The Classical Review

<http://journals.cambridge.org/CAR>

Additional services for *The Classical Review*:

Email alerts: [Click here](#)

Subscriptions: [Click here](#)

Commercial reprints: [Click here](#)

Terms of use : [Click here](#)

Notes on Marcus Aurelius

Herbert Richards

The Classical Review / Volume 19 / Issue 01 / February 2005, pp 18 - 26

DOI: 10.1017/S0009840X00991182, Published online: 27 October 2009

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0009840X00991182

How to cite this article:

Herbert Richards (1905). Notes on Marcus Aurelius. The Classical Review, 19, pp 18-26
doi:10.1017/S0009840X00991182

Request Permissions : [Click here](#)

χρησθαι τῇ δόξῃ = χρῆσθαι τῷ δοξαστικῷ and not χρῆσθαι τῷ δοξαστῷ. Coraes and Stewart think otherwise—see Stewart's notes. (d) The emphasis is not on χρῆται and χρῆσθαι but on ἐπιστήμῃ and δόξῃ, in spite of the order. The usual Greek rule of putting emphatic words at the beginning of a sentence or phrase is not regularly observed by Aristotle as it is by Plato. To take an instance close at hand, in 1142 b 16 ἀλλ' ὁρθότης τίς ἐστίν ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς the context shows the emphasis to be not on ὁρθότης but on βουλῆς—Plato would have written ἀλλὰ βουλῆς ὁρθότης τίς ἐστίν ἡ εὐβουλία or the like. (e) The two meanings of *μανθάνειν* that the editors quote may be borne in mind here: but whereas one of these two meanings of *μανθάνειν* admits *συνιέναι* as a synonym of *μανθάνειν*, while the other does not, the point is that *συνιέναι* can also be used in a sense in which it is not a synonym of *μανθάνειν*.—The passage may be paraphrased as follows: 'Learning is often called "understanding," when a man uses his faculty of scientific knowledge (which is the faculty always used in "learning") to grasp what another teaches him about necessary truth: and when a man uses his faculty of discriminating judgment to grasp what another teaches him about practical contingent truth, that exercise of the judgment is by analogy called understanding, if it is of the right kind. The name understanding, in this latter sense, has been diverted from its use as the name of excellence in "learning" necessary truth from another's teaching, as may be seen from the fact that we still (perhaps somewhat improperly now the later use is established) often give the name of "understanding" to this excellence in "learning" necessary truth.'

10. 1143 a 19. Ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ' ἣν συγγνώμονας καὶ ἔχειν φημὲν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις ὁρθή. This section is a remarkable instance of confusion caused by the view that etymological connection between words must carry with it kinship of meaning. *γνώμη* is taken as the common element in *συγγνώμη* and *γνώμην ἔχειν*, which in ordinary language represent two completely different notions; the meaning of *γνώμη* is arbitrarily fixed as about half-way between the meanings of *συγγνώμη* and *γνώμην ἔχειν*: a vague attempt is made to reconcile the two meanings, and *συγγνώμη* is forced, by mere unproved assertion, into being a synonym of *γνώμη*. As a matter of fact *συγγνώμη* represents the notions of 'forgiveness,' 'making allowances,' 'fair kindness,' and the like: the moral element in it, as in *ἐπιείκεια*, is essential. *γνώμη* on the other hand has properly no moral significance. *γνώμην ἔχειν* can mean two things: (a) 'to have an opinion' whether a true or a false one; (b) 'to have a true opinion,' 'to be right' intellectually, 'avoir raison.' The latter meaning, where *γνώμη* = ὁρθή or ἀληθής *γνώμη*, is chosen here to the exclusion of the former. Professor Burnet would, I believe, find it hard to justify his statement that in actual speech *γνώμη* had a sense corresponding to that of our 'feeling.' Stewart's paraphrase (*Notes* ii. 89) shows well how the author attempts to unify the two different notions of *συγγνώμη* and *γνώμη*: but no hint is given by him or any one else of what I believe to be the true explanation, that the whole attempt is the result of etymological confusion.

L. H. G. GREENWOOD.

NOTES ON MARCUS AURELIUS.

A VERY large number of the following suggestions had been put into writing before the appearance of Stich's Teubner text in its second edition (1903). The text itself is (I think) quite unaltered: the only change in the book is the addition of a few things in the critical notes, e.g. some of the emendations proposed by Dr. Rendall. A careful re-reading has however given me some new ideas.

1. 6 τὸ γράψαι διαλόγους ἐν παιδί (*while a boy*).

Considering that Marcus congratulates himself more than once in this first book (§§ 7 and 17) on having given little time to σοφιστική and ῥητορική, it is somewhat surprising that he should count having written dialogues an advantage. Should we read τὸ <μὴ> γράψαι? He mentions a good many negative advantages he has to be

thankful for, e.g. 4 τὸ μὴ εἰς δημοσίας διατριβὰς φοιτήσαι.

8 διὰ ταῦτα should perhaps be δι' αὐτάς or διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα.

15 τὸ πάντας αὐτῷ πιστεύειν περὶ ὧν λέγοι ὅτι οὕτως φρονεῖ, καὶ περὶ ὧν πράττει ὅτι οὐ κακῶς πράττει.

οὐ κακῶς has been questioned and is certainly unsatisfactory. Perhaps οὐκ ἄκων may be proposed. Maximus never said what he did not mean, nor acted reluctantly against his own judgment or feeling. So 3. 5 μήτε ἀκούσιος ἐνέργει . . . μήτε ἀνθελκόμενος: Epict. *Ench.* 1. 3 ἄκων πράξεις οὐδὲ ἔν: Zeno (quoted in Philo *Quod omni. prob.* 14. p. 460 M) θάπτον ἂν <τις?> ἀσκὼν βαπτίσαι πλήρη πνεύματος ἢ βιάσαιτο τὸν (!) σπουδαῖον ὀνητινοῦν ἄκοντα δράσαι τι τῶν ἀβουλήτων (perhaps β. τὸν σπ. δτιοῦν ἄ. δ. τ. ἄ.).

In Isocr. 5. 25 οὐ κακῶς is a v. l. for οὐκ ἀλόγως, and that too might perhaps stand here.

