emp. adv. Math.* vii, 157. Apparently τῶν δοξαστῶν must be taken actively, as if τῶν δοξαζόντων, though of this the lexicon gives no hint: compare the similar use of ἀδόξαστος (§ 35) by Eusebius, citing

Aristocles, *praep. evang.* xiv. 18. It has occurred to me that this active use of verbals in -τος may throw light on a well-known difficulty of the Stoic epistemology, viz., the division of φαντασία into καταληπτική and ἀκατάληπτος as laid down in Diog. Laert. vii. 46 (§ 119). It is not at first clear why, when the mind apprehends a real object, the perception should be designated by an adjective in -ικός, whereas, when the mind fails to apprehend a real object, the verbal in -τος is used; the former being ordinarily active, the latter passive, in signification. What we expect, indeed require, in the passage τῆς δὲ φαντασίας τὴν μὲν καταληπτικὴν, τὴν δὲ ἀκατάληπτον is that both adjectives should have a similar meaning. Hence the suggestion that καταληπτική should be taken passively, in order to assimilate it to the assumed passive sense of ἀκατάληπτος; or that Zeno purposely chose an ambiguous word capable of both an active and a passive meaning. In the third edition of his *Grundriss* Zeller, departing from his earlier view, paraphrased καταληπτική thus: die zur κατάληψις zu werden geeignet ist. But what if ἀκατάληπτος is to be taken actively, once more illustrating the flexibility of this verbal form? At all events, the obvious inference from Cicero's language, *Acad. post.* I. 41 is, that he found καταληπτόν in the Greek text of the authority he followed, while the whole description and the context fit nothing but what is generally known as καταληπτικὴ φαντασία.