16 παρέχει should probably be παρέχοι, referring to his father's lifetime.

ibid. φαρμάκων καὶ ἐπιθεμάτων <τῶν> ἐκτός?

ibid. τὸ ἔμφρον καὶ μεμετρημένον ἔν τε θεωριῶν ἐπιτελέσει (ἐπιτελέσεισι!) καὶ ἔργων κατασκευαῖς, καὶ διανομαῖς καὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἀνθρώποις πρὸς αὐτὸ [δὲ] τὸ δέον πραχθῆναι δεδορκότες, οὐ πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς πραχθείσιν εὐδοξίαν (δὲ wanting in the two best MSS). ἀνθρώποις is obviously wrong. I conjecture that the original was <ὡς> ἀνθρώπου, that ὡς fell out after οἱς in ἀνθρώποις, and that ἀνθρώπου was then accommodated to the datives before it. A converse case is perhaps to be found at the beginning of the §, where τὸ ἀπαρτρέπτως εἰς τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀπονεμητικὸν ἐκάστω looks meant (Reiske) for τὸ ἀπαρτρέπτως τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀπονεμητικὸν ἐκάστω.

17 εἰπούα should I think be the dative. Cf. on 5. 35 below.

ibid. χρήζειν μήτε ἐσθίων σημειωτῶν μήτε λαμπάδων καὶ ἀνδριάντων τοιῶνδε τινων καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου κόμπου.

If τοιῶνδε is not to be expelled altogether, it would seem necessary to write <καὶ> τοιῶνδε τινων. Or is that too much like καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου κόσμου?

ibid. (end) ὅπως τε ἐπεθύμησα φιλοσοφίας, μὴ ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς τινα σοφιστήν.

So Stich, but there is good authority for

οὕτως instead of ὅπως. Perhaps we might read οὕτως τε ἐπεθύμησα φιλοσοφίας <ὡς> μὴ ἐμπεσεῖν. Cf. above on 16.

2. 3 ταῦτά σοι ἀρκείτω, εἰ δόγματά ἐστι.

There is authority for αἰεὶ δόγματα ἔστω instead of εἰ δόγματά ἐστι. Perhaps καὶ δόγματα ἔστω.

2. 6 ὑβρίξει, ὑβρίξει αὐτήν, ὦ ψυχή. τοῦ δὲ τιμῆσαι σεαυτὴν οὐκέτι καιρὸν ἔξεις. βραχὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος ἐκάστω.

Surely Gataker was right in wishing to read ὑβρίξεις, ὑβρίξεις for the imperative, which is intrinsically absurd. Cf. 16 ὑβρίξει ἑαυτὴν ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχῇ, μάλιστα μὲν ὅταν κ.τ.λ. Moreover the οὐκέτι καιρὸν ἔξεις with a δὲ points distinctly by antithesis to a statement of something being done, not to an imperative.

14 κἂν τρισχίλια ἔτη βιώσεσθαι μέλλης καὶ τοσαντάκις μύρια, ὅμως μέμνησο κ.τ.λ.

In the first place write another κἂν (or ἢ) for καί. In the second can τοσαντάκις μύρια be right, 3000 years or as many times ten thousand? Who ever used such an expression instead of ten thousand times as many, μυριάκις τοσαῦτα?

3. 1 τὸ δὲ ἑαυτῷ χρῆσθαι καὶ τοὺς τοῦ προσήκοντος ἀριθμοὺς ἀκριβοῦν κ.τ.λ.

I do not think ἑαυτῷ χρῆσθαι by itself means anything. Some adverb or adverbial expression = καλῶς is needed in addition.

4 ἦτοι γὰρ ἄλλου ἔργου στέρη, τουτέστι φανταζόμενος τί ὁ δέον πράσσει κ.τ.λ.

ἦτοι is quite meaningless and ἄλλον can hardly be said to have any meaning. I have thought doubtfully of οὕτω γὰρ πολλοῦ ἔργου στέρη, which gives good sense itself and improves the meaning of τουτέστι, as explaining in part οὕτω.

ibid. ὁ γάρ τοι ἀνὴρ ὁ τοιοῦτος, οὐκέτι ὑπερτιθέμενος τὸ ὡς ἐν ἀρίστοις ἤδη εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.

ὡς ἐν ἀρίστοις is I think a phrase of an unknown kind as an equivalent for ὡς ἀριστος. Perhaps ὡς ἐν ἀρίστοις (as e.g. Xen. *Mem.* 4. 5. 9 ὡς ἐν ἡδιστα), or ὡς ἂν ἀριστος, if the ἂν is admissible, of which I am not sure.

6 τῷ λογικῷ καὶ ποιητικῷ ἀγαθῷ.

Read ἀγαθοῦ, as in 3. 11 μεγαλοφροσύνης ποιητικόν: 6. 52: 8. 14: 9. 1 twice. Cf. on 1. 16 above.

8 In the purified man there is nothing δούλον οὐδὲ κομψόν οὐδὲ προσδεδεμένον οὐδὲ ἀπεσχισμένον οὐδὲ ὑπεύθυνον οὐδὲ ἐμφωλεῖον. Would not ἀνυπεύθυνον give a better sense? There seem three pairs of opposed terms.

12 τῇ ὧν λέγεις καὶ φθέγγῃ ἡρωικῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀρκούμενος.

ἡρωικῇ is quite out of place, and Dr. Rendall's εὐροικῇ (which he translates *even truth*) does not recommend itself very much. The first letter may be a ditto-graph of the last in φθέγγῃ. Can we make anything of ῥωικῇ? Ῥωμαϊκῇ occurs to me as just a possibility. Cf. 5 ὁ ἐν σοι θεὸς ἔστω προστάτης ζῶον ἄρρενος καὶ πρεσβύτου καὶ πολιτικοῦ καὶ Ῥωμαίου καὶ ἄρχοντος: 2. 5 φρόντιζε στιβαρῶς ὡς Ῥωμαῖος καὶ ἄρρη: Martial xi. 20. 10 *qui scis Romana simplicitate loqui*: etc.

15 οὐκ ἴσασι πόσα σημαίνει τὸ κλέπτειν, τὸ σπείρειν, τὸ ὠνεῖσθαι, τὸ ἡσυχάζειν.

It is not easy to correct κλέπτειν, but surely ὠνεῖσθαι must be κινεῖσθαι.

4. 3 πάντα ταῦτα ὅσα ὁρᾷς ὅσον οὐδέπω μεταβάλλει καὶ οὐκέτι ἔσται.

ἔσται and the parallel passage in 7. 25 prove that we should read μεταβαλεῖ. Cf. ὅσον οὐδέπω with future in 10. 11, with μέλλω in 7. 70.

12 He speaks of a readiness to change, ἐὰν ἄρα τις παρῇ διορθῶν καὶ μετὰγων ἀπὸ τινος οἰήσεως.

παρῇ does not seem very suitable. Would παρή, comes forward, presents himself, be better? Cf. Plat. Rep. 494D τῷ δὲ οὕτω διατιθεμένῳ ἐάν τις ἡρέμα προσελθὼν τάλῃθι λέγῃ, ὅτι νοῖς οὐκ ἔνεστιν αὐτῷ.

16 ἐντὸς δέκα ἡμερῶν θεὸς αὐτοῖς δόξεις οἷς νῦν θηρίον καὶ πίθηκος, ἐὰν ἀνακάμψῃς ἐπὶ τὰ δόγματα καὶ τὸν σεβασμὸν τοῦ λόγου.

This is of course a reference to the saying ascribed in *Hippias Maior* 289B to Heraclitus, ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν (in comparison with God or a god) πίθηκος φανείται. Dr. Rendall has in consequence conjectured that we should read here θεὸς <θεοῖς> αὐτοῖς δόξεις. But why should they admire him so much as to account him one of themselves? Surely merely reverting to principles and revering reason would not move them to such enthusiasm. Let us rather read θεοῖς for θεός and for αὐτοῖς probably ἀνθρώπος, to which (1) the antithesis of θηρίον, (2) the use of the word by Heraclitus agree in pointing. ἀνθρωπος, written in its

shorter form *άνος*, is certainly corrupted sometimes, e.g. into ἄλλος (cf. on 10. 10), but I cannot quote a case of confusion with αὐτός.

17 μὴ ὡς μύρια μέλλων ἔτη ζῆν.

'Do not live as though you had a thousand years before you,' Rendall. 'Do not act,' Long. Probably some such word as διανοοῦ is lost. Cf. 2. 11 ὡς ἤδη δυνατόν ὄντος ἐξίεναι τοῦ βίου, οὕτως ἕκαστα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν καὶ διανοεῖσθαι.

19 ὁ περὶ τὴν ὑστεροφημίαν ἐπτοημένος οὐ φαντάζεται ὅτι κ.τ.λ. . . . μέχρι καὶ πᾶσα ἡ μνήμη ἀποσβῇ δι' ἐπτοημένων καὶ σβεννυμένων προϊόντων.

ἐπτοημένων is quite unmeaning as well as wrong in tense, and is evidently nothing but an accidental repetition of ἐπτοημένος above. I conjecture the true word to have been ἐξαπτομένων, which matches σβεννυμένων, as in 7. 24 ἀπεσβέσθη, ὥστε ὅλως ἐξαφθῆναι μὴ δύνασθαι (cf. Republic 498AB). Cf. also 21 and 9. 9. Nauck's μεμνημένων is not happy.

20 τί τούτων διὰ τὸ ἐπαινέσθαι καλὸν ἐστιν ἢ ψεγόμενον φθείρεται; σμαράγδιον γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ χεῖρον γίγνεται, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπαινῇται; τί δὲ χρυσός; κ.τ.λ.

φθείρεται and still more χεῖρον γίγνεται point to reading κάλλιον for καλόν, and a few lines above we have οὔτε γοῖν χεῖρον ἢ (?) κρείττον γίγνεται τὸ ἐπαινούμενον. Read also δέ for γάρ after σμαράγδιον, and four lines above τὸ δέ γε for τό γε δή.

50 ὅλον μικρόν ἐστι τὸ διάστημα (the difference in length of life), καὶ τοῦτο δι' ὅσων καὶ μεθ' οἷων ἐξαντλούμενον καὶ ἐν οἷφ σωματίῳ.

Read δι' οἷων which is much more natural in itself and confirmed by the double use of οἷος in the words following. Cf. also 6. 59.

5. 4 πορεύομαι διὰ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν μέχρι πεσῶν ἀναπαύσομαι.

Is the future indicative found after ἔως or μέχρι? Should we not read ἀναπαύσσομαι? I suspect on the other hand that πορεύομαι should be πορεύσομαι.

6 One man makes a merit of any service he may do. Another is at any rate conscious of having done it. A third seems all unconscious: ἀνθρώπος δ' εὖ ποιήσας οὐκ ἐπιβοᾶται ἀλλὰ μεταβαίνει ἐφ' ἕτερον. ἀνθρώπος here is much too general. It is not a man, that is the ordinary man, who is thus

described, but the man of rare character. Read therefore *ἄνθρωπον*, governed by *εὖ ποιήσας*. Cf. 9. 42 (near end) *τί γὰρ πλέον θέλεις εὖ ποιήσας ἄνθρωπον*;

There is something wrong in the description of the second character too. The sentences run: *ὁ μὲν τίς ἐστιν, ὅταν τι δεξιὸν περὶ τινα πράξῃ, πρόχειρος καὶ λογίσασθαι (imputare) αὐτῷ τὴν χάριν. ὁ δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο μὲν οὐ πρόχειρος, ἄλλως μέντοι παρ' αὐτῷ ὡς περὶ χρεώστων διανοεῖται καὶ οἶδεν ὁ πεποιήκεν.* There is no plausible suggestion for ἄλλως κ.τ.λ. I have thought of ὅλως for ἄλλως (a confusion found I think elsewhere); also of <οὐκ> ἄλλως . . . <ῆ> ὡς περὶ, or <οὐκ> ἄλλως περὶ αὐτοῦ ἢ περὶ. The first seems the best.

9. μὴ ὡς πρὸς παιδαγωγὸν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπαινέσαι, ἀλλ' ὡς οἱ ὀφθαλμιῶντες πρὸς τὸ σπογγάριον καὶ τὸ ψόν, ὡς ἄλλος πρὸς κατάπλασμα, ὡς πρὸς καταίονησιν. οὕτως γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐπιδείξῃ τὸ πειθαρχεῖν τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ προσαναπαύσῃ αὐτῷ (*find rest and refreshment in it*).

Dr. Rendall translates the last words 'not a question of outward show but of inward refreshment': Long (reading I can hardly tell what) 'thou wilt not fail to obey reason and thou wilt repose in it.' Coray conjectured *ἔτι δῆξει* for *ἐπιδείξῃ*. I would suggest *οὐδὲν ἐπιδείξῃ*, or *οὐδὲν ἔτι δείξῃ*, *τοῦ πειθαρχεῖν*, 'there will be no need then to obey reason,' i.e. with more or less constraint and reluctance: conformity to it will be natural and pleasant. Cf. Wordsworth's well known lines in the Ode to Duty.

Perhaps we should read *ὡς <ἄλλος> πρὸς καταίονησιν*, or *ῆ* for *ὡς* without adding ἄλλος. αὐτό a line or two below should be αὐτά, as *τούτων* following and *ᾧ* preceding combine to show.

12 *ἐξακούσεται* should probably be *ἐπακούσεται*, both as the fitter word and to harmonise with *ἐπακούσαι* just before.

23 *πῶς οὖν οὐ μωρὸς ὁ ἐν τούτοις φυσώμενος ἢ σπώμενος ἢ σχετλιάζων ὡς ἐν τινι χρόνῳ καὶ ἐπὶ μακρὸν ἐνοχλήσαντι*; (v.l. *ἐπὶ μικρὸν. Reiske ἐνοχλήσασιν*.)

It is surely clear that the last word should be future, not aorist. But we might think either of *ὡς ἐν τ. χ. καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἐνοχλήσονται* as *in some space of time which will trouble him even for a little*, or, better perhaps, of *ὡς ἐν τ. χ. καὶ ἐπὶ μακρὸν ἐνοχλήσονται*, as *though they would trouble him in (a certain period of time) and for long*. For the latter

interpretation the dative (*ἐνοχλήσουσι*) is not necessary; *ὡς* with the accusative is quite admissible.

26 Certain affections (*πείσεις*) of ours should be confined to the parts immediately affected: *ὅταν δὲ ἀναδιδῶνται κατὰ τὴν ἑτέραν συμπάθειαν εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν, ὡς ἐν σώματι ἠνωμένῳ, τότε κ.τ.λ.* The translators make no sense of *ἑτέραν*. Did not Marcus write *ἡμετέραν*? The first two letters might be lost after the *ην* of *τὴν*. So in Alciphron 1. 4 Dobree saw that *τὴν ἀκτὴν* stands for *τὴν ἡλακτὴν*.

28 *θεραπεύσεις* should perhaps be *θεραπεύσει*, *he will attend to it*. We should remember that *θεραπεύω*, like *curo*, does not mean *to cure*.

29 *ὡς ἐξελεθὼν ζῆν διανοῇ, οὕτως ἐνταῦθα ζῆν ἔξεστιν. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπωσι, τότε καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἔξιθι*.

Read *ἐξελεθὼν <τοῦ> ζῆν*: 'as you think to exist after quitting life, even so you can live here.' Even when *ἐξίναί* is repeated in the second sentence, *τοῦ ζῆν* is added to it. *ἐξελεθὼν* might perhaps stand alone (like *ἐξάγειν, ἐξαγωγή*), but *ζῆν* could hardly be used thus of a state after death. Out of *ζῆν* it is easy to supply another vaguer infinitive.

31 The first sentence with its *πῶς* is no more a direct question than the second with its *εἰ*. In both cases we supply something like 'ask yourself.' Observe *ἀναμνησκου* δέ following.

35 *εἰ μῆτε κακία ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἐμὴ μῆτε ἐνέργεια κατὰ κακίαν ἐμὴν*.

Read *κακία . . . ἐμῇ . . . ἐνεργείᾳ*.

6. 10 Why care to live? *τί δέ μοι καὶ μέλει ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ τοῦ ὅπως ποτέ αἶα γίνεσθαι*;

αἶα seems quite impossible. *Ménage's γαῖα γενέσθαι* is better (cf. 3. 3 where the body is called *γῆ καὶ λύθρος*, and *Il. 24. 54 κωφὴν γαῖαν ἀεικίζει*), but the poetical form is much against it. I have sometimes thought that we might repeat the last two letters of *ποτέ* and for *ταῖα* read *τέφρα* or *τέφραν*. *ρ* and *ι* are very often confused. Cf. 4. 3 *πόσοι ἦδη . . . ἐκτέτανται καὶ τετέφρωνται*: *ib. 48 κατιδεῖν αἰὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ὡς ἐφήμερα καὶ εὐτελῆ· καὶ ἐχθὲς μὲν μυξάριον, αὔριον δὲ τάριχος ἢ τέφρα*, and *σποδός* in 5. 33: 12. 27. Also *Herodas 1. 38 and 10. 2. Theocr. Ep. 6. 6*.

It seems hardly possible that the infinitive *γενέσθαι* can be right alone. But cf.

7. 58 αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τὸ πῶς χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς ὅλος γενέσθαι, and 10. 16 μηκέθ' ὅλως περὶ τοῦ οἶον τινα εἶναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα διαλέγεσθαι, where Coray inserts δὲ after ἄνδρα. But we might escape the difficulty here and in 7. 58 by reading πῶς. Cf. 4. 50 πάντως πού ποτε κείναι. So in Alciphron 1. 13 it is better to write ποθὲν γάρ ποτε, not πόθεν γάρ ποτε.

12 εἰ μητρυνίαν τε ἅμα εἶχες καὶ μητέρα, ἐκείνην τε ἂν ἐθεράπευες καὶ ὅμως ἡ ἐπάνοδος σοι πρὸς τὴν μητέρα συνεχῆς ἐγίνετο. τοῦτό σοι νῦν ἐστὶν ἡ αὐλή καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία. ὦδε πολλάκις ἐπάνιθι καὶ προσαναπαύου ταύτη.

The general sense seems to indicate that ἐστὶν should be ἔστω, and the imperatives following confirm this. Possibly ταῦτό for τοῦτο.

13 ὅπου λίαν ἀξιόπιστα τὰ πράγματα φαντάζεται, ἀπογομνοῦν αὐτὰ καὶ τὴν εὐτέλειαν αὐτῶν καθορᾶν καὶ τὴν ἱστορίαν ἐφ' ἣ σεμνύνεται περιαιρεῖν. Δεινὸς γὰρ ὁ τύφος παραλογιστῆς καὶ . . . καταγοητεύει.

For ἱστορίαν, which is manifestly wrong, Reiske conjectured and Nauck approved *τερθρείαν*. Rendall would read *ὑψηγορίαν*. I would rather think of *ῥητορείαν*, which is nearer to ἱστορίαν than either and harmonises well enough with παραλογιστῆς and καταγοητεύει. The word occurs in 10. 38. For *ρ* and *ι* cf. above on 10.

14 τὰ ὑπὸ ἕξεως ἢ φύσεως συνεχόμενα are contrasted first with τὰ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς and then with τὰ ὑπὸ λογικῆς ψυχῆς (cf. 10. 2) in such a way that it is clear they are inanimate things and plants (λίθους . . . ἐλαίας). But, to give this meaning, ἕξις, if not φύσις, must have some qualifying word, such as *σωματική* or *ὕλική* added to it. Standing alone, it might just as well be mental (11. 18 under τέταρτον and 12. 16) as material.

16 ἐπὶ τι should perhaps be ἐπὶ τοῦτο. τό, which is confused with both, might be the *tertium quid*.

27 πῶς ὁμόν ἐστι μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν κ.τ.λ.

We should expect ὥς, as in 5. 2 ὥς εὐκόλον κ.τ.λ. and elsewhere in exclamations. But a similar mistake, if it is one, occurs in several places, e.g. 8. 3: 10. 19 and 36: 11. 7.

30 ὥς ὀλίγοις ἀρκούμενος, οἶον οἰκήσει, στρωμνῇ, ἐσθῆτι, τροφῇ, ὑπηρεσίᾳ.

These things fairly exhaust the requirements of the most luxurious and exacting among us; cf. 12. 2. The question should

rather be of the *kind* of food, clothing, etc. Ought we for οἶον to read οἷα, harmonising very well with ὥς?

38 Speaking of the bond that holds all things together, he says τοῦτο δὲ διὰ τὴν τονικὴν (or τοπικὴν) κίνησιν καὶ σύμπνοιαν καὶ τὴν ἔνωσην τῆς οὐσίας.

τονικὴν hardly makes sense: perhaps γενικὴν. For κίνησιν there are such conjectures as σύννησιν and κοίνωσιν.

44 The obscure sentence εἰ δ' ἄρα περὶ μηδενὸς βουλευόνται will come out right, if we see that the parenthesis is not πιστεύειν μὲν οὐχ ὅσιον, as Stich gives it, where μὲν would be unmeaning, but πιστεύειν . . . βουλευόνται. The second εἰ . . . βουλευόνται resumes the first, and the δέ in it answers to the μὲν after πιστεύειν. We must take ἦ, not ἦ, the meaning being 'or, if we do believe, let us not offer sacrifice' etc., and (I think) read μήτε for μηδέ throughout. In the Didot text the Greek is improperly punctuated, but the Latin translation gives the right sense. Dr. Rendall seems to miss it.

46. πάσχειν should apparently be πάσχεις.

47 αὐτῆς τῆς ἐπικήρου καὶ. ἐφημέρου τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζωῆς χλευασταί.

It looks as though αὐτῆς should be ταύτης. The adjectives do not suit αὐτῆς: 'mockers even at our brief and calamitous life' is hardly sense.

50 πειρῶ μὲν πείθειν αὐτούς· πράττε δὲ καὶ ἀκόντων, ὅταν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ὁ λόγος οὕτως ἄγῃ.

Perhaps αἰρῇ, for the confusion is found elsewhere. Cf. 2. 5 τοῦ αἰροῦντος λόγου: 10. 32 οὐδὲ γὰρ αἰρεῖ λόγος (ζῆν) μὴ τοιοῦτον ὄντα. But ἄγῃ may not be wrong.

55 εἰ κυβερνῶντα οἱ ναῦται ἢ ἱατροῦντα οἱ κάμνοντες κακῶς ἔλεγον, ἄλλω τινὶ ἂν προσείχον ἢ πῶς αὐτὸς ἐνεργοίῃ τὸ τοῖς ἐμπλέουσιν σωτήριον ἢ τὸ τοῖς θεραπευομένοις ὑγιεινόν;

Rendall translates this: 'If the sailors abused the pilot, or the sick the physician, would they have any other object than to make him save the crew or heal the patients?' Long, adopting the other punctuation, 'would they listen to anybody else? or how could the helmsman secure the safety of those in the ship?' etc. I do not see the point of the passage on either of these interpretations, nor why with ἂν past tenses of the indicative should be used rather than optatives. One would expect

too τὸν κυβερνῶντα and τὸν ἰατρούοντα. The article is omitted because the participles refer to the subject of προσεῖχον, which is in reality first person singular, not third plural. 'If the crew had spoken ill of me when I commanded a vessel, or my patients when I was doctoring them, should I have given my mind to any thing but'—what? 'how I was myself to do what their preservation required.' Read ἐνεργούην. Marcus means that he does not any more than the doctor or the navigating officer allow himself to be distracted by complaints and discontent.

7. 3 κυνιδίους δστάριον ἐρριμμένον.

Perhaps a verse. Why else should κ. come first?

30 συμπαρακτείνειν τὴν νόησιν τοῖς λεγομένοις. εἰσδύεσθαι τὸν νοῦν εἰς τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ ποιούντα.

Read probably τοῖς γενομένοις or γιγνομένοις. γεόμενος and λεγόμενος are well known to be sometimes confused. τοῖς γιγνομένοις makes excellent sense and is confirmed by the next sentence, whereas most of τὰ λεγόμενα call for no mental strain and τοῖς λεγομένοις would be too complimentary to other people.

34 ἴδε τὰς διανοίας αὐτῶν οἶαι καὶ οἶα μὲν φεύγουσαι, οἶα δὲ διώκουσαι may be right, but I suspect we should read φεύγουσι and διώκουσι, as in 4. 38: 10. 13. The confusion may be found in other places.

55 τούτων οὖν ἐχόμενον τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν εὐθέα περαινέτω καὶ ἔχει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ.

After an imperative Greek idiom needs the future ξέει. In 11. 16 we should certainly read ἔσται for ἔστω with Gataker, χαῖρε αὐτοῖς καὶ ῥάδια ἔστω σοι.

58 θέλε σεαυτῷ καλὸς εἶναι ἐπὶ παντὸς οὐ πρᾶσσεις.

Coray conjectured καλῶς εἶναι. I would rather suggest ἱκανὸς εἶναι, the confusion of καλός and ἱκανός being quite familiar.

64 λανθάνει goes with πόνῳ ταῦτα ὄντα, not with δυσχεραίνόμενα, as the last words of the § show.

8. 3 'Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ καὶ Γάιος καὶ Πομπήϊος τί πρὸς Διογένη καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ Σωκράτην; οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἶδον τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὰς αἰτίας καὶ τὰς ὕλας, καὶ τὰ ἡγεμονικὰ ἦν αὐτῶν ταῦτά· ἐκεῖ δὲ ὅσων (or ὅση) πρόνοια καὶ δουλεία πόσων;

πρόνοια is a good quality and the word

could hardly be used in this disparaging sort of way. M. Casaubon παράνοια. Περύνοια (cf. 1. 7: 8. 36: Ar. *Frogs* 958) might be more suitable. One would think πόσων ought to be ὅσων, but cf. on 6. 27.

8. 'Ἀναγινώσκειν οὐκ ἔξεστιν· ἀλλ' ὕβριν ἀνείργειν ἔξεστιν· ἀλλ' ἡδονῶν καὶ πόνων καθυπερτερεῖν ἔξεστιν κ.τ.λ.

Dr. Rendall suggests πάντα γινώσκειν. But a comparison of Epictetus 4. 4 fully confirms ἀναγινώσκειν. The whole of that fourth chapter is devoted to answering the complaints of a man who finds that he has not leisure for reading—κακῶς μοί ἐστιν· οὐκ εὐσυχολῶ ἀναγνῶναι. The Stoic points out that he is perhaps just as well occupied otherwise. Renan therefore also misconceives the meaning of the words before us, when he supposes (*Marc-Aurèle*, p. 464) the emperor to have written them *un jour qu' il dut déposer par fatigue le livre qu' il tenait à la main*.

Cf. the references to books in 2. 3 τὴν δὲ τῶν βιβλίων δάψαν ῥίψον and, though obscure, in 2. 2: 4. 30 (in which passage I have sometimes thought the two last clauses should be written as questions).

16 μέμνησο ὅτι καὶ τὸ μετατίθεσθαι καὶ ἔπεσθαι τῷ διορθοῦντι ὁμοίως ἐλεύθερόν ἐστι.

I should prefer ἐλευθέρον. Cf. on 11. 9.

22 δικαίως ταῦτα πάσχεις· μάλλον δὲ θέλεις ἀγαθὸς αὔριον γενέσθαι ἢ σήμερον εἶναι.

Write γάρ for δέ.

30 λαλεῖν καὶ ἐν συγκλήτῳ καὶ πρὸς πάνθ' ὄντιν' οὐκ ἐπιτραπῶς· ὑγιεῖ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι.

περιτραπῶς has been doubted, and I was myself disposed to alter it, until I read in Longinus (*Rhetores Graeci* Teubner I. ii. p. 216) χρὴ τὸν παραμυθούμενον μὴ μετὰ σοφιστικῆς τρανότητος ἀλλὰ μετὰ συμπεπονθυίας λέγειν ἀπλότητος.

32. συντιθέναι δεῖ τὸν βίον κατὰ μίαν πρᾶξιν· καὶ εἰ ἐκάστη τὸ ἑαυτῆς παρέχει ὥς οἷόν τε ἀρκεῖσθαι· ἵνα δὲ τὸ ἑαυτῆς παρέχη, οὐδὲ εἰς σε κωλύσαι δύναται.

(1) I am inclined to suggest κατὰ μίαν <ἐκάστην> πρᾶξιν. κατὰ μίαν πρᾶξιν cannot mean that, and, if it meant *like* (so as to form) a single action, the ἐκάστη following would be intolerable. (2) Should μὴ be inserted in the last words after ἵνα δέ or τὸ ἑαυτῆς, or is it the abuse of ἵνα?

35 ὥσπερ τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἕκαστον (ἕκαστος, ἐκάστη) τῶν λογικῶν σχεδὸν ὅσον ἡ

τῶν λογικῶν φύσις, οὕτως καὶ ταύτην παρ' αὐτῆς εἰλήφαμεν.

I suggest something like ἐκάστῳ...σχεδὸν δίδωσιν ἡ τῶν ὄλων φύσις, believing λογικῶν to be a mere inadvertent repetition of the λογικῶν preceding. For ἡ τῶν ὄλων φύσις cf. 6 ἡ τῶν ὄλων φύσις τοῦτο ἔργον ἔχει; 12. 23 τὸν ὅρον δίδωσιν ἡ φύσις... ἡ τῶν ὄλων, etc.

45 Should συνδυομένη, which means nothing, be ἀναδυομένη, matching ὁρεγομένη?

48 οὐδὲν ὀχυρώτερον ἔχει ἄνθρωπος ἐφ' ὃ καταφυγῶν ἀνάλωτος λοιπὸν ἂν εἴη· ὁ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἑωρακὼς τοῦτο ἀμαθής, ὁ δὲ ἑωρακὼς καὶ μὴ καταφυγῶν ἀτυχήs. Should ἀμαθής and ἀτυχήs change places? The second at any rate seems odd where it stands.

52 τίς οὖν φαίνεται σοι ὁ τὸν τῶν κροτούντων ἔπαινον φεύγων ἥδιον, οἱ οὐθ' ὅπου εἰσὶν οὐθ' οὔτινές εἰσι γιγνώσκουσι;

There is no sense to be got out of this, nor is Gataker's bold conjecture (τὸν τῶν κροτούντων ἡ ψόγον φεύγων [as though οἱ κροτούντες could blame] ἡ ἔπαινον διώκων οἱ), or Dübner's modification of that (τὸν τ. κ. ἔπαινον διώκων οἱ), satisfactory. Perhaps οὐ should be read for ὁ (as in 10. 25) and ἂν added so as to give the meaning *who would not prefer to avoid*?

Cf. the change proposed in 12. 8 below.

I have also thought of τί σοι φαίνεται τοῦ τὸν τ. κ. ἔπαινον φεύγειν ἥδιον.

55 ὅποταν πρῶτον οὗτος θελήσῃ. αὐτός?

58 ὁ τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενος ἤτοι ἀναισθησίαν φοβεῖται ἢ αἰσθησιν ἑτεροίαν. ἀλλ' εἴτ' οὐκέτι αἰσθῆσιν, οὐδὲ κακοῦ τινος αἰσθήσῃ· εἴτ' ἄλλοιό-τεραν αἰσθησιν κτήσῃ, κ.τ.λ.

Read οὐκέτι αἰσθήσῃ or αἰσθησιν <ἔξεις>. We can hardly understand ἔξεις out of the coming κτήσῃ.

9. 9 ὥστε χρήζειν τῶν διεργόντων καὶ βίας.

Rather διεργόντων by Greek idiom, and possibly βία.

21 ἐνεργείας ἀπόληξις, ὁρμῆς <καὶ> ὑπολήψεως πᾶντα καὶ οἷον θάνατος, οὐδὲν κακόν. καί is due to Gataker. Perhaps a substantive has been lost, parallel to ἀπόληξις and πᾶντα.

41 Epicurus used to ask himself πῶς ἡ διάνοια συµμεταλαμβάνουσα τῶν ἐν τῷ σαρκιδίῳ τοιούτων κινήσεων ἀταρακτεῖ, τὸ ἴδιον ἀγαθὸν τηροῦσα.

Rather <οὐ> συµμεταλαμβάνουσα. The very point is that it did not share in the κινήσεις. οὐ would easily fall out before συ. τοιούτων may be right, but seems rather pointless. Qy. τοῦτῳ?

At the end of the § πράσσει wants a subject and should probably be πράσσεις.

10. 6 μέρος εἰμὶ τοῦ ὄλου, ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικουμένου.

Perhaps διοικούμενον or even -ος. Cf. 2 τί σου ἡ φύσις ἐπιζητεῖ, ὥς ὑπὸ φύσεως μόνον διοικουμένου.

7 εἰ δὲ φύσει κακόν τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τοῦτο αὐτοῖς (i.e. for the parts to perish), οὐκ ἂν τὸ ὅλον καλῶς διεξάγοιτο, τῶν μερῶν εἰς ἀλλοτρίωσιν ἰόντων καὶ πρὸς τὸ φθεῖρεσθαι διαφόρως κατεσκευασμένων.

I am puzzled by the combination of κακόν and ἀναγκαῖόν, nor can I, if the text is right, make any coherent sense of the whole §, especially of the πότερον γὰρ ἐπεχείρησεν ἡ φύσις αὐτῇ τὰ ἐαυτῆς μέρη κακοῦν, which immediately follows the words quoted. But other readers do not seem to have felt any difficulty. At present my impression is that κακόν and καλῶς should be changed to καλόν and κακῶς respectively. What is good and necessary for the parts cannot be bad for the whole, for nature never set about injuring her own parts.

8 (near end) Is there any such word as οὔτεπερ *that*, a form of ὅτι?

9 μῖμος, πόλεμος, πτοία, νάρκη, δουλεία καθ' ἡμέραν ἀπαλείφεται σου τὰ ἱερὰ ἐκεῖνα δόγματα, ὅποσα ὁ φυσιολογῆτος (ὅποσα ἀφυσιολογῆτως Gataker, ὅποσα οὐ φυσιολογῆτως, Rendall) φαντάζῃ καὶ παραπέμπεις.

μῖμος and πόλεμος, πτοία and νάρκη appear to be contrasted respectively, but δουλεία stands alone without a contrast. Is it possible that its proper antithesis ἀρχή has fallen out after the very similar letters of νάρκη?

10 ἀράχνιον μυῖαν θηρᾶσαν μέγα φρονεῖ, ἄλλος δὲ λαγίδιον, ἄλλος δὲ ὑποχῇ ἀφύην, ἄλλος δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Should the first ἄλλος be ἄνος, i.e. ἄνθρωπος? Cf. on 4. 16 above.

19 οἱοί εἰσιν ἐσθιόντες, καθεύδοντες, ὀχεύοντες, ἀποπατοῦντες, τᾶλλα· εἴτα οἱοὶ ἀνδρονόμοι καὶ γαυρούμενοι ἢ χαλεπαίνοντες καὶ ἐξ ὑπεροχῆς ἐπιπλήττοντες. πρὸ ὀλίγου δὲ ἐδούλεον πόσοις καὶ δι' οἷα, καὶ μετ' ὀλίγον ἐν τοιούτοις ἔσσονται.

For *ἀνδρονομούμενοι*, which is meaningless, there are conjectures such as *ἀβρυνόμενοι*, Reiske; *ἀνδριζόμενοι*, Coray; *ἀνδρογυνούμενοι*, Rendall. Of these the first is the best, both as being nearest and because some word seems wanted that may be coupled with *γυνουόμενοι* as the other two expressions are coupled together in sense. I would suggest as alternatives, and coming perhaps even nearer, either *φαιδρυνόμενοι* or *λαμπρυνόμενοι*. It is hard to see the meaning of *ἐν τοιούτοις*. Perhaps *ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς*, i.e. *ἐν δουλείᾳ*. For *ἐν πόσοις καὶ δι' οἷα* (cf. 9. 34) see above on 8. 3.

23 *ἐναργὲς ἔστω αἰὲν τὸ ὅτι τοιοῦτο ἐκεῖνο ὁ ἀγρός ἐστι, καὶ πῶς πάντα ἐστὶ ταῦτα ἐνθάδε τοῖς ἐν ἄκρῳ τῷ ὄρει ἢ ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ ἢ ὅπου θέλεις.*

Dr. Rendall's translation 'take for your axiom the old truth—the field is where you make it' is difficult to connect with the Greek, and his idea that the field 'signifies the place of seclusion and retirement, as in iv. § 3' seems fanciful. Long's 'that this piece of land is like any other' gives a better sense, though hardly the right one and not quite to be got out of the Greek either. I do not feel at all sure what Marcus is saying, but I should like to suggest *τοιοῦτο* (or *ταῦτό*) *ἐκεῖνῳ* ὁ ἀγρός ἐστι, his field is to another man much as your court, your empire, is to you; things here and on the mountain-top and on the seashore are all at bottom the same. *ἐκεῖνος* would also give a similar sense. Cf. 27, including the words quoted from it below; also 15. *πῶς* should perhaps be *πῶς*.

25 ὁ τὸν κύριον φεύγων δραπετής· κύριος δὲ ὁ νόμος· καὶ ὁ παρανομῶν δραπετής.

The last words want a connecting particle, *οὖν* (lost after *ων*) or *ἄρα* (lost before *δρα*).

27 πάντα γὰρ ἐκεῖνα τοιαῦτα ἦν, μόνον δι' ἐτέρων.

Probably *ταῦτα ἦν*, for *μόνον δι' ἐτέρων* wants something stronger than *τοιαῦτα*, with which it does not contrast sufficiently.

31 οἷαν should surely be *ποίαν*.

33 οὐ πρότερον παύσῃ στένων πρὶν ἢ τοῦτο πάθῃ, ὅτι, οἷόν ἐστι τοῖς ἡδυπαθοῦσιν ἢ τρυφῇ, τοιοῦτό σοι κ.τ.λ.

Read *μάθῃς* for *πάθῃς*.

34 τῷ δεδηγμένῳ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν δογμάτων ἀρκεῖ καὶ τὸ βραχύτατον καὶ ἐν μέσῳ κείμενον εἰς ὑπόμνησιν ἀλμπίας καὶ ἀφοβίας· οἷον Φύλλα

τὰ μὲν τ' ἄνεμος χαμάδις χέει . . . Ὡς ἀνδρῶν γενεή.

'When once true principles have bitten in,' 'to him who is penetrated by true principles' say the translators. Gataker who cannot stomach (*concoquere*) either *δεδεγμένῳ* or *δεδειγμένῳ*, which he found in some editions, suggests *δεδευμένῳ* (not *δεδιδαγμένῳ* which Stich ascribes to him), quoting Plato's *δόξα δευσοποιός*: such a use is however improbable. According to Stich's critical note one MS has *τῷ δεδογμένῳ* and one has *τῶν δεδηγμένων*. The genitive in the latter may very well be a mere accident, but it falls in with what I think the true reading. Δ and Λ being so often confused, it is probable that we should read *τῶν λελεγμένων ἀπὸ τῶν ἀ. δ.*, the genitive depending on and giving an improved meaning to *τὸ βραχύτατον καὶ . . . κείμενον*.

36 *μὴ ἔσται* cannot mean 'will there not be?' as the translators take it. It looks like a non-Attic construction, equivalent to the Homeric and occasional Attic use of *μή* and *μὴ οὐ* with subjunctive in independent sentences (Goodwin *M.T.* 261–264): 'I fear there will be.' But *μή* is wanting altogether in Stich's codex A.

ibid. τὸ ἴδιον ἔθος διασφύζων, φίλος καὶ εὖνους καὶ ἱλεως.

Read *ἡθος*.

11. 9 καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀσθενές, τὸ χαλεπαίνειν αὐτοῖς κ.τ.λ.

Perhaps *ἀσθενούς*, as in 18 ὥσπερ ἡ λύπη ἀσθενούς, οὕτως καὶ ἡ ὀργή. Cf. on 8. 16 above.

11 εἰ μὲν should apparently be omitted. Does it arise from ὤμεν concluding the § before?

16 Perhaps *κάλλιστα δὴ*, or *καλλίστη δὴ*, *ζῆν δύναμις αὐτή*.

18 (under *ἐννατον*) *ἐὰν διατελῇς εὐμενῆς αὐτῷ καὶ . . . πρῶς παραινῆς καὶ μεταδιδάσκῃς εὐσυχλῶν*.

For *εὐσυχλῶν*, which is quite inappropriate, read *εὐκόλως*.

ibid. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐ μὴ βλαβῶ· σὺ δὲ βλάβῃ, τέκνον.

The sense and the *οὐ μὴ* point clearly to *βλάβῃ* for *βλάβῃ*. Cf. on 9. 9 etc.

ibid. δεῖ δὲ μήτε εἰρωνικῶς αὐτὸ ποιεῖν μήτε ὀνειδιστικῶς ἀλλὰ φιλοστοργῶς καὶ ἀδῆκτως τῇ ψυχῇ.

τῇ ψυχῇ, could hardly be added in this way. Read φιλοστόργῳ καὶ ἀδίκτῳ τῇ ψυχῇ.

12. 1 μὴ τὸ παύσεσθαί ποτε τοῦ ζῆν φοβηθῆς. ἀλλὰ τό γε μηδέποτε ἄρξασθαι κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν.

παύσεσθαι should of course be aorist, like ἄρξασθαι.

2. ὁ θεὸς πάντα τὰ ἡγεμονικὰ γυμνὰ τῶν ἱλικῶν ἀγγείων καὶ φλοιῶν καὶ καθαρμάτων ὄρᾳ.

καθάρματα are strange things indeed to be 'bare' of. Is it not clear that we should read καθαμμάτων?

5. οὐκ ἂν δ' οὕτω διελεγόμεθα τοῖς θεοῖς, εἰ μὴ ἄριστοι καὶ δικαίωτατοί εἰσιν.

Is εἰσὶν a mistake for ἦσαν? It may be right, but I do not recall a parallel in Greek, or in Latin either, for such constructions as *carmina nūc sint, ex umero Pelopis non nituisset ebur* take the subjunctive.

8. θεάσασθαι . . τί θάνατος, τί δόξα, τίς ὁ ἑαυτῷ ἀσχολίας αἴτιος, πῶς οὐδεὶς ὑπ' ἄλλου ἐμποδίζεται.

The third point here suggested, 'who is the man that involves himself in disquiet and trouble,' seems hardly natural or in keeping with the others. I would suggest that for ὁ we should read οὐ or rather οὐχ, meaning that a man is always responsible for his own ἀσχολία. It goes along with the next words πῶς . . ἐμποδίζεται. ἑαυτῷ and ὑπ' ἄλλου, τίς οὐ, and οὐδεὶς match one another. For the correction of ὁ to οὐ cf. on 8. 52 above.

12 The use of μήτε and not οὔτε shows

something to be wrong or missing. Should the first μεμπτέον be μέμφεσθαι?

16 ἐπὶ τοῦ φαντασίαν παρασχόντος ὅτι ἤμαρτε· τί δαὶ οἶδα εἰ τοῦτο ἀμάρτημα· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἤμαρτεν, ὅτι κατέκρινεν αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν, καὶ οὕτως ὁμοιον τοῦτο τῷ καταδρύπτειν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ὄψιν.

Rendall and Long follow Coray, rightly I think, in adding an οὐ before κατέκρινεν: 'how do I know that he did not condemn himself?' But what is the point of the comparison that follows? 'How do I know that he did not condemn himself?' is a suggestion in the man's favour, whereas the comparison to scratching your own face would tell against him. I do not feel very sure of the drift, but am inclined to suggest οὐ κατέκρινον. 'Even if he did do wrong, in condemning him for it was I not condemning myself (since I do the same or similar things) and scratching my own face?' ἑαυτόν may of course = ἑμαυτόν.

27 ὑπὸ ἀνυφία. ἐπὶ for ὑπό?

31 τί ἐπιζητεῖς; τὸ διαγίνεσθαι; ἀλλὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι; τὸ ὀρμᾶν; τὸ αὖξεσθαι, κ.τ.λ. τί τούτων πόθου σοι ἄξιον δοκεῖ;

Rendall removes the note of interrogation after ἐπιζητεῖς and so gets a better general sense, 'why hanker for continuous (continued?) existence?' though then τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, etc. seem to have no proper construction and ἀλλά no meaning. For ἀλλά we should, I think, read ἄρα, which is sometimes confused with it: for the rest one would expect something like <ἐν> τῷ διαγίνεσθαι, or τῷ δ. without ἐν: τί ἐπιζητεῖς τῷ διαγίνεσθαι; ἄρα τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὸ ὀρμᾶν, τὸ αὖξεσθαι;

HERBERT RICHARDS.

PROHIBITIONS IN GREEK.

THE fascinating theory advanced by Mr. Headlam in the *C.R.* of July 1903, vol. xvii. p. 295, and approved by Dr. Jackson in the *C.R.* for June 1904, vol. xviii. p. 262, must have attracted the attention of all scholars.

I chanced recently, for other purposes, to run through the Greek Tragedians, and I kept my eyes open for cases which might prove the truth or falsity of this distinction between μὴ ποιεῖ and μὴ ποιήσῃς. It was an interesting investigation: very often I was convinced that the distinction was just; often again I was equally con-

vinced that the verdict must be 'non liquet.' I have ended by feeling that, while the alleged distinction exists, it is only one of many others possible.

'The current notions about this important piece of grammar' are not, I admit, satisfactory. But the question has received more attention than perhaps any in Greek Syntax, cp. Blass *Rhein. Mus.* 44 (1889, p. 406, Gerth. Kühner § 389, 6 c, Donovan, *C.R.* (1895), p. 145 ff., and Miller, *A.J.P.* 13 (1892), p. 424. The last, as Forman points out (*Plato Selections*, Append. p. 424), after examination of imperatives